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 “Life is a series of interwoven stories, not a set of concepts. Ideas are generalizations,   
 always some distance from the truth. A story, with its array of meanings and richness   
 of detail, is recognizably much closer to real life. That is why we relate more easily to   
 stories than to abstract theories. We love a good yarn.” 
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Beginning in medias res: 
In the Cūl̥ataṇhāsaṅkhaya Sutta (MN 37), Sakka (= Skt. Indra), king of the gods, gets straight to 
the point – for kings, and even more so kings of the gods, have much to do and are chronically 
short of time – by asking the Buddha: “Venerable sir, how in brief is a [monk] liberated in the 
destruction of craving, one who has reached the ultimate end, the ultimate security from bond-
age, the ultimate holy life, the ultimate goal, one who is foremost among gods and humans?”1 
While the Buddha is explaining, one of the Buddha’s most prominent disciples, Mahā Mog-
gallāna accidentally eavesdrops on their conversation. Since the Buddha and his disciples are al-
ways intent on helping others on the spiritual path and gods are generally known for their poor 
receptiveness, Mahā Moggallāna decides to test Sakka on his understanding of the Buddha’s les-
son: 
“5. Now on that occasion the venerable Mahā Moggallāna was sitting not far from the Blessed One. 
Then he considered: ‘Did that spirit penetrate to the meaning of the Blessed One’s words when he re-
joiced, or did he not? [Ascription of psychological state.] Suppose I found out whether he did or not.’ 
6. Then, just as quickly as a strong man extended his flexed arm or flexed his extended arm, the vener-
able Mahā Moggallāna vanished from the Palace of Migāra’s Mother in the Eastern Park and appeared 
among the gods of the Thirty-three. Now on that occasion Sakka, ruler of the gods, was furnished and 
endowed a hundredfold with the five kinds of heavenly music, and he was enjoying it in the Pleasure 
Park of the Single Lotus. [Character sketch – gods like to distract themselves by enjoying sense 
pleasures.] When he saw the venerable Mahā Moggallāna coming in the distance, he dismissed the 
music, went to the venerable Mahā Moggallāna, and said to him: ‘Come, good sir Moggallāna! Wel-
come, good sir Moggallāna! It is long sir Moggallāna, since you found an opportunity to come here. 
Sit down, good sir Moggallāna; this seat is ready.’ The venerable Mahā Moggallāna sat down on the 
seat made ready, and Sakka took a low seat and sat down at one side [Character sketch – Buddhist 
monks (in this particular case just a certain one) are superior to the highest gods and even ven-
erated by them.] The venerable Mahā Moggallāna then asked him: 
8. ‘Kosiya, how did the Blessed One state to you in brief deliverance in the destruction of craving? It 
would be good if we might also get to hear that statement.’ ‘Good sir Moggallāna, we are so busy, we 
have so much to do, not only with our own business, but also with the business of the gods of the 
                                                 
1
 MN I 251: Kittāvatā nu kho, bhante, bhikkhu saṃkhittena taṇhāsaṅkhayavimutto hoti accantaniṭṭho accan-
tayogakkhemī accantabrahmacārī accantapariyosāno seṭṭho devamanussānanti? Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001, 344.  
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Thirty-three. [Confirmation of the earlier narratorial character sketch – gods are busy and there-
fore distracted.] Besides, good Moggallāna, what was well heard, well learned, well attended to, well 
remembered, suddenly vanished from us. Good sir Moggallāna, it once happened that war broke out 
between the gods and the titans. In that war the gods won and the titans were defeated. When I had 
won that war and returned from it as a conqueror, I had the Vejayanta Palace Built. Good sir Mog-
gallāna, the Vejayanta Palace has a hundred towers, and each tower has seven hundred upper cham-
bers, and each tower has seven nymphs and each nymph has seven maids. Would you like to see the 
loveliness of the Vejayanta Palace, good sir Moggallāna?’ [Gods are not only distracted, they also 
tend to forget easily, and then try also to distract others.] The venerable Mahā Moggallāna con-
sented in silence. 
9. Then Sakka, ruler of gods, and the divine King Vessavana went to the Vejayanta Palace, giving 
precedence to the venerable Mahā Moggallāna. When the maids of Sakka saw the venerable Mahā 
Moggallāna coming in the distance, they were embarrassed and ashamed and they went each into their 
own rooms. Just as a daughter-in-law is embarrassed and ashamed on seeing her father-in-law, so too, 
when the maids of Sakka saw the venerable Mahā Moggallāna coming, they were embarrassed and 
ashamed, and they went each into their own rooms [Ascription of psychological state.] 
10. Then Sakka, ruler of gods, and the divine King Vessavana had the venerable Mahā Moggallāna 
walk all over and explore the Vejayanta Palace: ‘See, good sir Moggallāna, this loveliness of the 
Vejayanta Palace! See, good sir Moggallāna, this loveliness Vejayanta Palace!’ ‘It does the venerable 
Kosiya credit as one who has formerly made merit; and whenever human beings see anything lovely, 
they say: “Sirs, it does credit to the gods of the Thirty-three!’ It does the venerable Kosiya credit as 
one who has formerly made merit.”’ 
11. Then the venerable Mahā Moggallāna considered thus: ‘This spirit is living much too negligently. 
What if I stirred up a sense of urgency in him?’ [Ascription of psychological state] Then the venera-
ble Mahā Moggallāna performed such a feat of supernormal power that with the point of his toe he 
made the Vejayanta Palace shake and quake and tremble.2 [Mahā Moggallāna possesses (odd) su-
pernormal powers – he can shake palaces with merely one toe!] Sakka and the Divine King Vessa-
vana and the gods of the Thirty-three were filled with wonder and amazement, and they said: ‘Sirs, it 
is wonderful, it is marvelous, what power and might the recluse has, that with the point of his toe he 
makes the heavenly region shake and quake and tremble!’ 
12. When the venerable Mahā Moggallāna knew that Sakka, ruler of gods, was stirred to a sense of 
urgency with his hair standing on end [Ascription of psychological state], he asked him: ‘Kosiya, 
                                                 
2
 Cp. also the Māratajjanīya Sutta (MN I 337f.) and the references to the SN 51.14 (= V 269f.) and MN 37 
(Cūl̥ataṇhāsankhaya Sutta), the last mentioned of which is our passage here, when Mahā Mogallāna shakes the 
Vejayanta palace with his big toe. In general, the Māratajjanīya Sutta (MN 50) is an interesting source in connection 
with the characterisation of Mahā Moggallāna. 
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how did the Blessed One state to you in brief deliverance in the destruction of craving? It would be 
good if we might also get to hear that statement.’ 
‘Good sir Moggallāna, I went to the Blessed One, and after paying homage to him, I stood at one side 
and said: “Venerable sir, how in brief is a bhikkhu liberated in the destruction of craving, one who has 
reached the ultimate end, the ultimate goal, one who is foremost among gods and humans?” […; here 
follows a repetition of the content of the Buddha’s earlier teaching.] That is how the Blessed One 
stated to me in brief deliverance in the destruction of craving, good sir Moggallāna.’ 
13. Then the venerable Mahā Moggallāna delighted and rejoiced in the words of Sakka, ruler of gods. 
Then just as quickly as a strong man might extend his flexed arm or flex his extended arm, he van-
ished from the gods of the thirty-three and appeared in the Eastern Park in the Palace of Migāra’s 
Mother. 
14. Then, soon after the venerable Mahā Moggallāna had gone, the attendants of Sakka, ruler of gods, 
asked him: ‘Good sir, was that your teacher, the Blessed One?’ – ‘No, good sirs, that was not my 
teacher, the Blessed One. That was one of my companions in the holy life, the venerable Maha Mog-
gallana.’ – ‘Good sir, it is a gain for you that your companion in the holy life is so powerful and 
mighty. Oh, how much more so must be the Blessed One, your teacher!’”3  
To begin with, this book is not about gods (although a lot can certainly be said about gods 
in the Pāli Canon.4) It is about humans. In the above example, I have marked and spelled out 
those characterization statements about a god (deva) named Sakka – who appears quite human-
like – that were made by others, directly or indirectly in order to describe him, or those that can 
be inferred from his own statements. Many, many more qualifications could be identified. My 
point here is to illustrate the possibilities that lie dormant, as it were, of analyzing the different 
characters that are presented in the texts that constitute the basis of the only surviving school of 
early Buddhism, the Theravāda or “Doctrine of the Elders”. How this can be undertaken in a 
more systematic way will be the subject of Part II.  
The texts that I am concerned with here are found in the so-called Pāli Canon.5 This 
Canon consists in the thematically arranged “three baskets” (tipiṭaka), which is in fact the indige-
nous appellation for the Pāli Canon. The first of these “baskets”, the Vinaya Piṭaka, contains the 
rules regulating all aspects of the monastic life. The third, or the Abhidhamma Piṭaka (literally 
                                                 
3
 Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2009: 345-347. 
4
 There is a very interesting study on descriptions and the role of gods in the Sutta Piṭaka by M. M. J. Marasinghe 
(2009). 
5
 The following is based on von Hinüber 1996: §§6-10 and chapter II.2. Cp. ibid. for more details. 
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the basket of the “things relating to the teachings”), largely contains lists (mātikā) and all kinds 
of systematisations of the material found in the second basket of the Dhamma (Sutta Piṭaka), 
which – from an Abhidhamma point of view – presents the Buddha’s teachings “by way of anal-
ogy” (pariyāyena).6 The Sutta Piṭaka, in turn, is subdivided into five divisions called Nikāyas 
(Dīgha-, Majjhima-, Saṃyutta-, Aṅguttara-, and Khuddaka Nikāya), to which different organis-
ing principles apply, such as the length of the individual texts, called suttas (dīgha means “long”, 
and majjhima “middle”; the Khuddaka Nikāya contains a wide range of very diverse texts), or 
numerical principles. Here, I am concerned with the Majjhima Nikāya, which itself contains no 
less than 153 “middle length” suttas. 
In Part III, I present analyses of three of those suttas, the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta (MN 81), the 
Aṅgulimāla Sutta (MN 86), and the Piyajātika Sutta (MN 87). It is important to know that the 
suttas constitute anonymous literature, i.e. they do not have a single author but have been collec-
tively gathered, recited, redacted, and preserved by the community of monks (bhikkhu-saṅgha) 
over a long period of time, before they were finally written down sometime during the first cen-
tury B.C. in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, the tradition of oral transmission continued, and continues 
to exist up to the present day, alongside the developing literate culture. The so-called Dharma-
reciters (dhammabhāṇakas) were groups or individuals who secured oral transmission of the 
texts word for word and were responsible for the transmission of a certain collection which they 
learned by heart. However, when I refer to the suttas as texts, I am always referring to the written 
word, although, in principle, that would not make much of a difference for the modes of analysis 
that I apply.  
Furthermore, extensive commentaries on the Pāli Canon were composed, whose author, 
Buddhaghosa, presumably lived in the 5th century in South India.7 Although occasionally I do re-
fer to the commentaries, my main focus is the suttas themselves. 
The Pāli language was not the language the Buddha spoke (which exactly, however, we 
do not know for certain). Pāli was most probably a kind of lingua franca among early Buddhists, 
                                                 
6
 Cp. PED, s.v. pariyāya: “5. in Abhidhamma terminology, specifically: pariyāyena, the mode of teaching in the Sut-
tanta, ad hominem, discursively, applied method, illustrated discourse, figurative language as opposed to the ab-
stract, general statements of Abhidhamma = nippariyāyena, nippariyāyato Vism 473, 499; cp. DhsA 317 (figura-
tively).”  
7
 Cp. von Hinüber 1996: §207. 
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specifically used to preserve the Buddha’s teachings. Thus while most of the texts are presuma-
bly very old, their linguistic form is not, and they look back on a long period of revision that 
started with the first Buddhist Council shortly after the Buddha’s death.    
The suttas of the Sutta Piṭaka collectively project a world with its landscape (mountains 
and rivers), its country areas/provinces (janapadā), kingdoms (vijita)8 and states (raṭṭhā), cities 
(nagarā), market-towns (nigamā), and villages (gāmā), all enlivened by its people, while each 
sutta, with its special incidents and events, serves as a window to that world. This world be-
comes only fully ‘alive’, however, after having read a whole collection (and only after some time 
during which one gradually becomes familiar with it), and it then seems to live a life of its own. 
In other words, the world of the Pāli suttas appears to exist independently of the texts, indicated 
by the fact that books have been written that reconstruct the life of the Buddha about the social 
structure of ancient Northeast India and about Buddha’s disciples, whose life stories can only be 
reconstructed as collections of life-events by drawing from different collections within the 
Canon. Even maps have been drawn on the basis of the canonical texts depicting possible itiner-
aries of the Buddha in historical Northeast India.9 The view that the world of the suttas during 
the reception pocess starts to live a life of its own, to a certain degree departing from and becom-
ing independent from the text of particular suttas (because we can speak of the “inventory” of the 
world of the suttas without always having recourse to the particular text or passage), would be 
the perspective of the student of narrative theory. The view, on the other hand, that this world 
was already in existence before it was preserved (with what intention, though, must perhaps re-
main largely obscure) through the production of (oral or written) natural narratives about it, is the 
view of the historian. Most scholars of Pāli or early Buddhism in general regard themselves as 
historians and they either delve into the content of the texts in order to reconstruct the social, reli-
gious, and/or historical realities at the time of the Buddha, or they retrace the history of the texts 
themselves. For example, scholars employ the historical-critical method when they have reasona-
ble suspicion as to whether received texts with a long history of transmission are ‘trustworthy’, 
unaltered sources for the knowledge of past times (which is, in fact, the case with most if not all 
                                                 
8
 Note, however, that in ancient India kings ruled over people, not territory, so that the kingdom strictly speaking 
cannot be regarded as an “entity” of its own, independent of its social structure/content.  
9




of the texts Classical Indologists deal with). Nevertheless, in more recent buddhological scholar-
ship, more and more criticism is being voiced that questions the assumption that what Jonathan 
S. Walters has called “historical source mode” reading of the suttas is the only possible reading 
mode to make sense of early Buddhist texts. Even if we succeed in delimiting and contextualis-
ing a text or certain passages historically, still essential questions remain. Walters writes:  
“Yet fixing the text at an early period does not in itself yield any significant historical information. If 
in fact in this instance we can circumvent the doubts raised about the antiquity of the suttas en bloc, 
we are still left with the question of how the autobiographical fragment ought to be interpreted. Within 
‘historical source mode,’ the next move would be to ask whether the narrative as such can be taken as 
‘accurate,’ a designation requiring that the reported information be the result of eye-witness observa-
tion and ‘objective’ recording. Here the problems inherent in ‘historical source mode’ are not so easily 
overcome.”10 
Walters, after declaring the death of the 18th century’s “historical source mode” of read-
ing of Pāli suttas as ‘quarries’ of history-bits and pieces cobbled together over time by more or 
less capable redactors, argues for other ways instead to read Pali suttas that could still be profita-
ble for the historian of religion. 11 He then describes three modes of reading as alternatives to 
“historical source mode” reading. “Text of its day mode”, as expounded mainly by Greg Bailey, 
Walters argues, acts on the assumption that although the early Buddhist suttas are not to be read 
as historical documents, they yet betray, by way of reflexion, aspects of the social reality at the 
times of the historical Buddha. In this case, the way the texts describe or speak about different 
social groups, such as Brahmins, Ājīvikas, Jains etc., attests for the initial rivalry between the 
Buddha and adherents/exponents of Brahminism and/or other ascetic traditions of the time.12 The 
“text as a whole mode”13, as whose main exponent Walters identifies Steven Collins, regards the 
suttas a priori as wholes, i.e. coherent texts. This reading shifts the focus of enquiry to the liter-
ary quality and the narrative aspects of the suttas because it presumes – quite plausibly – that, put 
simply, the form of the suttas as we now have them is the result of a purposeful act14 on the side 
                                                 
10
 Walters 1999: 256. 
11
 Cp. Walters 1999.  
12
 Cp. ibid.: 259-266. 
13
 Cp. ibid.: 266-272. 
14
 However, Collins assesses the influence of the Theravāda tradition in Ceylon on the Pāli Canon much higher than 
other, more ‘conservative’ scholars, e.g. Richard Gombrich; cp. Collins 1990. 
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of the early compilers/editors/narrrators/composers of the suttas (this is, however, a difficult 
point, because our concrete knowledge about how the suttas might have come into existence is 
not solved yet, and perhaps never will be, because it is shrouded in the mist of ancient history 
and tradition). Walters argues that Collins’s opinions are equally relevant for later readers be-
cause the (assumed) deliberate and conscious employment of literary devices, frames, internal 
structuring, and ornamentation, which, as given phenomena in a certain text can objectively be 
analysed, and that they convey a certain message that is independent, or which, at least, can be 
retrieved independently, of the (socio-) historical context of the time of the composition/edition 
of the text.15 Finally, there is “Later reading mode”16, exemplified by Anne Blackburn’s “recon-
struction of eighteenth century monastic education through an examination of the holdings in pe-
riod temple libraries”17: While clearly favouring the “text of its day” and the “text as a whole” 
modes over the “historical source mode”, Walters still makes out an important drawback even in 
these more refined modes that shifted their focus of attention carefully “from reading to reader-
ship”, and that is the problem of the historical reader. At the end of the day, the historian Walters 
points out concernedly, that it is still the scholar who ‘pulls all the strings’ of the texts; his or her 
act of interpreting is still the foundation for all conclusions about readership and social and/or 
historical context – for how could we know how the suttas were read or received?18 Walters 
therefore favours a fourth mode of reading, which still pursues the question about historical read-
ership, but on the grounds of existing evidence. He then proposes three such kinds of evidence: 
manuscripts, supplementation, and commentaries. From among these, manuscripts themselves, 
and manuscript catalogues, can give important clues as to the popularity, use, and distribution of 
certain texts. 
The problem with the suttas is, it seems, that in the long history of pre-modern South- and 
Southeast Asian Theravāda rather “the idea of the Pāli Canon” (= Collins 1990) existed – alt-
hough enormous effort went into preserving the (written) texts, most of the suttas were probably 
                                                 
15
 Walters then presents an analysis of the structure of the famous Ariyapariyesana Sutta (MN 26), containing an 
important autobiographical fragment of the Buddha's life that reveals an intricate symmetrical inner structure of the 
sutta, in which the inner autobiographical account of the sutta thematically (and artistically) mirrors the outer narra-
tive communication situation, and also leaps over into the external, real communication situation. 
16
 Cp. Walters 1999: 272-282.  
17
 Ibid.: 273. 
18
 Cp. ibid.: 272. 
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not intensively studied or even read much as parts of the monks’ curricula. For that purpose, 
compilations like the ‘Book of Protection’ (singh. Pirit Potha/Catubhaṇvara) were used in pre-
modern times. With supplementation Walters describes a way of compiling bits and pieces from 
different sources, e.g. in order to produce a biography, which is based on the “historical source 
mode”. The Buddha’s biography, with which many are familiar nowadays, is a strange breed in-
deed. Jonathan Walters has neatly described and summarised the process if its materialization for 
us:  
  “In terms of supplementation, […] many later Buddha biographies – even all later Buddha biog-
raphies, including scholarly reconstructions – implicitly and often explicitly draw on NQ [= “Noble 
Quest”, i.e. the Ariyapariyesana Sutta, MN 26] as their source. In this sense, ‘historical source mode’ 
– namely, extracting chosen bits of the biographical fragment and supplementing them with other sorts 
of evidence, pertinent or not – is merely the most recent contribution to a long-standing literary tradi-
tion.”19 
A full-blown consistent Buddha-biography is alien to the oldest layers of the Pāli Canon. 
The genre biography was not known in ancient India, least of all perhaps at the times of the his-
torical Buddha (ca. 5th century B.C.). Nonetheless, biographies of Buddhism’s founder have re-
peatedly been compiled from the bits and pieces scattered throughout the canonical texts from 
early on (by the commentator(s) on the Theravāda Canon) up to the present day.20 This “tradition 
of supplementation”, as Walters calls it, was in a similar way masterly employed in a book by 
Hellmuth Hecker and the Ven. Nyanaponika Thera about the twenty-four most important disci-
ples of the Buddha.21 With no intention to downplay the merits or the extraordinary scholarship 
of this book, the biographies published by Hellmuth Hecker and the Ven. Nyanaponika are 
something of a fantasy, created to suit the needs and expectations of a certain audience (and not 
necessarily a modern audience, as we can probably deduct from the stock description of the main 
qualities of the different disciples in the Etadagga-vagga (AN 1.14 (Ekanipāta)). 
The commentarial tradition then, Walters states, “is intended to transmit just how one is 
supposed to read the original”.22 The commentaries on each sutta by Buddhaghosa, which are of 
                                                 
19
 Walters 1999: 274. 
20
 Cp. von Hinüber 1996: §66, for the elements scattered in the MN which presumably provided the building blocks 
for all later Buddha ‘biographies’ found in the Canon (as to that, cp. also ibid. §§95, 111, 235, 284, and 391sq.).  
21
 Cp. Nyanaponika & Hecker 2000. 
22
 Walters 1999: 278; cp. also pp. 272-282. 
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course taken as authoritative by the later Theravāda tradition, provide us with evidence as to how 
the respective sutta should ordinarily be understood. But, Walters notes, reading Buddhaghosa’s 
commentaries it soon becomes clear how much his (Buddhaghosa’s) agenda differs from our 
own. For example, Buddhaghosa’s reading of the autobiographical fragment contained in the 
Ariyapariyesana Sutta, which he supplements with all the elements that make for a docetic Bud-
dha figure, rather reflects an “advanced Buddhology” that contrasts starkly with a modern read-
ing which is – more or less consciously – influenced by ‘secular humanism’, i.e. the wish or 
wont to find evidence for the human face of the Buddha, which, according to Walters and others, 
clearly shines through in the autobiographical fragment, the most ancient kernel of the Ariyapari-
yesana Sutta. Buddhaghosa’s ‘reading mode’, according to Walters, is rather a “text as a whole” 
mode. However, his reading can often strike one as “odd”, an impression which alone reflects the 
very different thought-world in which he was living. However, Walters adds for our considera-
tion that since Buddhaghosa was considerably closer to a presumed originary moment of the sut-
tas than we are, his readings should at least –  even if they seldom convince us of his interpreta-
tion – “serve to check our assumption that we can just pick up a sutta and ‘get it’”.23 All of this 
illustrates how delicate the questions of understanding are with regard to the literary heritage of a 
temporally and culturally distant past, a problem which can be expected also to affect the presen-
tation of characters in those same texts.  
One of the observations that initiated the idea for the present study was that the stories 
and descriptions in the Pāli suttas leave the engaged listener/reader24 with an aftervision of sorts 
of the characters and the situations depicted.  Mostly, we can very well remember the plot and, as 
popular works like the above mentioned Ven. Nyanaponika’s and Helmuth Hecker’s Great Dis-
ciples of the Buddha (2000) show, main or characteristic attributes of the character’s acting in 
them (like Mahā Moggallāna’s in the above example). This is true for the reading of literature 
like novels and it is one of literature’s primary appeals. It is all the more surprising, then, that 
                                                 
23
 Cp. ibid.: 282. 
24
 By juxtaposing the alternatives listener/reader in the following, I am trying to account for the origin of the suttas 
in a culture of oral transmission. According to tradition, the suttas were written down sometime in the first century 
B.C. in the kingdom of Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, the oral transmission continued parallel to book culture and reading 
up to the present day. I dislike the translation “hearer” for P. sāvakā that is often used in connection with the suttas 
(probably to render the original Pāli word sāvakā used for the original disciples of the Buddha) – I am a ‘hearer’ of 
lift music (because I cannot escape from it!). 
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this seems also to be true for a literature whose formulaic nature has often been stressed and ana-
lysed25, and that in earlier times was even disesteemed as “literature” for its “immature style” 
(Hermann Oldenberg). I propose that there is much more to and about these texts than the fact 
that they consist of formulas and formulaic building blocks. There was apparently always room 
for variations and, say, creative uses of formulas, as Greg Bailey and Ian Mabbett have also ob-
served:  
“The meal narrative just summarized is highly structured and quite repetitive in narrative sequence 
and language, a feature it shares with the other examples of the genre. But whilst it is important to 
be aware of the structural aspects of the narrative, our task must be to penetrate beneath these 
virtually formalized features to discover the high emotion and excitement that must have accom-
panied the actual event of the meal.”26 
Besides that, the famous word applies here that the finger pointing to the moon is not the 
moon. Texts are multi-layered, more or less complex signifiers, not identical with the signified. It 
takes some imagination to make sense of them. This creative or active imagination, however, is 
not necessarily over-active imagination – it is inherent in human beings. (Post-) modern narratol-
ogy makes allowance for different varieties of this phenomenon and aims to describe and analyse 
as accurately as possible not only the structure and functions of texts, but also the role of the 
readers/recipients and their “system of presuppositions” (Ger. Voraussetzungssystem) that she 
brings into the reception process.     
Coming back to our example from the beginning, passages like these have most probably 
already early within the Buddhist tradition(s) led to such “petrified” characterization statements, 
independent from their original occurrence in a concrete text, and known by every student of 
Buddhism, as this: “Mahā Moggallāna, master of magical powers”.27 What is more, close reading 
with a view to finding out how characters are presented and characterised in a certain text or a 
passage, can already bring to the fore a range of characterisation statements, which can then be 
                                                 
25
 Cp. Mark Allon’s excellent study on the Style and Function of Pāli texts (1997), and the references therein, espe-
cially the general Introduction, pp. 4-7. 
26
 Bailey & Mabbett 2003: 241; my emphasis. 
27
 The Etadaggavagga of the AN (I 23-27) contains seven subchapters that enumerate and mention the Buddha’s 
foremost disciples and describe their special abilities/spiritual characteristics with a catchphrase, e.g.: “Bhikkhus, the 
foremost of my bhikkhu disciples among those with psychic potency [iddhimantānaṃ] is Mahā-Moggallāna.” Tr. 
Bhikkhu Bodhi 2012: 109.  
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analysed with regard to their content, ordered with regard to their significance, brought in rela-
tion with other statements or other characters, synthesised (or not) into a coherent (or incoherent) 
picture of a character, and many more operations.  
From another, equally interesting point of view, conversations of humans with gods in 
ordinary, everyday language naturally raises the question about ancient Indian/Buddhist 
worldviews and cosmology, as well as about the nature of the beings inhabiting the different 
planes of existence and their relationship with the human realm. While important discussions 
have been held, and publications exist, about “Miracles and superhuman powers in South and 
Southeast Asian Buddhist traditions”28, my treatment of the depiction of such phenomena in the 
Pāli Canon shall be narratological in this book. I will treat it as part of the inherent rules of the 
narrated or story-world instead of asking at every turn whether the event is realistically possible 
or not and welcoming each positive answer as historical fact and each negative one as forgery 
and fiction (which is one of the arguments in the historical-critical method applied to the Pāli sut-
tas, which seeks to stratify the textual material into older and younger contents in order to ulti-
mately arrive at the oldest ascertainable form of Buddhism). In the world of the Pāli suttas them-
selves, however, plain and simple, “[i]t is widely accepted […], Bhāradvāja, that there are 
gods”29, as the Buddha has allegedly stated – whether it could be proven to be equivalent with 
historical reality or not for that matter is irrelevant.30 The aim of this book, in which the suttas of 
the Pāli Canon are, for the time being, regarded as coherent, intentional structures of meaning, is 
to describe, analyse, interpret, the specific ways in which characters are presented in some se-
lected narrative suttas of the Majjhima Nikāya, and how this may contribute to our understanding 
of the texts themselves.  
I have no expertise in Analytic (or any other, for that matter) Philosophy. Nonetheless, I 
could not withstand the temptation of poking my head into the hornets’ nest of the problems con-
cerning concepts of persons, self-theories and personal identity – all areas of research that have 
more recently, again it seems, attracted the attention of scholars working in the (conjoint) fields 
                                                 
28
 Cp. JIABS 2010 (2011): “Contributions to a panel at the XVth Congress of the International Association of Bud-
dhist Studies, Atlanta, 23–28 June 2008” (Guest editor: David V. Fiordalis). Excellent explanations on Buddhist cos-
mology can be found in many of the more recent translations of the Sutta Piṭaka, e.g. Bhikkhu Bodhi 2000 & 2012, 
or Walshe 1987. Therefore, I will not go into details here.   
29
 Saṅgārava Sutta, MN II 213,6f.: Ucce sammataṃ kho etaṃ, Bhāradvāja, lokasmiṃ yadidaṃ atthi deva ti.   
30
 We will see later also that according to the Buddhist conception of the universe, i.e. from an emic viewpoint, that 
gods are generally seen as representing one of three possible types of individuality (attabhāva). 
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of Analytic Philosophy and Buddhist Studies. There can be no doubt that a relationship exists be-
tween the way characters are depicted in the suttas and probable historical and/or Buddhist con-
cepts of the person. The exact nature of this relationship, however, is difficult to describe or de-
fine, and caution should be exercised in drawing a direct connecting line between these two 
things. Nevertheless, such an inquiry was necessary in order to clarify my own point of view, 
which means, becoming aware of and reflecting on my own “baggage” or Voraussetzungssystem, 
i.e. the system of presuppositions with which one approaches the legacy of other cultures. What 
is said about this in Part I, is nothing really new. I have mainly drawn information and inspira-
tion from Steven Collins’s classic Selfless Persons, a book written by Raymond Martin and John 
Barresi, The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self, which tells the fascinating story of the history of the 
concept of personal identity in Western civilization beginning with the ancient Greeks, and also 
Melford Spiro (1993), who has contributed with a thought-provoking essay to the question as to 
whether the ‘Western Self’ is a peculiar concept among the world’s cultures.  
Characters are an integral and constituting part of literature and narrative. Imagine a nar-
rative without people acting physically, verbally, and/or mentally. Surprisingly, the study of 
characters in the Pāli Canon seems to be a rather neglected field of research within the study of 
early Buddhism31, apart, perhaps, from the study of the historical Buddha, on whom a lot has 
been written from earliest times. Even so, what seems to be lacking most, are methodically 
guided and theory-based studies on the nature of characters in the Pāli Canon.32 Generally speak-
ing, research about early Buddhism as embodied in the Pāli Canon (especially the Sutta Piṭaka) 
has concentrated much more on the doctrinal or the presumed historical contents of the suttas in 
lieu of the persons/characters, who are, however, an equally important part of the signifying 
structure of the suttas. Thus, this book aims to make sense of three individual suttas from the 
Majjhima Nikāya through the lens of the characters depicted therein. 
                                                 
31
 In the American tradition of Buddhological scholarship, this term, if referring to an ‘original’ set of Buddhist 
teachings, is itself considered somewhat outdated; cp. Walters 1999: 248: “[…] I think it fair to say that among con-
temporary historians of the Theravāda there has been a marked shift away from attempting to say much of anything 
at all about ‘early Buddhism.’ Whereas earlier scholars tended to ignore post-Aśokan Buddhist history as corrupt, 
more recent scholars have tended to regard early Buddhist history as unknowable.” However, it ought to be consid-
ered that while this description may be true for (Anglo-)American scholarship, it can by no means said to be true for 
the entire ‘Buddhological world’. Many scholars standing in the Continental-European tradition still tend to separate 
the form from the content of the suttas. 
32
 That seems even to be true still for the Pāli Canon on the whole; cp. von Hinüber 1996: 1: “A second difficulty is 
the lack of adequate research on the subject [of Pāli literature, B.G.], and the last, but by no means less serious one is 
the absence of any theory suiting the needs of studying and describing Pāli literature.” 
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Part II introduces the discipline of narratology, which means that we will leave the path 
of traditional Buddhological or Indological scholarship for a brief moment and explore new terri-
tory and reach a new viewpoint. From there, I invite the reader to look at the characters populat-
ing the suttas anew. After a very brief overview over that branch of narratology which may be 
called applied narratology, which is very much dependent on the analytical tools provided by the 
French literary critic Gérard Genette to anlayse the so-called ‘discourse-level’ of narratives, the 
work of two leading narrative theorists is introduced, whose analytical tools and models of liter-
ary characters I apply to the suttas: Uri Margolin and James Phelan.     
Part III, which is really the heart of this study, presents the application of the methods in-
troduced in Part II to the analysis and interpretation of the three above-mentioned suttas of the 
Majjhima Nikāya, the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta (MN 81), the Aṅgulimāla Sutta (MN 86), and the Piyaj-
ātika Sutta (MN 87).   
The Conclusion brings together the findings from Part III with what was said concerning 
the Pāli suttas’s underlying models and concepts of persons in Part I, and presents a summary of 
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1. Persons – East and West  
“What, monks, is the carrier of the load? ‘Person’ (puggala), it should be said. Carrier of   
 the load, monks, is called this venerable monk here of such name and such clan.”33 
Historians, translators, literary scholars, and everybody else who works with texts that were pro-
duced in the distant past and/or in a culture that is different from one’s own (or in a language that 
is different from the one that one uses to describe them), face one common problem: they often 
have to operate with terms and categories anachronistically. They thereby use concepts and no-
tions loaded with their own intellectual history to describe the objects they are studying. The 
question which then arises is, how best may scholars avoid superimposing ideas and concepts 
which are alien to that other culture’s ideas and concepts? I believe this can be achieved by self-
reflection to the best of one’s ability.   
Part of the difficulty of comparing different notions of self and person in different cul-
tures and times, then, is without doubt the very different usage – or, in this case, the referent – of 
the respective designations. As John Barresi and Raymond Martin write in The Oxford Hand-
book Self:  
“In philosophical theory, as well as in common parlance, the words self and person are often used in-
terchangeably, usually, but not always, in an effort to express the same idea.”34 
Yet, for a number of reasons, it is necessary for us to arrive at a clear distinction between 
these two notions, and Buddhist thought has succeeded in achieving this in an interesting way. 
Outside of the context of Buddhism, some philosophers have likewise pointed out a necessity for 
this distinction to be made, especially those who subscribe to a ‘narrative view of the Self’. The 
American philosopher Marya Schechtman writes:  
“[…] I am increasingly convinced that the concept of person as used by psychological theorists mixes 
together two components. One is [Galen] Strawson’s notion of the self [as the ‘Subject of Experience 
that is a Single Mental Thing’; i.e. his “Pearl String Theory”]; the other is a practical notion that is 
more intimately connected to social context.”35 
                                                 
33
 Bhāra Sutta, SN III 25,15-26,17. 
34
 Gallagher 2011: 33. 
35
 Schechtman 2007: 169. 
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Schechtman goes on to elaborate what exactly the two components are that should be dis-
tinguished in the notion of the person:  
“On the one hand a person is conceived as the subject of experiences, the ‘I’ that we experience as a 
psychological entity with persistence conditions distinct from human beings. On the other hand, a per-
son is conceived as the bearer of certain complex social capacities that carry important practical impli-
cations. A person is a moral agent who can be held responsible for her actions, a reasoning creature 
who can be held irrational when she acts against her interests, and a creature capable of a range of 
complex relationships with other persons.”36  
Having said this, Schechtman explicates her “narrative self-consitution view”, separated 
into two narrative accounts:  
“First is the claim that in order to constitute oneself as a person―someone with the capacity for moral 
responsibility, prudential interest, relations of compensation and related person-specific activi-
ties―one must implicitly organize one’s experience according to a narrative that recognizes past and 
future experiences as one’s own in the sense that one sees the past as having implications for one’s 
present situation choices, and the present as having similar implications for the future. Second is the 
claim that in order to constitute oneself as a self, one must have a narrative in which one experiences 
the past and the future as one’s own in the strong sense of experiencing the present as part of the 
whole narrative.”37 
While the Buddha would perhaps have agreed with Schechtman’s first statement, the nar-
rative account of Selves, as we will see again and in some details below, he would doubtlessly 
have dismissed and refuted the second view, “in which one experiences the past and the future as 
one’s own”, in other words, the ‘continuity-of-essence’ or ‘identity’ sort of view. In fact, 
Schechtman’s “weaker” ‘narrative account of persons’ (‘PN’) sounds in principle like a reformu-
lation of the Buddha’s doctrine of karma due to its signing over of moral responsibility to the in-
dividual. In fact, Mark Siderits has agreed that this narrative-self view would be acceptable for 
Buddhists on the level of conventional truth, where one could speak of ‘persons’ as “convenient 
designators”.38 According to the Buddha’s original teachings on karma, personal continuity is de-
fined by causal connections in relation to one’s mental, verbal, and physical acts. (Note therefore 
                                                 
36
 Schechtman 2007: 169. 
37
 Ibid.: 169f. 
38
 Siderits said this in a Target paper at the video-captured conference MIND & REALITY: A MULTIDISCIPLI-
NARY SYMPOSIUM ON CONSCIOUSNESS at Columbia University in 2006. See http://mindandreality.org/semi-
nar5.html#MarkSiderits (last accessed: 2 March 2012). 
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the difference in speaking of “personal continuity” rather than personal identity.) But in the Bud-
dha’s view,39 there is apart from this conditionality no lasting entity or essence to be found either 
within or outside of the five constituents (the khandhā) composing the empirical person that 
could properly be called a Self or a soul – the Buddha vehemently denied the existence of such 
an essence of living beings. Furthermore, he taught that it is a mistake to identify oneself (really: 
one’s Self) with one or all of these five constituents.40  
Clearly, the description and, by implication, the understanding of persons or, rather, of a 
person’s potential, in the Pāli Canon is very much characterised, if not dominated, by the de-
scription and ascription of special (psychic) abilities that originate in the training in meditative 
concentration. Although we certainly find direct or indirect references to the socio-historical con-
ditions of the day, as has been and still is the focus of several studies41, the orthodox Theravāda-
view that we come across in the Pāli suttas is on the whole very much determined and defined by 
the outline of the spiritual path leading to liberation. While we do encounter heads of households 
(gahapati), potters (ghaṭikāra), Brahmins (brahmaṇa), ascetics (paribbājaka) of various sects 
and so forth – that means, for example, social, occupational, and religious designations –, the 
Nikāyas’ overarching grid with regard to persons, nevertheless, is that of the distinction between 
worldly or ordinary people (putthujana) and those on the Path or beyond it (meaning the ones 
who have realized the final goal, nibbāna: the arahats (a-sekha); the individuals on the path, the 
ariyapuggalā, are called the ones “belonging to training”, sekha). This distinction reflects, in a 
way, the dichotomy of saṃsāra and nibbāna that is fundamental to the teachings of the Buddha 
on the whole. 
In specialist Buddhist discourse, that is, in the works belonging to the Abhidhamma, 
much of the commentaries, as well as some suttas which discuss such technical matters of the 
view (diṭṭhi), the Self (atta), and so forth42, the Self and the person are said to be non-existent in 
                                                 
39
 Which can as a matter of fact not really be called a view, because the Buddha on several occasions strongly ad-
vised against adhering to any view whatsoever, for they were like a thicket, a wilderness etc., cp. Brahmajāla Sutta 
(DN 1) and Mūlapariyāya Sutta (MN 1). The Buddha says of himself that he teaches only dhamma, which can be 
interpreted as just being the truth about phenomena. 
40
 MN I 140,33f.: Tasmātiha bhikkhave yaṃ na tumhākaṃ taṃ pajahatha, taṃ vo pahīnaṃ dīgharattaṃ hitāya su-
khāya bhavissati. 
41
 Cp. e.g. Fick (1974); Bailey & Mabbett 2003.  
42
 These are texts like the Brahmajāla Sutta (DN 1), the Mūlapariyāya Sutta (MN 1), or the Pañcattaya Sutta (MN 
102), and many more. 
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an absolute sense (paramatthato pana puggalo nāma n’ atthi). If a text speaks of persons, and so 
forth, it has “to be interpreted” – this is called neyyattha. A text whose “meaning is definite”, be-
cause it accords with ultimate reality (paramatthato), is called nītattha.43 In a text of the latter 
kind, therefore, one will almost certainly find talk of the “three characteristic” (tilakkhaṇā) of 
saṃsaric existence: impermanence (anicca), un-satisfactoriness (dukkha), and selflessness 
(anattā), which are how all things (dhammā) ultimately are (yathābhūtaṃ). Nevertheless, rebirth 
(punabbhava) is an equally accepted fact. Now, in order to be able to talk about beings that are 
constantly reborn in a meaningful way, Pāli texts use the word attabhāva, “individual/personal-
ity”.44 Collins writes:  
“Attabhāva, then, refers to the fact, condition or status of being a ‘self’ – a ‘self, that is, in the sense in 
which the unenlightened man feels himself to be a separate individual, confronting real others.”45 
This word possesses different connotations. Frequently, for instance, it means “body”, 
which designates, as a technical term, one of three different forms of “acquiring individuality”, 
namely “gross-material” (ol̥ārika-°/rūpī), “mind-made” (manomaya-°), and “formless” (arūpī) 
bodies, which correspond to the three hierarchical levels of the Buddhist universe, the kāma- 
(“desire”), rūpa- (“fine-material”), and arūpa-lokas (“immaterial” planes of existence), and thus 
the term refers to the different appearances of a being or a person in different forms of existence, 
in which rebirth takes place in accordance with one’s karma – thus, as we have seen in the Intro-
duction, talking to gods does not come as a surprise for Buddhists because gods similarly just are 
or have attabhāva.      
The Pāli word for person, puggala, amalgamates several sets of concepts which “[systema-
tise] the conventional view of personality and rebirth”46 according to the Theravāda tradition. For 
all the Theravāda-Abhidhammika’s skill in systematisation, the differences between persons – all 
of which are due to karma and different combinations of the four “great elements” (mahābhūtas) 
plus the “three poisons” (lobha, dosa, moha) – listed under all kinds of headings which can be 
                                                 
43
 Cp. Collins 1982: 154. 
44
 The following account is basically a summary of Collins 1982: 156-171. The translations of terms are his. 
45
 Collins 1982: 157. 
46
 Ibid.: 160. 
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found in the Canon47 are too numerous to count, and seem rather to have been made up on the 
spot by the Buddha (and systematised later), instead of making the impression of being a single 
coherent concept. But more importantly, besides these vertical differences, the tradition was 
more systematic in terms of horizontal differences, that is, a stratification of types of persons ac-
cording to the stages they have reached on the scale of spiritual accomplishment. The most im-
portant of these classifications is certainly the one of the so-called Noble Persons, ariya-puggalā. 
The Noble Persons, as opposed to “ordinary worldly people” (puthujjanā), are those bhikkhus or 
lay-persons who have nibbāna as their objective and have realised along the way, through the 
three trainings in conduct, meditation, and wisdom (sīla, samādhi, paññā), one of four possible 
stages of spiritual attainment by successively destroying the “ten fetters” (dasa saṃyojanāni) that 
bind one to samsaric existence.48 The stage reached is irreversible. The four Persons are called: 
“Stream-Winner” (sotāpanna), “Once-Returner” (sakadāgāmi), “Non-Returner” (anāgāmi), and 
“Enlightened man”, or “Arhat”, or “Holy One” (arahat) – translations vary greatly for this last 
term. If the texts speak of the “Eight Noble Persons”, each of the four types is subdivided in be-
ing on the path towards, and having fully attained the respective stage.49 Another important list of 
Noble Persons enumerates seven (sometimes nine, sometimes ten) types, probably hierarchically, 
according to their individual spiritual potential and quality and the specific way on which they 
reach the goal. Some of the types, respectively their descriptions, are obscure (for instance, the 
one “released on both sides”, or the “bodily witness”), while others are self-explanatory, and 
their possible historical development and relationship is complex. However, it seems reasonable 
to assume that their origin should be found in the different (psychological) characters, inclina-
tions, and spiritual potentials of the Buddha’s disciples. Another interesting aspect of this list is 
                                                 
47
 These are to be found especially in the Abhidhamma collection, to which the Puggalapaññatti belongs, the Aṅgut-
tara Nikāya, but also in the other Nikāyas of the Sutta Piṭaka. 
48
 The ten “fetters” are: belief in a Self (sakkāya-diṭṭhi); doubt or uncertainty, especially about the Path (vicikicchā); 
attachment to rites and rituals (sīlabbata-parāmāsa); sensual desire (kāma-cchanda/(kāma-)rāga); ill-will 
(vyāpāda); desire for material existence (i.e. rebirth in the kāma-loka; rūparāga); desire for immaterial existence 
(i.e. rebirth in the arūpa-loka; arūparāga); conceit (māna); restlessness (uddhacca); illusion (avijjā); cp. PED, s.v. 
saṃyojana. 
49
 A presumably quite early passage in the Canon that mentions the eight types of Noble Persons (ariya-puggalā) is 
found in the Ratana-sutta of the Cullavagga of the Sutta Nipāta (II.1.6–7):  
Ye puggalā aṭṭha sataṃ pasatthā, cattāri etāni yugāni honti.  
Te dakkhiṇeyyā sugatassa sāvakā, etesu dinnāni mahapphalāni.  
Idampi saṅghe ratanaṃ paṇītaṃ, etena saccena suvatthi hotu. 
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that some suttas50 mention that, in principle and under certain conditions, it is possible for almost 
all of these (except for the last two) different types to reach arhatship. It suffices for my purposes 
here to just cite the list of seven types, without going into details of their descriptions51:  
1. “released on both sides” – ubhato-bhāga-vimutto 
2. “released by insight”  – paññā-vimutto   
3. “bodily witness”  – kaya-sakkhī 
4. “who has seen the point” – diṭṭhi-ppatto 
5. “released by faith”  – saddhā-vimutto 
6. “follower of the teaching” – dhammānusārī 
7. “follower through faith” – saddhānusārī.52 
Although that account of the orthodox Theravāda conception of persons seems straight-
forward, scholars of early Buddhism have been pointing out certain tensions between two kinds 
of discourse in the Pāli scriptures. Collins, recognising the failure in the Self-theories of some 
modern philosophers like David Hume, Derek Parfit, and Galen Strawson (whose ideas seem to 
lend themselves easily to comparison with the Buddha’s view on the Self) of finding an over-
arching, single theory that could somehow unify the different aspects of the human being, sees 
such a single theory that actually is able to unify a person’s real condition (in category-analytic 
terms) and its individual continuity and being a social being and a moral agent in the Buddhist 
concept of the “Two Truths”: conventional (samutti-sacca; Skt. saṃvr̥ti-satya) and absolute truth 
(paramattha-sacca; Skt. paramārtha-satya).53 Collins writes:  
“In many types of narrative – ethical, exhortatory, behavioural – the use of terms like attā, ‘self’, and 
puggala, ‘person’, was accepted as useful and meaningful; only in explicitly theoretical contexts, 
where the discourse contained or openly presupposed a definite system of psychology and metaphys-
ics, were personal terms rigorously excluded.”54   
                                                 
50
 AN I 118-120; Kīṭāgiri Sutta, MN 70. 
51
 For a detailed treatment of these types, cp. Gombrich: “Retracing an ancient debate: How Insight worsted concen-
tration in the Pāli Canon”. In: Gombrich 2006a: 96-134. 
52
 Tr. Gombrich 2006a: 97. 
53
 Cp. ibid.: 147, 154 & ibid. 1994. 
54
 Collins 1982: 149. 
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In Western philosophical thought, however, this distinction was not always drawn (cp. M. 
Spiro below), and has consequently led to some confusion. In Buddhist narrative, then, and espe-
cially in the famous ‘rebirth-narratives’ (e.g. Jātakas), from an orthodox Theravāda point of 
view, the use of the concept ‘person’ to designate a unitary agent, connected as one being 
(bhava) through different rebirths, is doctrinally ‘permitted’55 and not seen as contradictory, alt-
hough the tradition did recognise that it could provide some grounds for misunderstanding, as in 
the case of the monk Sāti56, who held that it was consciousness that transmigrates, a mistaken 
view, the commentary states, that has developed in Sāti because he was an expert in the memori-
sation of ‘rebirth-narratives’.   
Similar to the misguided monk Sati’s view, in Western thought, however, consciousness 
was, and perhaps still is, often identified and regarded as the unifying element (the so-called 
“psychological continuity”). On the other hand, Mark Siderits summarises the orthodox Thera-
vāda-view of the consciousness: 
“The Buddha’s point is that the conclusion that the mind lasts at least a lifetime rests on an illusion. 
For what we call the mind is really a continuous series of distinct events, each lasting just a moment, 
but each immediately followed by others. There is no such thing as the mind that has these different 
events, there are just the events themselves. But because they succeed one another in unbroken succes-
sion, this illusion is created of an enduring thing in which they are all taking place.”57 
As with consciousness – the one thing that is thought to be truly “one’s own” – in the 
Western cultural context, so the terms Self and person seem rather to have been associated with 
individuality: 
“From knowledge of what the self truly is people have hoped to gain greater happiness, deeper fulfil-
ment, liberation from fetters or restraints, better relations with other people, or ways to achieve power 
over them. Selfhood thus matters to us both as individuals and as social creatures, shaping our per-
sonal existence and our relations with those whose lives we somehow share.”58 
                                                 
55
 Cp. Collins 1982: 150. 
56
 See n. 78 below and Collins 1982: 152. 
57
 Siderits 2009: 41f. 
58
 Seigel 2009: 3. 
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Although the formulation is general enough to be equally admissible for describing the 
general religious situation in the ancient Indian context (in fact, the statement is almost too ge-
neric to state anything significant at all), it is not valid for Buddhism, in which in fact the way to 
lasting happiness was seen in getting rid of the Self, which the Buddha had explained to be an 
illusion. This concoction, as it seems, of the ideas or the notions of Self, persons, and individual-
ity, on the other hand, appears indeed to be a rather modern Western phenomenon. 
1.1 The Problem of Personal Identity (PI) and the Buddhist Philosophical View of Persons 
“Just how the Exhortation-Narrative attitude to rebirth coexists culturally with the systematic account 
of it put forward by the orthodox voice in the Debate section is a matter for history and ethnography: 
but the coexistence is genuine, and the two ways of speaking are both deemed (by Buddhist systematic 
thought) to contain ‘truth’: as #12.1. states, ‘both of these truths should be understood, without confu-
sion’.”59 
One of the major questions in the study of literary characters – and one of the main points of 
controversy between structuralist and post-structuralist narratological stances taken towards liter-
ary character – is how to think about the exact relationship between characters in narratives and 
real persons. Another problem which is therefore bound up with (real or literary) persons, and 
which seems to be relevant for a discussion of literary characters and the thinking about their re-
lationship to ‘reality’ – especially when adopting a post-structuralist position – is the notion of 
personal identity (PI). The concept seems to be especially relevant in the context of a study of the 
presentation of characters in early Buddhist suttas, for they apparently embody, as has often been 
pointed out by scholars, what appears to be a contradiction: the scholastic and “religious virtu-
oso’s” intellectual understanding of the Buddha’s teaching of anattā versus the “man-in-the-
world’s”, the ordinary monks’, or the “naïve westerner’s views on reincarnation, in which a se-
ries of lifetimes, each containing a unitary ‘individual’, is somehow connected together as the 
                                                 
59
 Cp. Seigel 2009: 477. See also the next footnote, n. 61, for a quotation of the whole passage. 
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successive lives of one ‘person’”.60 Speaking of texts, on the one hand, the Buddha was vehement 
in denying the existence of a Self, while on the other hand, (early) Buddhist literature abounds in 
stories about past and future lives of individuals61, and phrases and formulations which have al-
ready quite early in the history of Buddhism led to controversy.62 The set of problems regarding 
personal identity that is, strictly speaking, comprised of two questions, the concepts surrounding 
change or sameness of persons and things over time (“characterization-question”), and the idea 
of the Self in terms of some kind of an impermanent essence (“Reidentification-question”63), is 
for the most part of a philosophical and often purely theoretical nature with no or merely mar-
ginal points of contact with our everyday notions and ideas of, or references to empirical per-
sons.64 As a philosophical problem, however, it is perhaps as old as philosophy itself. In the re-
cent literature on the subject, one often meets with the expression that the philosophical and of-
ten highly theoretical treatment of the problem of PI is counter-intuitive from an everyday point 
                                                 
60
 Cp. Collins 1982: 150 and throughout, especially parts II & III. Steven Collins, in a later essay (Collins 1997) and 
from a somewhat different angle, has characterised the coexistence between systematic thought (“debate”) and in-
structional or edifying narrative (“Exhortation-Narrative”) inherent in the canonical material a contradiction-free 
dichotomy: “The Debate and the Exhortation-Narrative sections of the text translated here exemplify, respectively, 
systematic and narrative thought in Buddhism. I believe Bruner (e.g. 1986, 1991) and others are right to see narra-
tive as a mode of cognition different from logical operations but equally basic to human thinking – neither system-
atic nor narrative thought is reducible to the other – and I find this a helpful rubric under which to think about Bud-
dhist intellectual history (see Collins, 1998). (This is a position which for the purpose of making these comments I 
will simply assume to be true, although obviously it can be contested on various grounds, not least of which would 
be the view, which I attribute to Parfit and Strawson and then criticize, that a complete description of reality could 
be given without using the language of narrative and persons.) In the conceptual analysis of Buddhist systematic 
thought, and in the mode of psychological practice which goes with it (‘insight’ meditation), the person is decon-
structed, broken down into what are seen as its constitutive parts, mental and physical. In exhortation, and the Bud-
dhist narratives in which it is characteristically embodied, as in the second section here, persons are addressed and 
described as unitary agents, albeit ones whose careers span multiple lifetimes. The simple view of rebirth evident in 
the Exhortation-Narrative section would, were it to be taken for systematic thought, deserve the critical disdain with 
which Geach (1969) rejects what he calls the vulgar ‘Bridey Murphy’ approach to reincarnation. Just how the Ex-
hortation-Narrative attitude to rebirth coexists culturally with the systematic account of it put forward by the 
orthodox voice in the Debate section is a matter for history and ethnography: but the coexistence is genuine, 
and the two ways of speaking are both deemed (by Buddhist systematic thought) to contain ‘truth’: as #12.1. 
states, ‘both of these truths should be understood, without confusion’.” (Collins 1997: 477; my emphasis) 
61
 Cp. e.g. the Jātakas, the Dhammapadatthakathā, as well as many suttas in the Sutta Piṭaka. 
62
 As we will again see later, a Buddhist school of thought called the Pudgalavādins, affirmed that, in a certain sense 
(cp. Cousins 2005: 94; the answers given by the Pudgalavādin opponent in the Puggala-chapter of the Abhi-
dhamma-Kathāvatthu are of a somewhat peculiar but astute ‘Yes-and-No’ type), it is one and the same person who 
undergoes the process of transmigration, which is clear from such statements made by the Tathāgata as, “He per-
ished from there and reappeared here” (e.g. DN I 81), which would otherwise not make sense.  
63
 Cp. Mark Siderits: The Cartography of Personal Identity: Mapping a Course for the Future. Podcast of a lecture 
given at the ‘Columbia Society for Comparative Philosophy’, available at: http://www.cbs.columbia.edu/cscp/mark-
siderits/ (last accessed: 24th June 2013). 
64
 Cp. Martin & Barresi 2006: 3. 
 24 
 
of view.65 The counter-intuitiveness of the philosophical understanding of a strict notion of ‘same 
person’ seems to have already been recognised as early as the 5th century B.C. in ancient Greece, 
for which Raymond Martin and John Barresi have found blithe evidence:  
“One of the earliest indications of interest in the problem of personal identity occurs in a scene from a 
play written in the fifth century B.C.E by the comic playwright Epicharmus. In this scene, a lender 
asks a debtor to pay up. The debtor replies by asking the lender whether he agrees that anything that 
undergoes change, such as a pile of pebbles to which one pebble has been added or removed, thereby 
becomes a different thing. The lender says that he agrees with that. ‘Well, then,’ says the debtor, 
‘aren’t people constantly undergoing changes?’ ‘Yes,’ replies the lender. ‘So,’ says the debtor, ‘it fol-
lows that I’m not the same person as the one who was indebted to you and, so, I owe you nothing.’ 
The lender then hits the debtor, who protests loudly at being abused. The lender replies that the 
debtor’s complaint is miscredited since he –  the lender – is not the same person as the one who hit 
him a moment before.”66  
Broadening the scope of the problem of PI beyond Greek antiquity, and just one lifetime 
(which does not make a difference in principle, separate from the fact that ‘reincarnation’ was a 
wide-spread concept also in ancient Greece, and likewise in many other world cultures67), we 
find a striking parallel with regard to the problem of PI and its practical implications in the con-
text of pre-modern South Asian Buddhism in the – though much later – extra-canonical but 
nonetheless very popular work the Milindapañha68:   
“The king said: ‘What is it, Nāgasena, that is reborn?’ ‘Name-and-form [i.e. the conglomeration of the 
khandhā] is reborn.’ ‘What, is it this name-and-form that is reborn?’ ‘No; but by this name-and-form 
deeds are done, good or evil, and by these deeds (this Karma) another name-and-form is reborn.’ ‘If 
that be so, Sir, would not the new being be released from its evil Karma?’ The Elder replied: ‘Yes, if it 
were not reborn. But just because it is reborn, O king, it is therefore not released from its evil Karma.’ 
Give me an illustration.’ ‘Suppose, O king, some man were to steal a mango from another man, and 
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 Cp. Martin & Barresi 2006: 12: “Heraclitus’s view was that nothing that changes can remain the same. Whether or 
not this view is true, it is not practical.” 
66
 Ibid.: 3. The philosophical problem featured in this example, through the predicate “same [person]”, is what in 
philosophy is known as the Sorites-Paradox (or the problem of indeterminacy), i.e. the problem of at what point we 
can tell a thing (e.g. a heap) to have changed, i.e. ceased to be the same, by altering its constituents (e.g. gradually 
taking away single grains from a heap of grains). 
67
 Cp. Marcel Mauss’s famous essay in: Carrithers, Collins, and Lukes 1985.  
68
 Only in the Burmese Theravāda-tradition, however, the Milindapañha as the eighteenth book of the Khuddhaka 
Nikāya, is considered canonical. Due to the evident ties of the content of parts of this text with the Classical world, 
the mentioned parallels would not come as a real surprise. However, I refrain from any speculations about the nature 
of these parallels.  
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the owner of the mango were to seize him and bring him before the king, and charge him with the 
crime. And the thief were to say: “Your Majesty! I have not taken away this man’s mangoes. Those 
that he put in the ground are different from the ones I took. I do not deserve to be punished” ‘How 
then? Would he be guilty?’ ‘’Certainly, Sir. He would deserve to be punished.’ ‘But on what ground?’ 
‘Because, in spite of whatever he may say, he would be guilty in respect of the last mango which re-
sulted from the first one (the owner set in the ground).’ ‘Just so, great king, deeds good or evil are by 
this name-and-form and another is reborn. But that other is not thereby released from its deeds (its 
Karma).’”69 
What the simile perfectly provides is the “missing link” which explains the momentous 
relationship between different persons (i.e. in consecutive rebirths), respectively mangoes, and 
which constitutes one application of the Buddha’s famous “middle way” between or beyond the 
extemes of sameness or identity and total un-relatedness. In a nutshell70, what is striking about 
the Buddha’s teaching on persons is that he could even explain continuity beyond bodily death, 
other than his ancient Greek ‘colleagues’, in an impersonal way in terms of cause and effect – 
instead of either denying any and all continuity or proposing some kind of transmigrating entity. 
Thereby, certain causes effect the new coming into being of a new set of ‘name-and-form’, 
which is itself an “exhaustive list” (R. Gombrich) of that which is conveniently designated by the 
“convenient designator” (M. Siderits) ‘person’, puggala in the Pāli language.71 A unified agent is 
not needed to explain the process. It is the same as saying, “it rains”, or “a plant grows” because 
of the presence of certain condition as the seed, sun, water, earth, etc. Similarly, it is perfectly 
comprehensible to say that it is “grasping” (upādāna) which brings about the coming-into-being 
(bhava) of a ‘person’. The Buddha’s understanding of “identity”, namely, as neither being essen-
tially identical nor separate or unrelated entities, stands in contrast to, and may thus even be un-
derstood as criticism against, concepts that taught some form or other of a transmigrating entity 
such as a soul or ‘vital force’ (Skt. jīva;), or consciousness, or concepts that oppositely taught the 
non-relatedness or randomness of actions and results. Common to the latter conceptions – and 
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 Cp. Müller 1890: 71f. and pp. 66-77 (= Mil 46,5-29). Nāgasena gives an even more illustrative example for a Bud-
dhist answer to the problem of PI and rebirth in the simile of the infant, cp. ibid. pp. 63-65 (Mil 40,1-19). 
70
 We are here really rushing through the topic in a somewhat superficial manner for the purpose of quickly grasping 
perhaps the most prominent or broader differences in the conceptions of persons in two of the most influential, or at 
least most often referred to currents of thought of the ancient worlds starting with the Buddha in India and Socrates 
in ancient Greece respectively.  
71
 Cp. Gombrich 2009: chapter 2 and pp. 61f.; Hamilton 1996: Introduction, pp. xv f. 
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regardless, it seems, of a specific cultural background –  is the very basic idea of the existence of 
something outliving the body – whether conceptualised as being something physical (related to 
breath, Gr. pneuma, which in many ancient cultures was associated with breath either as the prin-
ciple itself or its vehicle), as a soul or life principle, or as something mental, as consciousness, 
e.g. as “the experiencer” (Gr. psyche) – which may according to some scholars have originated in 
shamanism and the phenomenon of “out-of-body experiences”.72  
From a more systematic philosophical point of view, the Buddha’s (and his successors’) 
view on persons has been brilliantly systematised and summarised by Mark Siderits, a scholar of 
Indian and Analytic philosophies, as follows73: As was already hinted at above, the problem of PI 
consists really of two main questions: First, the problem of re-identification and the diachronic 
unity of persons, which presupposes a Self in terms of a kind of a permanent essence, and, sec-
ondly, the “Characterisation Question”, concerning potential cores of persons and attributes or 
properties, which entails ethical questions; both questions and their different philosophical for-
mulations address the problem with what can or should we identify (which touches on one of the 
major questions in ethics: How should we live?). However, one of the main differences between 
Western philosophy of the Self and Indian philosophical and religious systems seems to revolve 
more around soteriological questions. In the context of (most if not all of) the Indian systems, the 
interest in answering questions of PI lies mainly in “solving the problem of […]”, i.e. finding 
ways out of “existential suffering”. In several places in the Pāli Canon, the Buddha is portrayed 
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 Cp. Martin & Barresi 2006: 9-11 and n. 3 of chapter 1. The authors speak specifically about ancient Greece and 
ancient Greek shamanism. However, when compared to ancient Indian discussions of the different concepts, the par-
allels are striking, whether they are talking about the jīva or the sākṣin, in any case a pure or potentially pure entity 
existing prior to and separate from the material body; cp. Halbfass 2000: 195 and Gombrich 2009: 62-66. Shaman-
ism, in particular, appears to be a global phenomenon in ancient cultures. Going back even further in time (pre-phil-
osophical Greece and other cultural spheres as well, as the archeology of Germanic and Celtic burial practices be-
tray), prior to the concept of the person transmigrating, it seems that a widespread idea consisted in the identity of 
the life principle or vial force with the breath leaving the body at the moment of death.  
Socrates, like the Buddha, did not write anything. His teachings have presumably largely been preserved by the 
views of a character named Socrates in the plays of Plato. Plato’s views of the soul, then, are of course much more 
sophisticated (and have probably been developed during his career) than I have stated here. In his Phaedo, e.g., 
Plato’s view of the soul is conceptualised as being an immaterial (= not a physical object, however, subtle, like 
breath), single thing, without parts, unextended, and “essentially alive”, the natural consequence of which is the im-
mortality of the soul (because the soul is unextended, it is not divisible, and thus not corruptible); cp. Martin & 
Barresi 2006: 16f.  
73
 The following summary, and passages in “double quotes”, until annotated otherwise, is based on Siderits: The 
Cartography of Personal Identity, see n. 63 above. 
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to have addressed the different views on the Self that were circulating at his time in a very sys-
tematic way.74 Three major views emerge from the Buddha’s analyses (as formulated in the 
Pañcattaya Sutta): a) ‘Eternalism’ (sassatāvāda), b) ‘annihilation’ (ucchedavāda), and c) the 
Buddha’s own “Middle Path” (majjhimā paṭipadā), which, in a modern philosophical way of 
speaking, can aptly be circumscribed as “the continued existence of a person [that] consists in a 
causal series of psychophysical elements [the khandhā], properly arranged, none of which is of 
the nature of a self” (M. Siderits). That leads us, then, to the important and perhaps genuinely 
Buddhist conclusion that it is useful and necessary to differentiate between the Self and the per-
son (which many, especially Western taxonomies, do not, as we shall see further below). For 
Buddhists, it is no contradiction to state that persons do “exist” while the self does not – hence 
the seemingly contradictory expression “Selfless Persons”, the title of Steven Collins’s 1982 
landmark book on the subject –, provided that a qualification as to how the quotation marks in 
“exist” are to be understood, is included. That qualification is as follows: The question is what 
the first-person pronoun “I” may refer to. When the suttas talk of “I”, they address either a Self, 
understood as the (permanent, unchangeable) essence of a person (which, for all Buddhists, is a 
false notion because it does not really exist), or the person as “the whole consisting of psycho-
physical elements properly arranged”, designated with the “convenient designator” ‘person’. In 
the words of Analytic Philosophy, in this case in M. Siderits’s words, the Buddhist teachings on 
the Self and the person teach a form of Reductionism or, to be more precise, they embody a “Re-
ductionist view of personal identity”.75 In a nutshell, the (orthodox) Buddhist view on the Self 
and the person is this: Strictly speaking, no such things as persons can be found to really exist. 
But it is according to folk theory that we say ‘person’, which in reality is nothing more, and noth-
ing less, than a causal series of psychophysical elements properly arranged, and as such a “useful 
fiction”. Now, that does not mean that we are momentary (conscious) Selves, causally coming 
into and passing out of existence each moment. That would in fact be a form ‘Eliminativism’. 
Buddhist Reductionism holds that there is no such thing as a Self and, what is more, that there 
never was one to begin with. The ‘person’ is only conventionally real (“as a conceptual, useful 
fiction”); conventionally, we continue to exist as the same ‘persons’ at least for as long as the set 
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 Selectively, for the MN, there may be mentioned the Mūlapariyāya Sutta (MN 1), the Alagaddūpama Sutta (MN 
22), and the Pañcattaya Sutta (MN 102). 
75
 Cp. Collins 1997: 468. 
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of psychophysical elements (khandhas) remain to be “properly arranged”, that is supposedly for 
one lifetime. Ultimately, the khandhas are impermanent and “occur in a causal series”. In other 
words, for Buddhists “the folk theory of persons is a useful fiction”, useful for legal purposes, for 
instance, as we have seen above in the Mango-example from the Milindapañha.76  
And yet, as straightforward as all that sounds from the ‘tidying’ point of view of Analytic 
Philosophy, certain passages in the early Buddhist Canon nevertheless seem to have led to confu-
sion about the Buddha’s understanding of persons and the Self from very early on (thus, the 
problem is not new). Prominent examples include, in the MN, the monk Sāti’s “pernicious view” 
(pāpakaṃ ditthigataṃ) of what it is that transmigrates and survives bodily death in the 
Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya Sutta77, the arguments put forth by the Pudgalavāda-school of the Vātsīpu-
trīyas in favour of the person as a really existing element (paramatthato, Skt. dravyatas), or the 
controversies over the different roles of memory (sati; Skt. smr̥ti; implying some view of ‘unity 
of consciousness’) in connection with the notion of the person and its continuation over time in 
different Buddhist schools78. 
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 Yet we must be aware that with regard to that threefold taxonomy mentioned above (Eternalism or Essentialism, 
Eliminativism, and the Middle Path), the philosophy of the Buddha’s middle way most probably may have origi-
nally grown out of his “Middle Path” (majjhimā paṭipadā) as explained by the Buddha in what is traditionally held 
to have constituted his first sermon, which was to avoid the extremes of indulgence in sense-pleasures (“self-indul-
gence”) and self-mortification (“austerities”) with both of which the not yet awakened Siddhattha Gotama was all 
too familiar according to his own reports (e.g. in the Ariyaparyesana Sutta). This reminds us that we must keep in 
mind that these taxonomies are by themselves useful abstractions and systematisations. (Moreover,Siderits’s presen-
tation of Buddhist philosophy, though astute and very handy, besides or although having an analytic agenda, appears 
to be very much stamped by the Madhyamaka school of thought founded by the Buddhist saint Nāgārjuna (ca. 2nd 
cent. A.D.) –  which should make us cautious to not apply all of his findings uncritical to the earliest phases of the 
religion, in which the formation or the project of Buddhist philosophy proper with distinct schools of thought etc. 
was still underway.)  
77
 Cp. Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya Sutta (MN 38): Sāti, the former fisherman’s view is rendered as follows (MN I 256,10-
15): “I, friends, understand the dhamma taught by the Blessed One in this way, that that which goes on/continues 
[after bodily death], which transmigrates is this very consciousness and nothing else.” (Evaṃ me sutaṃ. Ekaṃ sama-
yaṃ Bhagavā sāvatthiyaṃ viharati jetavane anāthapiṇḍikassa ārāme. Tena kho pana samayena sātissa nāma bhik-
khuno kevaṭṭaputtassa evarūpaṃ pāpakaṃ diṭṭhigataṃ uppannaṃ hoti: tathāhaṃ bhagavatā dhammaṃ desitaṃ 
ājānāmi yathā tadevidaṃ viññāṇaṃ sandhāvati saṃsarati anaññanti.) The Buddha reprimands Sāti and states how it 
should be understood correctly (in short): “In more than one way/in many parallel expressions, indeed, have I, 
monks, told you that consciousness originates from causes/is causally arisen, not from somewhere else can con-
sciousness arise/consciousness cannot arise without cause.” (Anekapariyāyena hi vo, bhikkhave, paṭiccasamup-
pannaṃ viññāṇaṃ vuttaṃ mayā, aññatra paccayā natthi viññāṇassa sambhavoti.)   
78
 Cp. Gyatso 1992. 
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In particular, one short sutta in the SN seems to have caused much trouble already to the 
more immediate inheritors of the Buddha’s teachings.79 In the first short sutta of the Bhāravagga 
of the Khandhasaṃyutta of the Saṃyutta Nikāya, the Buddha explains how he understands the 
term person (puggala):  
“In Sāvatthī. There [the Buddha said]: “I will teach you, monks, the load80, the carrier81 of the load, the 
picking up of the load, and the laying down of the load. Listen to this! What, monks, is the load? ‘The 
five aggregates’ (pañca khandhā), one should say. What are the five? Such as [there is] the aggregate 
that fuels82 [the existential process of] form (or matter), the aggregate that fuels [the existential process 
of] feeling, the aggregate that fuels [the existential process of] apperception, the aggregate that fuels 
[the existential process of] volition, and the aggregate that fuels [the existential process of] conscious-
ness. What, monks, is the carrier of the load? ‘Person’ (puggala), one should say. Carrier of the load, 
monks, is called this venerable monk here83 of such name and such clan. What is the taking up of the 
load? There is this thirst, leading to rebirth and coupled with sensuous desire that delights in this and 
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 This sutta has “caused much trouble” in the later development of Buddhism, as R. Gombrich writes (2006a: 67). 
Several sources suggest that this sutta was used by the ‘Personalist schools’ (Puggalavādins) of Buddhism as a basis 
of discussion to ‘proof’ that the Buddha did not object to the existence of a person as a really existing entity, quasi a 
sixth element ‘above’, ‘behind’ or beyond the five khandhā that is neither identical nor different from them (cp. 
Bhikkhu Bodhi 2000: 1051, n.37).   
80
 I render bhāra here with its primary meaning “load” because I think it better fits the metaphor than the figurative 
meaning “burden” (which has a very negative connotation which, in my opinion, is not necessarily vindicated in the 
light of the frequent emphasis on pleasant and blissful experiences in or resulting from meditation and ethical con-
duct. Of course, the Buddha did explain the general unpleasantness and suffering of existence, but he did certainly 
not teach depression as a way out of it.) 
81
 I translate hāra with “carrier”, and thereby follow Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation (2000: 871), in order to make the 
comparison in the text with ‘person’ smoother, but under the premise that both terms are merely “convenient desig-
nators” of conventional, ordinary parlance (vohāra) with no implications of a real existence of a person. Steven Col-
lins (1982: 165) translated hāra as an action noun (“bearing”), presumably to present a more neutral rendering that 
would prevent a fostering of the reification of the term. But Collins’ argument that hāra as a noun can only mean 
“carrying” both in Sanskrit and in Pāli is wrong: see MW, s.v. hāra; Bhikkhu Bodhi 2000: 1050, n.35.  
82
 I adopt and incorporate Richard Gombrich’s understanding of upādānakkhandha as fire-metaphor in my transla-
tion; cp. Gombrich 2009: 114, who translates upādānakkhandha as “blazing masses of fuel”. In connection with per-
sons, the word upādāna is usually translated as “clinging” (cp. Bodhi 2000: 871: “The form aggregate subject to 
clinging”), through which, according to Gombrich, the original metaphor is lost.   
83
 This is clearly pointing to an actual (spoken) teaching situation, in which the Buddha may have exemplarily 
pointed to something or someone present or near.  
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that; such as [there is] the thirst for lust [-ful experiences], the thirst for becoming, the thirst for exter-
mination. This, monks, is called the taking up of the load.”84 
The phrasing of the sutta seems indeed to suggest that the person described as “the carrier 
of the load” is an entity who possesses the aggregates and who lasts (at least) for one lifetime 
(one “rebirth”, upapatti); then, another “load”, or “burden” (bhāra), is taken up according to 
one’s karma. The phrase “of such name and such clan” (evaṃ nāma, evaṃ gotto), moreover, 
seems to suggest the basic idea of an individual (proper name plus property). However, nothing 
is said with regard to the person about its continuation after death or its exact nature. 
Nevertheless, it seems somehow comprehensible that the Pudgalavādins may have taken this and 
similar passages in the canonical literature as their points of departure for speculations about the 
puggala. However, also the Pudgalavādins did strictly not contradict the Buddha’s No Self 
doctrine. They were rather concerned with the exact nature of the “carrier of the load”. In sum, 
leaving out the subtler points of controversy, the rational division between the intellectual, expert 
understanding of the No Self teachings, and the preliminary or conventional understanding of 
persons seems, upon closer inspection, only to be clear-cut as a philosophical abstraction. As 
Collins wrote, “systematic thought” and “Exhortation-Narrative” are unambiguously co-existent 
in the Buddhist tradition(s): 
“Just how the Exhortation-Narrative attitude to rebirth coexists culturally with the systematic account 
of it put forward by the orthodox [Theravāda-] voice in the Debate section [of the Upāsakajanālaṅkāra; 
see below] is a matter for history and ethnography: but the coexistence is genuine, and the two ways 
of speaking are both deemed (by Buddhist systematic thought) to contain ‘truth’: […] ‘both of these 
truths should be understood, without confusion’.”85 
Furthermore, what seems to be the point of departure for the different objectives of 
Buddhist and Western philosophy of the Self and PI, the often attested counter-intuitiveness of 
the Buddha’s doctrine of No Self (anattā), would also not trouble the believing Buddhist for 
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 Be(R): Saṃyuttanikāyo > Khandhavaggo > 22. (1. Bhārasuttaṃ) [= SN III 25,15-26,17]: Sāvatthiyaṃ ... tatra kho... 
“'bhārañca vo, bhikkhave, desessāmi bhārahārañca bhārādānañca bhāranikkhepanañca. Taṃ suṇātha. Katamo ca, 
bhikkhave, bhāro? pañcupādānakkhandhā tissa vacanīyaṃ. Katame pañca? rūpupādānakkhandho, ve-
danupādānakkhandho, saññupādānakkhandho, saṅkhārupādānakkhandho, viññāṇupādānakkhandho ayaṃ vuccati, 
bhikkhave, bhāro. “'Katamo ca, bhikkhave, bhārahāro? puggalo tissa vacanīyaṃ. Yvāyaṃ āyasmā “evaṃnāmo 
evaṃgotto ayaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, bhārahāro. “Katamañca, bhikkhave, bhārādānaṃ? yāyaṃ taṇhā ponobhavikā 
[ponobbhavikā (syā. kaṃ. ka.)] nandīrāgasahagatā [nandirāgasahagatā (sabbattha)] tatratatrābhinandinī, sey-
yathidaṃ: kāmataṇhā, bhavataṇhā, vibhavataṇhā. Idaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, bhārādānaṃ. …  
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whom it is no wonder that it is counter-intuitive – for while impermanence (anicca) and un-
satisfactoriness (dukkha) are apparent and universal existential facts, it needs a Buddha to 
disclose their ultimate selflessness (anattā).86 
Alongside the philosophical, systematic, or debate-manner of thinking about the Self and 
persons expressed in the canonical Buddhist literature (and even more so in the commentarial 
tradition), other forms of expression do exist, as has repeatedly been noticed and pointed out.  
Steven Collins, in presenting the translation of “chapter 9 of the Upāsakajanālaṅkāra, ‘A 
Treatise (lit. ‘Ornament’) for the Laity’, entitled ‘A Proof of Meritorious Deeds and their Re-
sults’”, a medieval (tentatively from the 12th century A.D.) Thai-Buddhist treatise for the laity, 
notes:  
I believe [Jerome] Bruner (e.g. 1986, 1991) and others are right to see narrative as a mode of cognition 
different from logical operations but equally basic to human thinking – neither systematic nor narra-
tive thought is reducible to the other – and I find this a helpful rubric under which to think about Bud-
dhist intellectual history […] 
In the conceptual analysis of Buddhist systematic thought, and in the mode of psychological practice 
which goes with it (‘insight’ meditation), the person is deconstructed, broken down into what are seen 
as its constitutive parts, mental and physical. In exhortation, and the Buddhist narratives in which it is 
characteristically embodied […], persons are addressed and described as unitary agents, albeit ones 
whose careers span multiple lifetimes. 
Here, it appears that the reductionist view of the person as one mode of thinking in Bud-
dhism serves foremost a practical purpose: its application in analytical or insight meditation.87 
Yet, as my analysis of the suttas of the Majjhimanikāya shows88, more than half of all of the indi-
vidual suttas in this collection exhibit, as self-contained texts, more narrative than argumentative 
elements, and are thus clearly to be understood as texts of the “Exhortation-Narrative” type that 
Collins describes.  
That dividing line between “systematic” and “narrative” thought is manifest in the seem-
ingly contradictory presentation of such a “natural” or intuitive understanding of persons, as I 
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call it, alongside the Buddha’s vehemence in teaching the (counter-intuitive) “selflessness” 
(anattā) of persons in many Pāli suttas. Again, Collins put it neatly:  
[W]hile it is true that there is – in principle, as one too easily says – a mode of analysis which can dis-
pense with reference to persons (that is, obviously, the Secondary theory analysis in terms of ultimate 
truth, ultimately real Existents [such as using the khandhā as a personality model]), such a reductionist 
discourse cannot serve the social, legal or behavioral purposes of the non-reductionist discourses 
which it can, in principle, replace. This is not simply because certain practical ends are not well 
achieved by Secondary theory language: such as, for example, trying to book a ‘table’ at a restaurant 
using the language of micro-physics to describe it. I think that consideration of this kind of case could 
show, eventually, that – to use Ian Hackett’s terms in a way he might not condone – there is no abso-
lute distinction to be made between representing the world and intervening in it. It is a philosophical 
fiction (albeit perhaps a necessary and fruitful one) to think that there could be an activity of describ-
ing the world, leave alone one of describing it completely, which would have no effect in it.89  
Jumping back to Epicharmus, Martin and Barresi sum up the problem of PI in a similar 
way:  
This very strict sense of same person is not an everyday notion but the product of a philosophical the-
ory. It is also not a very useful sense of same person – unless you owe someone money! […] In every-
day life, we want to be able to say such things as, ‘I saw you at the play last night,’ and have what we 
say be true. If everyone is constantly changing and every change in a person results in his or her ceas-
ing to exist, no such remarks could ever be true. Assuming that such remarks sometimes are true, there 
must be a sense of same person according to which someone can remain the same person in spite of 
changing. Saying what this sense is, or what these senses are, is the philosophical problem of personal 
identity.90  
Much more, of course, would remain to be said about the philosophical problem of PI, 
especially concerning an attempt towards a more unified theory of persons that could account for 
both “truths”, “conventional” and “ultimate”, to be true. However, that is beyond the scope of 
this study, and what has been said so far may suffice as a sketch of the problem.  
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One thing remains, though, which is that the Buddha, with his radical analysis of the per-
son, appears to be an original thinker comparable to Socrates, who is likewise held to have re-
placed mythical by more rational or perhaps “scientific” modes of thinking in his own system of 
teaching.91 But more than that, the historical Buddha is traditionally credited with having ‘only’ 
rediscovered and taught (sāsana, i.e. Gotama Buddha’s teaching) universal and eternal truths 
(dhamma). This bold Buddhist claim to universalism, which pervades the early Buddhist Canon, 
turned out to have the potential to make my search for individuals among the Pāli suttas at times 
fairly cumbersome. Yet, it would be premature to subscribe to the Reductionist version of the 
story of persons as mere “useful fictions”. 
1.2 “Selfless Persons” or Impersonal Selves? Is the ‘Eastern Self’ peculiar? 
The last mentioned Buddhist claim to possessing universal truths, raises yet another question 
concerning characters and persons that deserves being addressed here: Can one, apart from what 
has been said so far about Buddhism’s unique view of the Self, rightfully speak of the existence 
of a characteristically Eastern conception and understanding of the Self and the person and if, is 
it in any peculiar way distinct from a Western one?    
Besides the philosophical discourses on the Self and self-concepts – different “ātman-the-
ories” – there are other, partly related areas or levels of meaning of the notion ‘self’: the every-
day-understanding and our day-to-day experience as being (though continuing) separate, distinct 
individuals; the social dimension of the self and persons; and the way we talk about persons, i.e. 
language-use or grammar.92 The second, and partly also the first, aspect was addressed in an illu-
minating essay of the anthropologist Melford Spiro from 1993, which gives a good overview of 
some contemporary anthropological attempts to tackle the problem of the (supposedly) different 
ideas about the notions person and self in different cultural settings. His essay was partly moti-
vated by a challenging statement made by the famous anthropologist Clifford Geertz that “the 
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 I owe this idea of “organising” and summarising the large field of the self-theories to Dr Jowita Kramer, Munich 
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Western self and/or cultural conception of the self is […] ‘a peculiar idea within the context of 
the world cultures’”93. The question is relevant here for narratologists generally agree that the 
presentation of characters in the literature of a given culture is, among other things, dependent on 
the respective contemporary idea of man lying at the basis of that culture.  
According to Spiro94, the anthropological literature of a certain period (roughly speaking, 
around the mid-1980s) displays a considerable interest in the cross-cultural analysis of self-con-
ceptions.95 One may even wonder whether these findings have played a role in forging certain 
wide-spread stereotypes, as for instance, the notion that the history of Western societies and tra-
ditions is mainly characterised by explorations of the outside world, while Eastern (generally 
deemed to be more ‘spiritual’) cultures were always more interested in exploring “inner 
worlds”.96  
Spiro’s survey of “the contemporary [i.e. from the mid-1980s up to the publishing of his 
article in 1993] literature on the non-Western self”97 leads him to state that instead of clarifying, 
these studies had even added to the problem by producing two basic sources of confusion. The 
first confusion was their terminological vagueness in employing the term ‘self’, which was often 
conflated with other terms such as person, individual, personality etc. and, secondly, their impre-
cise techniques of inquiry, which had to lead to conflicting interpretations.98 Depending on their 
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methodological or disciplinary contexts, from among the fields of Theology, Philosophy, Psy-
chology, and Anthropology, Spiro distinguishes altogether seven different usages of the term 
‘self’ in the surveyed literature.99   
In summing up his analysis of the Western conception of the self, which reveals a basic 
dichotomy of strong individualism (“Western”) versus (social) interdependence (“non-West-
ern”), Spiro draws the conclusion that such “[…] a typology of the self and/or its cultural con-
ception, which consists of only two types, a Western and a non-Western, even if conceived as 
ideal types [in the Weberian sense], is much too restrictive”.100  
Spiro goes on to concretise these two problematic and confusing points in the anthropo-
logical studies of cross-cultural comparisons of self and person on the basis of two examples, 
Clifford Geertz’s “cultural symbols-approach” to aspects of the Balinese, Javanese and Moroc-
can cultures101, and the “experimental task-approach” in a comparative study based on the en-
quiry of Oriyans and Americans, in the latter of which the participants were asked to describe the 
personalities of their acquaintances, carried out by Richard A. Shweder and Edmund J. Bourne 
(1984). Spiro mainly criticises the following points: Both Geertz’s and Shweder & Bourne’s ap-
proaches fail in giving an adequate account of the peoples’ own, private ‘sense of self’, their 
‘self-representation’. But, he concedes, they may very well have given accounts of how the in-
vestigated subjects see and designate their fellow-countrymen, and how they might present them-
selves to others, in short: their ‘self-presentation’.102 Spiro doubts that these methods are able to 
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provide “access to the actors’ ‘subjectivities’”.103 Instead, he suggests the following: “[I]t be-
comes necessary to study their subjectivities more directly (dare I say ‘clinically’?) – by probing 
interviews, behavioural observations, projective tests, dreams, and other personal productions – 
but this Geertz believes to be unnecessary”.104  
Apart from the problems that Spiro’s requirements pose to the historical linguist or liter-
ary scholar, to whom no living “subjects” and interviewees are available, it is Spiro’s expression, 
“the actors’ subjectivities”, that somewhat troubles me. Gaining access to those seems especially 
difficult, if not impossible, when working with pre-modern, non-European texts, written in a 
“dead” language. Therefore, we should now like to have a somewhat closer look at the develop-
ments in the European cultural sphere or context with regard to that term, ‘subjectivity’, for its 
significance for the analysis of character-presentation in Pāli suttas. In any case, as Steven Col-
lins has carefully demonstrated in the use of imagery in Theravāda-Buddhism in Selfless Per-
sons105, for a study of the representation of persons in pre-modern, non-European texts to be taken 
seriously, one has to be careful not to inconsiderately impose concepts of one culture on phe-
nomena found in another culture (that means, for instance, using the same terms for what might 
turn out to be different ideas), however similar they may appear. Therefore, one must briefly 
compare what the notion of person means in the contexts in question: the modern “Westerner” as 
reader of the Pāli suttas, and the pre-modern Indian Buddhists, as authors of the texts.  
The roots of that modern notion of subjectivity must be sought, anthropologists agree, in 
ancient Rome – the Latin word persona is the direct ancestor of the English person (Ger. Person; 
Fr. personne, etc.). The word itself, persona, through Greek prósopon designating a role in a 
drama106, may be ultimately of Etruscan origin, meaning “mask”.107 It was in ancient Rome, the 
French sociologist and anthropologist Mauss wrote, that “[…] the ‘person’ (personne) [became] 
more than an organisational fact, more than a name or a right to assume a role and a ritual mask. 
It is a basic fact of law. In law, according to the legal experts, there are only personae, res and 
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actiones: this principle still regulates the divisions between our codes of law. Yet this outcome is 
the result of particular evolution in Roman law.”108  
Mauss, comparing the development of the notion ‘person’ in different world cultures, saw 
a shared characteristic of the term in the early (that is to say, pre-Roman/Latin) stages of its de-
velopment, in the individual’s being absorbed in its rank and its role within the clan – or societal 
hierarchy and structure.109 In summary, in many ancient cultures of the world, the role and func-
tion, the rights and duties, the exact place in the societal hierarchy, and so forth, of the individual 
was deemed of utmost importance for the perpetuation of the natural order of things, even of life 
itself.110 The history of the modern individual may, then, somewhat superficially, be told as the 
history of the emancipation of man from a role and a function within a tightly knit clan-structure. 
Although one’s ancestral origins were still deemed important, the spirits of the dead ancestors 
(and their “reincarnations”) slowly began to disappear, and the free citizen, with rights and du-
ties, and personal forenames, (except for the slaves!) emerged and “[a]long with them the word 
persona, an artificial ‘character’ (personnage), the mask and role of comedy and tragedy, of 
trickery and hypocrisy - a stranger to the ‘self’ (moi) - continued on its way. Yet the personal na-
ture of the law had been established, and persona had also become synonymous with the true na-
ture of the individual.”111 Martin and Barresi want to locate the emergence of something similar 
to our modern understanding of individuality and individual characteristics as distinguishing fea-
tures of persons in Roman Stoicism (and its Greek antecedents) with its emphasis on an individu-
alised and “voluntarist” ethics (to be more precise, in the writings of Cicero, 106-43 B.C.).112 In 
short, Mauss traces the development of the semantic content of persona from the original mean-
ing “mask”/“superimposed image”, to the citizen as the legal person, then, extended it to the in-
dividual (the innermost person, “with every mask torn away”), and finally – before coming to 
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Christianity’s massive influence – via the Stoics, to contain the moral or ethical element of the 
“accomplice”, the “witness”, “the consciousness of good and evil”: “To functions, honours, obli-
gations and rights is added the conscious moral ‘person’ (personne).”113 ‘Person’ as a metaphysi-
cal entity, then, is to enter the stage through Christianity. The modern understanding of ‘person’ 
is still very much determined by the Christian concept of it. Mauss summarises the result of that 
last but all the more decisive development into modernity neatly: 
“The person is a rational substance, indivisible and individual [which is really a resurgence of Aristo-
telianism]. It remained to make of this rational, individual substance what it is today, a consciousness 
and a category.”114  
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Here also, in modernity, came into being the merging of the ‘person’ with the category of 
the Self and its identification with “psychological consciousness” (M. Mauss).115  
The culture in which the historical Buddha was born was dominated by Brahmanism,116 
with its strict social class (Skt. varṇa) system, in which each individual was assigned a fixed 
place in society and the rights and duties that came with it (Skt. sva-dharma). Welfare and, in 
fact, the persistence of the world depended on the (correct) performance of the Vedic ritual and 
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begin to have special reference to conscious beings […].”  
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who asserts an altogether different cultural context, one hostile to Brahmanic culture, for the context from which the 
Buddha stemmed and in which he taught.  
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the strict compliance of individuals with the respective norms as established by the social order 
(which was, of course, conceptualised as divine, not as a practical human invention).117 With the 
Buddha and his radical emphasis on this-worldliness and personal responsibility, the notion of 
the subject and the individual and its role and place in society also changed. Most scholars agree 
that this altered role or understanding of the individual was itself facilitated or initiated by eco-
nomic conditions, most of all division of labour, which led to a surplus in food supply, and ur-
banisation.118 The Buddha’s emphasis on the individual and man’s personal responsibility in find-
ing salvation, I want to argue, is also remarkably reflected in many of the texts of the early Bud-
dhists. Although Buddhist or, rather, Theravāda orthodoxy did its best to conceal this fact from 
us through artificially highlighting systematisations, lists of character-types (the Puggala-
paññatti, for instance), and the doctrine of No Self (anattā), I think that we can nevertheless find 
passages that can corroborate the idea that at the Buddha’s time, the concept of the individual as 
a (self-) conscious and autonomous moral agent, maybe not entirely dissimilar to some of the 
views addressed above, played no unimportant role – whether as consequence, for example of 
certain social developments or as introduced by the Buddha, however, I do not feel confident to 
decide. The internalisation of ritual procedures and the subsequent centrality of consciousness as 
the essential self or essence of the person was a process that had already begun in Brahmanic 
speculative thought (in the Brāhmaṇas and, most importantly, in the Upaniṣads).119 Although the 
Buddha took a different road concerning the Self, nevertheless the idea of the human being as 
centrally conscious (even though not in metaphysical terms) was carried further by the Buddha. 
The Buddha’s (reformulation of the) theory of karma is the key to his whole conception of ethics 
and morals, and to the understanding of the individual. The specific Buddhist idea of man as re-
flected in the Canon of the early Buddhists is very much delineated, if not determined, by two 
basic concepts: karma and the stages of the spiritual path (we will see more about the latter 
soon). In a famous statement, the Buddha is reported to have said: “Intention/volition, monks, I 
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call action.  Having intended [something], one acts by way of body, speech, and mind.”120 The 
point here is not so much whether the Buddha wanted to say that action is really of a mental na-
ture121, or (just) whether a physical action originates in consciousness as intention/volition, but 
that the statement points to the centrality of consciousness or mind in the Buddha’s/Buddhist 
conception of the person.   
Furthermore, the monk is duty-bound to constantly review himself and his (physical, ver-
bal, and mental) conduct.122 This naturally implies the element of reflexive awareness and thus, 
reflexive references to the person, as is evident through the frequent use of the word attā, “self” 
(not ‘Self’) in the suttas (as forms of “non-specialist discourse”).123    
In fact, the whole set of concepts related to the person, the individual as conscientious 
moral agent, as Mauss and others have identified as an important stepping stone in the develop-
ment towards the modern conception of the person and the Self, was also characteristic of the 
Buddha’s system of ethics, as Collins has shown.124  
In any case, first an analysis of the texts is necessary (see Part III below), before picking 
this subject up again in the Conclusion.  
In natural narratives, however, which are most often an emulation of real life and often 
based on the human experience of real life, the situation seems to be very similar – it simply and 
naturally serves the purpose of narrating a sequence of events occurring in time that, for instance, 
pronominal reference to an already introduced character is understood by the listener/reader to be 
to one and the same person introduced earlier. What is more, the notion of development of a lit-
erary character – the example par excellence being perhaps the Western genre of the coming-of-
age novel – is entirely based on our everyday, intuitive understanding of the natural continuity of 
persons through time, and not on the philosophical notion of “same person”, and much less even 
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on any such philosophical approach to the problem. What self-theorists mean, then, by the term 
Self, is that the Self is that unchangeable “thing” or the ‘essence’ of our existence, which pro-
vides for our sense of diachronic continuity:  
“We said above that according to the self-theorist, a self is what explains why some person existing 
now is the same person as someone who existed earlier. The key thing to keep in mind is that here 
‘same’ is meant in the sense of numerical identity.”125  
Additionally, M. Siderits explains, qualitative identity does not require a Self, but a per-
son with certain attributes or characteristics. This is a common misinterpretation of the term Self: 
To equate (a sense of) identity (that is, our properties) with ‘the Self’. Now, inventories of prop-
erties are different from culture to culture and in different historical periods. Those properties, 
then, are conventional, historically and culturally variable names for (personality) traits. How-
ever, these are, of course, not the traits proper. Among other things, trait names depend on con-
temporary ideas of man and conceptions of persons that are, in turn, influenced or even deter-
mined by different disciplines or social institutions like science or religion, which influence peo-
ples’ lives according to their acceptance or predominance in a given culture126 (remember that 
here we are not talking about the “sense of self”, which is innate!) So far so good; thus, literary 
character equals proper name plus properties. But, as straightforward as it seems, it does not al-
ways work out that easily.  
The above discussions express, according to Spiro, conventional “cultural conception[s] 
of the person or individual”.127 But, regardless of nationality, the manifold concepts of persons of 
the peoples and cultures in the world, as well as the learned discussions about the philosophical 
implications and intricacies of the notion of the Self, I am inclined to agree with Spiro, referring 
to the works of William James (1842-1910) and Alfred Irving Hallowell (1892-1974), that every 
(sound) human being naturally has some sense or experience of herself or himself as a distinct 
person through some sense of psychological unity or unity of consciousness:    
“Thus, both James and Hallowell, respectively the preeminent psychological and anthropological 
(cross-cultural) theorists of the self (in my view at any rate), construe self-other differentiation, the 
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sense that one’s self, or one’s own person, is bounded, or separate from all other persons as a distin-
guishing feature of the very notion of human nature.”128  
One indication for this to be true is reflected in the simple linguistic fact that many natu-
ral languages distinguish three grammatical persons, “I”, “you”, and “he/she”, which means that 
in the experiential or conceptual sphere of human beings there exists a, however basic, form of 
self-other differentiation that “not only reflects, but also facilitates a clear separation of self and 
other in all societies”.129 In this regard it is also interesting to note that the differentiation of per-
sons or characters and their recognition in the course of a story, and the linguistic devices allow-
ing for it (appellations, naming, property-attribution/characterisation), constitute one large and 
elementary part of narratological analysis of characters in texts.130 Talk of persons, even in Bud-
dhist texts, thus, often has to resort to ‘ordinary language’, underlying which is often some kind 
of folk theory of persons.  
Nevertheless, the single-most important characteristic of a “peculiar” modern – I doubt, 
however, that it is exclusively Western – understanding of the individual is perhaps the (modern) 
individual’s situation of multi-fold inner conflicts, as it features in many or most works of the 
(post-)modern Western literary canon. Yet, an innate ‘sense of self’ seems to be a shared charac-
teristic of all human beings, similar perhaps to the DNA. What is more, ‘subjectivity’ and ‘re-
flectivity’ can by no means be claimed the ‘privilege’ or ‘invention’ of Western Enlightenment 
culture alone, as Marcel Mauss, in fact, seemed to suggest, when he wrote:  
“Who knows even whether this ‘category’, which all of us here believe to be well founded, will al-
ways be recognised as such? It is formulated only for us, among us. Even its moral strength - the sa-
cred character of the human ‘person’ (personne) - is questioned, not only throughout the Orient, which 
has not yet attained the level of our sciences, but even in the countries where this principle was dis-
covered. We have great possessions to defend. With us the idea could disappear. But let us refrain 
from moralising.”131 
In a most recent development, Analytical Philosophy and scholars of Buddhist Philoso-
phy seem to jump enthusiastically at recent findings in the cognitive- and neuro-sciences. One 
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such finding, in my opinion, is especially useful in coming to terms with the relationship be-
tween the notions person and the Self: the notion of the ‘minimal self’. The main question that 
can be raised here is: “Is it possible to speak of a non-conceptual access to the self – a more 
primitive self-consciousness that does not depend on the use of a first-person pronoun […]” – for 
the use of language already implicates the existence of concepts. Support for a possible answer to 
this question has most recently come from research in the behaviour of Neonates, which Gal-
lagher summarises as follows:  
“When I perceive objects or movement in the external environment, I also gain information about my-
self – information that is pre-linguistic and non-conceptual. This is what [Ulrich] Neisser calls the eco-
logical self. The fact that non-conceptual, ecological self-awareness exists from the very beginning of 
life can be demonstrated by the important role it plays in neonatal imitation. Neonates less than an 
hour old are capable of imitating the facial gestures of others in a way that rules out reflex or release 
mechanisms, and that involves a capacity to learn to match the presented gesture. For this to be possi-
ble the infant must be able to do three things: (1) distinguish between self and non-self; (2) locate and 
use certain parts of its own body proprioceptively, without vision; and (3) recognize that the face it 
sees is of the same kind as its own face (the infant will not imitate non-human objects).”132 
Now, whether a ‘minimal self’ as a minimal subject of experience does exist and whether 
it is dependent on the brain or not, is certainly a further question. What it proves is, in any case, 
that a sense of self seems to exist prior to an infant’s learning of cultural concepts. Thus, while 
the person and the Self are culturally and historically variable theoretical concepts, the “minimal 
self”, which does not even need a ‘person’ to exist, appears to be a biological given (and perhaps 
a driving force behind the intuitive sense of self and our perceived continuity throughout much 
of later life?).133  
In summary, I agree with Collins that narrative accounts of persons are not just the poorer 
or naïve version of describing reality; it is not reducible to what has been described as the expert 
view of reality and called the Reductionist view of persons. Narrative and systematic thought are 
both genuinely human modes of expression – man is not reducible to being a “rational animal” 
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(Aristotle) – and they are, in fact, unambiguously co-existent in the Buddhist literature and tradi-
tions. I agree with Sue Hamilton134 that the Buddha has perhaps rather thought in processes and 
that the Reductionist view of persons (the five aggregates) ascribed to him was rather intended as 
a description of how a human being exists, in order to facilitate and understanding of those pro-
cesses that are relevant to understand in order to reach enlightenment, instead of a full descrip-
tion of what a human being is. That a radically Reductionist view of persons, moreover, was 
maybe felt to be unsatisfactory (in any case it was often felt to be unpractical and counter-intui-
tive, as we have seen) from very early on, is perhaps betrayed by the great number – if one can 
believe numbers – of adherents of the Pudgalavāda.   
Implicit in some Pāli suttas is what we may call a “natural” understanding or view of the 
empirical person, which involves continuity of some sort (effected through causation or ‘the law 
of karma’) over time as well as a basic sense of being an individual. As Collins has explained, 
that view of the “unenlightened man” of the person as a persisting psychological unity and the 
Buddhist intellectual tradition have been reconciled by the orthodox Theravāda tradition through 
the concept of the two truths. Moreover, conventional truth has been systematised in the concepts 
of attabhāva and puggala. Nevertheless, as Collins himself states, “although these meta-linguis-
tic doctrines do succeed – given Buddhist presuppositions – in making a coherent whole of the 
Buddhist teaching, it can scarcely be denied that they have the flavour of rationalisations after 
the event, rather than an original and determining influence on the development of Buddhistic 
culture.”135   
What is certain, though, is the departure of the ancient Indian philosophical points of 
view on the subject from the European tradition concerning the idea of the innate ‘sense of a 
self’ to be an illusion, not worth pursuing or defining, because, according to most ancient Indian 
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spiritual or philosophical traditions from the context of the samaṇa-movement, what keeps peo-
ple tied to the ever-revolving wheel of cyclic existence (saṃsāra).136 Most of the western philo-
sophical analyses, on the other hand, according to Siderits, seem to have (and still do) enter ‘the 
path’ of “[…] exploring this sense [of Self] and trying to find its underlying structure”.137 For the 
Buddha, this view is not only mistaken but, more importantly, it leads to ever more suffering and 
into a “thicket of views, a wilderness of views”, instead of to liberation from suffering. The mis-
take, according to the Buddha, is not so much to think of oneself as an individual with certain 
properties and of a certain duration, but to think of these (individually assembled and appearing) 
constituents of oneself (khandhā) in terms of ‘being’ or existence, as something permanent, be-
longing to an underlying entity that exists ‘within’ or ‘beyond’ them, by which they are “taken 
up”, “assumed” or “clung to” (upādāna-kkhandhā). What there is, according to the Buddha’s in-
sight, is an ever-changing flux of causally produced experiences, which does not necessitate any 
permanent, central, or separate subject of experience. (Similarly, it is perfectly sound and valid to 
say, “It rains”.) Sue Hamilton, in her insightful book, expresses this in the following manner: 
 “And just as this ultimate experience [Nirvana] involves understanding of the nature of the human 
being and how he or she exists in saṃsāra, so, my research has found, the Buddha also teaches that the 
analysis of the human being into five khandhas is not an analysis of what the human being consists of, 
but of those processes or events with which one is constituted that one needs to understand in order to 
achieve enlightenment.”138 
Along this line of thought, the unwillingness to engage in philosophical debate ascribed 
to the Buddha is well-known. For the Majjhima Nikāya, the Aggivacchagotta Sutta (MN 72) and 
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the Cūl̥amāluṅkya Sutta (MN 63) both present a list of ten “undeclared (avyākata) questions”139, 
and presented in the latter is also the famous simile of the man shot by an arrow, who, instead of 
calling on the doctor to quickly remove the arrow, would first want to enquire all kinds of irrele-
vant facts about the man who had shot the arrow and why, and so forth. Some argue that to that 
list perhaps an eleventh item could be added. A passage in the Saṃyutta Nikāya seems to bear 
witness to the view that the Buddha may have included speculations about the existence or non-
existence of a Self as among the questions he deemed pointless to pursue. In the Atthattaṃ Sutta, 
SN IV 400f., the Wanderer Vacchagotta approaches the Blessed One and asks him: “What is it, 
then, friend Gotama, does the Self exist?” When the Buddha remains silent, Vacchagotta asks 
whether the Blessed One thought, then, that the Self did not exist. A second time the Buddha re-
mains silent, whereupon Vacchagotta leaves.140 Asked shortly thereafter by Ānanda, why he had 
not answered Vacchagotta’s questions, the Buddha says that answering them in a positive or a 
negative way would have meant to either subscribe to “the view of eternalism” (sassatavāda) or 
to “the view of annihilation” (ucchedavāda) held by some ascetics and Brahmins. What is more, 
the Buddha continues, if he had answered that a Self exists, that would contradict his knowledge 
(teaching) expressed in the words, “All phenomena are not-self” (sabbe dhammā anattāti). If, on 
the other hand, he had said that the Self did not exist, that would have caused even more confu-
sion for the poor, already confused Vacchagotta (who obviously, according to this passage, ad-
hered to a view that affirmed the existence of Self). So, on one line of the argument, the passage 
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expresses that there is no benefit whatsoever in engaging in speculations about the existence or 
non-existence of a Self.141 
Spiro leads one to conclude that it is useful, as a working hypothesis, to keep the distinc-
tion between the notions ‘Self’ and ‘person’ or ‘personality’ – the latter being perhaps the 
broader term and the (wrongly understood) “carrier of the load”, that entails all the culturally 
variable personality concepts and ideas of man. Thus, ‘Self’ shall be used for all kinds of meta-
physical speculations about an essence of the individual, whereas ‘the sense of self’ (being an in-
dividual characterised by the broad characteristics of having an outer appearance and an inner 
life), in a strict and limited sense, should be kept to designate the basic condition of being hu-
man, which does not change inter-culturally. Buddhist thinkers, ancient and modern, therefore, 
contend that it is perfectly reasonable to drop the (permanent) Self while keeping the person.142 
Thus, while it may be the business of philosophy to exactly determine and define “the 
sense according to which someone can remain the same person in spite of changing”143, it should 
be clear that everyone possesses a very natural and sufficient working notion of that “sense” in 
order to talk meaningful about persons, however underdeveloped or under-defined, or refined, 
that sense may be. And what is more, in this regard, there do not seem to be substantial differ-
ences between Eastern and Western persons and their representations as we have seen (i.e. there 
seems to be a certain shared basic understanding of what a person is and how it appears, as a hu-
man being, discernibly individual, with an outer (human) appearance and an inner life, which 
finds its expression in culturally and historically variable terms).  
What concerns Buddhism in South and Southeast Asia, finally, as anthropological and 
other studies have shown144, is the more or less clear-cut dichotomy of ideology (the intellectual 
and analytical Buddhist teachings of anattā of the expert or “religious virtuoso”) and praxis (the 
lived reality of the non-specialist Buddhist lay person or common monastic). When looking at 
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the latter, the sense of self and personal continuity appears ubiquitous and culture-transcending, 
“wired” through the way human perception and human brains function, as is suggested by more 
recent research in the neuro-sciences145. Moreover, the Buddha may not have denied the self as a 
psychological centre of the person146, but he certainly preferred to remain silent with regard to 
metaphysical speculations concerning the Self as an entity. The suttas explicitly state he regarded 
speculating over the Self as useless with regard to what his main concern was, namely, deliver-
ance from continuous cyclic existence (nibbāna), which he had explained to be a whole “mass of 
suffering” (dukkha-khandha). Steven Collins exemplifies the point well: “Buddhist monks as so-
cial agents, therefore, are unitary and enduring persons. It is not simply a convenient (or “con-
ventional”) fiction to use ordinary language to refer to such persons”147, and I would extend his 
judgment to narratives and all persons occurring in them: Reductionist discourse can replace – 
except “in principle” – neither narrated nor experienced reality of individuals. With these re-
marks we can leave the philosophical aspects of persons, and go on to explore the methodical un-
derpinnings of this study of characters in ancient Buddhist suttas. 
The following main part of this study, then, is concerned with individuals and the way 
they are represented in narrative suttas of the Majjhima Nikāya. This study’s main interest and 
focus of inquiry, however, lies in the modes of representation of the characters in the suttas. This 
interest entails a closely text-oriented approach (‘close reading’). This approach implicates the 
understanding, common to most of the different narratological theories, approaches and models, 
that it is impossible to talk about characters in narratives without analysing what is stated about 
them on the text’s “surface-level” (the ‘level of discourse’).148  
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“[I]f narrative is as basic a cognitive process as the logical operations of systematic thought, and if 
narratives predominantly – perhaps always – require continuous and coherent characters, then we 
clearly cannot describe the world completely without referring to persons.”149  
I hope to have successfully prepared the ground in the foregoing chapter to argue for two things:  
First, that narrative is not merely the “Idiot’s Guide” to the world in absence of a more sophisti-
cated, more intellectual expert-knowledge of “[…] whatever holds the world together in its in-
most folds” (J. W. v. Goethe). Narrative is one of mankind’s very own ways of making sense of 
and explaining the world and their own part in it – man is, besides so many other things, the 
“story-telling animal”150. Humans learn best through experience, and narration in emulating real 
life may be said to be a form of experience. Moreover, even highly abstract scientific publica-
tions, say, about Quantum physics, need to resort to ‘ordinary language’ in order to communicate 
their findings.  
We have seen in Part I, following S. Collins, how Buddhism on the level of technical, 
specialist-discourse, conceives of persons respectively individuals in a “category-analytic” (S. 
Collins) way, in terms of physical and mental processes, because that serves the underlying strat-
egy of the Buddha’s whole endeavour: reaching nibbāna. Other types of discourse, though, for 
instance narratives, cannot do without reference to enduring individuals as psychological unities. 
Literary characters stand structurally at the intersection of a net of possible relations and layers 
of meaning constituted by the narrative text. The main objective now is to adequately describe, 
analyse, and interpret – quite differently from a traditional Theravāda-approach – the way per-
sons are depicted or represented in the suttas. To this end, an introduction to a method of textual 
analysis which accounts for the multivalent phenomenon that narrative characters are needs to be 
given. The Conclusion will evaluate the additional implications that the resulting findings may 
have for the understanding of persons in the narrative traditions of the context of early Bud-
dhism. 
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I presuppose two things here: First, that the suttas of the Sutta Piṭaka are all narrative 
texts to a greater or lesser degree, and, consequently, that the analytical categories of structuralist 
narratology, although developed on the basis of the modern European literary canon, can never-
theless be adequate tools for the analysis of pre-modern Indian texts.151 These closed texts, that is, 
having a proper narrative (and at times dramatic) structure with beginning and ending, contain as 
their contents kaleidoscopic representations of the world of ancient India around the 5th century 
B.C. and the doctrines of early Buddhism. The form through which this content is conveyed is 
that of narrative. Narratives may easily contain even lengthy “sermons”, discourses, dialogues, 
discussions and so on, but by their overall structure they are still narratives.152 This furthermore 
implicates that I regard the suttas to be coherent texts, that is, to borrow a famous phrase from 
James Phelan, that qua narrative [they] “can be fruitfully understood as a rhetorical act: some-
body telling somebody else on some occasion and for some purpose(s) that something hap-
pened”.153  
Although the “invention” of narratology, or rather the coining of the term, lies in the late 
sixties154 of the last century and we speak of the ‘narrativist turn’ of the nineties, we should not 
forget that the concern for narratives and narrative devices is really “an old hat”, going probably 
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as far back in time as Plato and his differentiation of mimesis and diegesis haple (which stand for 
“characters’” and “narrator’s speech” – essential terms still in use today).155 
We owe most of the definitions in the “narratological tool-box” to Gérard Genette’s 
structuralist taxonomy, that he developed during his analysis of Marcel Proust’s magnum opus À 
la recherche du temps perdu.156 Although Genette’s categories are for their part considered “an 
old hat” within the now widely out-branched field of narrative theories and their practical appli-
cations, it nevertheless remains the “toolbox”; Genette remains indispensable for anyone who 
wants to work systematically with narrative texts and narratology – although he does give people 
a run for their money. The literary theorist James Phelan writes humorously in the Preface to his 
book Living to Tell About It about his experiences in years using Genette’s narratological nomen-
clature: 
“[...] Genette’s more precise terms have not caught on beyond the field of narratology; they have even 
proved to be infelicitous coinages for most other contemporary critics in the United States. Indeed, 
experience has taught me that these terms have the unfortunate effect of making the eyes of non-narra-
tologists glaze over – or, if used in combination with other narratological neologisms (‘there’s a para-
lipsis in the proleptic homodiegesis’), making some think they should call 911.”157 
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narratological analysis distinguishes a wider range of “shades of grey” for the representation of events, speech, 
and consciousness (Cp. Neumann & Nünning 2008: 108, fig. 6.1). Cp. also Genette 1990: 42f.: “Like every 
verbal act, a narative can only inform – that is, transmit meanings. Narrative does not ‘represent’ a (real or fic-
tive) story, it recounts it―that is, it signifies it by means of language―except for the already verbal elements 
of the story (dialogues, monologues). And these, too, it does not imitate―not, certainly, because here it cannot, 
but simply because it need not, since it can directly reproduce them or, more precisely, transcribe them”. Cp. 
this to Goetsch 1985: 202: “Mündlichkeit in geschriebenen Texten ist nie mehr sie selbst, sondern stets fingiert 
und damit eine Komponente des Schreibstils und oft auch der bewußten Schreibstrategie des jeweiligen Au-
tors.” 
156
 The work in which his special nomenclature is demonstrated is Genette 1980, which has been “outsourced”, 
as it were, from his multivolume work Figures, and the English translation of which (Narrative Discourse: An 
essay in method) is perhaps his best known book. It had a follow-up, which was basically a reply to his critics, 
in 1990 (= Narrative Discourse Revisited). 
157
 Phelan 2005: xi (Preface). 
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Nevertheless, the big advantage of Genette’s system for describing narrative situations 
(and perhaps an unintended consequence) lies in the fact that his categories are more freely com-
binable to suit different kinds of narrative.158  
Genette was the first to propose the term ‘narrative levels’ and put forward a model of 
three such levels: the narrating, the very act of recounting the story, which is the “totality of the 
narrated events” (for which Genette also uses the term diegesis), which leads to the narrative or 
the “oral or written discourse that narrates the events”.159 Since narrating and narrative happen 
wholly simultaneously “in its earliest occurrence”, the difference between narrative (Fr. histoire) 
and narrating (Fr. narration) is more one of aspect than of time: narrating designates the prag-
matic aspect or the actual situation in which a discourse is uttered. Technically, there is an im-
portant difference between non-fictional narratives and fictional narratives: In a work of fiction 
this situation is of course fictive, imaginary. In a non-fictional text, say, the work of a historian, 
the story occurs first in (real) time and space but only through the “narrative act of the historian” 
the narrative comes into being. In a fictional work, on the other hand, the story and the narrative 
are “born” simultaneously in the very act of narrating. However, considering the product, or the 
discourse/narrative, there is no difference concerning the structure of the narrative transmission. 
This observation has let narratologists and some historians (e.g. Haydn White) to the statement 
that the distinction between purely fictional and purely non-fictional texts is rather a “fictive” 
differentiation of ideal types. In reality, we always have a mixed bag. This becomes especially 
problematic when no or only scanty external referents and evidences survive to prove the state-
ments made in a text. However, there are also other narratologists who refuse the “mixed-bag 
conception” (Wolf Schmid). As soon as one enters the text-world of any narrative text, they pro-
pose, one enters a fictional realm, which is ontologically different, and separate, from the real 
world (e.g. must the character Napoleon in Tolstoi’s novel War and Peace not be put on a level 
with the historical figure Napoleon Bonaparte160). Be that as it may, the understanding of Ge-
nette’s tripartite model is crucial for a narratological analysis of texts. This is a basic sketch of 
the narrative/communicative levels: 
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 In contrast, e.g., to Franz K. Stanzel’s typological circle of the ‘three typical narrative situations’, which he 
created empirically on the basis of what he found in the Western literary canon of novel literature; cp. Strasen, 
Sven: “Zur Analyse der Erzählsituation und der Fokalisierung”. In: Wenzel 2004: 113-120.   
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 Genette 1980: 13. 
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Fig.  1: Communication levels in narratives (source: Manfred Jahn, http://www.uni-koeln.de/~ame02/pppn.htm)  
 
It is an interesting feature of the Pāli suttas that they share an important structural feature 
with fictional texts. In narrative theory, this is called a ‘doubled communication situation’ (“dop-
pelte Kommunikationssituation”).161 The definition, in the words of the slavicist Wolf Schmid is 
as follows:  
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 However, this is not a proof for the fictional status of the texts. On this subject, the question of fictionality in 
the Pāli suttas, I had a brief discussion with Wolf Schmid, narratologist and Professor emeritus of Slavonic 
studies at the University of Hamburg (E-mail correspondence from 6th February 2011). I give here an English 
translation of Schmid’s answer to me: 
“Your interesting question touches on a tricky problem, and I will briefly outline the theoretical context. Your 
texts are without doubt narrative texts. Moreover, they appear as if they were fictional, such as the parables in 
the New Testament, for instance. Fictionality, however, does not mean so much in this case, for that status can 
equally be assigned to the examples in didacticism (i.e., e.g., in a math book, a joke, in a solemn speech, etc.) It 
would perhaps be useful to distinguish between didactic and artistic fictionality. 
Yes, fictional narrative tends to form a doubled communication situation, so that the narrating and its enuncia-
tor (the narrator) appear as (mimetically) constructed. The reverse, however, is most probably not the case/true 
[i.e. the conclusion that any text that shows a doubled communication situation must be fictional]. Moreover, 
doubled communication situations in a factual context are nevertheless conceivable: A (= author) tells how B 
(= narrator) has told something. Narrators are of course conceivable in any everyday-speech contexts. There-
fore, one cannot extrapolate from a doubled communication situation to fictionality. 
I cannot therefore agree with your conclusion: “That would mean that, because of the criterion of the doubled 
communication situation, in the case of the Pāli suttas we are dealing with fictional texts?!” 
A fictional status can, if other unique features such as the ones defined by E. M. Forster and Käte Hamburger, 
namely access to the mind/mental states of the characters in the third person, probably only be assigned 
through the pragmatical aspect of the speech situation and the context. What would be lost for you if you 
dropped the theory of fictionality, just stated the doubled communication situation and focused on the relation-
ship between the narrator’s and the character’s speech instead?”  
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“[…] the narrative work does not just narrate, but represents an act of narration: the narrator’s commu-
nication in which the narrated world is created is part of the fictive represented world, which is the 
object of the real author’s communication.”162  
In summary, although structurally the suttas show a doubling of the communication situ-
ation, they are not strictly works of fiction, i.e. intentionally fictive, imaginative creations of a 
single mind: an author.  
However, for the suttas, we have to extend this model to include one more level which 
oscillates, as it were, between the extra-textual (author – reader) and the intra-textual (narrator – 
addressee) realm, namely, where we have a real person (bhāṇaka) reciting or reading the text 
aloud for a real audience. In the case of the suttas, the bhāṇaka must not be confused with either 
the author or the narrator!   
I shall now give a very brief overview over narratology’s nomenclature according to Ge-
nette’s system, which uses relational grammatical terms, and a very short introduction to narrato-
logical textual analysis. For the sake of clarity, I present them first in tabular form: 
Time: (Relations of chronology between story and discourse) 
- Order (chronological, analepsis (“flashback”), prolepsis (“flashforward”)) 
- Duration (scene, stretch, summary) 
- Frequency (singulative, iterative, repetitive) 
 
Mode: 
- Distance (‘showing’ vs. ‘telling’) 
- Focalization (fixed, variable, multiple) 
 
Voice: (narrative instance/ ‘narrator’) 
- Time of the narration (relation between the time of narration and the narrated 
events) 
- Communication level (extra-, intradiegetic) 
- Presence on the level of the characters/diegesis (homo-, heterodiegetic) 
- Degree of explicitness (covert/neutral; overt/explicit) 
                                                 
162
 Schmid 2010: 33. 
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‘Discourse’, or the level of mediation, is analysed and described using the following cate-
gories163: The temporal organisation (Fr. ‘temps’) fundamentally describes the ratio of ‘narrative 
time’ (= “time of discours”) and ‘narrated time’ (= “time of the histoire”), for which order, dura-
tion and frequency of events are analysed. Mood (‘mode’) is basically perceived as the “regula-
tion of narrative information”. Its modalities are ‘distance’ (= degree of ‘mediatedness’: ‘dra-
matic’ vs. ‘narrative’ mode of presentation, for which the Anglo-American tradition has coined 
the terms “showing” and “telling”)164, and the so-called ‘focalization’, which determines the per-
ception instance from which the narrated is perceived of the narrative (‘narrative perspective’; 
Ger. “Erzaehlperspektive”), Engl. ‘point of view’), and about which there is more to say later. 
Eventually, the category ‘voice’ (‘voix’) or the Narrating Instance, gives answer to the question 
about the ‘explicit’ or ‘implicit’ narrator, the ‘enunciator’ of the text, and includes the hierarchy 
of narrative levels (= ‘primary, secondary, or tertiary narrator’) of these instances, as well as the 
degree of involvement the narrator has with the narrated events. Genette has coined the term “ex-
tradiegetic level” for the manifestation of the narration in the form of a text. According to the 
terms ‘extra-’ and ‘intra-diegetic’ when referring to the levels of enunciation in narratives, Ge-
nette terms the narrating instances of the respective levels accordingly: the narrator at the extra-
diegetic level is heterodiegetic when he/she is situated ‘outside’ of the diegesis (which is, accord-
ing to that terminology, the intradiegetic level). If a story occurs within a story, Genette calls this 
level metadiegetic165. The defining feature of narrative levels is the change in the enunciator of 
the respective discourse. Genette’s definition is as follows: 
“We will define the difference in level by saying that any event a narrative recounts is at a diegetic 
level immediately higher than the level at which the narrating act producing this narrative is placed.”166 
In other words, the crucial point is to determine the respective “locus” of the narrating 
and the relationship with the narrative. The sutta-narrator, as we will see, is an extradiegetic (he 
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 Cp. Genette 1980: 29-32. 
164
 Ibid.: 162. 
165
 Genette’s terms have repeatedly been criticised for several reasons. Mieke Bal, e.g., suggested the term hy-
podiegetic for Genette’s meta-diegetic, and in fact, in terms of a hierarchy of the narrative levels or ‘levels of 
enunciation’, it would make more sense to speak of the levels that are dependent on the ‘first narrative’ (i.e. 
Genette’s extra-diegetic level) as subordinated – thus, hypo-°. However, Bal’s suggestion causes more prob-
lems than it solves, which is why here I stick to Genette’s terminology.   
166
 See Genette 1980: 228-234. 
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enunciates the diegesis), heterodiegetic narrator (he does not appear as a character in the die-
gesis). More applications of this rather hairy category will appear in the analyses of the suttas in 
Part III. 
2.1 Focalization 
According to some narratologists ‘mediacy’ (“Mittelbarkeit”), or the presence of a mediating in-
stance between an author and the narrated world, is regarded as the defining characteristic of nar-
rativity.167 The underlying idea here is that what constitutes the nature of narrative is a “mediation 
process” which does not present the world as it really or objectively is, but as “filtered” through a 
human or human-like (a narrator’s or a character’s!) mind.168 Consequently, the narrative tech-
nique of focalization plays an important role in the narratology of characters in general and tech-
niques of characterisation in particular.169   
 “[F]ocalization ‘is the submission of (potentially limitless) narrative information to a perspectival fil-
ter.’ In the case of focalization the reader typically becomes a witness of a character’s experiences and 
not the narrator’s communicative addressee.”170  
Ordinarily, to have a certain perspective is a natural occurrence for human beings, a given. Hu-
man perception (and that of all other animals) as a source of knowledge about the world is natu-
rally perspective-bound. An “Olympic narrative perspective” (i.e. the “omniscient narrator”, or 
‘zero-focalization’ according to Genette), by contrast, is not natural or biologically possible un-
der normal circumstances. It is an artificial construct existing only in literature. The literary term 
‘perspective’ or – as Gerard Genette has clarified – ‘focalization’, still carries the danger of being 
slightly misleading. The term ‘perspective’, as it is widely used in the analysis of literature, is re-
ally a state of knowledge including, but not exclusively bound to, sense-perception.171 Our per-
ceptions of, and concepts about, the world and other beings are influenced, if not determined, 
physically by our stance, i.e. having a physical body and sense-functions. On the side of the 
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 This view is said to be prevalent mainly among the German literary theorists, “long before the term narra-
tology was introduced to describe it.” (Schmid 2010: 1). For other views on what constitutes narrativity, see 
Schmid 2010: ch. I.1.  
168
 Cp. Schmid 2010: 1, esp. the quotes from Käte Hamburger on that page. 
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 Cp. also Grabes 1978: 422. 
170
 Neumann & Nünning 2008: 95, quoting Manfred Jahn. 
171
 Cp. Genette 1980: 185-212. 
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mind, there are perspectives, too, dependent on what people have experienced, learned and made 
their beliefs in the course of their lives. Under normal conditions people cannot just change, for 
instance, their visual perspective in real life. However, one of the functions and benefits of litera-
ture is that it provides us with access to the stances, perceptions, and perspectives of others – “to 
put oneself in someone else’s shoes”, as the phrase goes.  
The term ‘focalization’ was coined by Gérard Genette, who pointed out that in the exist-
ing theories of point of view, there was a basic confusion of two different things or actions. He 
resolved the problem by distinguishing ‘voice’ from ‘focalization’: The former term provides an 
answer to the question “Who speaks?” while the latter gives an answer to the question “Who 
sees/perceives?”. As a definition one could say that a ‘focalizer’ is “[...] a psychological centre of 
orientation through whose perception and consciousness the fictional events are filtered before 
they reach the reader. Focalizers present narrative information through the filtering and colouring 
devices of their minds – [...].”172 Genette’s model has been highly influential, although it was 
also criticised and often modified, specifically by Mieke Bal, to the great displeasure of Ge-
nette.173 He distinguishes three types: (1) ‘zero focalization’, which means that no restriction of 
perspective occurs (= “omniscience”), (2) ‘internal focalization’, i.e., the limitation of the per-
spective to a character, and (3) ‘external focalization’, in which the only possibility is the view of 
the outside of the characters (no inner life is portrayed). In combination with the two possible 
narrator-positions in relation to the narrative level (‘extra-, intradiegetic), six different types are 
thus possible. 
The slavicist Wolf Schmid174 has more recently offered his own model of narrative point 
of view: he distinguishes space, ideology (judgement), time, language, and perception as parame-
ters of the notion of perspective, and forms his categories accordingly. He is thus able to add 
more scope and flexibility to the concept. However, for practical purposes, he states that the pa-
rameters of perception, ideology, and language (in this order) are the most common and the most 
important ones. He has criticised Genette’s model quite convincingly in several aspects, which 
does not mean, however, that Genette’s model is thereby outdated. Specifically, I found that for 
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 See Neumann & Nünning 2008: 93.  
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 Cp. Schmid 2010: 91-95. 
174
 Cp. Schmid 2008: 131-153. 
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my purposes in this thesis, and for the kind of texts that I am dealing with, Genette’s model is not 
only sufficient but valid.175 
Since narrative is often an emulation of real life, it is impossible to restrict the analyses of 
the presentation of characters in early Buddhist suttas to one particular aspect. For my analyses 
of three Pāli suttas from the Rāja Vagga of the Majjhima Nikāya in Part III, I have therefore cho-
sen a theoretical model that allows for a wider range of aspects of literary characters without arti-
ficially separating the element character from narrative discourse and plot. Moreover, although I 
regard the suttas, for the time being, as coherent narrative texts, I found it unreasonable at times 
to blend out other non-synchronic aspects of texts, literary characters, or areas of research, as, for 
instance, relative chronology of texts or parts of texts, “text-of-its-day-mode” readings (J. S. 
Walters), doctrinal aspects of early Buddhism, and so forth, from my discussion. 
Literary characters are seen as complex phenomena by more recent narratological theo-
rists, as “[…] devices in the communication of meaning and [as serving] purposes other than the 
communication of the facts of the storyworld as well”.176 This dimension of (literary) character, 
which James Phelan calls the ‘thematic aspect’, may potentially lead directly from description to 
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 Space does not permit to retrace all the subtleties, discussions, and disputes among theorists of narrative 
with regard to the concept of focalization here. I will therefore restrict myself to stating very briefly the major 
differences between W. Schmid’s and G. Genette’s system. Schmid’s main criticism pertains to Genette’s 
identification of the extradiegetic narrator with the author, which according to Schmid results in the limited 
independence of a narrator figure, and the consequent postulation of the category of “zero-focalization”. For 
Schmid, it is the narrator who is responsible for the selection and presentation of the happenings and events 
(cp. Schmid 2010: 58). He furthermore distinguishes between two different acts in narration: comprehension 
and representation. Although superficially similar, this dichotomy, Schmid stresses, is not the same as Ge-
nette’s distinction between ‘Who sees’ and ‘Who speaks’. Schmid’s premise with regard to the category of 
point of view is different from other models in that there can be no story without point of view prior to the act 
of narration. He explains: “Without point of view, there is no story. A story is only constituted at all when 
amorphous, continuous happenings are subjected to a selecting and hierarchizing viewpoint. One of the prem-
ises of this study is that every representation of reality implies a point of view or perspective in the acts of se-
lection, naming and evaluation of its elements.” (ibid.: 99) Now, in the Pali suttas, we have no reason to grant 
the narrator that much independence as Schmid postulates for him (which does, nevertheless, fit very well for 
his literary corpus). 
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 Jannidis, Fotis: “Character”, Paragraph 34. In: Hühn, Peter et al. (eds.): The Living Handbook of Narratol-
ogy. Hamburg: Hamburg University Press. URL = hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/lhn/index.php?title=Character
&oldid=1729 [view date: 21 Nov 2012]. 
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interpretation.177 However, making “quick leaps from traits to themes”178 has been criticized for its 
often leading to premature interpretations. Nevertheless, a common (post-structuralist) criti-
cism179 is that this ‘structuralist’ approach to the suttas seemed disconnected from the conclusions 
I had presented subsequent to my analysis. It was thus suggested to drop my structuralist ap-
proach altogether and focus on interpretation instead because that would yield the more interest-
ing results. This criticism, however, seems to me warranted only when what is meant by a “struc-
turalist approach” is a hermetic viewpoint and a certain presupposed text model, that is insepara-
ble from a literary theory, which tries to find static and universal, time-transcending structures in 
texts, the latter being understood as a network or system of significations. What I mean by ‘struc-
turalist approach’, on the other hand, is the application of the structuralist-narratological 
“toolbox” of textual analysis as fundamentally developed by Gérard Genette, without dragging 
along the ideological superstructure of structuralism itself. The advantage of the narratological 
toolbox lies in its wide scope of application and in its potential to function as a magnifying glass 
for close reading: applying the narratological categories to texts can reveal textual structures and 
details that one may easily pass over otherwise, and thus lead one to different interpretations.  
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 Cp. Jannidis, Fotis: “Character”, Paragraph 34. In: Hühn, Peter et al. (eds.): The Living Handbook of Narra-
tology. Hamburg: Hamburg University Press. URL = hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/lhn/index.php?title=Character
&oldid=1729 [view date: 21 Nov 2012]: “The difference between characters as part of storyworlds and the 
meaning of character cannot be aligned with the difference between (narratological) description and interpreta-
tion because elements of a character or the description of a character are often motivated by their role in the-
matic, symbolic, aesthetic and other networks.” 
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 See Phelan 1989: 13.  
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 As it was indeed voiced after a presentation of my method of narratological text-analysis on at least one oc-
casion: “Narrative Transmission in the Suttas of the Majjhima Nikāya”. Invited Lecture at the OCBS (Oxford 
Centre for Buddhist Studies), Michaelmas term 2011, November 21, 2011. 
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3. Narratology of Characters 
“What is character but the determination of incident? What is incident but the illustration of charac-
ter?” (Henry James)180 
 
“As an element of the constructed narrative world, ‘character’ is a general semiotic element, independ-
ent of any particular verbal expression and ontologically different from them. Like all elements of the 
narrative deep structure, it must be designated by linguistic expressions in order to be communicated, 
but it cannot be reduced to them.”181 
Although the two statements quoted above seem to express opposing viewpoints on literary char-
acters, they are not from the outset incompatible. At a closer look, literary character is a virtually 
elusive phenomenon and, consequentially, there is a theoretical problem with literary characters, 
namely, to determine what exactly a literary ‘character’ is. Is it a person, a mere name or pro-
noun, a trait, an action, or an incident? And if so, where does ‘character’ begin and ‘incident’ 
end? The problem of many narratological typologies of literary characters, as Fotis Jannidis 
states182, is that many of them do not differentiate clearly between the two narrative levels, story 
and discourse, in their attempt at establishing analytical categories, and have thus often failed to 
locate the complex phenomenon precisely.183 Characters, Jannidis summarises, can neither be re-
duced to linguistic reference, nor be regarded as direct representations of real(-life) persons. 
Nevertheless, characters do contain something of both and to identify this “something” is exactly 
                                                 
180
 From The Art of Fiction by Henry James (1885), quoted in Margolin 1983: 6. 
181
 Margolin 1983: 7. 
182
 Cp. Jannidis 2004: 163ff. 
183
 Cp. ibid.: 98. Seymour Chatman was the first to describe character as being an essential part of the level of 
story, not, as the structuralists insisted, a mere surface-/discourse-phenomenon, as Jannidis states (ibid.: 165). 
Cp. also, what Phelan writes in the Preface of Reading People. Reading Plots, 1989: ix: “A myth of origin and 
evolution: In the beginning, I set out to write a book about character in narrative. It seemed to me that from 
Henry James through E. M. Forster and Walter J. Harvey down to most recent narratologists, the study of char-
acter had always gotten too mixed up with discussions of plot or action (the what-is-character- but - the - deter-
mination - of - incident? - what - is - incident - but - the- illustration-of-character? syndrome). I intended to iso-
late the element, analyze its nature, and report my findings to a breathlessly waiting critical world. As the title 
of this book indicates, however, I too have ended by mixing up the study of character with the study of plot—
what is here called progression. I have ended this way, of course, because the events of the middle of my story 
pushed me in this direction. The more I tried to isolate the species, the more I became convinced that the task 
was impossible: the only way to capture the species’ dazzling variety was to link it to the chief influence on 
that variety—the larger context of the whole narrative created by the progression.” 
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what constitutes the ‘problem of literary characters’.184 According to the two most recent charac-
ter models in narratology, Uri Margolin’s model of characters as entities in fictional worlds (Pos-
sible Worlds Theory, PWT) and Ralf Schneider’s ‘mental models’, characters in fictional narra-
tives are both dependent on the linguistic representation and at the same time independent from 
their linguistic representation. This is a fact that can easily be demonstrated by the evident ability 
of readers to remember contents and, specifically, characters (or character traits and characteris-
tics) while the exact wording of the linguistic presentation is easily forgotten.185 Thus, the most 
recent developments in the theory of characters seek to accommodate for “[…] our sense that 
[many] fictional characters are uncannily similar to people, [which is] not something to be dis-
missed or ridiculed, but a crucial feature of narration that requires explanation.”186  
The problems facing the case of the Pāli suttas are intricate. First, although it is clear that 
the suttas are not historical sources, they are not works of fiction either. As described previously, 
their structure does indeed resemble that of fictional narratives, but that does not entail that they 
are fictions. Secondly, theories of literary characters are numerous and they are usually part of a 
larger theoretical framework or text theory. At the heart of the problem lies the aforementioned 
controversy about the status and nature of literary characters. However, this is not the focus of 
this section. Although literary character is not exclusively a phenomenon on the discourse-level 
of narratives, the analysis of character-descriptions in narrative texts must, of course, start with 
the analysis of words. According to Jannidis, characters in a narrative text are categorised as fol-
lows: based on a distinction of the two constitutive levels of narrative texts, the story-level and 
the level of discourse, linguistically, the characterisation of characters in a narrative text occurs 
on the discourse-level through the attribution or ascription of information to a character, that is 
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 Cp. Jannidis 2004: 172. 
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 Cp. ibid.: 176, esp. n. 59. 
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 See Margolin 1989: 10, quoting Wallace Martin; the full citation goes: “Plainly speaking, I suspect that the 
scholars who expressed the dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs feel, like Wallace Martin, that our 
sense that [many] fictional characters are uncannily similar to people is not something to be dismissed or ridi-
culed, but a crucial feature of narration that requires explanation (Martin 1986: 120).”  
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itself represented by a name (or, if the name was already introduced earlier, by personal pro-
noun). For example, King Pasenadi is most often in his textual occurrences introduced as “King 
Pasenadi, the Kosalan” (rājā pasenadi kosalo).187  
3.1 ‘Basis type’ 
Recent narratological theory has come to the conclusion that most of the prevalent analytical cat-
egories of character typologies (Ger. “Figurentypologien”) are to a great extent culturally and 
historically dependent.188 The American literary critic James Phelan described is in this way: 
“Silently underlying this discussion of the mimetic component are some messy problems. First, all this 
talk about characters as plausible or possible persons presupposes that we know what a person is. But 
the nature of the human subject is of course a highly contested issue among contemporary thinkers.189” 
It is, however, as Jannidis has argued, reasonable to assess a ‘basis type’ (Ger. “Basist-
ypus”) of literary characters, from which it is then possible to move on to the cultural particulars 
of the presentation. Comparing the findings of linguistic analysis of the presentation of charac-
ters with a respective prevalent idea of man is only a second step, and perhaps not always possi-
ble. The reason is that no culture in the world features one consistent characteristic personality 
model or idea of man (not even in a single historical epoch) and it is, of course, not advisable to 
superimpose such a model, even should one think to have identified it, on the texts. As Susan 
Hamilton has observed:  
“In view of such diversity just in the contemporary Western understanding of the human being, one 
cannot assume a priori that any culture will have a consistent or coherent view of what constitutes a 
human being. And it would be particularly inadvisable to make such an a priori assumption of the Pali 
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 See e.g. all the beginnings of the suttas in the Kosala Saṃyutta of the SN, in all of which Pasenadi occurs as 
one of the main characters (besides the Buddha himself, of course). 
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 Cp. Jannidis 2004: 97. As examples, Jannidis discusses Baruch Hochman’s dichotomous categories ‘coher-
ence’ – ‘incoherence’ and ‘changeability’ – ‘constancy’ as potentially problematic to apply in historical and 
cultural settings different from the modern European. Some cultures/societies may not be interested in the ‘co-
herence’ of characters, i.e. a stable character identity, and the category ‘changeability’ is mostly, or perhaps 
solely, “a reflection of a modern interest in ‘personal development’” (ibid.: 97); cp. the genre of the coming-of-
age novels (Ger. “Entwicklungsroman”). Thus, the creation of categories is very much directed by specific in-
terests. 
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 Phelan 1989: 11. 
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canon since it is a body of oral literature which is generally thought to have come together over 
time.”190  
Fotis Jannidis191 has proposed a ‘basis type’ or ‘minimal conditions’ for the perception of 
a textual phenomenon as a character to occur: (1) the ability to act (intentionally), (2) the differ-
entiation of an inside (which is invisible, like thoughts and feelings) and an outside (which is vis-
ible, i.e. the body), and (3) the differentiation of transitory and persistent personality features 
(traits), which seems to be an inter-culturally relatively stable concept. In any case, these three 
aspects are very likely innate to the human condition and the way humans perceive other per-
sons. However, it is important to consider, Jannidis points out, not to equate the perception of 
characters in these basic categories with the perception of actual persons. Humans have a natural 
disposition to ascribe, for instance, intentions to their fellow human beings. However, in the nar-
rated world, it becomes a fact that intentions are real and not the very fact of the human disposi-
tion to ascribe intentionality. A narrative is essentially an image of the real world (“an illusion of 
mimesis”, G. Genette). Anything that is a part of that image can become a part of the narrated 
world, which is the reason why “witches can be real in the world of a novel”192 and Mahā Mog-
gallāna can visit the god Sakka and make his Vejayanta palace quake with his big toe.    
By the same token, ‘naturalism’ of literary characters can hardly be considered a gener-
ally and universally valid criterion of difference, since a realistic representation of characters 
(“complex character”) is known to be an ideal of the modern novel (a European development 
starting with the 18th century) and therefore bound to a specific character-ideal, conditioned by 
historical times and spaces and reader expectations.193 The whole problem, then, hinges on how 
far the rules of the fictional world can be seen to be modeled after the actual world (in fictional 
narratives, however, this need not always be the case!). This is rather a question of style and 
taste, and in the case of the Pāli suttas we would easily run into trouble, as we have seen, since it 
is completely natural for Mahā-Moggalāna to pay occasional visits to Sakka, king of the gods, 
residing in the Tāvatiṃsa heaven. Thus, characters in narrative fiction can be person-like, and 
their representation is very often only effective because they resemble real persons, but it would 
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be too naïve an assumption to put literary characters generically on a level with real persons. 
Nevertheless, a human-like ‘basic type’ of literary character seems to exist, a structure basic 
enough to be shared by all human beings, which serves as an identifying feature in texts. The 
same is true for the persons acting in the early Buddhist suttas, although it is not intended here to 
deny their historical existence. However, it has become almost commonplace in the contempo-
rary discussion to assume that historical texts contain a good portion of rearrangement and other 
“manipulations” of the historical and/or narrative raw material they are based on.  
A similar problem constitutes the category of personality ‘traits’: they are not “atomic”, 
unchangeable factors; they convey information about a character which is largely dependent on 
language, literary genre, and current, that is, culture- and time-specific personality models (like, 
e.g., the psycho-analytical model etc.).194 
On one level (the “category-analytic” discourse of Theravāda orthodoxy), for instance, 
the characters’ traits in the Pāli suttas (Ger. “Figurenmerkmale”) are very often expressed in bi-
nary distinctions – as properties or characteristics of persons, either vested in the language of the 
Path (sekha; a-sekha) or in dependence of the early Buddhist system of ethical or moral values. 
In most cases, furthermore, they refer to the generic states of mind of individuals, like the oppo-
sition “negligence” (pamāda) and “vigilance” (appamāda), with the positive term having the 
greater value attached to it. These distinctions may be instantiations of the more abstract “man-
in-the-world”/saṃsāra ― “world-renouncer”/mokṣa dichotomy.  
3.2 Theories of Characters 
It is well-known that literary characters contribute to the significance of a work. In that charac-
ters may embody certain themes, they can fulfill different functions in the progression of the nar-
rative action, and in particular they contribute to the structures of meaning and signification.   
However, an equally well-known phenomenon in (Western) fictional literature is that that 
literary characters – once the members of a given society or epoch have grown accustomed to 
them – step out, as it were, of their realm, the story-world, to virtually commence an existence 
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independent of their medium of origin.195 Another, but related, phenomenon was expressed by 
Peter Lamarque: 
“What is striking is how often fictional characters from the literary tradition – like the well-loved Eliz-
abeth Benett, Jane Eyre, Oliver Twist, Pip, Tess of the d’Ubervilles – enter reader’s lives at a highly 
personal level. They become, as Martha Nussbaum puts it, our ‘friends’, and for many readers the 
lives of these characters become closely entwined with their own.”196 
Also, Lamarque remarks197, these lives from the canonical literary tradition seem, as time 
goes by, to serve as blueprints for the stories people tell about their own lives. It is reasonable to 
assume that the principle of narrating exemplary lives may also be applicable to Indian Buddhist 
literature, in which the identification or, at least, the process of comparing and/or identifying 
oneself with certain characters, may every now and then occur intentionally.198 
This phenomenon and its related problems are also well known in literary criticism, and 
attention has especially been drawn to it by those theories of literary characters whose objective 
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it is to integrate the cognitive processes of the readers.199 The phenomenon can be explained by 
reference to the two levels of representation (the story- and the discourse-level): The constitution 
of the story-world or the narrated world is dependent on the presentation in the narrative dis-
course, but they are not identical. The narrative discourse triggers certain semiotic processes 
(Ger. “Zeichenprozesse”), which become detached from the informational content of the mes-
sage in the brain/mind of the reader. Empirical findings suggest that this is actually quite often 
the case: The average reader frequently remembers the content, but easily tends to forget the (ex-
act) wording of a text.200 The representation of a literary character seems therefore to be much 
more dependent on certain cognitive operations of readers (so-called ‘bottom-up’ processes201) 
than is generally assumed.202 The thus generated mental image can then further enriched be by 
additional information from (real-) world/encyclopedic knowledge (Ger. “Weltwissen”) of the 
reader (‘top-down’ inferences). Although this is an irrefutable fact, as the most recent cognitive 
approaches to narrative have shown, the structuralist theory of characters, on the other hand, has 
no place for what James Phelan calls the ‘mimetic aspect’ of literary characters. However, it is 
beyond doubt that structuralism has contributed invaluable insights, and as Jannidis has ex-
plained in his historical overview of the development of theories of characters in literary fiction, 
every new theory has built its edifice on the foundation of the insights of their (structuralist) pre-
decessors.  
For these reasons, from now on I will use the term ‘character’ when talking about the per-
sons that are depicted in the Pāli suttas, without, however, implying a final judgement about their 
ontological status. Therefore, I do not presuppose them a priori as either fictive “paper beings”203 
(Mieke Bal) or representations of real persons, and for the purpose of this study, which is largely 
synchronic, it is in fact irrelevant. The term character seems ideal for that purpose. Uri Margolin 
has provided a definition of ‘character’:  
“The core sense, shared by all usages of ‘character’ in literary contexts, is that of narrative agent 
(=NA), that is, an individual capable of fulfilling the argument position in the propositional form DO 
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(X), which is the sine qua non of all narrative and drama. It is an individual, human or human-like, of 
whom actions can be predicated.”204  
According to Uri Margolin, for readers to turn their focus of attention onto characters is 
purely a matter of choice, a second-level “interpretative activity” which is itself subject to certain 
conditions like contemporary prevalent poetic concepts and (literary as well as sociological) con-
ventions.205 This is true, given the numerous other interesting aspects contained in the suttas as, 
for instance, the wealth of Buddhist teachings themselves. What is more, although Margolin’s 
statement points to the problem of the impossibility for historical scholars to know whether the 
historical addressees of the suttas had the same interest in their characters as a modern audience 
has, the following analyses show how characters have essential parts in the structure and narra-
tive progression of the texts, and one can therefore assume that characters were indeed, in some 
way or other, in the focus of the attention of the historical listener/reader too.  
Having thus decided to turn one’s attention to the characters, in order to go about the task, 
one is confronted with a plethora of character typologies (Ger. “Figurentypologien”). Within the 
already very diverse field of the discipline of narratology, a number of theories of characters ex-
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ist. They range from models grown out of structuralist approaches that view characters as ‘act-
ants’, roles, and narrative devices up to characters as individuals/persons.206 In an important es-
say from 1983 about characterisation, Margolin summarises the different historically evolved po-
sitions of narratology regarding characters in literary narratives concisely.207 Characters, he 
writes, can be described as ‘actants’, as “abstract spheres of actions, defined in terms of a narra-
tive case grammar (object, instrument, etc.)”, as ‘roles’, embodying “standardized, stereotyped 
and codified social role[s] with the norms of action and appropriateness, expectations and values 
associated with it”, they can be described as ‘individuals’ and/or (possible) ‘persons’, i.e. as nar-
rative agents viewed “in terms of inner states, mental properties, personality traits, and general or 
specific complexes of such properties, i.e. individual personality models or personality types”208, 
and, finally, characters as ‘narrative devices’, sub-dividing in ‘character as symbols’ or as 
‘theme, idea, thesis, [or] literary archetype’, character as ‘narrative instance’, and character as 
part of the formal design of the action of a particular work (as agent, “foil”, “card”, “ficelles”, 
and so forth, as described by Henry James). 
In a later essay, Margolin gives a more detailed account209 of the field, which is very di-
verse and sometimes even contradictory, and in which he identifies two layers of meaning (“as 
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an intuitive, pre-theoretical term and as a theoretical term within the confines of an explicitly for-
mulated theory” – and he bemoans that they all too often had been blurred!) and six explications 
of the theoretical term ‘literary character’, which oscillate between the two poles of “textual-
ity/signifier” and “representation/signified” together with their respective theoretical frame-
works: a) “Character as the topic entity of a discourse” [= linguistic signifier; analysis is strictly 
intratextual or text-internal]; b) “Character as device, one of the pieces or components of the 
composition or design of the literary work”; c) “Character as textual speaker (speech position, 
voice, source of utterances) or communicative role in the enunciatory system represented by the 
text; in other words, a narrative instance or level”; d) “Character as thematic element, one of the 
figural projections of the narrative text’s underlying macrosemantic/thematic deep structure, 
‘theme anthropomorphized’”; e) “Character as [1] actant and [2] role. For Greimas and his 
school, character as actant is a purely formal category, involving whoever carries out or under-
goes an action, preceding any semantic investment. […]. As a second step, the actant may un-
dergo some qualitative semantic concretization, turning it into a role (that is, a bundle of social 
functions). At this point, standardized, stereotyped, and codified attributes, together with the 
norms of action and appropriateness, expectations, and values associated with them, become the 
defining features of character”; “f) Character as non-actual individual, designated by means of a 
referring expression, who is included in or is a member of some nonfactual state of affairs or 
possible world [‘Possible Worlds Theory’].” 
The category or the view of “character as narrative instance” is particularly productive 
from the perspective of narratological textual analysis (Ger. “Erzähltextanalyse”) because it fur-
ther yields information about such important analytical categories as ‘point of view’, ‘focaliza-
tion’, ‘narrator’, ‘character’, speaker, and so forth.210 The last mentioned model, however, the 
“character as a non-actual individual” in a “non-actual world” (= “textual actual world”), is inter-
esting for its ability to connect (Ger. “Anschlussfähigkeit”) to extra-textual, historical personality 
theories. The treatment of literary characters as representational, as ‘possible persons’, on its 
part, offers the possibility to account for most audiences’ intuitive response to characters as per-
son-like, and the interpretation of the possible motivations underlying their actions from folk-
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psychology. This procedure, as Herbert Grabes (1978) has explained based on empirical findings 
in psychology is not different from what one does in real life when interpreting the behaviour of 
fellow human beings.211 Because of the role conscious and reflecting individuals play in the sut-
tas, the view I shall in principle, but not exclusively, adopt is that of characters as possible per-
sons. As is apparent, there exists a stark opposition between the structuralist and the “personal-
ity” view, which lies at the centre of the New Critics’, the Structuralists’, and the post-Structural-
ists’ criticisms of too naïve a treatment of literary figures as real persons (= a “mimetic treatment 
of literary characters”).212 However, these different theories and character-models are not relat-
ing to each other in a kind of hierarchy of “increasing specification” (from ‘actant’ to ‘individ-
ual’).213 If anything, their criteria and/or their “defining features” (Ger. “Differenzkriterien”) are 
different in each case and the insights and the knowledge about characters thus gained from nar-
ratives is not lost with the emergence of each new character-model. Ideally, applied in a com-
bined way where possible and/or necessary, and without dragging along their respective ideolog-
ical superstructure (particularly with regard to structuralism), the different kinds of information 
about characters thus obtained could rather complement each other or ‘pile up’ instead of contra-
dicting each other, and have the potential to show a complex phenomenon from different an-
gles.214 However, when things start getting too complicated, one is well advised to concentrate 
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on the basics. Although often criticised, narratologists have in principle never really departed 
from E. M. Forster’s pioneering and sagacious distinction of literary characters as either “flat” or 
“round”:  
“We may divide characters into flat and round. Flat characters were called ‘humours’ in the seven-
teenth century, and are sometimes called types, and sometimes caricatures. In their purest form, they 
are constructed round a single idea or quality; when there is more than one factor in them, we get the 
beginning of the curve towards the round. The really flat character can be expressed in one sentence 
[…].  
It is only round people who are fit to perform tragically for any length of time and can move us to any 
feelings except humour and appropriateteness. […] The test of a round character is whether it is 
capable of surprising in a convincing way. If it never surprises, it is flat. If it does not convince, 
it is flat pretending to be round. It has the incalculability of life about it – life within the pages of 
a book.”215  
Now, how does one get, in a methodical way, from names to qualities, to traits, to charac-
ters, and, finally, perhaps to a personality model?  
3.3 Characterisation 
Before turning to the problem of finding a model that is suitable to adequately describe charac-
ters in the suttas, one must look at the problem of characterisation, which lies at the heart of any 
character-analysis. 
One of the more intricate problems of literary characters is the question of how a coherent 
and unified semantic structure like a character in a narrative, a ‘macrostructure’, is developed 
from individual and consecutive textual/linguistic signifiers like words and sentences in the mind 
of a recipient.216 In this context, Herbert Grabes questions what the “objective correlative” on the 
surface-level of a text is that ultimately triggers the successive subsuming of character-related 
information under the unified macro-semantic structure ‘character’?217 Therefore, what lies at the 
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heart of any character analysis is a linguistic/textual analysis of the characteristics, attributes, and 
traits ascribed to characters – a process called ‘characterisation’. 
However, Uri Margolin, among others, has shown that characterisation proper, the “con-
stitutive activities of the reader which involve the ascription of mental properties (traits, features) 
or complexes of such properties (personality models or types) to human or human-like NAs 
[=”narrative agents”]”218 is at its very core a mental, inferential process of readers.219 What is 
more, the treatment of character as individual, as Margolin in his 1983 essay does, presupposes 
some sort of psychological model of character. This means the ascribing of (or deriving from) of 
an inner, mental or psychological life to ‘narrative agents’ by readers/listeners. Margolin writes:  
“[…] ’character’ is meaningless without the notions of individual, person, mind, inner states and men-
tal or psychic life.”220  
Furthermore, Margolin suggests the following terminology: 
“The ascription of individual properties to a NA [= “narrative agent”] may be called ‘characteriza-
tion’, and the ascription of complexes of properties termed ‘character-building’, or character-profil-
ing”, or ‘Portraiture’.”221 
The ascription of properties or complexes of properties to narrative agents is understood 
and analysed as a rule-based mental activity of readers/listeners. According to Margolin, two 
processes or activities follow upon each other here: first the reader/listener infers mental states 
etc. from a character’s actions (verbal, mental, or – representational – physical ones), (physical) 
appearance (“looks”), settings, and so forth , to a character’s personal features and traits, and the 
second process consisting in a dynamic and on-going  “accumulation” (during reading), “classifi-
cation”, “hierarchization”, “confrontation”, and “interrelation” of individual traits into a stable 
and unified personality model.222 Margolin explains:  
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“In fact, one of the first steps on the way from characterization to character-building is the determina-
tion whether a given trait occurs at one/several/all times and in one/several/all situations for this NA 
[= ‘narrative agent’].”223  
Thus, according to Margolin the process of characterisation, unfolds as follows: Based on certain 
premises, the reader makes inferences termed ‘characterization statements’ (“CS”). These prem-
ises –  textual cues in their most basic form: proper names or pronouns to which attributes are at-
tached – consist of224: 1.) “Explicit characterization statements” (they actually function in both 
directions: when a character ascribes to or describes certain features of another character, these 
verbal acts can in turn be equally revealing about the personality of the character making the 
statement); 2.) Statements about the mental, verbal and physical acts performed by characters in 
the story-world (“dynamic elements”); 3.) Statements about a character’s name, appearance, the 
cultural and natural settings (“static elements”); 4.) Inferences made from statements about artis-
tic compositional patterns like arrangement of characters (Ger. “Figurenkonstellation”) in artistic 
narratives. Points 2.) and 3.) are often called methods of indirect characterisation and they are 
generally held to be much too diverse to be listed comprehensively225; the aforementioned there-
fore represent the most common and obvious parameters.226   
Certainly, it is one facet of the truth that characters in (written) narratives are first of all 
an illusion or an “illusion of mimesis”, as Gérard Genette has expressed that written or oral nar-
ration is truly a narrative representation of persons and events. Nevertheless, it is equally true 
that the characters presented in the narrative are neither just linguistic structures (nor, ultimately, 
ink on paper) nor, as entities in possible worlds, self-contained, i.e. existing as complete charac-
ters/persons merely by the text.227 The reader or listener of a narrative plays a crucial role in the 
construction and complementation (Ger. “Leerstellen”) of the story-world the text signifies. Fotis 
Jannidis (2004) has analysed three kinds of knowledge that readers generally apply in the pro-
cess: (1) a concept of a ‘basis type’ (i.e. the question, which basic or minimal characteristics do 
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textual structures need to have so that they are recognized as a character or a person?), (2) 
knowledge or presuppositions about character models or types (these are culturally and histori-
cally variable), and (3) world-knowledge, as well as knowledge of narrative and genre-conven-
tions.228 An illustrative example for the role played by genre-conventions, and possibly reader-
expectations, is the book Great Disciples of the Buddha by Hellmuth Hecker and the Ven. 
Nyanaponika229. The authors present 24 of the most prominent disciples of the Buddha found in 
the Pāli scriptures in a completely coherent biographical manner – a genre that is completely al-
ien to ancient Indian literature. Thus, their reading is in no way reflected in, or suggested by, the 
original texts (which themselves give at best situational snippets of the life, respectively the ac-
tions of a certain figure).230 
Concerning the second point mentioned above, i.e. that characters are not self-contained 
“as entities in a story-world”, more recent narrative theories accommodate the fact that the story- 
or the narrated world comes into being only through the process of narrative communication (or 
the participants and the roles they take on during the process of the narrative communication), 
and that “characters thus form a part of the signifying structures which motivate and determine 
                                                 
228
 Jannidis 2004: 126ff., and Jannidis, Fotis: “Character”, Paragraph 4. In: Hühn, Peter et al. (eds.): The Living 
Handbook of Narratology. Hamburg: Hamburg University Press. URL = hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/lhn/in-
dex.php?title=Character&oldid=1729 [view date: 15 Nov 2012] & Paragraph 10: “Until recently, there was 
nothing like a coherent field of research for the concept of character, but only a loose set of notions related to it 
touching on such issues as the ontological status of characters, the kind of knowledge necessary to understand 
characters, the relation between character and action, the naming of characters, characterization as process and 
result, the relation of the reader to a character centering around the notions of identification and empathy, etc. 
[…]. The situation has changed over the past ten or fifteen years thanks to a series of monographs on character, 
all of which are indebted to the ground-breaking work done by Margolin in the 1980s and 1990s. Most of these 
studies draw on the cognitive sciences and their models of text processing and perception of persons […].” 
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 = Nyanaponika & Hecker 2000. 
230
 Such an undertaking is of course warranted, for example, for the purpose of religious/spiritual uplifting and 
inspiration. The book thus addresses a specific kind of reader: A Western follower of the Theravāda tradition. 
The book, furthermore, may betray a certain need for identification with specific characters in the early Bud-
dhist texts on the side of Western followers of Buddhism. The main point of criticism with regard to the 
method employed by the Ven. Nyanaponika and Hecker in their book is that they compile information about 
the Buddha’s disciples indiscriminately from all the collections of the Pāli Canon including the commentaries 
such as the Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā. The authors’ explicit aim was to cobble together as much information on 
the persons as possible from all the different sources to produce, say, individual “hagiographies of Buddhist 
Saints” – a genre which did not exist as such in ancient India. In the Preface to their book, the authors even 
state frankly that besides compiling information from varied sources they felt free to complete the characters 
where they felt that it was necessary or where they were able to do so. Furthermore, the authors state that they 
have deliberately taken an emic viewpoint in presenting these twenty-four Buddhist figures; cp. ibid.: 24.     
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the narrative communication.”231 In other words, the study of characters in narratives according to 
the most recent narratological models of character analysis do not regard literary characters as 
something static232, as merely static textual structures awaiting in situ-discovery (as was very 
much the idea of structuralism), or as only the effect of a linguistic system of references. More 
recent theories regard character as a complex and dynamic process by which, on the basis of 
(textual/linguistic) signs, the reader/listener draws inferences, which are, in turn, based on or in-
fluenced by particular culturally and historically variable parameters.  The reader then piles up, 
revises, and modifies character-models based on the (additional) textual information received 
during the narrative communication process. At the end of that process, that is, the end of the text 
or the narrative, a ‘mental model’ of particular characters is concretised. 
Already, as early as 1978, Herbert Grabes explained the “mechanism” and the nature of 
the formation of the narrative illusion (Ger. “Illusionsbildung”) with regard to characters.233 Im-
aginings of literary characters, Grabes writes, form through a process that he calls “synthe-
sis/synthesisation” (Ger. “Synthetisierung”). The concrete work that the reader or listener has to 
provide in order to make this happen is to correlate the information on persons successively pro-
vided by the narrative with an identifiable and recognisable ‘substrate’ (Ger. “Substrat”).234 This 
substrate is sufficiently provided by a proper name or an unambiguously identifiable pronoun. 
However, the reader will probably also search for recognisable non-changing traits (Ger. “Merk-
male”). In this regard, it is interesting to note how Grabes in this for German narratology founda-
tional essay expands the range of character-information from direct and indirect characterisation 
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 Jannidis, Fotis: “Character”, Paragraph 6. In: Hühn, Peter et al. (eds.): The Living Handbook of Narratol-
ogy. Hamburg: Hamburg University Press. URL = hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/lhn/index.php?title=Character
&oldid=1729 [view date: 15 Nov 2012]. 
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 However, this is what college-level introductions to narratology often suggest when they show literary char-
acters to belong to the story-level of narratives and, together with the ‘settings’, as elements of the ‘existents’ 
of a narrative; cp. e.g. Neumann & Nünning 2008. Regarding the necessity of including the reader in the recep-
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zogenen Schlussfolgerung, dass sich die Erzählforschung nicht auf die Modelle des klassischen Strukturalis-
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tischer Textmerkmale beschränken darf, sondern auch solchen dynamischen Faktoren wie der Textrezeption 
und Textverarbeitung Rechnung tragen muss […].” 
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 Cp. Grabes 1978; the author favours a reading of literary characters as ‘possible persons’ and can therefore 
perhaps be regarded as a pioneer of a theoretically sound mimetic and psychological approach to character. 
234
 Cp. Grabes 1978: 421. 
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to the characters’ recurrent utterances, gestures, and ‘perspective’ (Ger. “Perspektive, Auf-
fassungs-, Sicht- und Denkweise”). According to Grabes, it is precisely the ‘recurrences’ 
(“Rekurrenzen”) which encourage readers to transcend the level of the text and reach into the 
realm of imagination, the “inner world”, in order to venture into imaginings and prognoses about 
the essence or the nature of the characters and their future behaviour or actions, which is, in nov-
els, e.g., a basic strategy to keep the reader interested.235  
The phenomenon of the formation of character-related ideas “in one’s head” and their 
successive modifications on the grounds of new information while reading on, is easily compre-
hensible through a self-experiment: Anyone can experience for oneself while reading a novel 
that although one’s imaginings feed solely on the text (in the case of fiction the only information 
available during the actual reading process), in the process of (re-)shaping the narrated world, the 
resultant imaginings/images cannot be reduced to the text (the linguistic signs or the discourse 
level). In other words, although a strictly text-oriented approach like Lamarque’s (2007), e.g., 
proves a point in stating that the supplementation of literary characters was a kind of impoverish-
ing “abstraction” (Lamarque 2007: 118), it is empirically clear that this is only half of the truth. 
For it is (1) what simply and inevitably happens in our minds while reading (but also what occurs 
while, for instance, making new acquaintances in real life!), and (2) what is intended by authors 
to happen because it is part of “the game”, the cooperation-principle that applies to the relation-
ship between authors and their audiences, as Jannidis has explained.236  
Grabes describes three possibilities or modes for readers/listeners to deal with new infor-
mation obtained about an already introduced character: the reader or listener can (1) discard the 
already formed “image”, (2) modify it (this is commonly called development and a whole liter-
ary genre is devoted to such narrative: the coming-of-age novel) or, finally, (3) attest to the in-
consistency of the character (Ger. “Bruch”). A typical case for the second point would be the 
classical detective story.  
Another important aspect of the formation of imaginings (Ger. “sich Vorstellungen ma-
chen von”) of characters is the so-called ‘primacy effect’. Grabes references psychological ex-
periments where test subjects were asked to envision persons based on written descriptions of 
features of fictive persons. The experiments showed that the first information or impressions 
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given were dominating the test participants’ image of the fictive person. Therefore, Grabes sug-
gests, one is well advised to give the first information received on a character particular im-
portance, and to pay special attention to them in the further analysis of literary characters.237 The 
findings further suggested that the forming of such a “character-prejudice” through the primacy 
effect is effective even despite the knowledge that characters are constructed successively, built 
up step by step through the successive distribution of information in the narrative discourse. The 
first information given is of primary importance in a (fictive or ancient) literary text because the 
narrative discourse is the only source of information for the reader. He/she has no possibility to 
refine the picture by checking back to ‘reality’. 
The consequent imaginings, Grabes explains, are further influenced by the personal back-
ground and life-experiences of the respective reader (no two readers will create absolute identical 
imaginings), but to an even greater extent by what Grabes calls ‘social stereotypes’ (Ger. 
“soziale Stereotypen”).238  The formative processes with regard to character-images are basically 
the same in real life and in literature. The same psychological “mechanisms” apply239, as, for in-
stance, the ascription of inner qualities and characteristics (‘traits’) of characters from observed 
behaviour. Readers automatically have recourse to social stereotypes to supplement the infor-
mation the literary piece gives, in order to yield a complete picture of a (possible) person. That 
process, Grabes explains, sets in already after the first information about a character is received. 
The exact relationship between the depiction of social types in narratives and contemporary per-
sonality models, however, is not clear-cut. Even so, a historical narratology (of the kind that 
Jannidis (2004) proposes, for instance) is, on the other hand, and for obvious reasons, more con-
cerned with reconstructing the authorial intention of a work of fiction instead of delving into em-
pirical studies of contemporary reception or even the historical reconstruction thereof. This is 
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 Cp. ibid.: 416. Grabes subsumes under this term certain fixed (within any culture or society) conventional 
and commonly/widely shared combinations of personal feature/traits, but makes no clear distinction between 
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etc. Cp., e.g., Theophrastes’ work Characters (or “Behavioural Types or Distinctive Marks of Characters”, as 
is probably the work’s true title; cp. Diggle 2004: 5). 
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 Jannidis (2004: 185ff.) emphasises the role of folk-psychology in this respect.   
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noteworthy because it need not always be the case for the rules of the narrated world and the 
real, actual world to partly or entirely overlap. For example, it is not so clear whether the differ-
ent planes of divine forms of existence (deva-lokā) described in the suttas was common currency 
in ancient Indian society or is known only through Buddhist narratives.240 In any case, when deal-
ing with non-naturalistic narrative, the application of genre-specific types makes perhaps more 
sense than that of social stereotypes. 
Grabes thinks that the competence by which the reader accomplishes the ‘synthetization’ 
or building up (Ger. “Synthetisierung”) of character information works analogous to one’s own 
self-awareness (Ger. “Selbsterfahrung”), one’s self-perception of being an individual. From that, 
Grabes explains, one infers the in the end unprovable assumption that others must possess some 
form of self-awareness similar to one’s own. These assumptions form the basis for all of our so-
cial interactions. This is one of the crucial points of theories of literary characters. Plus, it is the 
point of intersection of character with culture-dependent personality models.241 One’s own sense 
of self and self-awareness taken together with the assumption that it is similar to, or even identi-
cal with, others’ sense of self and self-awareness, is called the folk-theory of persons. 
Grabes’ main concern or motive, however, is to arrive at a well-founded and reasonable 
hypothesis (Ger. “begründete Hypothese”) about the personality model of an author or a certain 
group of texts and thus, via the author’s intention, at a historical understanding of the respective 
character model employed. Thereby the readers or listeners will find themselves in a position in 
which they are able to add a further dimension to the already instantly available implicit person-
ality theory (Ger. “implizite Persönlichkeitstheorie”).242 Perhaps, he further emphasises, one 
would best attain to that (underlying) personality theory, which is at the basis of literary charac-
ter, by paying attention to the characters’ dynamic aspect through tracing the ‘narrative progres-
sion’ (to borrow a term used from J. Phelan) on the discourse level by way of observing the (or 
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 Cp. Grabes 1978: 421. 
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 Cp. Grabes 1978: 427. 
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one’s own?) succession of personality-syntheses at different points in time during which the nar-
rative progresses.243 To illustrate this, Grabes warns us about the limitations of a personality the-
ory-guided synthesization of characters for our understanding of characters in any given cor-
pus244: One might be surprised, for instance, how neatly the analytical categories of the Freudian 
personality theory fit the Shakespearean characters. But for all that, Grabes asks the rhetorical 
question, at what other conclusion is one to arrive, if one’s presupposed personality theory, ac-
cording to which one pieces together the successive character information during the reception 
process, is S. Freud’s?245   
According to Margolin, the process of inferring character-attributes is to be carried out as 
follows: a ‘characterisation statement’ (about actions, settings, formal patterns) can be inferred 
on the basis of a premise  (leading to) “a statement about non-structural attributes of a narra-
tive agent” (inferred by applying the (“inference-”) rules of the text(-world))  conclusion (= 
statement/set of statements about character attributes)  ordering and organising the “named, 
inferred and accumulated attributes or traits” into a set of attributes concludes the process of 
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characterisation.246 This descriptive and inferential activity on the part of the reader/listener leads 
to a temporary “character frame” (= a set of character traits of a given character at a certain point 
in time in a narrative). However, since narratives are by nature progressing, the goal of character 
analysis may be described as “the integration of successive character frames into a final retro-
spective overall character portrait.”247 The processes or steps towards a “global personality 
model”, then, are essentially the same as those explained for the character frames.248 An assess-
ment, finally, of the relations that obtain between individual character frames leads to a “result-
ant global personality model”, for which the following “typology of literary characters” has been 
proposed249:  
1. No change at all or no change of core properties (more properties may be added in the 
course of the narration though, but without changing the core personality). 
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 Cp. Margolin 1989: 18f. Margolin, in his 1989 essay, Structuralist approaches to character in narrative: 
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(8) Identifying the resultant set of sets of features in terms of a global frame (kind of person or personality 
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ality theories of an age and those stemming from its encyclopedia or life-world models.” (Margolin 1989: 17f.) 
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 Summarized from Margolin 1989: 18, 19. The occasional quotations within the different points are from 
ibid.: 18, 19.  
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2. Progressive, unidirectional, semantically related change; classical example: the Bildungs-
roman (because the occurring change is gradually and unidirectional, the respective char-
acter frames are easily relatable). 
3. An abrupt change in some or all core properties between two successive character 
frames/story-moments; the individual thus appears fragmented by two contradicting or 
incompatible character frames/property sets and can only be unified, or his/her coherence 
can only be preserved by a higher-ranking model: “To preserve individual identity and 
continuity over time, we need a second-order dynamic model, of which the two radically 
different character frames will function as variants.” As possible (cultural) models for 
this state of affairs, Margolin mentions cases of religious conversion, illumination, or 
mental breakdowns. (An example for this type is the character Aṅgulimāla in the famous 
Aṅgulimāla Sutta, treated extensively in Part III).  
4. An “abrupt, iterative, and semantically unrestricted (random) change of most or all core 
properties of a narrative agent”, is set apart by Margolin for postmodern literary works. 
(This type is therefore most probably not to be expected in or the Pāli suttas.)  
 
Different from Grabes’s account, narrative progression does not play a role for Margo-
lin’s purposes because his description presupposes a “retrospective representation” of an “overall 
character portrait”, which emerges only after reading. 
Most character models, as evidenced in one example above, distinguish between direct 
and indirect forms of characterisation. Here, familiarity with the instances of the narrative com-
munication avails. Characters are characterised directly either by the narrator (or a less anthropo-
morphic narrating instance) or through direct speech uttered by other characters. One question in 
particular is of interest here, whether that person (character or narrator) is reliable or not.250 (A 
relevant example is treated also in the following Part III, in the Piyajātika Sutta.)   
This concludes the introduction to the analysis and interpretation of literary characters 
that is mainly based on structuralist textual analysis. The rhetorical approach to narrative and the 
application of narrative communication models in the analysis of literary characters forms the 
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 The narratological concept of ‘unreliability’ does not exactly feature prominently in the Pāli suttas. We will, 
however, provide an interesting example later of the appearance of unreliable characters from the Piyajātika 
Sutta in Part III. 
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subject of the following chapter. It has the advantage of not having to make assumptions about a 
text’s status as fictional or factual. Thus it is possible to bypass this problem in the case of the 
suttas, as was stated in the Introduction.  
3.4 James Phelan’s rhetorical approach to characters: Reading People, Reading Plots  
It was already mentioned that the starting point of the investigation of the presentation of charac-
ters in the early Buddhist suttas was the subjective impression of virtually being drawn into the 
story. Expressed alternatively in the perhaps more adequate jargon of literary studies or narratol-
ogy: the Pāli suttas seem to effectively offer a possibility for the active involvement of the 
reader/listener in what J. Phelan calls the ‘mimetic illusion’, and that despite the fact that they are 
experienced highly formulaic and repetitive texts (at least by the standards of Western aca-
demia). Phrased in the language of the rhetorical approach to narrative (Rhetorical narratology), 
this phenomenon is described by James Phelan as follows: 
“To participate in the illusion is to enter what Peter Rabinowitz has called the narrative audience; to 
remain covertly aware of the synthetic is to enter what Rabinowitz has called the authorial audience. 
In other words, the authorial audience has the double consciousness of the mimetic and the synthetic, 
while the narrative audience has a single consciousness … .”251 
The “illusion” and the “synthetic” spoken of here by Phelan refer to the nature of any nar-
rative as something constructed (“synthetic”) and re-presented (narrative is always a recounting 
of what has already happened, except in the case of a live broadcast, say, of a commentated foot-
ball match!). The ‘synthetic aspect’, however, can be more or less prominent for the reader. (In 
fact, most of the pleasure of reading a novel or watching films stems from the blocking out of the 
synthetic aspect. Aesthetic pleasure, however, is something that only the ‘authorial audience’ can 
enjoy!) Phelan, and Rhetorical narratology as a branch of narratology, is interested in analysing 
the ways narratives can effect or influence people. Furthermore, Phelan’s model offers a highly 
practical and strongly text- or discourse-oriented approach, while at the same time it allows for a 
wide range of aspects of characters in narratives to be covered.  
Rhetorical narratology conceives of narrative as a purposive communicative act:  
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“[N]arrative is not just a representation of events but is also itself an event – one in which someone is 
doing something with a representation of events. [...] this conception gives special attention to the re-
lations among tellers, audiences, and the something that has happened.”252 
In a narrative, narrators (on all narrative levels) can perform three functions: (1) Report-
ing about characters and events; 2) Interpreting those reports; 3) Ethical evaluation of those re-
ports and/or interpretations. Indications of endorsement or departure in the author’s comments 
from the narrators’ reports, evaluations, and interpretations can act as signals for unreliable nar-
ration.253 There are six ways, according to Phelan, in which a narrator’s speech can be assessed as 
unreliable: He can underreport or misreport, he can “underread (underinterpret)” or “misread 
(misinterpret)”, he can “underregard (inderevaluate)” or “misregard (misevaluate)” events. That 
means that a narrator can be a reliable reporter, but, at the same time, an unreliable interpreter, as 
we will see later in the gamblers’s episode in the Piyajātika Sutta: In accusing the Buddha of 
speaking nonsense, the householder misevaluates the spiritual truth in the Buddha’s words, and 
thereby bereaves himself of any chance to salvation (one would, however, not call the house-
holder an “unreliable narrator” because he is not ‘lying’ – apart from the very fact that the house-
holder is not the narrator but a character in the story.)  
In his own practice, Phelan employs six key principles for approaching and interpreting 
narratives254:  
1) ‘Rhetorical action’: “Somebody tries to accomplish some purpose(s) by telling some-
body else that something happened.” 
2) ‘The rhetorical triangle’: “The [rhetorical] approach postulates a recursive relationship 
among authorial agency, textual phenomena (including intertextual relations), and reader re-
sponse.”  
3) ‘Audiences’: Fictional narrative can address five intended audiences:  
a) The actual reader [can/is invited to assume the roles of b) and c):] 
b) The authorial audience (the author’s ideal reader, who “understand[s] the invitations 
for engagement [in the (meta-?) narrative ethical dimension of the narrative as a whole as in-
tended by the author] that the narrative offers”). 
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c) The narrative audience (that is, “the observer position within the narrative world that 
the flesh and blood reader assumes. In fiction, we are in this observer position when we re-
spond to characters as if they were real people.” [my emphasis])  
d) The narratee (that is, “the audience [directly] addressed by the author” (this is not nec-
essarily the flesh and blood reader. One could think, for instance, of letters that would acci-
dentally fall into one’s hands, without being intended for oneself.) 
e) The ideal narrative audience (that is, “the narrator's hypothetical perfect audience, the 
one he expects to understand every nuance of his communication.”) 
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4) ‘Reader response’: “As flesh and blood readers enter the authorial and narrative audi-
ences, they develop interests and responses of three kinds, each related to a particular component 
of the narrative: mimetic, thematic, and synthetic.” As Phelan argues in Reading People, Read-
ing Plots (1989), those are the three major features of narratives.255 The reader’s response to the 
mimetic component consists in “an interest in the characters as possible people and in the narra-
tive world as like our own [...].” One may call this the “emotional or affectional response” (or the 
empathetic), and it is what the actual reader does when he assumes the role of the narratee (‘fic-
tive reader’). This phenomenon is an indisputable fact that accompanies the active engagement 
with fictional worlds through reading, watching films etc., and it perhaps also accompanies our 
social interactions. It involves the actual, active application of Samuel Taylor Coleridges’s fa-
mous phrase of the “willing suspension of disbelief” or, in its modern version, the recipients’ en-
gagement with the ‘mimetic illusion’. Thus, the response to the thematic component describes 
the more reflective reader’s interest in “the characters as representatives of classes of people [...], 
and in the cultural, ideological, philosophical, or ethical issues being addressed by the narrative 
[...].” A reader’s response to the synthetic component, finally, describes the reader’s being aware 
of the “constructedness” of the narrative, its nature of being an artificial, mental construct. Char-
acters, then, are a vital element for an engagement with narratives in the first place. 
In a way, Phelan’s model transcends the structuralist heritage of binary oppositions: In-
stead of perpetuating or modifying the mimetic-didactic distinction of the neo-Aristotelians and 
their ‘either-or’ view, he proposes a ‘both-and’ model that gives equal weight to the three aspects 
of literary characters: the mimetic, the thematic, and the synthetic aspect.  
Phelan has proposed his interpretative model for characters in narratives, first in a pro-
grammatic essay titled Character, Progression, and the Mimetic-Didactic Distinction (1987), 
and put it to test in his later book Reading People, Reading Plots (1989). His model centres on 
the notion of narrative progression.256 A narrative – and any narrative, not just the modern novel – 
can be propelled forward through the staging of a central conflict, usually fought out by its char-
acters, or a constellation that creates instabilities (on the level of the story), or through the crea-
tion of tensions (caused by the difference in knowledge of the different instances or roles of the 
narrative communication). Whether the story itself is fictive or not does not really matter here – 
the zest of a story lies, among other things, in its ability to engage the listener/reader emotionally 
and/or intellectually through the creation of suspense and dénouement. 
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255
 Fotis Jannidis (2004) describes basically the same aspects of literary characters as Phelan does (in Phelan 
1987&1989). However, Jannidis’s presentation is based on Matias Martinez’s proposed threefold concept of 
motivations (which Jannidis adopted for his presentation of motivation and which I have, again, summarised 
here); cp. Jannidis 2004: 223: “Die hier dargestellten Kategorien für die Motivierung der Figureninformatio-
nen auf der Ebene des narrativen Lesers (finale und kausale sowie leserorientierte Motivierung) sowie auf der 
Ebene des auktorialen Lesers (kompositorische Motivierung als Oberbegriff für ästhetische, thematische und 
auf den Realitätseffekt bezogene Motivierung), diese Kategorien entsprechen trotz ihrer gänzlich anderen Her-
kunft weitgehend dem Vorschlag von James Phelan, der drei Aspekte von Figureninformationen unterscheidet: 
den mimetischen, den thematischen und den synthetischen.” However,  Phelan’s model is more easily applica-
ble/pragmatic for the actual interpretation work because it is not laden with theory and minutest details in the 
way Jannidis’ presentation is (cp. Jannidis 2004: 228f & 221-229; cp. also the review of Jannidis 2004 by Gesa 
Stedman [2007]). Jannidis criticises that Phelan’s notion of character-information is limited because it is re-
stricted to account only for those attributes that can or do serve as character traits, and does not, like his own 
model, give room for the inclusion of all the relevant information on character (ibid.: 229, n. 59). He goes on to 
equate Phelan’s mimetic aspect with his “compositional motivation” of character-information, the thematic 
aspect with the “compositional-thematic motivation”, and the synthetic aspect with a special case of “aesthetic 
motivation”. Furthermore, Jannidis states that the mimetic aspect (= “compositional motivation”) served the 
purpose of achieving the ‘effect of reality’ á la Barthes. Even though this may be so in the case of fictional, 
literary narratives, it is not entirely convincing that Phelan also aims at this point. As Jannidis himself remarks, 
Phelan’s categories have a completely different origin than his (“trotz ihrer gänzlich anderen Herkunft”, see 
quote above, Jannidis 2004: 223). In my view, Jannidis overrates the authorial intention more than is useful, if 
one wishes to include also other kinds of narrative than highly artificial, fictional literary narratives (the mod-
ern, 19th cent. realist novel, e.g.), which Phelan’s model is broad enough to allow for. The description of super-
fluous details, according to Jannidis’s theory, serves the purpose (Jannidis: ‘are motivated by wanting to con-
tribute to the effect-of-reality’) of creating (on the side of the author) the reality-effect in a literary work of art 
(because, this is obviously the reasoning behind it, our real lives are also filled with superfluous, function-/pur-
poseless details!). But to include a somewhat broader range of narratives, real-life or “natural narratives”, e.g., 
Phelan’s model is still applicable and other explanations for the origin of “superfluous” character-information 
are possible. Is it not also conceivable, that certain (superfluous) details just stem from real-life “originals”, 
and that the author-narrator might also hand himself over to a kind of “willing suspension of disbelief” while 
narrating (especially in everyday or oral narration)? I do not find it convincing to say that the reader’s impres-
sion of encountering a ‘possible person’ while reading narratives is created merely by the discrepancy between 
story- or action-related, functional character information and “superfluous” character information, as Jannidis’s 
remark in one place suggests.(He writes: “Auf die Figur angewendet bedeutet das, es ist zu erwarten, daß Fig-
ureninformationen kausal, final oder kompositorisch, etwa durch den Realitätseffekt, motiviert sind; letzteres 
würde, soweit es sich um Figureneigenschaften handelt, nicht mehr besagen, als daß die Figuren über den 
Grad hinaus individualisiert werden, der für den Fortgang der Handlung oder die ästhetische Komposition 
notwendig sind.” Ibid.: 228) But Phelan is talking about the mimetic sphere of a (literary) character as being 
able to have functions as well as dimensions: “Mimetic functions result from the way these traits are used to-
gether in creating the illusion of a plausible person and, for works depicting actions, in making particular traits 
relevant to later actions, including of course the development of new traits.” (Phelan 1989: 11) For Phelan, the 
mimetic function is a function in itself, and does not necessarily have to have a function for or in the ac-
tion/events of the story. In other words, a ‘mimetic dimension’ (= a character trait) cannot be said to always 
and automatically point to something ‘higher’ beyond the particulars depicted by the text. Mimetic dimensions 
turn into functions if a) they “are used together in creating the illusion of a plausible person” (for modern indi-
viduals: the more inner conflicts, the more “life-like” the character!) (Phelan 1989: 11) or b) serve as plausible 
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The advantage of Phelan’s model lies not least in the fact that it does not overemphasize 
the factual-fictional distinction and that it remains rather undetermined with regard to the onto-
logical status of the characters, whether they are representations of (possible – in fictional ac-
counts –) persons, fictive characters, types (representatives of a certain class of people etc.), or 
embodiments of certain themes. Phelan explains:  
“The distinction between dimensions and functions is based on the principle that the fundamental unit 
of character is neither the trait nor the idea, neither the role nor the word [these are, basically, the dif-
ferent structuralist positions, cp. S. Chatman], but rather what I will call the attribute, something that 
participates at least in potential form in the mimetic, thematic, and synthetic spheres of meaning sim-
ultaneously. Thus, the rhetorical theorist need not stipulate in advance that the characters in a 
given work will be represented people, or themes with legs, or obvious artificial constructs.  The 
theorist only commits himself to the position that a character may come to perform any of these func-
tions or indeed all three of them to varying degrees within the same narrative.”257  
                                                 
motivations, or are otherwise relevant, for a character’s later actions (i.e. at least in works depicting or empha-
sizing action; cp. ibid.). Thus, Phelan argues, the ‘mimetic aspect’ of literary character is a, or has a, narrative 
function or purpose in itself, and is not – and this is the major difference of Phelan’s model to a thematist or 
structuralist view of text – ‘just’ a point of departure for thematisation (= interpreting traits “habitually” as sig-
nifying something beyond themselves, like a general situation, or as instantiation of a “higher truth”). Underly-
ing (t)his model is a view of texts as a communicative structure and an interest in the ((un-)/intended) effects of 
literary works and narratives on an audience. Further underlying is a view of literary character as something 
that has an (immaterial, of course) existence outside the text, a phenomenon which Phelan calls character as 
‘possible or plausible persons’ (vehemently disliked, as we know, by structuralist approaches!). Nevertheless, 
as Phelan also acknowledges at this point in his discussion (Phelan 1989: 11), “[s]ilently underlying this dis-
cussion of the mimetic component are some messy problems”. Phelan writes: “First, all this talk about charac-
ters as plausible or possible persons presupposes that we know what a person is. But the nature of the human 
subject is of course a highly contested issue among contemporary thinkers. [B]ut […] such a discussion is not a 
necessary preliminary to the rhetorical study I am undertaking. For that to be justified, it is enough that authors 
write with some working notion of what a person is and with some belief that characters can (or indeed, can-
not) represent persons and that as readers and critics we can discern these ideas in the work.” (Phelan 1989: 
11) 
256
 Cp. Phelan 1987: 285: “[... A]ny conclusion about the nature of character in a given narrative cannot be sep-
arated from the analysis of that narrative’s developing structure, or what I will hereafter call its narrative pro-
gression. Progression, of course, is a nonliteral term: to speak literally would restrict us to the order or the se-
quence of the text. Adopting the term progression moves the analysis to the rhetorical mode, to an interest in 
how authors generate, develop, and resolve readers’ interests in narratives. Authors may take advantage of nu-
merous variables in the narrative situation to generate the movement of a tale. Progression may involve the ele-
ments of either story – characters, events, settings – or discourse – the way the story is told – or it may involve 
elements of both. The movement of most narratives depends at least to some degree on the introduction, com-
plication, and resolution (to one degree or another) of instability at the level of story.” 
257
 Phelan 1989: 9 (my emphasis). 
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In order to go beyond a mere functional notion of characters, Phelan additionally distin-
guishes between the ‘function’ and the ‘dimension’ of a character258:  
“We can usefully distinguish between the thematic elements of a character like the Duke and of one 
like Jack in Golding’s novel by making a distinction between a character's dimensions and his or her 
functions. A dimension is any attribute a character may be said to possess when that character is con-
sidered in isolation from the work in which he or she appears. A function is a particular application of 
that attribute made by the text through its developing structure. In other words, dimensions are con-
verted into functions by the progression of the work.”259 
Expressed differently, the idea of the differentiation between ‘functions’ and ‘dimen-
sions’ of characters’ attributes and their participatory role in the structure of meaning of a narra-
tive is explained by Phelan in the following:  
“Similarly, when an author creates a character, she creates a potential for that character to participate 
in the signification of the work through the development of the character in three spheres of meaning 
[i.e., the mimetic, the thematic, and the synthetic “sphere”]; that potential may or may not be realized 
depending upon the way the whole work is shaped.”260 
Readers arrive at the mimetic dimension of any character by analysing his or her traits, 
i.e., the attributes ascribed to a character (represented by a proper name or personal pronoun). 
This is in principle a linguistic analysis, although not exclusively), and comprises the different 
                                                 
258
 Again, Jannidis (2004: 223) – citing Matias Martinez – states that in the end all facts of the narrated world 
serve a certain function as long as a narrative can be regarded as an intentional whole (Ger. “ein organisiertes 
Sinnganzes”). Elements that do not serve any obvious intentional purpose for the progression still have the 
function of serving the ‘reality effect’ (R. Barthes). The different ‘motivations’ as put forward by Martinez 
have different recipients/readers: while the causal motivation (“kausale Motivierung”, i.e. when certain charac-
ter traits serve directly as motives for certain actions) and the ‘final motivation’ (“finale Motivierung”: events 
that are predetermined in a narrative through a concept of providence etc.) are recognized by the narrative au-
dience, the ‘compositional motivation’ (“kompositorische Motivierung”) can only be recognized by the autho-
rial audience (see Jannidis 2004: 223). That is the case because the authorial audience (or ‘authorial reader’, 
“auktorialer Leser”, in Jannidis 2004) represents the counterpart of the implied author, the instance that is re-
sponsible for the semantic structures of the narrative as a whole. 
259
 Phelan 1989: 9. 
260
 Ibid.: 10. 
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processes or methods of characterisation which were described above.261 In the case of a realistic 
narrative portrait, say, the realist 19th century novel, for example, a character’s traits will be 
turned into mimetic function when these “coalesce into the portrait of a possible person” (J. Phe-
lan), or when they become ‘causes’ (psychologically in the form of possible or inferred explana-
tions or motivations) for later actions performed in the narrative world by that character.262 The 
latter is an aspect of character that is often found in pre-modern (Western) narrative traditions 
which center more on action than on the psychological portrayal. However, at times, Jannidis’s 
criticism of Phelan’s model should be considered that not only traits (Ger. “Persönlichkeitsmerk-
male”) may (explicitly) serve to characterise a character, but also other information that are pro-
vided by the text in relation to a character, for instance, situational or environmental descriptions, 
and so forth, from which inferences can be drawn (remember, however, that in most cases this 






                                                 
261
 Cp. Phelan 1989: 11: “Mimetic dimensions, as we have seen, are a character’s attributes considered as traits, 
e.g., the Duke’s maleness, his position of power, his imperiousness, his boldness, and so on. Mimetic functions 
result from the way these traits are used together in creating the illusion of a plausible person and, for works 
depicting actions, in making particular traits relevant to later actions, including of course the development of 
new traits. In works where the traits fail to coalesce into the portrait of a possible person, e.g., Swift’s creation 
of Gulliver, or some modern works intent on destroying the mimetic illusion, a character will have mimetic 
dimensions without a mimetic function. Moreover, within the creation of a possible person, a particular trait 
might serve only to identify that character, e.g., the detective who always eats junk food, and the trait might 
not (though it often will) have any consequences for his later actions—or for our understanding of them. In 
such a case, the character has a mimetic dimension that is incidental to his or her mimetic function: the plausi-
bility of the portrait would remain without the trait and the rest of the work would be essentially unaffected by 
its absence.” Note, however, that Phelan’s approach to characterisation is not decisively structuralist or based 
on an analysis that treats texts as something static because his interest does not lie in a detailed step-by-step 
(cognitive-narratological) analysis; he argues: “The point […] is that my rhetorical theory of character is 
claiming to offer analytical distinctions that allow us to understand the principles upon which works are con-
structed rather than claiming to offer a blow-by-blow description of what happens when we read.” (Phelan 
1989: 10) 
262
 Cp. also Jannidis 2004: 6.3: ‘Motivierung’ (pp. 221-229). 
263
 Cp. n. 258 above. 
264
 Cp. Jannidis 2004: 222. 
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Part III  
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The presentation of characters in selected Suttas of the Majjhima Nikāya 
The following chapters will add flesh on the dry skeleton of narrative theory. I will take an in-
depth look at three primary sources, all taken from the “Chapter on Kings” (Rāja Vagga) of the 
fourth division of the “Middle Fifty Discourses” (Majjhimapaṇṇāsapāl̥i) of the “Collection of 
Middle Length Suttas” (Majjhima Nikāya) of the “Basket of the Teachings” (Sutta Piṭaka) – 
which is the exact determination of their location within the Pāli Canon according to the indige-
nous organising principle of the Pāli Canon. After a short introduction, I will, based mainly on 
the notion of Genette’s narrative levels, first provide structural analyses of the three suttas fol-
lowed by detailed summaries of the suttas’ contents. Following that I will analyse the main char-
acters appearing in the texts, together with an investigation of the characters’ relation to their fel-
low-characters, as well as other elements of the story (especially narrative progression), in other 
words, their “entanglement” in the story. Throughout this process, I will constantly resort to the 
analytical tools laid out in Part II. Finally, I will bring this chapter to a close with an attempt at 
interpreting the role of the characters in the sutta as a whole. The analytical part will also provide 
accounts of the narrative’s ‘progression’ as defined by James Phelan. 
For my study of the Majjhima Nikāya, I made use of Bhikkhu Bodhi’s English translation 
of the standard and probably most widespread edition of the original text in Pāli by the Pali Text 
Society. However, I also made extensive use of the Burmese edition of the Canon – as an alter-
native recension of the Pāli text, but also for its easy accessibility as electronic text.265  For the 
work on the texts focused on in this chapter, I have compared the Pali Text Society’s edition with 
the Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition (both the print edition, Rangoon 1954-56, in Burmese characters, 
and the electronic version). Where variant readings may have a bearing on the meaning or are 
otherwise significant, or where I deviate from the Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s English translation, I 
have made an annotation accordingly in the footnotes.  
                                                 
265
 The revised and annotated text of the Sixth (international) Buddhist Council (from 1954-1956 in Rangoon, 
Birma; known as the Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana-edition) is available at: http://www.tipitaka.org/ in various scripts. It 
is important to note, however, that the online-editions of the Canon are not thoroughly proofread and may con-
tain several errors and/or omissions. For citations I referred, if not indicated otherwise, always to the PTS edi-
tion of the Pāli Canon in the ‘standard’ manner, providing the standard-abbreviation of the text according to 
the Critical Pāli Dictionary, followed by the volume number in Roman numerals and the page (and line) num-
bers in Arabic numerals.  
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4. The presentation of characters in the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta266 (MN 81) 
4.1 Introduction 
The Ghaṭīkāra Sutta is the first sutta of the Rāja Vagga of the Majjhima Nikāya (MN 81). This 
text is very interesting in several respects, one of which is that it, according to Richard Gom-
brich, provides early evidence for the development and the proliferation of the tenet of former 
Buddhas that eventually became formulated in the Theravāda tradition.267 The sutta represents 
one of the very few examples in the Canon, in which the Buddha himself reportedly speaks of 
the existence of a former Buddha, namely, the Buddha Kassapa (Skt. Kāśyapa), who is one of 
the seven Buddhas mentioned in the DN268 and the third Buddha that appeared in our aeon (Bud-
dha Gotama being the fourth), and how he is related to him. 
The sutta furthermore represents a ‘proto-Jātaka’, a story told by the Buddha himself 
about one of his former births.269 However, if this text is to be regarded as a Jātaka proper, Rich-
ard Gombrich adds for consideration270, how could one possibly explain the fact that one of its 
main characters, Jotipāla, vanishes completely from the story after he has received ordination 
                                                 
266
 This is the form of the main character’s name in the PTS edition; the Be(R) reads Ghaṭikāra.   
267
 Cp. Gombrich 1980: 68. Gombrich’s main argument, in his article on the significance of former Buddhas in 
the Theravāda tradition, is that the concept of serveral Buddhas that have preceded Gotama Buddha was intro-
duced – perhaps under the influence of the Jain tradition, as the analogy of the number of predecessors – 
twenty-four – and the names of the “Jaina-Buddhas” and of one of the former Buddhas, Tīrthaṃkaras and 
Dīpaṃkara, between the Jain and the Buddhist sources suggest – as a means or a strategy of authentication, for 
the Buddha did not from the start place himself in a succession line of teachers/r̥ṣis etc., as the founders or 
promulgators of other contemporary traditions did: “We have suggested in this article that the original function 
of former Buddhas was to authenticate the Buddha’s message; and that they later acquired the function of en-
suring the availability of that message by launching Bodhisattvas on their careers [through the theory of 
paṇidhi and vyākaraṇa: The Buddha-to-be, technically then a bodhisatta, makes an aspiration in the presence 
of a Buddha whereupon the Buddha has to give a prediction of the future Enlightenment of the Bodhisattva 
making the aspiration.” As Gombrich notes, this later theory is documented well in a later version of the 
Jotipāla-story in the Mahāvastu (ed. Senart, I, 332, line 2; cp. Gombrich 1980: 72, n. 26), where the Buddha 
Kassapa offers a prediction to Jotipāla, whereas it is missing in the Pāli canonical version, our Ghaṭīkāra 
Sutta]. (Gombrich 1980: 71) 
268
 DN II 7. 
269
 Oskar von Hinüber calls this the “Ur-Jātaka” in his 1998 study of the genesis and structure of the Jātaka 
collection, see von Hinüber 1998: 182, as well as the entire chapter III.2, pp. 182-92, for a description of the 
early form of the Jātakas in the Vinaya- and Sutta Piṭakas. For more on the structure of the sutta see below. 
270
 Richard Gombrich, personal communication 28.05.2012. 
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(pabbajjā/ upasampadā) by the Buddha Kassapa himself? (This question will be returned to later 
with a possible answer to it from a text-internal viewpoint.)  
The story of the Brahmin youth Jotipāla and his friend the potter Ghaṭīkāra seems to have 
been fairly known and widespread, as the references to Ghaṭīkāra and Jotipāla in the DPPN (see 
below), as well as a different version of the whole story in the Mahāvastu-Avadāna (= Mvu) of 
the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin Vinaya suggest.271 The Ghaṭīkāra Sutta is also ‘famous’ for 
narrating one of the four “Aeon miracles” (kappaṭṭhiyapāṭihāriyā), the miracle through which 
Ghaṭīkāra’s dwelling remained rain-free for the whole duration of this present aeon.272 Although 
the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin version closely resembles the version in the Sutta Piṭaka in 
formal respects273, already a brief comparison of the two texts shows that while the plot is more 
or less identical, stylistically they are told in a completely different manner, as regards e.g. the 
use of certain stock phrases and – most interestingly – the characterisation as well as certain de-
tails of the actions of their protagonists.274 These two texts will be compared after the content of 
the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta has been introduced. 
4.2 The Commentary 
For the purposes of this study, the commentary on the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta is not too helpful because 
it mostly indulges in metaphorical and highly technical accounts. It starts, for instance, with a 
                                                 
271
 The DPPN lists five different persons under the name Jotipāla that occur throughout the Pāli Canon; for 
Ghaṭikāra/Ghaṭīkāra the potter, see e.g. SN, Sagāthāvaggapāl̥i 50. (“Ghaṭīkāra Sutta”). For a detailed bibliog-
raphy and a thoroughgoing comparison of the different versions of the story of Ghaṭīkāra and Jyotipāla found 
throughout Buddhist literature, see Anālayo 2011: 441-451. Bhikkhu Anālayo also mentions two references to 
pictorial representations, one from Barhut (in Lüders 1913: 883) and one from Gandhāra (in Vogel 1954: 810), 
a fact that seems to corroborate the impression that the story may have been quite popular. However, unlike the 
former lives of the Buddha Śākyamuni as Mahāsudassana and Makhādeva, the life of the bodhisatta as the 
Brahmin youth Jyotipāla has not found its way into the Jātaka collection; see Anālayo 2011: 450, n. 53. 
272
  Jā I 172,8-15: Iminā hi saddhiṃ imasmiṃ kappe cattāri kappaṭṭhiyapāṭihāriyāni nāma: cande sasabimbaṃ, 
vaṭṭakajātakamhi saccakiriyaṭṭhāne aggissa gamanupacchedo, ghaṭikārakumbhakārassa mātāpitūnaṃ 
vasanaṭṭhāne devassa avassanaṃ, tassā pokkharaṇiyā tīre naḷānaṃ ekacchiddabhāvoti. Cp. also Cowell et. al. 
2002: 56 for further references. 
273
 Von Hinüber (1998: 198) in particular highlights the identical formulas/ formulations at the beginning and 
the end of the sūtras: bhūtapubbaṃ <> bhūtapūrvaṃ; siyā nu kho pana <> syāt khalu punaḥ.  
274
 This is not the place for an in-depth comparison of the two texts – however interesting this would be – but 
one detail may be given here, since it nicely illustrates the manner of characterisation in both texts, and the dif-




very odd explanation of how it came to be that Ānanda could recognize the Buddha’s very subtle 
smile275: Because, while ‘normal’ folk would jovially beat their breast and burst in laughter, call-
ing “What? What?!”, Buddhas just show very sutble and decent smiles, only exhibiting the tips 
of their front-teeth slightly – the Buddha’s mirth in this particular incident occurs only inwardly, 
as the commentary explains, as a laugh whose “[state of] mind is concomitant with joy that is an 
element of pure mental cognition/apperception effecting no karma (kiriyā-’hetuka-mano-
viññāṇa-dhātu-somanassa-sahagata-cittaṃ).276 It furthermore gives peculiar explanations about 
the nature and the different kinds of “skillful” versus “unskillful” laughter277 as well as, later on, 
the labour involved in the production of rice.278 
                                                 
275
 Ps III 279,22-280,4: Taṃ pan’ etaṃ hasitaṃ evaṃ appamattakampi therassa pākaṭaṃ ahosi. Kathaṃ? 
tathārūpe hi kāle tathāgatassa catūhi dāṭhāhi catuddīpikamahāmeghamukhato sateratāvijjulatā viya vi-
rocamānā mahātālakkhandhapamāṇā rasmivaṭṭiyo uṭṭhahitvā tikkhattuṃ sīsavaraṃ padakkhiṇaṃ katvā 
dāṭhaggesuyeva antaradhāyanti. Tena saññāṇena āyasmā ānando bhagavato pacchato gacchamānopi 
sitapātubhāvaṃ jānāti. The commentary asks: If the Buddha smiled so subtly, how did it come that Ānanda 
still recognised it? The four front teeth of the Buddha emitted rays of light resembling a flash of lightning from 
the Buddha’s mouth like from a rain cloud, so vast that it extended over the whole earth, and rose up to the 
size of the trunk of a huge palm tree. After circling three times around the head of the Buddha it finally disap-
peared again in his front teeth. From that occurrence, the Venerable Ānanda, who was following the Buddha, 
recognised that the Buddha produced a subtle smile.       
276
 Ps III 279,7-11: […] sitapātukammamakāsi, aggaggadante dassetvā mandahasitaṃ hasi. Yathā hi lokiyama-
nussā uraṃ paharantā: “kuhaṃ kuhanti hasanti, na evaṃ buddhā, buddhānaṃ pana hasitaṃ haṭṭhapa-
haṭṭhākāramattameva hoti. 
277
 Ps III 279,11-21:  Hasitañca nāmetaṃ terasahi somanassasahagatacittehi hoti. Tattha lokiyamahājano aku-
salato catūhi, kāmāvacarakusalato catūhīti aṭṭhahi cittehi hasati, sekkhā akusalato diṭṭhisampayuttāni dve ap-
anetvā chahi cittehi hasanti, khīṇāsavā catūhi sahetukakiriyacittehi ekena ahetukakiriyacittenāti pañcahi cit-
tehi hasanti. Tesupi balavārammaṇe āpāthagate dvīhi ñāṇasampayuttacittehi hasanti, dubbalārammaṇe 
duhetukacittadvayena ca ahetukacittena cāti tīhi cittehi hasanti. Imasmiṃ pana ṭhāne kiriyāhetukamanov-
iññāṇadhātusomanassasahagatacittaṃ bhagavato haṭṭhapahaṭṭhākāramattaṃ hasitaṃ uppādesi. 
278
 Ps III 283,10-22: Paṇḍupuṭakassa sālinoti puṭake katvā sukkhāpitassa rattasālino. Tassa kira sālino vap-
pakālato paṭṭhāya ayaṃ parihāro: kedārā suparikammakatā honti, tattha bījāni patiṭṭhāpetvā gandhodakena 
siñciṃsu, vappakāle vitānaṃ viya upari vatthakilañjaṃ bandhitvā paripakkakāle vīhisīsāni chinditvā muṭṭhi-
matte puṭake katvā yottabaddhe vehāsaṃyeva sukkhāpetvā gandhacuṇṇāni attharitvā koṭṭhakesu pūretvā tatiye 
vasse vivariṃsu. Evaṃ tivassaṃ parivutthassa sugandharattasālino apagatakāḷake suparisuddhe taṇḍule ga-
hetvā khajjakavikatimpi bhattampi paṭiyādiyiṃsu. Taṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ paṇītaṃ khādanīyaṃ bhojanīyaṃ - pe 
- kālaṃ ārocāpesīti. 
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4.3 Content of the sutta & narrative structure 
In doctrinal terms, or concerning its prevalent theme, the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta stresses the importance 
of faith in the Buddha, his teachings, and in the saṅgha (especially faith through understanding 
or one’s own experience, avecca-ppasāda279).  
The followering offers a summary and structural analysis of the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta of the 
MN. The Roman numbers (I, II, III) signify the narrative levels, which are by definition always 
indicated through a change of the narratological category of ‘voice’ (i.e. the narrator)280, the Ara-
bic numbers indicate paragraphs, which constitute units of meaning (introduction of a new theme 
or person, e.g.) or other structural units (indicated by textual signifiers)281. (Note that my para-
graph-division here may or may not coincide with the paragraph arrangement in the editions of 
the original Pāli text or the English translation in Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001.)  
 
I.1 Exposition282 (MN I 45,1-10) [0. Bhāṇaka: Introductory formula plus I.1. Narrator: extradie-
getic, heterodiegetic sutta-narrator (= G. Genette), or ‘primary narrative’ (= Martinez/Scheffel), 
or ‘first-level’ narration (W. Schmid)283 
                                                 
279
 See MN I 51,16f.: Ghaṭīkāro kho maharaja, kumbhakāro buddhe aveccappasādena samannāgato, dhamme 
– pe – [according to the Critical apparatus of the PTS edition, do the Siamese and the Burmese mss repeat the 
phrase verbatim!] saṃghe, ariyakantehi sīlehi samannāgato.  
280
 Cp. Genette 1990: 84-87. 
281
 Cp. Galasek 2009: chapter 2.2. 
282
 I have adopted the term ‘exposition’ from the classical theory of the drama, in which it ideally or typically 
stands at the beginning of the drama, prior to the action and provides the spectator or reader with “the 
knowledge of and information about the [specific] preconditions lying in the past and determining the present, 
on which the following conflict [or story] is based”. Cp. http://www.li-go.de/definitionsansicht/drama/exposi-
tion.html (last accessed: 9th March 2013). 
283
 See http://www.li-go.de/definitionsansicht/prosa/ebenendeserzaehlens.html, note 1 (last accessed: 16th 
March 2013). Different narrative theorists have coined different terms for the same phenomena. I mainly rely 




After the standard introductory formula (= the frame284 proper) for the longer suttas, “Thus have I 
heard” (evam me sutaṃ), an extradiegetic, heterodiegetic narrating instance (henceforth: the 
sutta-narrator) provides the audience with the introduction or ‘exposition’, subsequent to which 
the Jātaka story unfolds. In it, as usual, the setting is provided, that is the (unspecified) time 
(ekaṃ samayaṃ), the place (Kosalesu), as well as the introduction of some of the persons, and 
the protagonists, respectively, appearing in the story (Bhagavā; mahatā bhikkhusaṃghena sad-
dhiṃ).  
I.2 The first sentence285 that commences the actual story (if only of the frame story to the Jātaka 
in this case), relates that the Buddha, while wandering with a large body of monks following 
him, unexpectedly steps down from the road and smiles. Ānanda, knowing that Buddhas do not 
smile without a reason, enquires after the reason for this.  
 
II. Jātaka (MN I 45,11-54,18) 
 
II.1. 2nd Narrator: Buddha Gotama: ‘embedded’ narrative, 2nd level narration (“sekundäres 
Erzählen”)] 
At this point, the role of the speaker is “handed over” by our covert omniscient narrator286 of the 
suttas to one of the main characters in the narrative, the Buddha Gotama (= extradiegetic, ho-
                                                 
284
 “Frame” I call the introductory formula (Evam me sutaṃ) of all the longer suttas of the Sutta Piṭaka, enunci-
ated by the recitator (bhāṇaka). What is usually called frame, I here call the “exposition”. I chose the term 
frame for convenience’s sake (see also n. 313 below!). However, it shoud be noted that by that term I do not 
mean the frame of a framed story, e.g. Narrative “embedding” with “frame story” etc. are older terms; cp. LHN 
s.v. Narrative Levels, §5: “Formally, embedding is defined by syntactic subordination, even though it does not 
necessarily involve a change of narrating instance (a digression can be related by the primary narrator).” G. 
Genette’s explanations, and subsequent clarifications (Genette 1990), on the narrative levels were meant to 
“[systematize] the traditional notion of “embedding,” whose main drawback is that it does not sufficiently 
mark the threshold between one diegesis and another – a threshold symbolized by the fact that the second die-
gesis is taken charge of by a narrative fashioned within the first diegesis.” (Genette 1990: 84) (For my use of 
‘frame’ (marked by single quotes) in a cognitive sense, see further below!) 
285
 The actual ‘story’ or narrative that a sutta relates, structurally starts with the conjunction Atha kho, “And 
then...”   
286
 A narrator is ‘covert’ when he is not designed or does not appear as a distinct person in a text (= ‘overt’ nar-
rator). Nevetheless, all narrating must have a ‘place of origin’. A more neutral term also current in naratology, 




modiegetic narrator). This results in an interesting situation where the narrator, according to Ge-
nette’s nomenclature, appears to be extradiegetic and heterodiegetic (“third-person narration”). 
However, given the later revealed identity of the Buddha Gotama with the Brahmin youth 
Jotipāla, whom Gotama addresses in the third person, he is in fact a homodiegetic narrator 
(Ghaṭikāra/Gotama Buddha). 
As an answer to Ānanda’s enquiry, he tells a story of the past beginning with bhūtapub-
baṃ287, “in old times/formerly”, in which he himself features prominently (however, not as prom-
inently as one might expect – the actual main character is Ghaṭīkāra!). The following Jātaka, 
then, serves as an explanation of a place288: Somewhere on a made road in the ancient Indian state 
of Kosala, perhaps on the way to ancient Benares289, was once situated the prosperous and flour-
ishing market town of Vebhal̥iṅga290. Near that town dwelled the Buddha Kassapa who had once 
instructed his monks exactly on that very spot on which the Buddha Gotama and Ānanda are 
standing at this moment in the narrative of the (frame) story.  
[I.3.] (MN I 45,18-46,1) The next part sees a shift back to the first narrative level (that of the 
frame story) through its change of speaker from the Buddha Gotama to the (omniscient) sutta-
narrator. Ānanda arranges a seat for the Buddha with his robe and invites the Buddha to relate 
the story of the past in full to him and the assembled saṅgha of monks. After these preparations, 
the Buddha repeats his earlier comment to Ānanda verbatim to the assembly.  
                                                 
287
 This phrase, which seems to be unique for Buddhist texts, also because it is alien to the great Indian epics, 
as Oskar von Hinüber states, resembles the traditional introduction of fairy tales (Ger. “Es war einmal”; Once 
upon a time); cp. von Hinüber 1998: 184, esp. n. 541. 
288
 Cp. von Hinüber 1998: 186. 
289
  MN I 49,11 states that half a month after Jotipāla’s ordination, the Buddha set out from Vebhal̥iṅga to Bena-
res (bārāṇasī). Cp. DPPN s.v. Kāsi: “Kāsi (Kāsika). One of the sixteen Mahājanapadas (AN I 213, etc.), its 
capital being Bārānasī. […] Sometimes the king is referred to merely as Kāsi-rājā. Among other kings of Kāsi 
mentioned are Kikī (MN II 49) and Kalābu (Jā III 39). The extent of the Kāsi kingdom is given as three hun-
dred leagues (Jā V 41; also III 304, 391). The capital of Kāsi is generally given as Bārānasī […]. Kāsi was evi-
dently a great centre of trade and a most populous and prosperous country. Frequent mention is made 
of caravans leaving Kāsi to travel for trade. One highway went through Kāsi to Rājagaha (Vin I 212) 
and another to Sāvatthi (Vin II 10; Mhv V 114). [my emphasis] Kāsi was famed for her silks, and Kāsi-
robes were most highly esteemed as gifts, each robe being valued at one hundred thousand. (See, e.g., Jā VI 
151, 450; see also Addhakāsi).”   
290
 The mss., according to the critical apparatus of the PTS edition, give different spellings for the name of the 
town; the notes in the PTS ed. record: Vegaliṅgaṃ (Bm) and Vebhaligaṃ (Si) as vv.ll. Cp. MN I 45, n. 2. The 
Be(R) has Vegal̥iṅgaṃ. 
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II.2 (MN I 46,1-48,3) [Narrator: Buddha Gotama; Addressee: Ānanda/monks; Focalisers: Buddha 
Gotama/Jotipāla (MN I 47,27-48,3)] 
(1) This part sees the continuation of the story begun by the Buddha (Gotama). At this point, the 
text introduces the main characters of the narrated world of the embedded story (= the Jātaka). In 
the town of Vebhal̥iṅga once lived a potter, ‘Potter’ (Ghaṭīkāra) by name, who served as the 
chief attendant (agg’-upaṭṭhāka) of the previous Buddha Kassapa. His very best friend was a 
Brahmin student called Jotipāla. The potter wished very much to go and see the Blessed One 
Kassapa, the arahat, the fully Awakened One, but his friend the Brahmin speaks contemptuously 
of the Buddha as a “bald-headed kind of a recluse” (muṇḍaka samaṇaka) and sees no point in 
meeting such an ascetic. Ghaṭīkāra asks his friend three times, and three times he refuses to ac-
company Gaṭīkāra to go and see the Blessed One. It seems that the potter has given up, and he 
suggests to Jotipāla that it is perhaps time for the evening bath. Then the two friends go to the 
river to take the evening bath. But as soon as they arrive at the river, Ghaṭīkāra starts again to en-
treat his friend. Altogether, the same phrase is repeated291 verbatim six times in the text, realised 
as direct speech of Ghaṭīkāra, before the situation finally escalates: As they dress after their bath 
(this fact is implicit in the text, because it states that Jotipāla is girding himself and has washed 
his hair), Ghaṭīkāra first grabs the girdle of Jotipāla to lend weight to his bidding which Jotipāla 
once again rejects – also with the same wording as the six times before.292  
(2) Then follows the dramatic climax of the narrative: Once again the potter entreats his 
friend (with the same words as before) and once again Jotipāla (the future Buddha!) refuses and 
slanders the Buddha Kassapa (also with those same words as before, MN I 46,6-10), whereupon 
Ghaṭīkāra takes an even more extreme measure. He grabs Jotipāla by the [freshly] washed hair of 
                                                 
291
 First appearance of the phrase in MN I 46,6-10: Āyāṃa, samma Jotipāla, Kassapaṃ bhagavantaṃ ara-
hantaṃ sammāsambuddhaṃ dassanāya upasaṃkamissāma; sādhusammataṃ hi me tassa Bhagavato das-
sanaṃ arahato sammā-sambuddhassāti, “My dear Jotipāla, let us go and see the Blessed One Kassapa, accom-
plished and fully enlightened. I hold that it is good to see that Blessed One, accomplished and fully enlightened 
(tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 670,6.). When the phrase is repeated for the seventh time by Ghaṭīkāra, at the 
river, the sentence is added to the phrase cited above: Ayaṃ, samma Jotipāla, Kassapassa bhagavato arahato 
sammā-sambuddhassa avidūre ārāmo (MN I 46,27f.), My dear Jotipāla, not far from here is the monastery 
(ārāma originally means a ‘pleasure grove’ or a park where the Buddha was usually staying; it has been 
doubted that a tradition of permanent structures, monasteries, as dwelling places for the saṅgha had been ets-
bablished by the time of the early saṅgha) of the Blessed One Kassapa.  
292
 MN I 46,11f.: Alaṃ, samma Ghaṭīkāra; kiṃ pana tena muṇḍakena samaṇakena diṭṭhenāti? “Enough, dear 
Ghaṭīkāra, what is the use of seeing that bald-pated recluse?” (tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 670,6.)  
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his head, entreating him for the last time with those same words: “The dwelling place of the 
Blessed One Kassapa, accomplished and fully awakened, is not far from here, my dear friend 
Jotipāla. Let us go, dear Jotipāla, to the Blessed One Kassapa, accomplished and fully awakened, 
let us approach [him] to see him/to behold him.293 I consider it good, indeed, to see/behold the 
Blessed One Kassapa, accomplished and fully awakened.” Jotipāla is astonished at this extreme 
act of his friend, thinking: “This is indeed surprising, this is astonishing!294 I imagine this [the 
meeting with the Buddha Kassapa] will certainly be no trivial matter, that (yatra hi nāma295) this 
potter Ghaṭīkāra, while being himself of a lowly birth, should think it necessary to grab 
(parāmasitabbaṃ maññissati) our (amhākaṃ), the Head-Ablutioned’s296 (sīsanahātānaṃ) hair 
                                                 
293
 The phrase probably does not have the same connotation that it later gained in the Hindu tradition and that is 
known as ‘darshan’ (Skt. darśana). However, it is likely that the idea of the possibility of partaking in or get-
ting one’s share of the “enlightened charisma” of a spiritually highly realised being did already resonate in the 
expression (dassanāya upasaṃkamissāma). Cp. Gifford 2003: 77.   
294
 Note the Vocative singular of the honorific pronoun bhavant, bho, here used as an exclamation, which is 
indicative of actual speech, which in the Pali suttas is, however, always ‘simulated orality’ (Ger. “fingierte 
Mündlichkeit”; cp. von Hinüber 1996: §55). Since Jotipāla is not speaking here (we are but dealing with a rep-
resentation of his thoughts) it is even more interesting how the text, for all, or despite, its formulaic character, 
creates a quite lively situation through this imitation of colloquial speech.  
295
 See PED, s.v. yatra. 
296
 I somewhat venturesomely, as an interpretatio difficilior, interpret sīsanahāta here as a noun functioning as 
an attribute to amhākaṃ (= Jotipāla). Because we are here clearly presented with Jotipāla’s point of view (in 
the form of a representation of his thoughts), the noun “Head-Ablutioned”, as a derived meaning, makes sense 
– it expresses his (arrogant and proud) view of himself and serves to underline the gravity of his friend’s act, as 
well as it is indicative (for Jotipāla) of the importance of the event to come (which is explicitly stated in the 
sentence before this one, which, in effect, expresses a speculation on Jotipala’s part about Ghaṭikāra’s possible 
motivation for his action).  
Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi (2001: 671) translates the Pāli phrase amhākaṃ sīsanahātānaṃ accordingly absolute geni-
tive-construction of (however, as the plural signifying that both Jotipāla and Ghaṭikāra had just washed their 
heads): “It is wonderful, it is marvellous that this potter Ghaṭīkāra, who is of an inferior birth, should presume 
to seize me by the hair when we have washed our heads! Surely this can be no simple matter.” 
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(kesesu)!”297 It was only after his friend the potter had gone so far, that Jotipāla consented to their 










                                                 
297
 MN II 46f.: Atha kho, ānanda, jotipālo māṇavo ovaṭṭikaṃ viniveṭhetvā ghaṭikāraṃ kumbhakāraṃ etad av-
oca:  Alaṃ, samma Ghaṭikāra; kiṃ pana tena muṇḍakena samaṇakena diṭṭhenāti? atha kho, Ānanda, 
Ghaṭikāro kumbhakāro Jotipālaṃ māṇavaṃ sīsanahātaṃ kesesu parāmasitvā etad avoca: Ayaṃ, samma 
Jotipāla, Kassapassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa avidūre ārāmo. Āyāma, samma Jotipāla, Kas-
sapaṃ bhagavantaṃ arahantaṃ sammā-sambuddhaṃ dassanāya upasaṅkamissāma. Sādhusammataṃ hi me 
tassa Bhagavato dassanaṃ arahato sammā-sambuddhassāti. Atha kho, Ānanda, Jotipālassa māṇavassa etad 
ahosi: Acchariyaṃ vata, bho, abbhutaṃ vata, bho. Yatra hi nāmāyaṃ Ghaṭikāro kumbhakāro ittarajacco 
samāno amhākaṃ sīsanahātānaṃ kesesu parāmasitabbaṃ maññissati; na vat’ idaṃ [Bm adds kira; Ps na va-
dat’ idaṃ] orakaṃ maññe bhavissatīti; Ghaṭikāraṃ kumbhakāraṃ etad avoca: yāvetadohipi [Be(R), Bm 
yāvatādohipi], samma Ghaṭikārāti. Yāvetadohi pi [Be(R), Bm yāvatādohipi], samma Jotipāla. Tathā hi pana me 
sādhusammataṃ tassa bhagavato dassanaṃ arahato sammāsambuddhassāti. ’Tena hi, samma Ghaṭikāra, 
muñca; gamissāmāti. 
Ian Mabbett and Greg Bailey provide a very different translation of the phrase, Acchariyaṃ vata bho… (after 
Ghaṭīkāra has pulled Jotipāla’s hair; cp. Bailey & Mabbett 2003: 245). Interestingly, they interpret the phrase, 
na vat’ idaṃ orakaṃ maññe bhavissatīti, as being Ghaṭīkāra’s thoughts, not Jotipāla’s. That would indeed pro-
vide some kind of motivation for the potter’s extreme action; however, not a very informative or convincing 
one, lest one assumes that Ghaṭīkāra possesses some kind of higher knowledge (abhiññā) in order to be able to 
see what is waiting for Jotipāla. 
298
 The expression yāvetadohi pi (MN I 47,32; Be(R) yāvatādohipi) must remain doubtful (probably a textual 
corruption). Buddhaghosa tries to explain it, but not entirely convincingly (Ps III 281,25f.): Yāvetadohi pī ti 
ettha do-kārahikārapikāra nipātā yāvetaparaman ti attho. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti vācāya ālapanaṃ ovaṭṭikāya 
gahaṇañ ca atikkamitvā yāva kesegahaṇā pi tattha gamanatthaṃ payogo kattabbo ti, ’yāvetadohi pi’ [means]: 
“Here, the sounds ‘do’, ‘hi’, and ‘pi’ are interjections. Yāveta [perhaps = yāva etad, “so far as this”] [means] 
‘farthest’. The meaning of this has to be understood as follows: After this had been said, i.e. the addressing [of 
Jotipāla] orally [āyāma, samma Jotipāla …], surpassing the grasping (or reference to (gahaṇaṃ)) of the girdle, 
up to the grabbing of [Jotipāla’s] hair, all this [, i.e. Ghaṭīkāra’s action, escalates] for the purpose of going [to 
see the Blessed One Kassapa]. However, compare also the expression Cara pi re, Mallike (MN II 108,22f.) 
occurring in the Piyajātika Sutta (MN 87), where “pi re” appear to be interjections/particles of some sort; cp. 




II.3 (MN I 48,3-48,32) [narrator: Buddha Gotama; addressee: Ānanda/monks] 
Then the two friends approach the Blessed One Kassapa299 and Ghaṭīkāra formally introduces his 
friend to the former Buddha and asks him to teach the dhamma to his Brahmin friend. The Bud-
dha does so, he instructed (sandassesi) them, roused (samādāpesi) them, “fired them up” (samut-
tejesi), and “thrilled” them (sampahaṃsesi) with a talk on dhamma (dhammiyā kathāya), where-
upon Jotipāla is so inspired that he wants to go forth under the Buddha Kassapa (beforehand, af-
ter having left Kassapa, Jotipāla asks his friend why he himself had not had the idea of getting 
ordained by the Buddha. Ghaṭīkāra replies that it was impossible for him because he had to take 
care of his blind parents: “But surely you know me, dear Jotipāla – I take care of my blind old 
parents.” 300).  
II.4 (MN I 48,32-49,9) Jotipāla becomes ordained 
After this conversation and Jotipāla’s resolve, the friends return to the Blessed One Kassapa. 
(There is a time leap in the text (an ‘ellipsis’)301 –it is not mentioned what the friends do after they 
have talked about Jotipāla’s plans to become ordained. Nevertheless, it would be natural to as-
sume that some time had elapsed between them leaving the Buddha Kassapa and their repeated 
                                                 
299
 MN II 48,4-13: Atha kho, Ānanda, Ghaṭīkāro ca kumbhakāro Jotipālo ca māṇavo yena Kassapo bhagavā 
arahaṃ sammā-sambuddho ten’ upasaṃkamiṃsu. Upasaṃkamitvā Ghaṭīkāro kumbhakāro Kassapaṃ bhaga-
vantaṃ arahantaṃ sammā-sambuddhaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdi. Jotipālo pana māṇavo Kassapena 
bhagavatā arahatā sammāsambuddhena saddhiṃ sammodi., sammodanīyaṃ kathaṃ sārāṇīyaṃ vītisāretvā 
ekamantaṃ nisīdi. Ekamantaṃ nisinno kho, Ānanda, Ghaṭīkāro kumbhakāro Kassapaṃ bhagvantaṃ ara-
hantaṃ sammā-sambuddhaṃ etad avoca: — …. “Then Ghaṭīkāra the potter and Jotipāla the young Brahmin 
student went to where the Blessed One Kassapa, accomplished and fully awakened [was staying]. [For a dis-
cussion of the yena … tena-phrase “in its most common employment […] in approaches to a person” (and not 
a place or “by way of”), see Allon 1997: 47]. After they had approached [the Blessed One], Ghaṭīkāra the pot-
ter paid homage [in the sense of “Having prostrated himself at the feet of the Buddha”; cp. ibid.: 54] to the 
Blessed One Kassapa, accomplished and fully awakened and sat down to one side. But the young Brahmin stu-
dent Jotipāla exchanged greetings with the Blessed One Kassapa, accomplished and fully awakened and, hav-
ing exchanged agreeable and courteous talk [with him], sat down to one side.” 
 Cp. Allon 1997: 51-54; 86f.; summary p. 95f.; 174, formula C.1).  
300
 MN I 48,29f.: Nanu maṃ, samma Jotipāla, jānāsi: Andhe jiṇṇe mātā-pitaro posemīti? The blind parents are 
a frequent motif in Indian literature, as Bailey & Mabbett (2003: 247) explain: “The symbolism of the blind 
parents, found often elsewhere in Indian literature (e.g., the acetic killed by Pāṇḍu in the Ādiparvan of the 
Mbh) [cp. also the Jātaka’s], lends more dramatic emphasis to his domestic responsibility than would the sim-
ple declaration that he had to support a family.”   
301
 MN I 48,31-32: Tena hi, samma Ghaṭīkāra, ahaṃ agārasmā anāgāriyaṃ pabbajissāṃī ti. […] Atha kho, 
Ānanda, Ghaṭīkāro ca kumbhakāro Jotipālo ca māṇavo yena Kassapo bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho 
ten’ upasaṃkamiṃsu.  
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approach. Otherwise, the repeated use of the approach formula would perhaps sound odd even to 
one who is used to this highly formulaic language.302 That the language is highly formulaic – us-
ing the usual approach formulas303 – does not come as a surprise (owing to the mnemonic exigen-
cies), and should not mislead one over the liveliness and realistic touch of the situation). Again, 
it is Ghaṭīkāra who asks the Buddha on behalf his friend to be ordained by him, and Jotipāla ob-
tains the full admission into the order (upasampadā) in the presence of the Blessed One Kass-
sapa.304 
II.5 [MN I 49,9305-50,12] King Kikī/the ‘meal narrative’306 (Narrator: Buddha Gotama; Addressee: 
Ānanda/the monks respectively; Focaliser: Buddha Gotama; Place: Benares, the Deer Park] 
It is an interesting fact in the story-world that at this moment the character Jotipāla disappears 
from the story. (We will return to this later.) The Buddha Kassapa wanders to Benares (= Kāsī) 
and makes camp in the famous Deer Park (Isipatane Migadāye). Kikī, the king of Kāsi at that 
                                                 
302
 This is perhaps a weak explanation; for a similar situation cp. Allon 1997: 57. 
303
 MN I 48,4-8 and re-occurring verbatim at MN I 48,33-49,5: Atha kho, Ānanda, Ghaṭīkāro ca kumbhakāro 
Jotipalo ca māṇavo yena Kassapa bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho ten’ upasaṃkamiṃsu; upasaṃkamitvā 
Kassapaṃ bhagavantaṃ arahantaṃ sammāsambuddhaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdiṃsu. Ekamantaṃ nis-
inno kho, Ānando, Ghaṭīkāro kumbhakāro Kassapaṃ bhagavantaṃ arahantaṃ sammāsambuddhaṃ etad av-
oca: […]. See Allon 1997: 172 (approach-formula A.6)) 
304
 MN I 49,7-9: Alattha kho, Ānanda, Jotipālo māṇavo Kasspassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa 
santike pabbajaṃ alattha upasampadaṃ. It is conspicuous that Jotipāla receives the full ordination at this 
point. This speaks for the assumption that the sutta-content may record a point of time in the history of the 
saṅgha where the ordination was not yet split into two separate ceremonies (pabbajā and upasampadā), as re-
lated by the Vinaya (Vin I 82).  
305
 Interestingly, unlike the PTS edition, the Be(R) has a new paragraph starting here (287.), which congruously 
coincides with the starting of a new unit of meaning: the Buddha Kassapa, after having stayed at Vebhaliṅge 
for as long as he wished, half a month after the ordination of Jotipāla the Brahmin youth, set out for Benares. 
MN I 49,9-13: Atha kho, Ānanda, Kassapo bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho arirūpasampanne Jotipāle 
māṇave addhamāsūpasampanne Vebhaliṅge yathābhirantaṃ viharitvā yena Bārāṇasī tena cārikaṃ pakkāmi; 
anupubbena cārikaṃ caramāno yena Bārāṇasī tad avasari …  
306
 Cp. Allon 1997: 125f.; Bailey & Mabbett 2003: 240 (It is somewhat noticeable that Bailey and Mabbett do 
neither cite Allon’s study throughout their book nor list it in the bibliography). 
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time, receives the message of the Buddha Kassapa’s arrival and prepares to meet him.307 The king 
approaches the Blessed One Kassapa, greets him respectfully308, and sits down to one side. Kas-
sapa is reported to deliver a discourse on dhamma to the king (it is reported that such an event 
took place, not its content; verbatim the earlier dhamma-talk given to the two friends: dhammiyā 
kathāya sandassesi samādapesi samuttejesi sampahaṃsesi309), whereupon the king invites the 
Buddha310 and his entourage for a meal at his house for the next day. Kassapa agrees, customar-
ily, by remaining silent (adhivāsesi … Kassapo … tuṇhībhāvena). Kikī leaves and arranges for a 
lavish meal to be prepared at his place during the night. By dawn, he sends for the Buddha to in-
form him that the meal is ready. Up to this point, including the following report of the meal at 
king Kikī’s dwelling, the presentation of the narrative follows exclusively formulaic patterns, 
                                                 
307
 The text employs the formulas frequently/standardly used for the description of this kind of action; see MN 
I 49,15-26: Assosi kho, Ānanda, Kikī Kāsirājā: Kassapo kira bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho Bārāṇasiṃ 
anuppatto Bārāṇasiyaṃ viharati Isipatane Migadāye ti. Atha kho, Ānanda, Kikī Kāsirājā bhadrāni bhadrāni 
yānāni yojāpetvā bhadraṃ [Bm bhadraṃ bhadraṃ] yānaṃ abhiruhitvā bhadrehi bhadrehi yānehi Bārāṇasiyā 
niyyāsi mahatā rājānubhāvena [Be(R) mahaccārājānubhāvena] Kassapaṃ bhagavantaṃ arahantaṃ 
sammāsambuddhaṃ dassanāya; yāvatikā yānassa bhūmi yānena gantvā yānā paccorohitvā pattiko va yena 
Kassapo bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho ten’ upasaṅkami; upasaṅkamitvā Kassapaṃ bhagavantaṃ ara-
hantaṃ sammāsambuddhaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdi. Ekamantaṃ nisinnaṃ kho, Ānanda,…. Cp. Allon 
1997: 26ff. (“Hearing that the Buddha has arrived in town”), 36-40 (“Preparing to approach someone and the 
means of getting there”), 168-190 (“References to Part I” > Formula ‘L’). For a translation and detailed treat-
ment of this passage see below.  
308
 As Allon has discovered, this greeting (which as a gesture seems to be equivalent with [gen.] pāde śirasā 
vanditvā) is probably the most respectful within a hierarchy of possible forms of greetings addressed to the 
Buddha and bhikkhus respectively; see Allon 1997: 53f. The very respectful approach-formulas seem to have 
been reserved by the sutta redactors exclusively for approaching and addressing the Buddha(s) or bhikkhus; cp. 
ibid.: 59f. The ‘simpler’ approach-formulas (Allon’s ‘Type A Formulas’; cp. ibid.: 19-23) which exclude polite 
and more or less elaborate forms of address etc. are usually not used for describing an approach to the Buddha 
or a bhikkhu (ibid.: 21).  
309
 See above under II.3; cp. also Allon 1997: 133, where this formula is analysed as part of the “post-approach 
formulas” of the ‘B-type’ (formula ‘B d) 1a)’, for which see ibid.: 187 (“References”). 
310
 Note the address ‘bhante’ here (MN II 50,1)! Cp. this to Allon 1997: 57&59 (59: when used in the ap-
proach-formulas (B 5-7), the address ‘bhante’ is seen to go almost always together with the most formal salua-
tion possible, i.e. the abhivādetvā salutation) 
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namely employing approach-formulas311 and formulas used to describe the Buddha following an 
invitation for a meal.312 The king serves the Buddha Kassapa and his monks with his own hands. 
II.6 Failed “conversion frame”/competing donors: the qualities of the lay follower Ghaṭīkāra313 
[MN II 50,13-51,11 (failed conversion/Kikī’s reprimand) // MN II 51,11-52,4] 
After the meal is finished, Kikī sits down on a lower seat at one side of the Blessed One Kassapa 
and invites him to stay with him for the rains retreat. Although Kikī shows the highest possible 
respect in his behavior towards the Blessed One Kassapa, and thus declares his trust in him as a 
(his?) religious teacher314, the way Kikī pitches a rains residence to Kassapa is somewhat unusual 
and occurs only in this place in the Sutta Piṭaka. Kikī repeats three times: “May the Blessed One, 
                                                 
311
 See n. 307 and 308. 
312
 Cp. Allon 1997: 125-138. There is one minor, almost trifle, as it were, variation here in comparison to the 
formula described by Allon for the DN. MN II 50,13-16, Ghaṭīkāra Sutta, has Atha kho, Ānanda, Kassapo 
bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho pubbanhasamayaṃ nivāsetvā pattacīvaraṃ ādāya yena Kikissa 
Kāsirañño nivesanaṃ ten’ upasaṃkami; upasaṃkamitvā paññatte āsane nisīdi saddhiṃ bhikkhusaṅghena. In 
the DN formula, the saṅgha is mentioned already in the approach-formula: atha kho Bhagavā pubbaṇha-sama-
yaṃ nivāsetvā patta-cīvaraṃ ādāya saddhiṃ bhikkhu-saṅghena yena … (see Allon 1997: 125). This variation 
could mean, if nothing else, a difference of transmission within the different bhāṇaka groups/traditions of the 
DN and MN respectively. A brief database survey shows that the former variation occurs in this form, besides 
in the MN, ten times in the Mahāvagga, four times in the Cullavagga, one time in the Pārājika of the Vinaya 
Piṭaka, and five times in the MN (=http://www.bodhgayanews.net/pali.htm; search entry: nisīdi saddhiṃ; 
19.03.2013). Allon has already recognised and described this difference; cp. ibid.: 127. According to his obser-
vation, the former variant is prevalent in DN and the Udāna, whereas the latter occurs in Vin, MN, AN, and 
Sn.  
313
 The following unit (MN II 50,13-24), which I have detached here from the preceding one and joined with the 
following praise of Ghaṭīkāra’s qualities, belongs strictly speaking still to the narrative frame of the ‘meal nar-
rative’ (being what Allon calls the ‘post-approach’; cp. Allon 1997: 128-137). However, I have connected it 
here with what follows because, in my view, seen from a perspective of its narrative function, as a “failed con-
version frame” it serves as a kind of bridge (Ger. “Überleitung”). Note that I use the word ‘frame’ (in con-
verted commas) in its specialised narratological sense (defined, e.g., in Fludernik 2008: Glossary, s.v. Rah-
men). ‘Frame’ in (so-called Cognitive) Narratology means certain standard situations which consist in a fixed 
sequence of actions (= ‘script’; e.g. ‘visiting a restaurant’ and ordering a meal), and which are typically known 
to the members of a given society as part of their world knowledge and expressed through stock phrases). I use 
frame (without inverted commas) to indicate its more common use in description of narratives, as in “frame 
story”, etc. See also n. 284 above.  
314
 Cp. Allon 1997: 131; 133 & 137 (Conclusion): “The giving of a meal is a sign of respect.” Allon argues that 
the phrase was perhaps inserted later in the MN. In any case, this approach formula appears to be used to indi-
cate an obsequiousness on the the part of the person taking the “lower seat” and that the person approaching 
has trust in the Buddha as a teacher to salvation (and thus submits to his authority). 
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venerable sir, accept from me a rains residence in Benares. The service to/supply for the saṅgha 
will be of such a/this kind.”315 Three times the Buddha Kassapa refuses.316  
Following upon the refusals, king Kikī gets upset. The narrator presents Kikī’s thought in 
the voice of the Buddha Gotama, introduced with an abridged variant of the usual formula ([gen. 
of person] etad ahosi, which is left out here): “Then, Ānanda, the following thought occurred to 
Kikī the king of Kāsi: ‘Kassapa, the Blessed One, accomplished and fully awakened, does not 
consent to my [offer of a] rains residence in Benares’.” The narrator (= Buddha Gotama) obvi-
ously saw the need to comment on the ‘mode’ in which this thought is to be understood: “He be-
came depressed317 and dejected.”318 Then, Kikī asks the Buddha: “Is there anyone, venerable sir, 
who serves you better than I do?”319 Kassapa replies truthfully that the potter Ghaṭīkāra in the 
market town called Vebhaliṅga was his chief supporter. What is more, the Blessed One Kassapa, 
accomplished and fully awakened, and therefore endowed with the ability to read others’ 
thoughts (ceto-pariya-ñāṇa, one of the six abhiññā), contrasts the king with his chief supporter. 
The passage gives the strong impression of being a reprimand addressed to king Kikī.320 Kassapa 
                                                 
315
 MN II 50,24f.: Adhivāsetu me, bhante, Bhagavā Bārāṇasiyaṃ vassāvāsaṃ; evarūpaṃ saṃghassa 
upaṭṭhānaṃ bhavissatīti. Horner translates (1957: 247): “Revered sir, may the Lord consent to (accept) my 
rains-residence in Benares; there will be suitable support for the Order.” Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi (2001: 673,17.) 
has: “Venerable sir, let the Blessed One accept from me a residence for the Rains in Benares; that will be help-
ful for the Sangha.” Both translations do not bring the full implication of this phrase across: a mild form of 
“extortion” of the Buddha Kassapa: “If you accept me as your donor and main supporter here in Benares (> 
prestige for Kikī), this (evarūpaṃ = the sumptuous meal just enjoyed) is what you can expect every day for 
yourself and your monks!”      
316
 MN II 50,26: Alaṃ, maharaja, adhivuttho me vassāvāso ti, “Enough, great king, I have [already] consented 
to a residence during the Rains.” 
317
 The commentary explains that literally the “change” (aññathattaṃ) that occurred in Kikī was pertaining to 
his mind or “mental” (cittaññathattaṃ); Ps III 284,6. Cp. also to the same expression used for the householder 
in the Piyajātika Sutta. 
318
 MN II 50,31-51,2: Atha kho Ānanda, Kikissa Kāsirañño: Na me Kassapo bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsam-
buddho adhivāseti Bārāṇasiyaṃ vassāvāsan ti. Ahu-d-eva aññathattaṃ ahu domanassaṃ. 
319
 Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 673,18., translate: “Then he said: ‘Venerable sir, have you a better supporter than 
I am?’” MN II 51,4f.: Atthi nu te, bhante, añño koci mayā upaṭṭhākataro ti? However, according to Pāṇini, the 
suffixes –taro and –tama can theoretically be added freely to any noun without altering the meaning (R. Gom-
brich, personal communication). Buddhaghosa does not comment on this passage.  
320
 MN II 51,5-11: Atthi, mahārāja, Vebhaliṅgaṃ nāma gāmanigamo; tattha Ghaṭīkāro nāma kumbhakāro; so 
me upaṭṭhāko aggupaṭṭhāko. Tuyhaṃ kho pana, maharaja: Na me Kassapo bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho 
adhivāseti Bārāṇasiyaṃ vassāvāsn ti atthi aññthattaṃ atthi domanassaṃ; tayidaṃ Ghaṭīkāre kumbhakāre 
[Be(R), Bm Ghaṭīkārassa kumbhakārassa] n’tthi na ca bhavissati.  
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Buddha says: “You, on the other hand, maharaja, [just] thought: ‘Kassapa, the Blessed One, ac-
complished and fully awakened, does not consent to my [offer of a] rains residence in Benares’, 
and you became depressed and dejected. [But] this is not so with the potter Ghaṭīkāra and it will 
not be so (i.e. the potter does not and will never think thus!).” Now, the Blessed One Kassapa ex-
plains why Ghaṭīkāra has no reason to be disappointed and will not be disappointed – it is be-
cause of his qualities (these qualities are related to the “wholesome courses of action’ (kusala 
kamma-pathas), his trust in the four Noble Truths, his general virtuous conduct, and finally the 
stage of his spiritual attainment).  
 
III. ‘Meta-metadiegesis’, 3rd level narrative (“tertiäres Erzählen” (Schmid)) 
III.1 (MN II 52,4 -54,2) [Narrator: Buddha Kassapa; Addressee: the maharaja Kikī; Focaliser: 
Buddha Kassapa]  
Following this enumeration of Ghaṭīkāra’s positive character traits, we have another “story of the 
past”, this time of the more recent past within the time frame of the Jātaka (= the time of the 
‘metadiegesis’, Ger. „erzählte Zeit”; however, no absolute time specification is given, as al-
ways). Here the narration is handed over to a (real) homodiegetic narrator: the Buddha Kassapa – 
the Buddha Gotama thereby becoming an extradiegetic narrator. Thus, the narrative level or the 
narrating situation shifts from the second to the third level or, in Genette’s terms, meta-metadie-
getic level of narration.321  
As to the content of this embedded story, three episodes from the life of the potter 
Ghaṭīkāra as the chief supporter and lay follower of the Buddha Kassapa and of their relationship 
are narrated. These episodes serve to exemplify the potter’s virtues as well as to explain the roots 
of the rather intimate relationship between the Buddha Kassapa and the poor potter. In the first 
episode, Kassapa during his daily begging round reaches the dwelling where Ghaṭīkāra is living 
with and caring for his old and blind parents. The Blessed One enquires of the whereabouts of 
                                                 
321
 MN II 52,4: Ekam idāhaṃ, mahārāja, samayaṃ Vebhal̥iṅge gāmanigame viharāmi, “At one time, maharaja, 
I was living in/near a market town called Vebhal̥iṅga.” Cp. also Genette 1980: 232–34. 
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the bhaggava.322 His parents inform Kassapa that he has gone out but invite him to help himself 
with the food that had been prepared. He enjoys his meal and went on. Upon arriving home, the 
potter recognises that someone has taken from his food. He asks his parents and they tell him 
what had happened. After hearing that it was the Blessed One Kassapa, the Accomplished and 
fully Awakened One, who has asked for him and then taken food from the pots, Ghaṭīkāra 
thinks, “It is indeed a gain for me, it is indeed well gotten by me that the Blessed One Kassapa, 
accomplished and fully awakened, is trusting me that much.”323 Because of this, feelings of joy 
and pleasure abided in the potter for half a month, and for seven days in his parents.  
In the second episode, which is an almost entirely verbatim repetition of the first episode, 
Kassapa just reports (remembers!) having taken a different kind of food (kummāsa, kind of rice-
porridge (?), and curry or some kind of sauce, sūpa, instead of boiled rice, odana, with curry).324   
The third episode, however, is markedly different. Kassapa, the Buddha, relates that 
while he was once living in Vebhal̥iṅga, his hut leaked. So he asked of his monks to go to 
Ghaṭīkāra’s dwelling and see if he had some spare grass for the repair of his roof. When they re-
turn empty-handed, Kassapa sends them again to fetch the grass from Ghaṭīkāra’s roof. The 
monks do as they were told and, asked by the blind parents, who were tampering with their 
house’s roof, the monks reply truthfully that the grass was for the Blessed One Kassapa, whose 
hut was leaking, whereupon the parents encourage the monks to take freely whatever they 
needed. After Ghaṭīkāra had returned home and had seen what had happened to the roof, he 
asked his parents about it. After they tell him everything that had happened, the potter rejoices as 
before. Additionally, the Blessed One Kassapa relates that it was discovered that although it was 
rainy season, for the remaining three months not even a single drop of water fell into the potter’s 
                                                 
322
 The term bhaggava, literally “pertaining to/coming from [the ancient clan of] Bhr̥gu”, seems to have been a 
general designation for potters; cp. DPPN, s.v. bhaggava: “[…] Bhaggava seems to have been a generic name 
for all potters, perhaps a special form of address used towards members of the kumbhakāra “caste”. Thus we 
find in the books several instances of potters being addressed as “Bhaggava”. E.g., DhA.i.33; J. ii.80, iii.382. 
At J. 111.382.” 
323
 MN II 52,21f.: Lābhā vata me suladdhaṃ vata me yassa me Kassapo bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho 
evaṃ abhivissattho ti. 
324
 This gives Anālayo (2011: 448) reason to speculate whether this passage might have its origin in an acci-
dental textual doubling. I find this idea not very convincing given the fact that the suttas abound in this kind of 
repetition (– and thus in “accidental” textual doublings?) Furthermore, there is a difference, if only a small one, 
in the kind of food between the two passages (which could have been inserted, of course, after the doubling 
had occurred).  
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house, which now had only the sky for a roof. This event came eventually to be known as one of 
the “Aeon miracles” (kappaṭṭhiyapāṭihāriyā).325 “Such, maharaja, is Ghaṭīkāra the potter!”326 With 
these words, Kassapa closes his story and the king Kikī, impressed, comments on it using 
Ghaṭīkāra’s own words: “It is a gain for the potter Ghaṭīkāra, venerable sir, it is a well gotten 
gain for the potter Ghaṭīkāra, venerable sir, that the Blessed One is trusting him so [much].”327 
II.7 Kikī’s gift 
In the last paragraph of the Jātaka, within the time frame of the Jātaka tale, the narrating in-
stance shifts ‘back’ to the extradiegetic, heterodiegetic narrator, Buddha Gotama, and thus re-
turns to the second, or metadiegetic, level of narration. It relates that Kikī has five-hundred cart-
loads of foodstuffs (red husked rice with suitable materials for sauce)328 sent to Ghaṭīkāra as a 
gift, which the potter rejects.329  
II.8 Samodhāna; narrator: sutta-narrator; focalizing instance: sutta-narrator 
In the following “application of the story” (samodhāna), the Buddha Śākyamuni finally resolves 
the identities of the persons in the story of the past to Ānanda. It should be understood as fol-
lows: He himself, he says, was no other than the Brahmin youth Jotipāla, not somebody else.  
I.4 Concluding Sentence/-Formula 
Ānanda was satisfied and rejoiced in what the Buddha had said. Although the text describes that 
the monks are assembled around Buddha Gotama and Ānanda, it is slightly puzzling that here 
only Ānanda rejoices about the Jātaka the Buddha told. 
0. ‘Frame’: 
-ti= inverted comma, indicating that this is what was heard (evam me sutaṃ):  the recitation of 
the sutta ends here. 
                                                 
325
 Cp. n. 272 above. 
326
 MN II 54,4f.: Evarūpo ca, mahārāja, Ghaṭīkāro kumbhakāro ti. 
327
 MN II 54,5-7: Lābhā, bhante, Ghaṭīkārassa kumbhakārassa, suladdhaṃ lābhā, bhante, Ghaṭīkārassa 
kumbhakārassa yassa Bhagavā evaṃ abhivissattho ti. 
328
 MN II 54,8-10: Atha kho, Ānanda, Kikī Kāsirājā Ghaṭīkārassakumbhkārassapañcamattāni taṇḍulavāha-
satāni pāhesi paṇḍumuṭikassa sālino tadūpiyañ ca sūpeyyaṃ. 
329
 Greg Bailey and Ian Mabbett, on the other hand, interpret the potter’s last sentence in a sense that he does 
accept the gift; cp. Bailey & Mabbett 2003: 246. I. B. Horner’s translation of the passage is of the same tenor. I 
will discuss the different interpretations and its implication of our understanding of the narrative below. 
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4.4 Comparison with the Jyotipāla Sūtra, Mahāvastu  
In comparison to the version of this story found in the Mahāvastu-Avadāna (Mvu), which inter-
estingly bears the title Jyotipāla Sūtra, one can observe a general tendency to dramatise or emote 
the action or the presentation of events in the Mvu. This is interesting in comparison to the char-
acterisation in the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta in some parts. Here are a few notable examples: Prior to the 
crucial “bathing scene”, the Mvu states, in a brief interior monologue, Ghaṭīkāra’s thoughts. In it, 
the potter, because he realises that his plea will be unsuccessful, thinks of a trick for how to get 
his friend Jyotipāla to go see the Blessed One. This narrative technique is also standardly found 
in mediaeval Europan literature: a character’s thoughts are presented “to explain” the motivation 
for his action (the verbal statement of the action is usually identical to the thought representation, 
except perhaps for the grammatical person). In Ghaṭikāra’s mind, the idea to go for the evening 
bath just serves his intention because the nearby lotus-pond Sumukā, lies close to where the Bud-
dha Kāśyapa is dwelling.330 And just as Jyotipala is beginning to dress again after his bath, 
Ghaṭīkāra starts again to entreat him. After having grasped Jyotipāla’s girdle and entreating him 
for the fourth time to go and see the Buddha Kāśyapa, Jyotipāla drags himself away, whereupon 
Ghaṭīkāra runs after him and manages to catch hold of a strand of his friend’s freshly washed 
hair.331 To even aggravate the bad habits in Jyotipla’s character, the Mvu adds (i.e. when com-
pared with the Pāli version) rather prosaically to the conversation with the Blessed One Kāśyapa 
that Jyotipāla professed himself to be unable to put all of the five sets of precepts (paṃca 
śikṣāpadāni) into practice right away because he first had to kill somebody who had annoyed 
him. Asked by Kāśyapa who this person was, Jyotipāla replies that it was Ghaṭikāra, the potter, 
                                                 
330
 Bāgcī 1970: 265,7-11: Atha khalv Ānanda Ghaṭīkārasya kumbhakārasya etad abhūṣi | ko nu khalu syād 
upāyo yaṃ Jyotipālo māṇavo bhagavantaṃ Kāśyapaṃ darśanāya upasaṃkrameya paryupāsanāya | atha khalv 
Ānanda Ghaṭīkārasya kumbhakārasya etad abhūṣi | asti khalu tasyai ’va vanakhaṇḍasya avidūre sumukā 
nāma puṣkariṇī yaṃ nūnā ’haṃ Jyotipālena māṇavena sārdhaṃ yena sumukā nāma puṣkariṇī gaccheyaṃ 
śīrṣasnāpanāya |. 
331
 Bāgcī 1970: 265,4f.: Atha khalv ānanda Jyotipālo māṇavo Ghaṭīkāraṃ kumbhakāraṃ apadhunitvā prayāt | 
tam enaṃ ghaṭīkāro kumbhakāro anujavitvā praveṇikeśehi gr̥hītvā etad avocet |. I disagree with Anālayo, that 
this Mvu version of the event would “[explain] why Ghaṭīkāra undertook an action that would have been a se-
rious breach of etiquette in view of the ancient Indian respect for the head […].” He could as well have 
grabbed him by the arm. It does not particularly explain his reaching for his hair, an action which has, in my 




because he, himself being of a low social class, had touched his freshly washed hair.332 The ex-
pression śīrṣa-snātaka corresponds to Pāli sīsanahāta. One possible reading would be this: In the 
Mvu version, me tadā evaṃ śīrṣasnātaṃ is construed as an absolute accusative construction (in-
stead of an absolute genitive construction as in the Pāli). The verb, parāmṛśati, would then have 
to be construed with the instrumental (keśehi), “he/she grabbed by the hair”, instead of the loca-
tive in the Pāli (“at the hair”). In any case, the pronoun ‘me’ can stand for both the (enclitic) ac-
cusative singular or the dative-genetive singular.333 Another, and perhaps more likely, reading, 
then, would take ‘me’ as the direct object of parāmṛśati, and śīrṣasnātaṃ as a bahuvṛhi-com-
pound, “one who has bathed”.    
However, the meaning seems to be the same (except that in the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit version 
of the Mvu, the reference of the pronoun (me) is to Jyotipāla alone (singular), not to both charac-
ters as in the Pāli (amhākaṃ), at least according to the Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation). Since 
both went to wash their heads, the singular here could be interpreted to be intentioned to high-
light the difference in status between Jyotipāla and Ghaṭikāra. Now the word snāta “bathed, 
washed” in the expression śīrṣasnāta (lexicalized in classical Skt. as śiraḥsnāta; cp. MW, s.v.) 
can also have a religious and ritual connotation, “purified by ablution”334. Since bathing in a brah-
minical context almost always has religious and ritual overtones, it is possible to interpret this 
particular passage as adding to the dramatic climax of the action (i.e. the pulling of the hair of 
Jyotipāla’s ritually bathed Brahmin head) through highlighting the difference in social status of 
the two friends, underlining the gravity of Ghaṭikāra’s action, and thereby (indirectly) contrib-
uting to Jyotipāla’s characterisation as a proud Brahmin. If this interpretation is acceptable, this 
passage may even be seen to contain a Buddhist critique of the varṇa- or ancient Indian class-
system. It is possible that the different constructions in the (Buddhist Hybrid) Sanskrit and the 
Pāli simply reflect differences in language usage. On the other hand, if my interpretation is valid, 
                                                 
332
 Bāgcī 1970: 265,15-22: Atha khalv Ānanda Bhagavāṃ Kāśyapo Jyotipālaṃ māṇavaṃ trīhi ca śaraṇaga-
manehi paṃcahi ca śikṣāpadehi samādāpaye | atha khalv Ānanda Jyotipālo māṇavo Bhagavantaṃ Kāśyapaṃ 
etad avocat | na tāvad ahaṃ Bhagavaṃ sarvāṇi paṃca śikṣāpadāni samādāpayiṣyaṃ | asti tāva me eko puruṣo 
viheṭhako roṣako jīvitād vyaparopayitavyo | evam ukte bhagavāṃ Jyotipālaṃ māṇavaṃ etad avocat | katamo 
punar Jyotipāla eko puruṣo viheṭhako roṣako jīvitād vyaparopayitavyo | evam ukte Ānanda Jyotipālo māṇavo 
Bhagavantaṃ Kāśyapam etad avocat | ayaṃ Bhagava Ghaṭikāro kumbhakāro yo me tadā evaṃ śīrṣasnātaṃ 
mūrdhni keśehi parāmr̥ṣati | 
333
 See Edgerton, BHSG, § 20.11f. 
334
 Cp. Apte, s.v. snāta. 
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the Mvu seems to corroborate my interpretation of the Pāli sīsanahāta as “Head-Ablutioned” and 
even bring out the intended dramatic impact of the passage more starkly (which is not reflected 
by the Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation). 
More interesting for my purpose here, however, is the fact that some of the direct speech 
passages in the Pāli text, appear in the Mvu version as representations of thoughts of the respec-
tive characters.335  
The Mvu version deviates completely from the Pāli version towards the end of the sutta. 
Whereas the end of the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta enhances or once more emphasizes the moral qualities of 
Ghaṭīkāra, the Mvu comes up with the prediction of the future Buddhahood (Skt./P. vyākaraṇa) 
of Jyotipāla by the Buddha Kāśyapa, before, for the last few pages, it bursts into all kinds of 
wonderworks and miracles performed by the Buddha to impress and/or instruct his monks (the 
Buddha bursts into flames, flies up into the sky, and “thrills” his monks with a ‘talk’ on dhamma: 
“Think like this, monks, not like that! Concentrate like this, monks, not like that! […]”; all of 
this neither relates to the story nor serves to make it more interesting). 
Anālayo observes that the Mvu version shifts the emphasis form the (moral) qualifica-
tions of Ghaṭīkāra to the bodhisattva career with Jyotipāla at its centre.336 
These few examples of a very superficial comparison may be indicative that the version 
of the story as preserved in the Mvu betrays an interest of its redactors/authors to change certain 
aspects of the story when compared to the Pāli version. This might be a simple and perhaps alter-
native explanation to the historical-critical one, that these comparisons may point to the existence 
of a different recension as basis for the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādin translation. Also, the dif-
ferent titles given to these two versions may be seen to reveal something about the confusion the 
story must have raised early on (Mvu: Jyotipāla Sūtra; Pāli: Ghaṭīkāra Sutta). 
At this point I will return to the Pāli version of the story and take up again my synchronic 
investigation of the sutta instead of venturing into more intertextual comparisons and other such 
speculations.      
                                                 
335
 See e.g. Bāgcī 1970: 272,19ff., and MN I 54,5-7. 
336
 Cp. Anālayo 2011: 450: “In this way, the Mahāvastu account presents the events described in the 
Ghaṭīkāra-sutta from the perspective of the bodhisattva’s career. This shift of emphasis finds its explicit ex-
pression in the discourse’s title in the Mahāvastu, where the “discourse on Ghaṭīkāra” has become the “dis-




As mentioned above, this sutta relates the story of the Brahmin student Jotipāla, one of the Bud-
dha’s former births, and his friend Ghatīkāra the potter, bracketed by the usual expository (or 
frame) story of the longer suttas, that shows the defining structure of the canonical “Ur-Jātaka” 
as found, e.g., in the Sutta Piṭaka.337 The two major structural or formal defining characteristics 
of which are, as von Hinüber has shown, the introduction with bhūtapubbaṃ, “in old times/ for-
merly” (MN II 45,11), etc., and the (early) form of the samodhāna, “Now, Ānanda, you may 
think thus: ‘Certainly, someone else was the brahmin student Jotipāla on that occasion.’ But it 
should not be regarded thus. I was the brahmin student Jotipāla on that occasion.”338 
The content of the uplifting teachings the Buddha Kassapa gives them are, according to 
the commentary, to be understood as “connected with the former births [of the two friends, or of 
Jotipāla alone?]’ to evoke [their] memories.”339 In other words, here dhammī kathā should be un-
derstood to mean Jātaka. This is in accordance with “the purpose” of a Jātaka, as is often stated 
in the Jātaka paccuppannavatthu, namely to reveal the reasons and thus provide an explanation 
for a present situation through events in the past.340 The purpose or the reason for the Buddha in 
                                                 
337
 Cp. von Hinüber 1998: 186f. Von Hinüber speaks congruously of a “Jātaka in Suttanta-Form” (ibid.), since 
the story of Buddha’s former birth as Jotipāla forms the main body of the text and the content of the sutta, 
framed just by the ‘standard’ sutta-frame and a somewhat longer introduction.  
338
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 676,23. MN II 54,16-19: Siyā kho pana te, Ānanda, evam assa: Añño nūna tena 
samayena Jotipālo māṇavo ahosīti. Na kho pan’ etaṃ, Ānanda, evaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Ahaṃ tena samayena 
Jotipālo māṇavo ahosin ti. See also von Hinüber 1998: 185, for the commentaries’ explanation of this usage of 
bhūtapubbaṃ, which is very similar to the general reason for relating a story of the past, in order to show the 
reasons [for a present event/situation] concealed by [the present] rebirth.  
339
 Ps III 282,1f.: Dhammiyā kathāyāti idha satipaṭilābhatthāya pubbenivāsapaṭisaṃyuttā dhammī kathā 
veditabbā. 
340
  Jā I 98,6f.: […] himagabbhaṃ padāletvā puṇṇacandaṃ nīharanto viya bhavantarena paṭicchannakāraṇaṃ 
pākataṃ akāsi, rendered very poetically by Robert Chalmers (Cowell et. al. 1990: 4) as: “Having thus excited 
the Treasurer’s [=Anāthapiṇḍika] attention, he made clear the thing that re-birth had concealed from them, as 
though he were releasing the full moon from the upper air, the birthplace of the snows.” See also von Hinüber 
1998: 16ff. Cp. also the ‘reminiscence’ of the elaborate and later abbreviated transition from paccuppannavat-
thu to atītavatthu in Jā. 35.  
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the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta to relate this story (vatthu) of the past is to shed light on the (‘pre-) history’ 
of a certain place.341  
4.6 Narrative Progression 
The following discussion frequently takes recourse to Phelan’s model of narrative progression 
and characters, and I use his nomenclature (as explained in Part II).    
It is vital to the progression of the narrative in the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta that when the Blessed 
One had stepped down from the road and smiled, Ānanda asks for the reason for this – he first 
asks himself and then the Buddha. The Buddha’s (unusual) smile produces the first ‘instability’ 
in the story (“Why does the Tathāgata smile?” may be the question of the narrative audience at 
this point). Ānanda asks this question, which dissolves the first instability, as a substitute or rep-
resentative for the narrative audience (or rather, in fact for the ‘authorial audience’, because the 
narrative audience is expected to know, like Ānanda, that Tathāgatas do not smile for no rea-
son!). This initial instability serves as the motivation for the Buddha to tell the following story 
about Ghaṭikāra the potter. It might also not be mere chance that the interlocutor of the Buddha is 
Ānanda, because the story is perhaps as much about Ānanda’s and the Buddha Gotama’s rela-
tionship as it is about Ghaṭīkāra’s and the Buddha Kassapa’s, as I will argue in the following.342  
                                                 
341
 However, in our case here, it does not seem entirely convincing that the whole sutta should be intended to 
be merely an explanation of a certain place. Buddhaghosa explains comments that the Buddha K. here is re-
minding Jotipāla of his former bodhisatta vows! According to Buddhaghosa, there must be some remember-
ance from an earlier life, because just before seeing the Buddha J. was not at all interested in seeing the Bud-
dha and then he even asks for the full ordination right away! So far this is plausible. However, if one considers 
who the addressee on this level of communication within the sutta is, it is clearly Ānanda, to whom the “Ur-
Jātaka” is addressed. The commentator is thus confusing narrative levels here: The actual Jātaka that is being 
told to Ānanda (as direct addressee), respectively the saṅgha, by the Buddha Gotama is exactly this “embed-
ded” Jataka-story of Jotipāla and Ghaṭīkāra. There is no indication (or reason) why the Buddha Kassapa should 
refresh Jotipāla’s and Ghaṭīkāra’s memory about their past lives (which would indeed mean that Buddhaghosa 
understood the content of the summarising statement, dhammīkathā, to be a Jātaka within the Jātaka that 
Ānanda is being told. This is Buddhghosa’s interpretation, but it is not indicated by the sutta itself). This being 
so, the commentator seems to confuse the first-level or primary frame-narrative with the metadiegetic, second-
level story, which is told by a homo-diegetic narrator (the narrator, the Buddha Gotama, speaks about himself 
in the third person because the identity of Jotipāla and himself is only, according to the Jātaka-genre conven-
tion, revealed later at the end of the narrative. (The account may be called, according to Genette’s taxonomy, 
auto-diegetic. However, there’s no model for a narrator who is one of the main characters in the story but 
speaks about himself in the third person, as is the case in the Jātakas).  
342
 It is noteworthy, I think, in this respect that only the identity of Jotipāla is revealed in the samodhāna, not 
that of any other character.  
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All in all, when looking closely at the way this ‘exposition’ of the sutta is arranged, it 
strikes one as a quite scenic portray of the situation or, speaking with the Anglo-American (Neo-
Aristotelian) tradition of narratological analysis, as “showing”, as opposed to “telling”, referring 
to Plato’s famous distinction of diegesis and mimesis. 
It must surely strike one as a peculiarity here that the same narrator, namely the Buddha 
Gotama, repeats the same words in quick succession.343 Why does he do that? As regards the con-
tent, the passage does not seem to be very important. However, it is important insofar as it pro-
vides the occasion/a reason for the Buddha to tell a story of the past to the monks: And therein 
lies, in my reading of the sutta, the reason for the repetition. In the first instance, the Buddha is 
standing and talking to Ānanda, his close attendant. Whether we take the content of what the 
Buddha tells to Ānanda at face value or not (the “real”, i.e. the historical fact of the existence of 
the former Buddha Kassapa; furthermore, it has to remain a complete mystery how exactly the 
Buddha remembers the place, since – according to his own teaching – everything changes con-
stantly!), this remark of the Buddha provides an occasion for him to give a sermon. Why, then, 
does he repeat the same words? At the very beginning of the sutta it was said that the Buddha 
was travelling with a large group of monks in the land of the Kuru’s.344 With the second repeti-
tion, after having sat down on a seat prepared by Ānanda, he is going to give the sermon to this 
large following, despite the fact that he continues to address directly only Ānanda (vocative 
case). 
Now, the passage prompts us to take a closer look at the nature of the Buddha’s interac-
tion with Ānanda. According to tradition, although Ānanda is still “in training” (sekha) shortly 
before the first council starts (AN 3:78), at which the whole of the Buddha’s teachings were to be 
recited after his death in order to preserve them and to which only arahats were permitted, he 
                                                 
343
 MN II 45f.: Bhūtapubbaṃ ānanda, imasmiṃ padese vehaliṅgaṃ nāma gāmanigamo ahosi iddho ceva thito 
ca bahujano ākiṇṇamanusso. Vehaliṅgaṃ kho ānanda, gāmanigamaṃ kassapo bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsam-
buddho upanissāya vihāsi. Idha sudaṃ ānanda, kassapassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa ārāmo 
ahosi. Idha sudaṃ ānanda, kassapo bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho nisinnako bhikkhusaṅghaṃ ovadati.’ 
This phrase is only interrupted by the descriptive statement that Ānanda is preparing a seat for the Buddha 
(Gotama) to sit down at exactly that spot: Atha kho āyasmā ānando catugguṇaṃ saṅghāṭiṃ paññāpetvā bha-
gavantaṃ etadavoca: tena hi bhante, bhagavā nisīdatu, evā'yaṃ bhūmippadeso dvīhi arahantehī sammāsam-
buddhehi paribhūtto bhavissatī'ti. Nisīdi bhagavā paññatte āsane. Nisajja kho bhagavā āyasmantaṃ ānandaṃ 
āmantesi: […].  
344
 MN II 45: Ekaṃ samayaṃ bhagavā kosalesu cārikaṃ carati mahatā bhikkhusaṅghena saddhiṃ. 
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was nevertheless regarded as the highest of those who possess perfect memory (aggaṃ 
satimantānaṃ).345 While others are said to be foremost in one area among all the disciples of 
Buddha, Ānanda is said to be foremost in no less than five areas (in the Etadagga-Vagga of the 
AN): Besides his perfect memory, he is also foremost among the learned (bahussutānaṃ, liter-
ally “those who have listened to many [teachings]”), among the ones who are resolute/posses a 
firm character (dhitimntānaṃ), among the clever ones (or the ones who show perfect conduct? 
gatimantānaṃ), and last, but most importantly, he was foremost among the monk-attendants of 
the Buddha (upaṭṭhākānaṃ).346 Now, seen together with the fact that Ānanda is the Buddha Go-
tama’s addressee throughout the sutta, the parallels between Ānanda and Ghaṭīkāra appear even 
less accidental. I believe that here we have find a clue to the narrative strategy of the sutta itself.  
But after these preliminary remarks, I will take up this thread again at a later point and 
shall now proceed with the progression of the narrative. 
During the first half of the story, when the potter makes several attempts to convince his 
friend to go and see the Buddha Kassapa, narrative tension builds up dramatically: While the 
friends bathe and dress, three times, with increasing urgency, the potter insists on wanting to go 
and see the Buddha Kassapa. Now the number of the repetitions – three – is not unusual. Often in 
the suttas, a question is asked, or a statement or an injunction is made three times, and the same 
reply or a counter-argument repeated in equal number.347 However, in this particular instance, the 
repeated begging of Ghaṭīkāra builds up a dramatic tension expressed through and accompanied 
by ever more blatant physical actions from the side of the potter, which finally climaxes in 
                                                 
345
 Tradition has it that Ānanda was asked to recite the entire Sutta Piṭaka on the occasion of the first council. 
The whole story of the first council is told right at the beginning of the commentary to the DN, the Sumaṅgala 
Vilāsinī: Ānanda could not attend the council because only arahats where permitted, but soon Mahākassapa 
who was the convener of the council realized that without Ānanda, who had attended on the Buddha a life long 
and was therefore present at most of the Buddha’s talks, it would be impossible to retrieve all the sermons the 
Buddha held. So he commanded to pick Ānanda to recite the suttas. (Bhikkhū āyasmantaṃ mahākassapaṃ 
etad avocuṃ: “ayaṃ, bhante, āyasmā ānando kiñcāpi sekkho abhabbo chandā dosā mohā bhayā agatiṃ 
gantuṃ, bahu cānena bhagavato santike dhammo ca vinayo ca pariyatto, tena hi, bhante, thero āyasmantampi 
ānandaṃ uccinatūti. Atha kho āyasmā mahākassapo āyasmantampi ānandaṃ uccinīti.) 
346
 AN I 24f.: Etadaggaṃ bhikkhave mama sāvakaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ bahussutānaṃ yadidaṃ ānando. Etadaggaṃ 
bhikkhave mama sāvakaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ satimantānaṃ yadidaṃ ānando. Etadaggaṃ bhikkhave mama sāvakaṃ 
bhikkhūnaṃ gatimantānaṃ yadidaṃ ānando. Etadaggaṃ bhikkhave mama sāvakaṃbhikkhūnaṃ 
dhitimantānaṃ yadidaṃ ānando. Etadaggaṃ bhikkhave mama sāvakaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ upaṭṭhākānaṃ yadidaṃ 
ānando. [my emphasis] 
347
 The following references may suffice: MN I 172; 231,17-29; 359,17-29; 375,18-23;  
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Ghaṭīkāra’s highly inappropriate act of pulling (parāmasati, literally “to touch, to hold on to”) 
his Brahmin friend’s freshly washed hair. According to the understood behavioural codes of the 
social classes in ancient India, this is a grave offence. However, surprisingly, the Brahmin stu-
dent Jotipāla’s reaction does not at all meet the gravity of this offence. This and Jotipāla’s 
thought “[…] this will surely be no trivial matter […]”, or in other words, “this [seeing of the 
Buddha Kassapa] must be very important, that the potter goes so far”, prepare for the resolution 
of the instability created by Ghaṭīkāra’s repeated urging to go and see the Blessed One. On the 
other hand, it creates a tension on the level of the “author” (= the Buddha Gotama, in this case) 
and the authorial audience: Why does the potter insist so strongly on making his friend meet the 
Blessed One Kassapa? Does Ghaṭīkāra know something that “we”, the authorial audience do not 
know? Does he know what is going to happen soon after his friend has met the Buddha Kassapa? 
Whatever it may be – surely, it can be no trivial matter! The answer is, of course, that the Bud-
dha, fully awakened and omniscient, already knows, other than the authorial audience, the ou-
come of the story, whose narrator he himself is (and even its “author” – whether or not that re-
quires him to be omniscient or not is yet another question!). The resulting tension on the part of 
the audience seeks to be released: we desire to know what happens next!  
Part II (2) (MN I 46,1-48,3) represents the “dramatic core” of the sutta. The climax of 
Ghaṭīkāra’s actions and their detailed description, the repetitive structure, and the internal focali-
sation at the height of the conflict between the friends – although there is no isochronicity here 
(like, for instance, in a drama scene), the flow of the narrative transmission is noticeably deceler-
ated. The repetitive structure of this passage is what in the judgement of many modern Western 
readers would perhaps be considered tiring (and thus is often shortenend in modern transla-
tions).348 The effect of this form of presentation of events – the more elaborate and detailed selec-
tion of actions or events – consists in a relative broadening or expansion of the narrative flow 
(and the ‘narrative time’; Ger. “Dehnung”), specifically in contrast to the following summarised 
                                                 
348
 This is not to say that repetition in the Pāli suttas is always of the same kind or type. Here I confine my dis-
cussion to repetitions on the level of the structure of the narrative composition (without labelling them). For 




accounts (Ger. “Raffung”) of the subsequent events of the section of the friends’ visit to the Bud-
dha Kassapa (Part II.3) and Jotipāla’s ordination (Part II.4). The expansion of this dramatic situa-
tion, however, is not a real expansion but rather what is called a “scene”.349 Genette writes:  
“In novelistic narrative as it functioned before Recherche [Marcel Proust’s À la recherche du temps 
perdu, the object of Genette’s ‘Essay in Method’], the contrast of tempo between detailed scene and 
summary almost always reflected a contrast of content between dramatic and nondramatic, the strong 
periods of the action coinciding with the most intense moments of the narrative while the weak peri-
ods were summed up with large strokes and as if from a great distance […]. The real rhythm of the 
novelistic canon […] is thus the alternation of nondramatic summaries, functioning as waiting room 
and liaison, with dramatic scenes whose role in the action is decisive.”350 
A most interesting additional aspect is that the ‘dramatic scene’ here is not solely com-
prised of the representation of (physical and verbal) actions, but also contains at its dramatic 
height an instance of ‘internal focalization’ (i.e. a filtering of the perception of events through a 
character’s mind) effected through a ‘direct thought representation’ that functions to characterise 
one of the protagonists in social and psychological terms.351  
4.7 Character analysis 
Next will be a treatment of the characters in more detail through tracing the presentation of each 
of the protagonists (Ghaṭīkāra, Jotipāla, and king Kikī) through the progression of the narrative. 
This section will start with the potter Ghaṭīkāra and proceed in the order of events as given by 
the narrative discourse of the sutta, keeping in mind the classification or types of characters and 
                                                 
349
 Cp. Genette 1980: 109-112. 
350
 Genette 1980: 109f. 
351
 Cp. ibid.: 111, where Genette redefines his use of the analytical term ‘scene’ with regard to its special use in 
Proust’s work (“[…] where action […] is almost completely obliterated in favor of psychological and social 
characterization.”). Again, I neither intend to draw coarse comparisons nor hold a purely structuralist view. Of 
course, there is a great difference in degree between a modern novel and an early Buddhist sutta. However, I 
find the idea fascinating that the basic concept seems to already find expression in those pre-modern texts. 
On another reading, one could perhaps even try to describe the dynamic of the story in terms of the classical 
drama: the whole passage II.2 (2) of the text seemingly serves as the second step in the ideal five-fold concep-
tion of the classical drama. The touching of the head is the climax (“Steigerung”) in the five-fold progression 
of a drama: After the introduction (of the characters, settings, situation etc.), the actions of the protagonists 
(and/or antagonists) antagonistically climax up to the very bold and almost extreme act of Ghaṭīkāra – clearly 
the apex (‘Peripetie’) of the climax – and generate a tangible instability (on the level of the events) – which in 
turn serves to propel (/motivate) the subsequent actions of the protagonists – as well as a tension (the authorial 
audience must be puzzled by the calm reaction of Jotipāla towards this taboo breach of Ghaṭīkāra’s. 
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character-related information obtained from direct and indirect characterisation statements given 
in the discourse. 
The first information the listener/reader learns is the place where the following course of 
events is going to take place, namely in the kingdom of Kosala352, one of the twelve mahājanapa-
das of ancient India, reigned over by the king Pasenadi at the Buddha’s time.353 Though this in-
formation is not (direct) character information, it is one that is related to character – in this case 
to all the characters in the sutta but especially to the Buddha(s). What we learn from it is that the 
story, which is to be told in the following Jātaka, took place in this same region, however, at a 
much earlier, mythical time in the dim and distant past.354 In this case, in the Pāli suttas and the 
cultural settings whose expression they are, that relational information does indeed contribute to 
the characterisation, for it states that the place is attributed continually to the Buddha Kassapa 
(and thus Jotipāla) and the Buddha Gotama – although in general circumstantial information in 
narrative as we usually know it is only “temporary” – underlying what may be the (modern 
Western?) notion that if particulars are related in a narrative concerning time and date, that the 
                                                 
352
 MN II 45,1: Ekaṃ samayaṃ Bhagavā Kosalesu cārikaṃ carati …, “At one time the Blessed One was wan-
dering among the Kosalans.” One has to bear in mind here that in ancient India kings reigned over people, not 
over land.   
353
 Cp. DPPN s.v. Kosala: “A country inhabited by the Kosalā, to the north-west of Magadha and next to Kāsī. 
It is mentioned second in the list of sixteen Mahājanapadas (E.g., AN I 213; IV 252, etc.). In the Buddha’s 
time it was a powerful kingdom ruled over by Pasenadi, who was succeeded by his son Vidūdabha. By this 
time Kāsī was under the subjection of Kosala, for we find that when Bimbisāra, king of Magadha, mar-
ried Kosaladevī, daughter of Mahākosala and sister of Pasenadi, a village in Kāsī was given as part of the 
dowry (Jā II 237; IV 342f). […] In the sixth century B.C. the Sākyan territory of Kapilavatthu was subject to 
Kosala. The Sutta Nipāta (vs.405) speaks of the Buddha’s birthplace as belonging to the Kosalans; see also AN 
I 276, where Kapilavatthu is mentioned as being in Kosala. Elsewhere (MN II 124) Pasenadi is reported as 
saying, ‘Bhagavā pi Kosalako, aham pi Kosalako.’ At the time of the Buddha Sāvatthi was the capital of 
Kosala. Next in importance was Saketa, which, in ancient days, had sometimes been the capital (Jā III 
270; Mtu I 348). There was also Ayojjhā, on the banks of the Sarayu, which, judging from the Rāmāyana, must 
once have been the chief city; but in the sixth century B.C. it was quite unimportant.” 
354
 The Mvu even gives the current name (at the Buddha Gotama’s time), Mārakaraṇḍa, for the town 
Vebhal̥iṅga of the Jātaka at the time of Buddha Kassapa; cp. Bāgcī 1970: 261,11. Exact time specifications as 
well as an exact statement of time spans (i.e., in this case, for the duration of the sāsana of Buddha Kassapa in 
this place) are only found in commentarial Pāli literature, and are often contradicting each other at that. 
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depicted events are unique, singular and not repeatable.355 Later on, in the commencement of the 
‘story of the past’ (atīta-vatthu), the place itself is further characterised as having been “prosper-
ous” (iddho), “rich” (phīto), and “crowded, full of people” (bahujano ākiṇṇa manusso).356  
After this (repeated; see above) description of the place, the main characters, or protago-
nists, of the Jātaka-story are introduced (MN II 46,1-5). First, the story introduces someone 
named Ghaṭīkāra357 who is a potter (Ghaṭikāro nāma kumbhakāro) by (inherited) profession 
(sippa).358 It is noteworthy that Ghaṭīkāra is introduced first, which make most of the following 
information, about Jotipāla, for instance, as somewhat relational to him, the focal point of the 
narrative (Jotipala is his friend; he is the active part in trying to get Jotipāla to see the Buddha, it 
is he who asks for ordination on Jotipāla’s behalf, etc.). Ghaṭīkāra, literally “jar-maker”, how-
ever, is not a very original name. Potters, kumbhakāras, belonged to an inferior class of artisans, 
                                                 
355
 “Aus diesem Grund sollen alle diejenigen figurenbezogenen Tatsachen als Teil der Charakterisierung gel-
ten, die - bezogen auf den Zeitverlauf der erzählten Welt - stabil bleiben. Angaben über die räumliche Position 
von Figuren gehören dann meistens nicht zur Charakterisierung, aber z.B. im Mythos von Atlas, der im äußers-
ten Westen das Himmelsgewölbe tragen muss, ist diese Ortsangabe Teil der Charakterisierung.” (see: 
http://www.li-go.de/definitionsansicht/prosa/tatsachendiezurcharakterisierungeinerfigurindererzaehltenwelt-
beitragen.html (las accessed: 22nd March 2013).  
According to tradition all of the thousand Buddhas to appear in this kalpa or eon will manifest full enlighten-
ment at the so called “vajra-seat” (vajrāsana), as the place upon which now the famous Mahābodhi temple is 
situated, in Bodhgayā. However, I was unable to trace any written sources for that; in fact, the Mahāpadāna 
Sutta (DN 14) does not allot specific places to the seven Buddhas of the past. Cp. also later in the sutta, when 
Ānanda had prepared a seat for the Tathāgata: “Venerable sir, may the Blessed One sit down. [In this way] will 
this very same spot have been used by two arhats, by two fully awakened Ones.” (MN II 45,20-22: Tena hi, 
bhante, Bhagavā nisīdatu. Evāyaṃ bhūmippadeso dvīhi arahantehi sammāsambuddhehi paribhutto bhavis-
sati.). Perhaps we could say then that this function of places as specifically assigned to characters may be a pe-
culiarity of the suttas (or perhaps other Indian religious traditions as well). 
356
 MN II 45,12f. This information is interesting given the implicit fact that this region was perhaps not so 
densely populated at the Buddha Gotama’s time; cp. DPPN, s.v. Kosala: “Yet, though woodland tracts were 
numerous (see, e.g., SA.i.225) where monks could meditate in solitude, the number of monks actually found in 
Kosala was not large (VT.i.226).” Malalasekera’s last mentioned reference (Vinaya Texts I,226) discusses 
rules concerning the impossibility for monks to get nissaya (“support”); the occasion is given as monks wan-
dering in Kosala. 
357
 Richard Gombrich, in a personal communication (16.04.2012, remarked that Ghaṭīkāra is not a very witty 
name, which together with the fairy-tale like introduction bhūtapubbaṃ, “Once upon a time,” lends the whole 
story a fairly fictitious touch, “like the parables in the Bible.” Nevertheless, in ancient times where the struc-
ture of society and the social life, at least of the lowest social classes to which a potter belonged, was very 
much determined by profession (cp. Fick 1974: 203), this was perhaps not very unusual, like, for instance, 
Western names like Smith, which in modern life has, of course, become decoupled from the profession.  
358
 Cp. Fick 1974: 210. 
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as Banerji states.359 Already at the time of the Buddha, potters, among certain other professions, 
were regarded with very low social rank and esteem.360  
The second attribute of Ghaṭīkāra that is given in the discourse is that he is a “supporter” 
or “attendant” (upaṭṭhāko) and even the “main supporter/chief attendant” (aggupaṭṭhāko) of the 
Buddha Kassapa. The following sentence shows that Ghaṭīkāra has a friend, Jotipāla by name, a 
very dear friend (piya-sahāyo), who is a young Brahmin (student?). Interesting about this first – 
and according to Grabes (1978) therefore very important narratorial explicit characterization – is 
the parallel sentence structure on the one hand361 and the stark opposition (chiasm) of content be-
tween the two friends on the other hand: a potter from a disdained social class is the chief at-
tendant of the Buddha Kassapa. His best friend is a Brahmin student. The implied oppositions lie 
in the social and religious sphere: potter  Brahmin class; Buddha  Brahmin. In a narra-
tological reading, this contrast may be seen to hold a potential cause for conflict in that it antici-
pates or contains an (potential) instability. One may even go so far as to interpret it as anticipa-
tion or a foreshadowing362 of the actual instability that is to unfold a little later in the story (the 
“pulling-of-the-hair” incident), in which the status disjunction plays an important role.  
The next information obtained about Ghaṭīkāra stems from an indirect characterisation – 
i.e. from Ghaṭīkāra’s own words in his addressing his “dear friend” Jotipāla: “I consider it good, 
indeed, to see that Blessed One, accomplished and fully awakened.”363 However, this does not 
add new information, but rather confirms the information that Ghaṭīkāra is Kassapa’s chief at-
                                                 
359
 Cp. Banerji 2007: 217 citing the Suttavibhaṅga. 
360
 Cp. Fick 1974: chapter 12, esp. pp. 208ff., where potters are even counted among the disdained social stra-
tum, classed through their “base trade” (hīna-sippa), together with the weavers (pesakāra), barber (nahāpita), 
basket maker (nal̥akāra) etc., whose origins as castes lie probably in their ethnic and/or professional group 
membership. The ‘collective’ social class, or caste proper, of the śūdras, however, may have come into exist-
ence through a mixing of the Aryan invaders and the locals; cp. Banerji 2007: 201. 
361
 MN II 46,1-5: Vebhal̥iṅge kho, Ānanda, gāmanigame Ghaṭīkāro nāma kumbhakāro Kassapassa bhagavato 
arahato sammāsambuddhassa upaṭṭhāko ahosi aggupaṭṭhāko. Ghaṭīkārassa kho, Ānanda, kumbhakārassa 
Jotipāla nāma māṇavo sahāyo ahosi piyasahāyo.  
362
 However, this has to be distinguished from the ‘prolepsis’ or the definite anticipation of a future event by a 
character that has, by genre-convention, the ability to foresee the future. But if my reading is correct, it clearly 
shows/proofs narratorial intervention: either this contrastive situation was skilfully created, or facts very skil-
fully narrated – both, in any case, from the redactors’ perspective or knowledge of the development and the 
progression of the narrative.  
363
 MN II 46,8-10: Sādhusammataṃ hi me tassa Bhagavato dassanaṃ arahato sammāsambuddhassāti.  
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tendant already received through the narrator. Nevertheless, by inference, it tells the lis-
tener/reader something about Ghaṭīkāra’s motivation. Since the listener/reader already knows 
that Ghaṭikāra must be close to the Buddha Kassapa, it is, already at this point in the story, possi-
ble to assume that he does not only consider it good to see the Buddha for his own benefit, but 
that he has his reasons for urging his friend to go and see the Blessed One. That Ghaṭīkāra is not 
thinking about himself here, but that his sole purpose is to make his friend go, becomes then 
more and more tangible for the listener/reader during the dramatic climax leading up to the pull-
ing of Jotipāla’s hair, and fully so after they have seen the Blessed One, and Ghaṭīkāra’s state-
ment that he, of course, could not go forth from home life to homelessness himself because of his 
obligation towards his parents. After he has pressed his friend three times without success, 
Ghaṭīkāra suddenly seems to change his mind or give up his intention when he says: “Well then, 
dear Jotipāla, let us take a shell364 [and/filled with?] bath powder (sotti-sinānīṃ) and go to the 
river to bathe.”365 However, at the river, Ghaṭīkāra starts again to entreat his friend, now bringing 
forward the argument that the current dwelling place of the Buddha Kassapa was nearby.366 Thus, 
the text leaves no doubt that Ghaṭīkāra has not given up on his plan (whatever lies behind this 
“plan” remains obscure for the listener/reader). Even if this may be stating the obvious, I find it 
worth noting that the redactors of old had obviously felt the need to explain Ghaṭīkāra’s sudden 
change of heart, namely to explain it in the way that it was not a change of heart at all, but rather 
a red herring for reluctant Jotipāla. In other words, what we have in the Mvu passage is an early 
attempt at inferring the motivation of a character’s action that is not stated explicitly in the earlier 
version of the story.367  
As mentioned earlier, the gravity of Ghaṭīkāra’s actions climaxes from intensely insisting 
upon the importance to go and see the Blessed One Kassapa (verbally), via holding Jotipāla by 
his belt while continuing to talk insistently to him, up to him pulling Jotipāla’s hair. Now, what 
can this obtrusive mental, verbal, and physical behavior towards Jotipāla tell about Ghaṭīkāra? 
As one possible explanation, his actions show that he has courage because it simply would have 
                                                 
364
 The Pāli word sotti, explained as “[Sk. śukti] a shell (?) filled with chunam and lac, used for scratching the 
back, a back-scratcher acting as a sponge” (see PED s.v.; cp. also sutti 1), and translated by Bodhi as “loofah” 
(Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 670,6.), is doubtful (for the vv.ll. cp. MN II 46, n.3).  
365
 MN II 46,21f. 
366
 See above II. (2) (MN I 46,1-48,3). 
367
 See n. 330 above. 
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taken a big portion of courage to act in the way he did, being a member of a disdained social 
class. It is either courage or a sense of urgency that propelled him to pull Jotipāla’s hair. What is 
more, as we have seen earlier in the parallel passage from the Mvu, it is not unlikely that the pot-
ter even risked his life by this action368, which means that his trust in the Buddha must be such 
that he was even willing to risk his life or, at minum, severe punishment. One of the other main 
characters, Jotipāla, also makes a statement about Ghaṭīkāra’s behaviour (technically, according 
to Pfister’s model, a “figural, explicit alterocharacterisation, made in private”369, i.e. in his own 
thoughts). His statement, similarly an attempt to infer Ghaṭīkāra’s motivation, could also be re-
garded as delegating a characterisation statement about the potter by the narrator to another char-
acter. The sutta-narrator hands over an explanation for the behaviour of one of the protagonists 
to another character and thus assumes, and provides the audience with, that character’s perspec-
tive on the situation. (We will return to this passage and its function when discussing the charac-
terisation of Jotipāla below.)  
 The next indirect characterising statement about Ghaṭīkāra can be found in in the sutta-
narrator’s description of the approach of the Buddha Kassapa. This approach is highly formulaic, 
as described above.370 Nevertheless, the standard formulas used here are still somewhat “individ-
ualised” for Ghaṭīkāra and Jotipāla respectively according to their status and to the situation in 
the story. According to Allon’s analysis, the “abhivādetvā-approach”, which is the highest form 
of respect shown and equivalent to bowing down and touching the feet of the approached with 
one’s head371, is most often used in the suttas as the form of respect that disciples and devotees 
show towards their teacher, whereas the “saddhiṃ sammodi-form” is clearly only employed for 
individuals who are not followers of the religious teacher they are approaching.372 Thus, the nar-
rative discourse is consistent with the information already gathered about Ghaṭīkāra and Jotipāla 
but also concretized (the information we have received so far – that Ghaṭīkāra was Kassapa’s 
main supporter – is thereby confirmed through this indirect characterization statement by the nar-
                                                 
368
 See n. 332 above. 
369
 Cp. Neumann & Nünning 2008: 56, fig. 3.3. 
370
 See n. 299. 
371
 Cp. Allon 1997: 54. 
372
 Ibid.: 79f. 
 125 
 
rator, but also refined): Besides being his chief lay patron, Ghaṭīkāra is also a devoted and ac-
cepted student of the Blessed One Kassapa. Another fact of the story world is confirmed or re-
peated, this time in the character’s discourse, when Ghaṭīkāra introduces his very dear friend 
with the words: “This young Brahmin student Jotipāla here, venerable sir, is my friend, my very 
dear/close friend; may the Blessed One teach him the Dhamma!”373  
A further trait of the potter is introduced shortly after the friends have returned from their 
visit of the Buddha Kassapa. When Jotipāla, still feeling inspired from the teachings, asks his 
friend if he had never thought of entering the Buddha’s order after hearing such teachings374, 
Ghaṭīkāra replies: “But surely you know me, dear Jotipāla – I take care of my blind old par-
ents.”375 With these words, Ghaṭīkāra reminds his friend of a stable character trait of his: He 
would never disregard an obligation once he has committed himself to it. 
After his friend’s ordination, the story diverts into another episode (the meeting of king 
Kikī and the Buddha Kassapa) and Ghaṭīkāra reemerges only later, now again as a character in 
an embedded story – this time told by the Buddha Kassapa as narrator. The Buddha Kassapa ex-
poses the king as a thinker of inadequate thoughts, because Kikī had shown signs of great disap-
pointment over his refusal of the king’s offer to provide lodgings and food for the saṅgha’s rains 
                                                 
373
 MN II 48,13f.: Ayaṃ me, bhante, Jotipālo māṇavo sahāyo piyasahāyo; imassa Bhagavā dhammaṃ desetūti. 
374
 MN II 48,26-28: Imaṃ nu tvaṃ, samma Ghaṭīkāra, dhammaṃ suṇanto, atha ca pana na agārasmā anāgari-
yaṃ pabbajasīti? Ñāṇamoli/Bodhi (2001: 671,11.) translate: “Now that you have heard this Dhamma, my dear 
Ghaṭīkāra, why don’t you go forth from the homelife into homelessness?” However, I think that it would better 
fit the actual dynamic of the story to translate (and understand) the present tense form of the verb pabbajasi 
more in a (durative-) iterative sense or as a general statement: “Having heard this Dhamma, then, dear 
Ghaṭīkāra, [have you ever had thought of] going forth from the homelife into homelessness?” We also need not 
take the particle nu as an adverb of time, as Bodhi does in his translation (cp. PED s.v.). From what we have 
learned so far by following the progression of the story, it is clear that Ghaṭīkāra is already a student of the 
Buddha Kassapa before he introduces his friend Jotipāla to him. Thus, it is most likely not the first time he had 
listened to his teachings. And what is more, at MN II 48,14 he requests the Buddha Kassapa to teach the 
Dhamma to his dear friend – he is not requesting teachings for himself!   
375
 MN II 48,29f.: Nanu maṃ, samma Jotipāla, jānāsi: Andhe jiṇṇe mātā-pitaro posemīti? 
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retreat. He then points out Ghaṭīkāra’s qualities to the king, which are – this seems to be the im-
plication of this passage376 – the opposite, as it were, of the king’s current state and feelings. The 
Buddha Kassapa says: “Ghaṭīkāra the potter, great king, has gone for refuge to the Buddha, he 
has gone for refuge to the dhamma, he has gone for refuge to the saṅgha. Ghaṭīkāra the potter, 
great king, is one who abstains from killing living beings, who abstains from taking what was not 
given tim him [or stealing], who abstains from misconduct regarding sense-pleasures [or sexual 
misconduct], who abstains from false speech [or lying], who refrains from consuming intoxicat-
ing drinks which leads to carelessness. 377 Ghaṭīkāra the potter, great king, is endowed with intelli-
gent faith in the Buddha378, in the dhamma and in the saṅgha, [and] he is endowed with moral 
discipline (sīlavat) that is dear to the Buddhas’ disciples (ariya-kanta). Ghaṭīkāra the potter, 
great king, is one who is without doubt with regard to [the Noble Truth of] suffering, [repeat] the 
origin of suffering, [repeat] the cessation of suffering, [repeat] the path leading to the destruction 
of suffering. Ghaṭīkāra the potter, great king, is one who eats only one meal per day, lives chaste, 
observes the five moral precepts, and has a virtuous character. Ghaṭīkāra the potter, great king, is 
one who has freed [himself from the possession of] jewellery and gold [-ornaments], has gotten 
rid of [his supply of sterling-?379] gold and silver. Ghaṭīkāra the potter, great king, is one who 
                                                 
376
 This seems to be clear from the phrase MN II 51,9f.: Tuyhaṃ kho pana, mahārāja: Na me Kassapo bhagavā 
arahaṃ sammāsambuddho adhivāseti Bārāṇasiyaṃ vassāvāsan ti atthi aññathattaṃ atthi domanassaṃ; tayidaṃ 
Ghaṭīkāre kumbhakāre na ’tthi na ca bhavissati, “[…] and depression/anxiety and grief were present [in you]. 
Just that is not present/existing in the potter Ghaṭīkāra and it cannot/will not be so.” What follows in the text, 
the statement of the potter’s qualities/virtues, serves as an explanation of a) the reason why depression and 
grief as consequence of anticlimaxes cannot develop in the potter, and b) how the relationship between the 
Buddha and the potter as his chief supporter came about or developed.   
377
 More literally perhaps: “abstains from situations (or places? Cp. Cone 2010: 257, II s.v. ṭhāna 3. iii.) leading 
to carelessness (pamāda) [caused by the intake] of fermented [and other] intoxicating spirits/drinks.” Ñāṇamoli 
& Bodhi (2001: 674,18.) translate the stock expression surā-meraya-majja-ppamāda-ṭṭhānā: “[he abstains 
from …] wine, liquor, and intoxicants, which are the basis of negligence”. Cp. also I. B. Horner’s more literal 
translation (1957: 248): “[…] restrained from occasions of sloth engendered by strong drink and spirits.” 
378
 Cp. CPD s.v. avecca. What is meant is trust in the Buddha that is based on understanding (ava + √i, aveti, 
“to know, to understand”) and one’s own experience, not blind faith.  
379




does not dig into the earth [for clay] with a pestle or with his hands. From what is there, crum-
bled from a river bank or dug up380 by rats, after having carried it home gladly, he forms pots [out 
of it] and declares: ‘He who wants [something] from here [/of this, ettha] may leave a portion of 
husked rice or a portion of beans or a portion of chick-peas and then take what he wants!’ 
Ghaṭīkāra the potter, great king, looks after his blind old parents. Ghaṭīkāra the potter, great king, 
is one who [will be] spontaneously born [in a Brahmā- or Deva-realm/heaven] because he has 
exhausted the five fetters connected with the [world] below [i.e. kāmadhātu/-avacara, the desire-
realm] and, characterised by not returning from that world, will attain Nirvana there381.”382  
                                                 
380
 I read mūsik’-ukkaro here, adopting the meaning of Sanskrit utkara, cp. MW s.v. (176, III): “m. anything 
dug out or scattered upwards, rubbish […], a heap”, which makes most sense, instead of PTS mūsi-kukkuro, 
“mice/rats and dogs”. 
381
 The term used is opapātiko, a standard term employed in the DN and MN for the third level or attainment 
within the system of the four ‘Noble Ones’ or ‘noble persons’, ariya-puggalā. The term probably goes back to 
the Prākrit word ovavāiya (< uvavāya, “manifestation”) which denotes those beings who get reborn in a heaven 
or in hell spontaneously, i.e. not trough a womb and conception (cp. Eimer 2006: 83f. and 87 (§6.3); cp. also 
Collins 1998: 303). Technically, this means that Ghaṭīkāra was what in later Thervāda systematics was called 
an anāgāmī, one who will not return to the kāmāvacara after his death, and attain Nirvana in one of the 
Brahmā- or Deva-worlds. The so-called “five lower fetters” are: (1) sakkāyadiṭṭhi, “belief in a [permanent etc.] 
self”; (2) vicikicchā, “sceptical doubt”; (3) sīlabbataparāmāso, “attachment to mere rules and rituals”; (4) 
kāmacchando “craving for sense-pleasures”; (5) vyāpādo, “ill-will”.  
382
 MN II 51,13-52,3: Ghaṭīkāro kho, mahārāja, kumbhakāro buddhaṃ saraṇaṃ gato dhammaṃ saraṇaṃ gato 
saṃghaṃ saraṇaṃ gato. Ghaṭīkāro kho, mahārāja, kumbhakāro pāṇātipātā paṭivirato adinnādānā paṭivirato 
kāmesu micchācārā paṭivirato musāvādā paṭivirato surāmerayamajjapamādaṭṭhānā paṭivirato. Ghaṭīkāro kho, 
mahārāja, kumbhakāro buddhe aveccappasādena samannāgato, dhamme – pe – saṃghe, ariyakantehi sīlehi 
samannāgato. Ghaṭīkāro kho, mahārāja, kumbhakāro dukkhe nikkaṅkho dukkhasamudaye nikkaṅkho dukkha-
nirodhe nikkaṅkho dukkhanirodhagāminiyā paṭipadāya nikkaṅkho. Ghaṭīkāro kho, mahārāja, kumbhakāro ek-
abhattiko brahmacārī sīlavā kalyāṇadhammo. Ghaṭīkāro kho, mahārāja, kumbhakāro nikkhittamaṇisuvaṇṇo 
apetajātarūparajato. Ghaṭīkāro kho, mahārāja, kumbhakāro na musalena na sahatthā paṭhaviṃ khanati 
[Be(R) Ghaṭīkāro kho, mahārāja, kumbhakāro pannamusalo na sahatthā paṭhaviṃ khaṇati; other minor vv.ll. 
see MN II 51, n. 6,7,8,9,10,11]. Yaṃ hoti kūlapaluggaṃ vā mūsikukkuro [Be(R) mūsikukkaro] vā taṃ kāmena 
[Be(R), Bm, Si kājena] āharitvā bhājanaṃ karitvā evam āha: — Ettha [So Sk Si; Bm tattha] yo icchati taṇḍula-
pabhivattāni [Be(R) Bm; So Sk taṇḍulapaṭibhastāni; Si patibhastāni] vā muggapabhivattāni vā kāl̥āyapa-
bhivattāni [Be(R) Bm kal̥āya; Sk kālāya] vā nikkhipitvā yaṃ icchati taṃ haratūti. Ghaṭīkāro kho, mahārāja, 
kumbhakāro andhe jiṇṇe mātāpitaro poseti. Ghaṭīkāro kho, mahārāja, kumbhakāro pañcannaṃ 
orambhāgiyānaṃ saṃyojanānaṃ parikkhayā opapātiko tattha parinibbāyī anāvattidhammo tasmā lokā.  
I have included the major variant readings from the Be(R) and the footnotes from the PTS edition in square 
brackets. The sheer amount of variant readings in this passage indicates that the text has been corrupted in the 
mss. However, the variants are very often minor ones, the general meaning of the passage being easily cog-
nizable. As a possible emendation for the obscure expression taṇḍulapabhivattāni, Margaret Cone in her dis-
cussion of the variants suggests the reading °-pavibbhattāni, “apportioned (rice)” which makes good sense. Cp. 
Cone 2010: 276, I. s.v. °-pabhivattāni. Neither the form pabhivatta nor paṭibhasta do exist in Pāli.  
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This passage, provided by a reliable narrator, which the Buddha Kassapa or any other 
Buddha would be expected to be, is crucial in terms of the direct characterisation of Ghaṭīkāra. 
Clearly, most, if not all, of Ghaṭīkāra’s attributes are turned into actions, or in Phelan’s words, 
his mimetic dimensions (i.e. his psychological attributes or traits) are turned into (thematic) func-
tions.383 He acts perfectly in accordance with his ascribed traits when it is stated that he “is one 
who abstains from killing living beings” (pāṇātipātā paṭivirato) in the passage described by Kas-
sapa that he does not even dig in the ground (in order not to destroy small living beings). The re-
lationship to the (broader) thematic aspect of his traits becomes more apparent through an analy-
sis of the aforementioned moral qualities. Ghaṭīkāra’s behaviour is not only perfectly in accord-
ance with the “five precepts” (pañca-sīla) that are characteristic of the lay adherents of the Bud-
dhas but is even very close to the (ten) precepts that are binding for monks.384 For he is also de-
scribed as observing three precepts from among the list of the “ten precepts” (dasa-sik-
khāpadāni385), namely numbers 6), 8), and 10) as “one who eats only one meal a day” (eka-
bhattiko), who has freed [himself from the possession of] jewellery and gold [-ornaments] (nik-
khittamaṇisuvaṇṇo), and “one who has gotten rid of [his supply of sterling-?] gold and silver 
(apetajātarūparajato). Supposedly, from the description given above, he also observed the other 
two precepts of the list of ten. His livelihood is exemplary, for he only takes what he needs to 
make his pots from what he finds on the surface of the earth without digging into it order to not 
harm any living beings.  
Leading thus a life of perfect moral discipline according to the Buddhist precepts, the 
only item missing from this list, it seems, is the practice of meditation or absorption (samādhi). It 
                                                 
383
 Cp. Phelan 1989: 11f. 
384
 The first four of the five sīlas are in fact the same as the first four items of another list, the “ten unwhole-
some actions” (akusala-kamma-patha) which are frequently ennumerated in the MN. Cp. PED s.v. sīla: 
“(b) The pañca-sīla or 5 items of good behaviour are Nos. 1 – 4 of dasa – sīla, and (5) abstaining from any 
state of indolence arising from (the use of) intoxicants, viz. surā-meraya-majjapamāda-ṭṭhānā veramaṇī. These 
five also form the first half of the 10 sikkhā-padāni. They are a sort of preliminary condition to any higher 
development after conforming to the teaching of the Buddha (saraṇaŋgamana) and as such often men-
tioned when a new follower is “officially” installed, e. g. Bu ii.190: saraṇâgamane kañci nivesesi 
Tathāgato kañci pañcasu sīlesu sīle dasavidhe paraŋ.” [my emphasis] |This, however, would not correspond 
with this example, since Ghaṭīkāra is said to have attained the state of an “Non-returner” already. 
385
 These are (according to PED s.v. sikkhāpada): 6) vikāla-bhojanā (-veramaṇī), not eating at the wrong hour; 
7) nacca-gītavādita-visūka-dassanā˚, to avoid worldly amusements; 8) mālā-gandha-vilepana-dhāraṇa-
maṇḍana-vibhūsanaṭṭhānā˚, to use neither unguents nor ornaments; 9) uccā-sayana-mahā-sayanā˚, not to sleep 
on a high, big bed; 10) jātarūpa rajata –  paṭiggahaṇā˚, not to accept any gold or silver.  
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would strike one as only natural that a person that is committed to such a high level of spiritual 
attainment should be successfully engaged in this essential Buddhist practice.386 What is more, 
the Puggalapaññatti (Pp), although a much later (Abhidhamma-) text, explains the connection 
between the stages of the path and the “three trainings” in sīla, samādhi, and paññā in a way that 
the anāgāmī/opapātika does not only fullfill the moral precepts perfectly, but also the second of 
the so-called ‘three trainings’: concentration (= meditation/absorption, samādhi).387 While one 
could of course argue that the passage here may be an early, perhaps pre-systematised (i.e. pre-
Abhidhamma) presentation or description of one of the stages of the Buddhist path, it still strikes 
one as strange that the Buddha Kassapa even mentions it, because the whole passage rather 
sounds like a ‘prophecy’ (vyākaraṇa) about the future attainment of a disciple (“future” from the 
stance of story-time), which is usually reserved for the bodhisattas, i.e. future Buddhas. This fu-
ture attainment of Ghaṭīkāra does indeed resurface in elaborate form in the introduction to the 
Jātaka-tales, the Nidānakathā. 
Additional information on Ghaṭīkāra can be found in other sources: According to the 
(legendary) Pāli commentarial literature (Aṅguttara Nikāya-commentary, the Manorathapūranī), 
Ghaṭīkāra, after his death, became a deity in the Brahmā-world called Avihā388 due to the realisa-
tion he had gained during his life as a contemporary and main supporter of the Buddha Kassapa 
(he had reached the level of a Non-Returner, anāgāmī).389 This episode or information reoccurs in 
the Nidānakathā, when Ghaṭīkāra sees from his abode in the heavenly realm of form (rūpa-loka) 
that his former dear friend Jotipāla has set out to renounce the world and eventually become the 
                                                 
386
 It is not clear if lay followers of the Buddha did or were indeed encouraged to practice sitting meditation. 
However, as the Kandaraka Sutta (MN 51) states, householders did practice mindfulness (which is not neces-
sarily to be practised in a formal setting and/or sitting). Cp. MN I 340,13f.: Mayam-pi hi bhante gihī odātava-
sanā kālena kalaṃ imesu catusu satipaṭṭhānesu supaṭṭhitacittā viharāma: …. “From time to time, venerable 
sir, we white-clothed lay people also abide with our minds well established in these four foundations of mind-
fulness.” (Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 444, 4. Cp., however, also Bodhi’s translation of the cty (p. 1253, n. 
542): “We too, when we get an opportunity, from time to time attend to this; we are also practitioners; we do 
not completely neglect meditation.”)   
387
 The ‘three trainings’ are: moral discipline, “meditation”, and wisdom (sīla, samādhi, paññā). Cp. Eimer 
2006: 89 (§6.5.2). Pp 128 (PTS 37.13-24). Katamo ca puggalo sīlesu ca paripūrakārī, samādhismiñca 
paripūrakārī, paññāya mattaso kārī? anāgāmī: ayaṃ vuccati puggalo sīlesu ca paripūrakārī, samādhismiñca 
paripūrakārī, paññāya mattaso kārī.  
388
 According to Buddhist cosmology, this is the 23rd realm within the world of form, rūpa-loka; cp. Walshe 
1987: 39. 
389
 Cp. DPPN, s.v. Ghaṭīkāra. 
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next Buddha. He provides him with the necessities of a mendicant, including a begging bowl 
(piṇḍapāta). This same begging-bowl is said to have vanished at the same moment that Sid-
dhattha Gotama gave up his severe austerities that had nearly caused him to die of enervation, 
and was offered a bowl of milk-rice by Sujātā. 390   
Therefore, the attainment of final Nirvana of Ghaṭīkāra is an established fact in the world 
of the Pāli Canon. It is possible to explain this inconsistency. There exists also another group or 
classification of persons (puggalā) – “noble persons” (ariya-puggalā) in this case – in the 
Majjhima Nikāya (Kīṭāgiri Sutta, MN 70) comprised of seven types391: “Seven kinds of [noble] 
persons, monks, are to be found existing in the world. What seven? The one liberated-in-both 
ways, the one liberated-by-wisdom, the ‘body-witness’, the one attained-to-view, the one liber-
ated-by-faith, the ‘dhamma-follower’, and the faith-follower.”392 Relevant here are “the one liber-
ated-by-faith” (saddhā-vimutto) and the “faith-follower” (saddhānusārī). The faith-follower is 
one who has entered the spiritual stage of ‘stream-entry’ (sotāpanna), while the one liberated-by-
faith is called so, because he has already attained to one of the other seven stages of the spiritual 
path393.394 The two are characterised as follows: They both do not (physically) experience the ab-
sorptions (rūpa- and āruppajhāna) through the perfection of concentration (because they do not 
have the ability to meditate like this?), and they do not have sufficient wisdom for (all of) their 
                                                 
390
 See n. 389; Ja I 65,11-19 and Ja I 69,29-32 respectively.  
391
 This list of seven is presented in different orders throughout the Canon and the commentarial Pāli literature; 
cp. Eimer 2006: 92ff. (§6.8).  
392
 The Kīṭāgiri Sutta (MN 70), MN I 477,22-24: Satt’ ime bhikkhave puggalā santo saṃvijjamānā lokasmiṃ, 
katame satta: ubhatobhagavimutto paññāvimutto kāyasakkhī diṭṭhipatto saddhāvimutto dhammānusārī sad-
dhānusārī. I have adopted the Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation of the seven types; cp. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 
2001: 580,14. 
393
 Cp. the “Eight Noble Persons” introduced in part I above, and Nyanatiloka 1980: 48 (A)). 
394
 Cp. Nyanatiloka 1980: 51 (s.v. ariya-puggalā) and Vism XXI, 73. 
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hindrances395 (āsavā) to be destroyed. However, they have firmly rooted faith in the Tathāgata.396 
Although the relevant passages do not specify if or in what degree the practice of meditation 
plays a role in attaining those paths and stages, it is possible to imagine that the formal practice 
of meditation was not obligatory for attaining some degree of liberation. However, according to 
the Puggalapaññatti, in this case one would not be able to experience the four “immaterial or 
formless absorptions” (āruppa-jhāna) and thus the “realm without form” (arūpāvacara).397 None-
theless, if one compares the phrasing of Ghaṭīkāra’s characterisation with other, more technical, 
descriptions of the anāgāmī, more parallels come to light. The type “released-by-faith” (saddhā-
vimutta) is described by the Puggalapaññatti, which is largely a compilation of canonical materi-
als, as one who “truly/as it is understands suffering, […] the arising of suffering, […] the extinc-
tion of suffering, [and] the path leading to the desctruction of suffering.” He is one who has 
“fully understood through his insight what the Buddha has taught; it has penetrated his mind”, 
and therefore some of his defilements have been eradicated.398 The description of the type “fol-
lower-through-faith’ (saddhānusārī), adds a characteristic feature of this type the “faith in and 
                                                 
395
 Cp. CPD s.v. āsava: “[…] (b) t. t. for the obstacle to the attainment of Arahantship.” Two lists are presented 
in the Canon, one of three and one of four items, the former being the more frequent one. Three “hindrances” 
to Arhatship are: the hindrance of, craving for sensual pleasure (kāmāsava), craving for [eternal] existence 
(bhavāsava), of ignorance (avijjāsava), and – sometimes added – the hindrance of having, or adhering to, 
wrong views (diṭṭhāsava). The term itself, here provisionally and neutrally translated as ‘hindrances’, and its 
origin is problematic; several suggestions for translation exist; cp. CPD s.v.  
396
 MN I 478,29-35: Katamo ca bhikkhave puggalo saddhāvimutto: Idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo ye te santā 
vimokkhā atikkamma rūpe āruppā te na kāyena phassitvā viharati, paññāya c’ assa disvā ekacce āsavā parik-
khīṇā honti, Tathāgate c’ assa saddhā niviṭṭhā hoti mūlajātā patiṭṭhitā. Ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave puggalo sad-
dhāvimutto. 
MN I 479,18-25: Katamo ca bhikkhave puggalo saddhānusārī: Idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo ye te santā 
vimokkhā atikkamma rūpe āruppā te na kāyena phassitvā viharati, paññāya c’ assa disvā āsavā aparikkhīṇā 
honti, Tathāgate c’ assa saddhāmattaṃ hoti pemamattaṃ, api c’ assa ime dhammā honti seyyathīdaṃ sad-
dhindriyaṃ viriyindriyaṃ satindriyaṃ samādhindriyaṃ paññindriyaṃ. Ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave puggalo sad-
dhānusārī.  
397
 Richard Gombrich has treated the problematic list of different types of attainments in detail in his essay: 
“Retracing an Ancient Debate: How Insight worsted Concentration in the Pali Canon.” In: Gombrich 2006: 96-
135. If my interpretation is correct, this passage would also support Gombrich’s theory that originally the 
dhammānusārī and the saddhānusārī designated only one type; cp. Gombrich 2006: 107-110.  
398
 Pp: 28. Katamo ca puggalo saddhāvimutto? idhekacco puggalo ‘idaṃ dukkhanti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti, 
‘ayaṃ dukkhasamudayoti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti, ‘ayaṃ dukkhanirodhoti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti, ‘ayaṃ duk-
khanirodhagāminī paṭipadāti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti. Tathāgatappaveditā cassa dhammā paññāya vodiṭṭhā 
honti vocaritā. Paññāya cassa disvā ekacce āsavā parikkhīṇā honti, no ca kho yathā diṭṭhippattassa: ayaṃ 
vuccati puggalo saddhāvimutto.  
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affection for the Tathāgata”,399 while the Puggalapaññatti’s description stresses the more tech-
nical aspect, that this type is set on the path to enlightenment through the faculty of faith. In re-
gards to content, these descriptions are in accordance with Ghaṭīkāra’s characterization described 
above.400 Without the intention of making any claim as to whether this passage might have been 
the inspiration for the passage in the Puggalapaññatti or vice-versa, or about the antiquity of it in 
relation to other passages like, e.g., in the Kīṭāgiri Sutta or in the Alagaddūpama Sutta, what this 
comparison reveals, in my opinion, is that the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta presents an ideal type rather than 
a (possible) person. Add to this that the text is very clearly about Ghaṭīkāra having “intelligent” 
faith in the Buddha, and the Buddha having complete confidence in him, which shows that the 
embedded story, the Jātaka-tale, as well as the whole sutta as such centers on faith (saddhā) and 
thus makes it an exemplification of the theme “faith”. The rest of Ghaṭīkāra’s characterisation 
consists in the standard formula used for the attainment of the Non-Returner that also appears 
elsewhere in the Canon.401 If Gombrich is right in arguing that in an earlier, pre-scholastic under-
standing of the different types, all three faculties (faith, concentration, and insight) were equally 
bound for awakening402, then there is no contradiction in identifying Ghaṭīkāra as being a “fol-
lower through faith” (saddhānusārī) and a Non-Returner.403 Furthermore, while Ghaṭīkāra, in 
terms of his position on the spiritual path, may be a Stream-Winner (sotāpanna) as a ‘follower-
through-faith’ (saddhānusārī), the text clearly states that he definitely will be a Non-Returner 
(anāgamī/opapātika) as one ‘liberated-through-faith’ (saddhā-vimutto) after his death.  
There are, of course, many other statements inferable from the text that could be consid-
ered relevant for a comprehensive picture of Ghaṭīkāra’s characterization, for example the type 
of food he eats, but they are not really relevant here, and it is moreover sheerly impossible to 
gather and evaluate all information about a character in a narrative. (The theoretical problem of 
                                                 
399
 Tathāgate c’ assa saddhāmattaṃ hoti pemamattaṃ […]. See n. 396 above. The translation is Gombrich’s; 
cp. Gombrich 2006: 100 (7.).  
400
 See n. 382 and the translation above. 
401
 Cp. e.g. Alagadūpama Sutta (MN 22), MN I 141,26-29: Evaṃ svākkhāto bhikkhave mayā dhammo uttāno 
vivaṭo pakāsito chinnapilotiko. Evaṃ svākkhāte bhikkhave mayā dhamme uttāne vivaṭe pakāsite chinnapi-
lotike, yesaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ pañcorambhāgiyāni saṃyojanāni pahīnāni, sabbe te opapātikā tattha parinibbāyino 
anāvattidhammā tasmā lokā. 
402
 Cp. Gombrich 2006: 105ff. 
403
 However, there is also the possibility that this passage somehow preserves the pre-Buddhist, brahmanical 
idea of rebirth. 
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the sheer infinity of character, character-related, and inferential information in a narrative text 
has already been pointed out in Part II.) 
However, a few more textual statements have to be discussed. The content of Ghaṭīkāra’s 
thoughts is reported three times after the Buddha Kassapa had visited the potter’s house in his 
absence: After the Buddha had taken from the food offered by the parents, and Ghaṭīkāra has re-
turned home and learned from his parents that the Blessed One had visited in his absence and 
had helped himself to the food, Ghaṭīkāra (and also his parents – although for a shorter period of 
time) experience a state of bliss and joy (pītisukhaṃ) for two weeks only because Ghaṭīkāra 
thinks that the Blessed One Kassapa puts his trust in him (me Kassapo bhagavā arahaṃ 
sammāsambuddho evaṃ abhivissattho).404  
In sum, although Ghaṭīkāra does not fit in exactly with one or the other model provided 
by the structure of the early Buddhist Path (e.g. he is either a saddhānusārī or one of the different 
types of saddhā-vimutto; he is definitely bound to be a Non-Returner after death; he fulfills the 
five sīlas that are binding for lay followers of the Buddha; but, according to the description, he 
actually fulfills not only the five precepts, but eight out of the ten sikkhāpadas), his character’s 
traits in the thematic aspect of the presentation are outnumbering those in the mimetic aspect. He 
is thus the perfect embodiment of the follower-through-faith’. Add to this the “constructedness” 
and artificial, fairy-tale-like character of the whole Jātaka-episode (“Once upon a time”, bhūta-
pubbaṃ), his impersonal name, his unusual friendship with a member of the highest social class, 
his somewhat exaggerated states of joy and bliss after the Buddha had come and taken his (sim-
ple) food, and so forth. It may perhaps sound odd to talk of the ‘synthetic aspect’ of a character 
in an early Buddhist sutta, but if one takes a closer look at such characters as the “mythical king” 
Kikī, Ghaṭīkāra and Jotipāla, then the application of the concept does not seem very far-fetched. 
Perhaps names as Ghaṭīkāra etc. were quite suggestive for an ancient Indian (authorial) audience 
of an invented tale (compare, for example, the parables in the Bible). It may have been obvious 
due to certain indicators – we would according to Phelan’s model call them “synthetic aspect” of 
                                                 
404
 Atha kho, mahārāja, Ghaṭīkārassa kumbhakārassa etad ahosi: Lābhā vata me suladdhaṃ vata me yassa me 
Kassapo bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho evaṃ abhivissattho ti. Atha kho, mahārāja, Ghaṭīkāraṃ 
kumbhakāraṃ addhamāsaṃ pītisukhaṃ na vijahi sattāhaṃ mātāpitaraṃ (MN II 52,19-24; 53,8-12, 31-34). 
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a character – that the characters the Buddha was presenting in a tale were invented – either on the 
spot by himself or taken from folk-lore.405 
  
Now, as for Jotipāla, the sutta has the following to say about him. Jotipāla, whose name literally 
means “guardian of light”406 or such like407, is introduced as Ghaṭīkāra’s best friend408 and as being 
a māṇava or a “Brāhmaṇa boy”.409 The cordiality between the friends seems to be mutual, since 
both address each other frequently with the word samma, “dear” (e.g. MN II 46,11). 
The second impression readers obtain of him is that he is not only not at all interested, but 
even thinks very lowly of the Buddha410, and seemingly of samaṇas in general (if the word sa-
maṇa designated also other, non-Buddhist ascetics). 
Next, the expression (MN II 47,30) sīsanahātānaṃ411 demands some discussion. A na-
hātaka (nhātaka in Be; Skt. snātaka), usually translated as “one who has bathed”412, designates a 
Brahmin student (Skt. brahmacārin) who has completed his studies and who is thus obliged to 
move on to the next stage in his life (Skt. varṇāśramadharma), which means marrying and be-
coming a householder (a gr̥hastha or gr̥hapati). As previously mentioned, the friendship between 
the two young men is unusual, to say the least, since we have reason to assume that the varṇa-
                                                 
405
 Cp. Phelan 1989: 115. 
406
 It is perhaps intersting to note that there might be some (however loose) connection between a recurrent 
story (in the Jā etc.) and the name of our protagonist Jotipāla: The bodhisatta born as a Brahmin bearing the 
name Jotipāla appears twice in the Jātaka collection. It is not clear whether they are one and the same person 
(or whether the tradition saw them as one and the same person). What is common to them, though, is the story 
of their birth, which is betokened by a flashing of all the weapons in the city in the moment of his birth. 
(Jotipāla = Sarabhaṅga? Cp. Jā 522; Jātaka (tr. Cowell) III, p. 277; von Hinüber 1998: 132). 
407
 Cp. Gupta 2006: 121: “tender of fire or lamp”. 
408
 MN II 46,4f. Ghaṭīkārassa kho, Ānanda, kumbhakārassa Jotipālo nāma māṇavo sahāyo piyasahāyo. 
409
 Banerji (2007: 214) has something peculiar to tell about the word: “Māṇavas appear (4.5.1-7 [Kauṭilīya Ar-
thaśāstra]) to have been the designation of a class of people indulging in dacoity [Ind. “bandenmäßiger 
Raub”], and using magical art in their activities. The word māṇava being generally used to denote a Brāhmaṇa 
boy, it has been suggested by some [reference of the author not clear; the author in question seems to be J. J. 
Meyer, the work the footnote is referring to is given in the bibliography as Meyer, J. J. Sexual Life in Ancient 
India. London, 1930] that it was the designation of a class of Brāhmaṇas who, before adopting the usual duties 
of their class, took to such heinous practices. Others, however, do not attach much value to this hypothesis.” I 
do not think this information carries any value for our understanding of the term in this context.  
410
 MN II 46,11f. (et passim): Alaṃ, samma Ghaṭīkāra; kiṃ pana tena muṇḍakena samaṇakena diṭṭhenāti?  
411
 Vv.ll. Be(R) sīsaṃnhatānaṃ; Sk sīsaṃ nahatānaṃ, Bm Si sīsanhatānaṃ (for the two latter cp. MN II 47, n. 
2).  
412
 Cp. Cone 2001: s.v. nahātaka. 
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system was already well established at the time and the geographical area of the historical Bud-
dha. Even if it is possible that a Brahmin student could have been friends with a low-caste pot-
ter413, touching him by the head after the (ritual) bathing is by all means to be regarded as a very 
grave offence. The sutta does not specify the age of the two friends, but it is unlikely to assume 
that they were little boys. Nevertheless, judged from the silence of the text about it, and his rather 
spontaneous decision to ordain, it can be inferred that Jotipāla was not married yet. Arthur L. Ba-
sham gives as the ideal age of the “second birth” (upanayana), the rite of passage and one of the 
twelve “sacraments” (saṃskāra) of later Hinduism, eight (brāhmaṇs), eleven (kṣatriyas), and 
twelve (vaiśyas) respectively.414 The period of studenthood (brahmacārin) would ideally amount 
to twelve years, so that the student would return home, give or take a couple of years, usually in 
his early twenties. On his return, he would take a ritual bath, put on fine clothes and wear orna-
ments, which ceremony would make him “one who has bathed” (Skt. snātaka; Pāli nahāta(ka)) 
and thus fit for marriage. Since the text states that Jotipāla received the full admission to the 
Buddha’s Order (upasampadā), we can presume that he was at least twenty years of age415 and 
not married.  
However, it is also possible that Jotipala was not even a Brahmin and that the authors of 
the Mvu version as well as the Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi, who translates māṇava with “brahmin 
youth” throughout, have been influenced by two different appearances of the same compound. 
The compound sīsanahātaṃ occurs first in the narrator’s text when he describes Ghaṭīkāra’s ac-
tions in that dramatic scene at the river, when he grabs his friend’s hair: Atha kho, Ānanda, 
Ghaṭikāro kumbhakāro Jotipālaṃ māṇavaṃ sīsanahātaṃ kesesu parāmasitvā etad avoca: 
Ayaṃ, samma Jotipāla, Kassapassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa avidūre ārāmo. 
                                                 
413
 Cp. Banerji 2007: 203f.: See ‘privileges allowed to śūdras’; cp., however, also Gobhilagr̥hyasūtra III 5.34 
where a snātaka (a Brahmin youth who has finished his studies) is forbidden to “mix” (?? Be/walk alone) with 
a śūdra: na vr̥ṣalaiḥ saha //34// [cty.> vr̥ṣalāḥ śūdrāḥ; taiḥ kevalaiḥ saha; na saṃmiśraiḥ]; see also Banerji 
2007: 203. Cp. also Allon 1997: 58, who seems to be certain about a (sīsa)nahāta being indeed a Brahmin stu-
dent. 
414
 Cp. also MW, s.v. upanayana: “that ceremony in which a Guru draws a boy towards himself and initiates 
him into one of the three twice-born classes (one of the twelve सं᭭कारs or purificatory rites [prescribed in 
the धमᭅ-सूᮢs and explained in the गृ᳭-सूᮢs] in which the boy is invested with the sacred thread [different for the 
three castes] and thus endowed with second or spiritual birth and qualified to learn the वेद by heart; a Brahman 
is initiated in the eighth year [or seventh according to िहर᭛यकेिशन् ; or eighth from conception , according 
to शा᭑खायन &c ] , a ᭃिᮢय in the eleventh , a वै᭫य in the twelfth ; but the term could be delayed).” 
415
 That was the permitted age for the ordination; cp. Basham 2003: 281. 
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Āyāma, […].416 Here, the term can easily be taken as an adjective (bahubbīhi) relating to Jotipāla 
meaning, “who had [just] washed his head”.417 However, in the second instance – Jotipāla’s direct 
thought representation –, the exalted diction suggests to read sīsanahātaṃ as a tappurisa-com-
pound: “[…] Ghaṭīkāra, while being of a lowly birth, should think it necessary to touch 
(parāmasitabbaṃ maññissasi) our (amhākaṃ), the Head-Ablutioned’s (sīsanahātānaṃ) hair 
(kesesu)!418 
If my – admittedly adventurous – interpretation is correct, then there may even be a dif-
ference in the evaluation of the character Jotipāla: in the first case (in the narrator-text) the narra-
tor’s, and in the second (Jotipāla’s direct thought-presentation), Jotipāla’s self-evaluation. This is 
effected by the presentation of Jotipāla’s perspective in his direct thought representation –  his 
apparent nosism (his use of the pluralis majestatis), which is different from the narrator’s view. 
In any case, the character’s text does not merely repeat, verbatim or minor variations as so often, 
the narrator’s text (which would let us expect something like mama māṇavassa 
sīsanahāta(ka)ssa kesesu etc.). This is an important point with regard to Jotipāla’s characterisa-
tion which will be discussed at length below. 
First, however, it is necessary to determine the other implications for the person Jotipāla 
found in the narrator’s text, which speaks of Jotipāla always as Jotipālo māṇavo. The term 
māṇava designates mostly Brahmin youths, but not exclusively. Basham states that in early times 
also kṣatriyas and vaiśyas were initiated into society through the upanayana ceremony and that 
the term “twice-born” (Skt. dvi-ja) has become synonymous with ‘brāhmaṇa’ only later (though 
possibly “even before the Christian Era”419).420 In theory, thus, it is possible that Jotipāla was not a 
Brahmin but perhaps either a khattiya (Skt. kṣatriya) or a vessa (Skt. vaiśya). The narrator’s text 
                                                 
416
 See n. 297 above for the reference. 
417
 Cp. PED s.v. sīsa 2: “sīsaŋ nahāta, one who has performed an ablution of the head”. This expression occurs 
passim in the Sutta Piṭaka in the context of king’s (i.e. kṣatriyas!) having performed ritual ablutions in prepara-
tion of the uposatha observances; cp. e.g. DN II 172: Rājā ānanda mahāsudassano sattahi ratanehi sa-
mannāgato ahosi catūhi ca iddhihi. Katamehi sattahi? Idhānanda rañño mahāsudassanassa tadahuposathe 
paṇṇarase sīsaṃ nahātassa uposathikassa uparipāsādavaragatassa dibbaṃ cakkaratanaṃ pāturahosi sa-
hassāraṃ sanemikaṃ sanāhikaṃ sabbākāraparipūraṃ, disvā rañño mahāsudassanassa etadahosi: ….  
418
 MN II 47,27-31: Atha kho, Ānanda, Jotipālassa māṇavassa etad ahosi: Acchariyaṃ vata bho, abbhutaṃ vata 
bho. Yatra hi nāmāyaṃ Ghaṭīkāro kumbhakāro ittarajacco samāno amhākaṃ sīsanahātānaṃ kesesu 
parāmasitabbaṃ maññissati; na vat’ idaṃ orakaṃ maññe bhavissatīti.    
419
 Cp. Basham 2003: 162. 
420
 Cp. ibid.: 161f., 165f.  
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does not specify in the direct speech passages421, which is why this must remain speculative. 
However, even if Jotipāla was a khattiya or a vessa, that would not make their difference in so-
cial status completely unproblematic. 
According to my interpretation, then, Jotipāla saw himself to be of a superior social 
standing in relation to his friend (“the potter Ghaṭīkāra, being of lowly birth”422), as well as in re-
lation to the Buddha Kassapa (whom he does not recognise or address as a Buddha, but pejora-
tively as “some kind of recluse”), as he repeatedly states (“Enough, dear Ghaṭīkāra, what is the 
use of seeing that bald-pated recluse?”423). Thus, one arrives at a relatively consistent impression 
of Jotipāla’s attitude for this section of the narrative, which is prior to his ordination. In the oppo-
site direction (i.e. ‘alterocharacterisation’424), his contempt for the Buddha, without knowing him 
personally, as being just a “bald-headed recluse/ascetic” (muṇḍaka samaṇaka), identifies the 
Buddha Kassapa – from the biased point of view of Jotipāla – as belonging to a group of ascet-
ics, implies information of the religious landscape at the time of the historical Buddha, in which 
different groups of ascetics were competing with each other. The text thus suggests that the situa-
tion was the same or equal at the time of the Buddha Kassapa. That the Buddha in the Canon is 
often characterised or addressed by others simply as a samaṇa is noteworthy and can be inter-
preted as expressing biased/competitive views of rivals (especially Brahmins), or perhaps as 
pointing to a physical characteristic of the Buddha himself, namely that there was no particularly 
outstanding characteristic about him (there are other passages in the Canon which seem to sup-
port this view). 
Next, it is time to take another look at the salient passage in which Ghaṭīkāra had just 
touched his friend’s hair: “Then, Ānanda, Jotipāla the Brahmin youth thought the following: 
                                                 
421
 MN II 47,28-31: Acchariyaṃ vata, bho, abbhutaṃ vata, bho. Yatra hi nāmāyaṃ Ghaṭikāro kumbhakāro itta-
rajacco samāno amhākaṃ sīsanahātānaṃ kesesu parāmasitabbaṃ maññissati. [my emphasis] 
422
 …Ghaṭikāro kumbhakāro ittarajacco samāno… 
423
 MN II 46,11f.&19f.&33-47,1&10f.&19f.: Alaṃ, samma Ghaṭīkāra; kiṃ pana tena muṇḍakena samaṇakena 
diṭṭhenāti? (tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 670,6.) 
424
 Neumann & Nünning 2008: 56, fig. 3.3. 
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‘This is indeed surprising, this is astonishing!425 I imagine this [the meeting with the Buddha Kas-
sapa] will certainly be no trivial matter, that (yatra hi nāma) this potter Ghaṭīkāra, while being of 
a lowly birth, should think it necessary to touch (paramasittabbaṃ maññissati) our (amhākaṃ), 
the Head-Ablutioned’s (sīsanahātānaṃ) hair (kesesu)!’ [He] said this to the potter Ghaṭīkāra: 
‘[You go] as far as this, dear Ghaṭīkāra?!’ ‘As far as this, dear Jotipāla!’ In this way/so [much] 
do I hold that it is good to see the Blessed One, accomplished and fully awakened.’ ‘Well then, 
dear Ghaṭīkāra, let go [of me]! We will go then.’ And thus it was only after his friend the potter 
had gone so far, that Jotipāla consented to their going together to visit the Blessed One Kas-
sapa.”426 
This passage contains a short ‘interior monolgue’ of the character Jotipāla, presented in 
the manner of direct thought representation (Ger. “Gedankenzitat”), which is in style similar to 
direct speech.427 The sutta-narrator ‘hands over’ his authority of focalization and perspective428 to 
one of the characters with the effect that the listener/reader is able to directly “hear” Jotipāla’s 
thoughts on the event. Characteristic of this mode is the introduction by a speech tag, in this case 
the formula “X thought the following: ‘….’”. Although also formalised like almost everything 
                                                 
425
 Note the vocative singular of the honorific pronoun bhavant, bho, here used as an exclamation, which is in-
dicative of actual speech, which in the Pāli suttas is, however, always ‘simulated orality’ (“fingierte Mündlich-
keit”; cp. von Hinüber 1996: §55). Since Jotipāla is not speaking here, but only his thoughts are represented 
here, it is even more interesting how the text, for all, or despite, its formulaic character, creates a quite lively 
situation through this imitation of colloquial speech.  
426
 MN II 47,27-48,3: Atha kho, Ānanda, Jotipālassa māṇavassa etad ahosi: Acchariyaṃ vata, bho, abbhutaṃ 
vata, bho. Yatra hi nāmāyaṃ Ghaṭikāro kumbhakāro ittarajacco samāno amhākaṃ sīsanahātānaṃ kesesu 
parāmasitabbaṃ maññissati; na vat’ idaṃ [Bm adds kira; Ps na vadat’ idaṃ] orakaṃ maññe bhavissatīti; 
Ghaṭikāraṃ kumbhakāraṃ etad avoca: yāvetadohipi [Be(R), Bm yāvatādohipi], samma Ghaṭikārāti. 
Yāvetadohi pi [Be(R), Bm yāvatādohipi], samma Jotipāla. Tathā hi pana me sādhusammataṃ tassa bhagavato 
dassanaṃ arahato sammāsambuddhassāti. ’Tena hi, samma Ghaṭikāra, muñca; gamissāmāti. Atha kho, 
Ānanda, Ghaṭīkāro ca kumbhakāro Jotipāloca māṇavo yena Kassapo bhagavā arahaṃ sammā-sambuddho 
ten’ upasaṃkamiṃsu. 
427
 This seems to be the only mode for the rendering of thoughts and speech of characters in these early Bud-
dhist texts.   
428
 Cp. Schmid 2008: 186, where he lists a catalogue of characteristics of characters’ text and narrator’s text, 




else in the language of the suttas429, the passages of direct speech and thought do indeed some-
times preserve, or imitate, an expressivity that is characteristic of (direct) character’s speech. Ex-
pressive phrases like ‘acchariyaṃ vata, bho, abbhutaṃ vata, bho’ and the “bunching together” of 
untranslatable particles like the phrase, yāvetadohi pi, are indicative of this.430 The use of the pro-
noun amhākaṃ, “our”, is indicative of the Origo of Jotipāla through the presentation of his visual 
perspective, and of his evaluative stance towards the event through the use of the pluralis majes-
tatis.   
At this point it is important to remember the analysis of the narrative’s progression. This 
focalised (‘focaliser’: Jotipāla) passage is not only the dramatic height and climax of the Jotipāla-
plot, it is also crucial for the further development and progression of the plot, and finally for the 
resolution of the instability it caused: Only because of this extreme action on Ghaṭīkāra’s part 
does Jotipāla visit the Buddha Kassapa and is finally set (back?) on his predestined path to Bud-
dhahood. Jotipāla’s arrogance and conceit (his ‘mimetic dimension’) function in a way that they 
activate Ghaṭīkāra to perform ever more blatant actions (=’mimetic function’). The narrative 
flow (or rather the climaxing action) is restricted to Jotipāla’s perspective exactly at the critical 
or decisive point of the conflict (the ‘instability’): Instead of reacting in a drastic way, to which 
he would surely be entitled given his higher social rank, Jotipāla seems to have a quasi-cathartic 
moment of insight (“[…] this will certainly be no trivial matter […]”). The friends go and see the 
Buddha Kassapa, which for Jotipāla becomes very significant: Upon hearing the Buddha teach, 
he decides that he wants to become a bhikkhu under the Blessed One Kassapa. This is not only a 
change of heart of Jotipāla, but could perhaps almost be called a conversion: his attitude must 
perform a volte-face. The text, however, is silent about it, and the story leaves the character 
                                                 
429
 O. von Hinüber argues that the orality presented in the suttas is highly formalised and artificial owing to re-
quired memorisability of the texts; cp. ibid. 1996: 28,§55: “In contrast to a modern author, however, who 
might imitate an actual conversation in creating a ‘fictitious orality’, the true orality found in early Buddhist 
texts avoids the natural ways of conversation, a situation that is the result of their having to create a formalized 
text that can be remembered and handed down by the tradition. In this respect, the remembered and originally 
true orality of the Buddhists is ultimately much more artificial than the fictitious orality in a modern novel.” 
430
 It is arguable in how far it is possible to discover traces of the narrator within the character’s speech, e.g. the 
use of the conjunction yatra, which might be indicative of Sanskrit as the language used by Brahmins. How-
ever, this is perhaps overstating my point and must remain speculative. Cp. the explanation of yatra in the 
PED: “[…] It is merely a differentiation of forms to mark a special meaning in the sense of a causal conjunc-
tion, whereas yattha is adv. (of place or time) only] in which, where, since; only in phrase yatra hi nāma (in 
emphatic exclamations) with Fut. […].” 
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Jotipāla behind with the words, “The youth Jotipāla, Ānanda, received the ‘going forth’/ordina-
tion (pabbajjaṃ) in the presence of the Blessed One Kassapa, the accomplished and fully awak-
ened One, and he received the full admission to the Order (upasampadaṃ).”431 The logic behind 
this seems to be: “The decisive moment for Jotipāla had happened already before. The rest 
should be clear.”  
Nevertheless, this passage is also an indirect characterising statement of both Jotipāla 
himself and his friend the potter. First, it is notable and surprising for the narrative audience, that 
Jotipāla remains very calm in the face of this heavy offence through his outcast friend. Legally, it 
would perhaps have given him every right of retribution according to Brahmin law, as we have 
seen. When he says to his friend, “you go as far as this, dear Ghaṭīkāra!”, he seems to show un-
derstanding and sympathy for his friend’s desire to see the Buddha. If one infers back from his 
behavior on his state of mind, his calmness in the face of such an extreme act is a statement of 
his affection for his friend.  
But it also characterises Ghaṭīkāra. His motivation to see the Buddha is simply that he 
holds that it is beneficial to see the Blessed One. This is enunciative of his strong faith in and af-
fection for the Buddha, the dominant character-trait of Ghaṭīkāra. 
However, I think that the situation and the role of the characters is more complex than 
this, and thus another reading of the text is possible. Reconsidering the narrated facts, the follow-
ing questions present themselves. Why is Ghaṭīkāra so keen on dragging his friend along to the 
Buddha Kassapa? And it is unlikely that his stated, overt motivation that he holds that it is good 
to see the Blessed One is his real motivation, simply because he himself has already established a 
close relationship with him. This leads one to the conclusion that he, for some reason, has a cov-
ert motivation to bring his friend to the Buddha Kassapa. Moreover, Jotipāla’s calmness in the 
face of his friend’s offence must strike one as strange. Both cases seem also to have puzzled the 
editors/compilers/authors of the Jotipāla Sūtra in the Mvu, as seen above, which is perhaps why 
they felt the need to supply the readers/listeners with the unexpressed motivation of the potter 
and the ‘missing’ appropriate reaction to his offence.432 With respect to Ghaṭīkāra’s characterisa-
tion through Jotipala’s statement, it implies that he must hold the Buddha dearer than his own 
                                                 
431
 MN II 49,7-9: Alattha kho, ānanda, jotipālo māṇavo kassapassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa 
santike pabbajjaṃ, alattha upasampadaṃ. 
432
 Cp. nn. 330 and 332 above. 
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life and that he, according to one possible interpretation of Jotipāla’s expressed thoughts433, must 
know something Jotipāla does not (which is Jotipāla’s future Buddhahood). Remember also that 
the short dialogue between the two friends after they have visited the Buddha, in which 
Ghaṭīkāra makes clear that he himself has never thought about entering the Order, supports this 
view. As stated earlier in the analysis of the narrative progression, the characters’ unclear moti-
vations create a tension (the narrator, Buddha Gotama, knows more than his audience at this 
point about the course of events, and the authorial audience is in suspense about how the story 
will develop – his tension is only resolved at the end of the sutta when the narrator reveals his 
identity: “I was that Brahmin youth Jotipāla”). This situation makes Ghaṭīkāra into a key figure 
in the sutta’s progression: it is because of him that Jotipāla becomes ordained by Kassapa Bud-
dha and later becomes himself a Buddha! However, we do not learn about his real motivation ex-
plicitly from the text, except that he is a model example of Buddhist values, and thus Ghaṭīkāra 
as a character remains opaque and somewhat unknown to the reader/listener, without (a possible, 
real) identity. Ghaṭīkāra the potter serves discrete functions in the progression of the narrative, 
which is reminiscent of Greimas’s theory of actants. It is also thinkable that Ghaṭīkāra himself 
does not even know why he is doing all this. He just acts out of his affection for the Buddha. It is 
somewhat awkward that he almost violently insists on their meeting with the Buddha, although, 
as a character in the middle of the story, he cannot not possibly know why it is so important. The 
plot actually owes the audience an explanation as to his obscure motivation. At this point his mi-
metic dimensions or attributes, which are explained only later during the ‘meal narrative’ to the 
king Kikī, are turned into functions. In sum, however, it becomes obvious that his real function 
lies in the thematic sphere, which is pointed out from the beginning through turning the audi-
ences’ attention to his synthetic aspect. The one who ultimately knows about the significance of 
Ghaṭīkāra’s actions for the future Buddha is the narrator, Gotama Buddha, himself.  
Jotipāla leaves the story after his ordination, and we do not learn anything from the text 
about his further development or whereabouts. His name only reoccurs at the end of the sutta, 
when the Buddha (Gotama) states his identity with Jotipāla. Seen in isolation, one could indeed 
                                                 
433
 This interpretation is based on my reading of the phrase, “I imagine this [the meeting with the Buddha Kas-
sapa] will certainly be no trivial matter” ([…] na vat’ idaṃ [Bm adds kira; Ps na vadat’ idaṃ] orakaṃ maññe 
bhavissatīti). The demonstrative pronoun “this” (idaṃ) in combination with the future “will be” (bhavissati) 
refers to a future event. 
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get the impression that in this (and similar) sutta(s) at this point (i.e. the “dropping out”, as it 
were, of the main character according to the traditional commentarial view!) one story ends and 
another begins, and that the two stories have more or less consistently been cobbled together by 
the bhāṇaka tradition for one reason or another. However, such an impression would be caused 
by an ignorance of the principle of narration in the suttas (and the subsequent narrative tradition). 
This principle is, put simply, based on the specific insight (of the Buddha?), which as a cultural 
code has the status of a fact, that the world together with its events does not have an end, and that 
therefore narration as an image or a representation of the actual world, does likewise not have an 
end. Due to the kaleidoscopic  character of the suttas (or one could perhaps also call this style 
“episodical”, although this term does not exactly fit because there is no real or recognisable se-
quential arrangement of the texts of the Nikāyas), the historical listener/reader might not have 
had the impression of an inconsistency, simply due to the fact that Jotipāla does not really disap-
pear – the narrator/author/reciter just chose, likely in order to make a certain point, to restrict 
himself for the rest of the sutta to another plot line which focuses on Ghaṭīkāra. (Cp. also what 
was said above, that the Ghaṭīkāra-story represents a complication of the narrative’s progression 
which serves to further develop the theme, respectively the development of the instability and its 
resolution.)  
However, in narratological terms, that does not necessarily mean that Jotipāla’s story is 
finished here. He is still present in the narrative universe (the narrated world) of the suttas – as 
the ‘prospective’ Buddha Gotama. He is just ‘covert’ as a character because the ‘contextual 
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‘frame’434’ in which he appeared (/acted) changed, due to the change of location (in Part II.5), and 
is now “inactive”. In any case, the sutta is indeed about the character Ghaṭīkāra (as the title al-
ready indicates, in constrast to the Mvu title) and the relations and identifications of the diegetic 
with the metadiegetic characters.      
Although, in the passage of Jotipāla’s short interior monologue, the expression of emo-
tions – besides his reaction being unexpectedly mild (thus creating a ‘tension’) – appears re-
strained to a very high degree through the use of “standard sutta-language” (Acchariyaṃ vata, 
bho, abbhutaṃ vata, bho. Yatra hi nāmāyaṃ Ghaṭikāro), already the use of the interior mono-
logue is indicative of the importance of this passage for Jotipāla but also, or even much more, for 
the progression of the story. The same passage, dryly summarised by the narrator, would not 
yield the same dramatic effect, which is here achieved through the focalization of the event 
through the character-perspective.  
In turn, this passage forms the introduction to the turning point of Jotipāla’s attitude to-
wards the Buddha Kassapa, namely when the two friends depart from their first meeting with 
Kassapa. Although before they went to see the Blessed One, the significance of this event was 
only foreshadowed (“I imagine this [the meeting with the Buddha Kassapa] will certainly be no 
trivial matter, inasmuch/for which as this potter Ghaṭīkāra, while being of a lowly birth, should 
think it necessary to tear at the hair of our freshly washed head”), and Jotipāla was perhaps still a 
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 I use the term ‘frame’ (in inverted commas) here as it is used or defined in Cognitive Narratology, i.e. as a 
cognitive process of readers that “fills in the blanks” of the narrative; cp. LHN: “Schank & Abelson’s (1977) 
foundational work explored how stereotypical knowledge reduces the complexity and duration of many pro-
cessing tasks, including the interpretation of narrative. The concept of script, i.e. a type of knowledge represen-
tation that allows an expected sequence of events to be stored in the memory, was designed to explain how 
people are able to build up complex interpretations of stories on the basis of very few textual or discourse cues 
(Schemata). Whereas the term “scripts” was used to refer to kinds of world-knowledge that generate expecta-
tions about how sequences of events are supposed to unfold, “frames” referred to expectations about how do-
mains of experience are likely to be structured at a given moment in time (Goffman 1974). Frames guide my 
expectations about the objects and decor that I am likely to find in a university classroom as opposed to a 
prison cell; scripts guide my expectations about what I can expect to happen while ordering a beer in a bar as 
opposed to defending a doctoral dissertation.” (Herman, David: “Cognitive Narratology”, Paragraph 12. In: 
Hühn, Peter et al. (eds.): LHN. Hamburg: Hamburg University Press. URL = hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/lhn/in-
dex.php?title=Cognitive Narratology&oldid=2058 (last accessed: 15th April 2013)). Indeed, Allon’s important 
work (1997) on the approach formulas in the DN could be rephrased in cognitive terms as an analysis of the 
use of certain ‘frames’ and ‘scripts’ in early Buddhist Pāli suttas: The ‘frame’ of the Buddha dwelling in a cer-
tain place entails certain ‘scripts’, i.e. standardised courses of actions and events, e.g. approaching the Buddha 




little bit reluctant to actually go, Jotipāla’s attitude changed after the Buddha had given them an 
inspiring talk about dhamma, about the actual contents of which the listener/reader is left in the 
dark. In the narrative discourse this change becomes manifest in the words, “they were thankful 
and approved joyfully of what the Blessed One had said”435, and in the abhivādetvā form of ad-
dress on their departure, which is now used for both!436 His change of heart in regard to his atti-
tude towards the Buddha is then fully expressed in his wish to become a member of the Buddha 
Kassapa’s order of monks.437 As in the two other suttas (the Piyajātika and the Aṅgulimāla 
Sutta), also here the characteristic of and the most dramatic point in the story seems the change 
of heart (“conversion”?) of one of its protagonists.  
Again, another crucial passage of the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta provides the listener/reader with a 
representation of the thoughts of one of the main characters. The passage is, as usual in such 
cases, introduced with the stock phrase for the representation of thought in the Pali suttas: “Then, 
Ānanda, the brahmin youth Jotipāla thought the following” (Atha kho, Ānanda, Jotipālassa 
māṇavassa etad ahosi). The thought provides us with an explanation or a possible motivation for 
Jotipāla’s consent, finally, to go and visit the Buddha. Moreover, Jotipala’s extremely disrespect-
ful and markedly dismissive address of the Buddha as muṇḍaka samaṇaka clearly betrays 
Jotipāla’s perspective: the narrator completely lends his voice to the character. And this gener-
ates a tension between his perspective and the authorial reader’s (and the implied author’s?) per-
spective because Jotipāla’s attitude towards the Buddha will reverse completely at the end of the 
story, when they will have met. In one possible reading, this later turn of events is already antici-
pated in the content of Jotipala’s thoughts. The Brahmin youth senses something special to hap-
pen by the strange and absolutely unacceptable behaviour of his friend the potter. And the lis-
tener/reader is equally made aware that the situation is somewhat extraordinary through the way 
Jotipāla comments on the situation in words (“You go as far as this, dear friend?”) and thought 
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 MN II 48,21f.: … Kassapassa bhagavato … bhāsitaṃ abhinanditvā anumoditvā …; in my translation of the 
the absolutives of the verbs abhinadati and anumodati here I follow the CPD ss.vv. 
436
 MN II 48,18-24: Atha kho, Ānanda, Ghaṭīkāro ca kumbhakāro Jotipālo ca māṇavo Kassapena bhagavatā 
arahatā sammasambuddhena dhammiyā kathāya sandassitā samādapitā samuttejitā sampahaṃsitā Kassa-
passa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa bhāsitaṃ abhinanditvā anumoditvā uṭṭhāy’ asana Kassapaṃ 
bhagavantaṃ arahantaṃ sammāsambuddhaṃ abhivādetvā padakkhinaṃ katvā pakkamiṃsu. [my emphasis] 
437





(“It is marvelous, it is strange […]”). Through being touched by Ghaṭīkāra, Jotipāla has become 
impure again, stained, by Ghaṭikāra’s action. Thus, under normal circumstances – and the reader 
(the authorial audience?) wonders perhaps why it does not happen – Ghaṭikāra’s behaviour 
would be regarded as outrageous and should provoke the rage of Jotipāla. The authorial audi-
ence, therefore, asks why Jotipāla does not even seem to feel in the least offended. The highly 
explosive social issue and cause for conflict lurking in this passage appears to have escaped the 
commentator. Thus, except for Jotipāla’s unexpectedly mild reaction towards Ghaṭīkāra’s action, 
nothing in his characterisation prior to the meeting with the Buddha Kassapa points to his change 
of heart towards the Blessed One. Therefore, his wish to become ordained is all the more surpris-
ing for the listener/reader (who does not know yet that Jotipāla is the future Buddha). It is, there-
fore, fairly safe to say that Jotipāla’s actions do not correspond to his characterisation by the text 
prior to his ‘conversion’. Yet, this admittedly rather extreme change in the attitude of young 
Jotipāla does not destroy the mimetic illusion of the character Jotipāla as a ‘possible person’ in a 
“real situation”. First, this is because his deprecatory attitude towards the Buddha Kassapa is not 
a stable character trait (as, e.g. the psychological traits extroverted versus introverted). One can 
surmise that it is a kind of learned behaviour, probably stemming from his caste affiliation (no 
matter, then, whether he was a Brahmin or from a royal family). He sees the Buddha Kassapa 
just as one of the many ascetics around. Only the “ascetic Gotama’s” teachings, however, “turn 
his life around”. Furthermore, it is perhaps also safe to say that such events belong to the conven-
tions of the “sutta-genre”: Several instances can be found in the Canon in which Brahmins or 
wealthy householders are converted to Buddhism after they had discussed with or heard the Bud-
dha preach.438 Finally yet importantly, the ability to surprise the listener/reader is essentially what 
makes a character interesting, more “true-to-life”, what E. M. Forster has called a “round charac-
ter”.  
We will now turn our attention to another major figure in the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta, “king 
Kikī”. The king Kikī seems to be a mythical figure, and only existent in the universe of Buddhist 
                                                 
438
 Cp. e.g. the Sāleyyaka Sutta (MN 41), Verañjaka Sutta (MN 42), Upāli Sutta (MN 56), Abhayarājakumāra 
Sutta (MN 58), Brahmāyu Sutta (MN 91), Sela Sutta (MN 92), Assalāyana Sutta (MN 93). Thus, the impres-
sion of the MN-suttas as being mainly “debates”, as Manné posits, is perhaps warranted in many cases.  
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literature. Kikin, - ī/ - i, -is (m.) in Sanskrit, is the blue jay439, which makes for a strange name for 
a king. However, according to Malalasekera’s Dictionay of Pāli Proper Names (DPPN) Kiki ap-
pears by name and with the attribute “king of Kāsī” (kāsirājā) at the time of the Buddha Kassapa 
in the Pāli Canon in the Mahāpadāna Sutta (DN) and several times in the Khuddakanikāya 
(Jātaka and Apadāna collections).440 It is mentioned that he had several daughters, who all (i.e. 
their rebirths) eventually became nuns under the Buddha Gotama, and one son who followed him 
on the throne. Interestingly, King Kikī’s („Krikri“) son (Pathavindhara (Puthuvindhara?)441) re-
surfaces in a much later, Tibetan, source in his reincarnation as the Tibetan scholar-saint ’Jigs-
med gLing pa (1729/30?-1798).442 
King Kikī enters the stage in the sutta in Part II.5 (MN I 49,9-50,12). The formula of 
someone receiving the news that the Tathāgata has come to a certain place is abbreviated here: 
“Kikī, king of Benares, Ānanda, had heard: ‘Allegedly the Blessed One Kassapa, accomplished 
and fully awakened, has arrived in Benares and is staying in the Deer Park’.”443 It misses the ex-
pression that contains the famous ‘itipiso’-formula, “the following high reputation has been pre-
ceding the Buddha […]”444 etc., which is usually used to express that the people who have heard 
about the Buddha’s arrival are not his followers. 
                                                 
439
 Grassman (Woerterbuch zum R̥gveda) has (s.v.): „kiki-dīví, m., der blaue Holzheher, auch bloß kiki ge-
nannt; der Name ist, wie kāka (Krähe), ursprünglich wol schallnachahmend […] die Bedeutung des zweiten 
Theils (dīví) ist nicht deutlich.“ This seems to be the ‘Indian Roller’ (Coracias benghalensis) and not the “blue 
jay”, which is an outdated designation, and the direct translation of the German “blauer Holzheher”. 
440
 See also http://www.bodhgayanews.net/pali.htm; search entry kikī (last accessed: 7th April 2013). 
441
 p. DPPN s.v. Kikī. 
442
 Cp. Tulku Thondup 2011: 31: “According to his [i.e. ’Jigs-med gLing-pa’s] recollections and revelations, 
many millennia ago Jigme Lingpa was born in India as the son of a king named Krikri, and he developed 
elightened aspiration (Skt. bodhicitta) in front of Buddha Kasyapa.” If nothing else, this perhaps indicates that 
the story of the potter, Jotipāla and the king Kikī must have been more widespread (and durative) than one may 
think. 
443
 MN II 49,15f.: Assosi kho, ānanda, kikī kāsirājā: ‘kassapo kira bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho 
bārāṇasiṃ anuppatto bārāṇasiyaṃ viharati isipatane migadāye’ti. 
444
 Assosi kho X: “samaṇo khalu bho, gotamo sakyaputto sakyakulā pabbajito [place-name] cārikaṃ carati 
mahatā bhikkhusaṅghena saddhiṃ pañcamattehi bhikkhusatehi. Taṃ kho pana bhavantaṃ gotamaṃ evaṃ 
kalyāṇo kittisaddo abbhuggato iti pi so: Bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho vijjācaraṇasampanno sugato lo-
kavidū anuttaro purisadammasārathi satthā devamanussānaṃ buddho Bhagavāti. So imaṃ lokaṃ sadevakaṃ 
samārakaṃ sabrahmakaṃ sassamaṇabrāhmaṇiṃ pajaṃ sadevamanussaṃ sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā 
pavedeti. So dhammaṃ deseti ādikalyāṇaṃ majjhekalyāṇaṃ pariyosānakalyāṇaṃ sātthaṃ sabyañjanaṃ, keva-




The king enters the realm of the Buddha – “Approaching by chariot”445  
As soon as the king and his entourage reach close to the dwelling place of the Buddha Kassapa, 
they have to alight from their carriages, and even the king has to proceed as a “mere pedestrian” 
(pattiko va). The contrast is played out by the text through (first) using the compound “with full 
royal pomp”446 (mahatā rājānubhāvena447), i.e. including “a number of state carriages”, and subse-
quently contrasting it by the information that the king has to proceed “by foot only,”448 i.e. as a 
mere pedestrian. The reason given for this in the text is that the road was no longer suitable or 
passable for carriages. However, as I have elaborated on elsewhere449, the phrase carries signifi-
cance beyond being a mere statement of facts, also since it is or has become highly formulaic in 
describing a king approaching the or a Buddha or, more rarely, other highly esteemed persons.450 
The formula this passage here deviates from the standard formula in the Dīgha Nikāya described 
by Allon in the particular detail mahatā rājānubhāvena (plus Kassapaṃ bhagavantaṃ ara-
hantaṃ sammāsambuddhaṃ dassanāya), which is also significant in that it serves to create or 
increase the contrast described above. Thus, the prominence of the Buddha (Kassapa) is empha-
sised: even a powerful king has to descend from his state carriage, which could be interpreted as 
representing his kingdom, and approach the Buddha on the same level.451 
                                                 
445
 MN II 49,22-24: yāvatikā yānassa bhūmi yānena gantvā yānā paccarohitvā pattiko va yena Kassapo bha-
gavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho ten’ upasaṃkami; […]. Cp. also Allon 1997: 36-40. 
446
 Tr. Bhikkhu Bodhi: Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 672.13. 
447
 Vv.ll.: Be(R) mahaccarājānubhāvena, Si mahaccā rājānubhāvena, for mahatā cp. Geiger 1994: §96.1. ma-
hacca/-ā=??? Instr. Sg. Fem., mahatī 
448
 Tr. Allon 1997: 38. 
449
 Cp. Galasek 2009: 94f. 
450
 The whole passage is a common variant of what Mark Allon has called ‘approach-formulas’; cp. Allon 
1997: 36-40, 2.2.1 ‘Approaching by chariot or elephant’; The complete (in Allon’s sense or definition) formula 
runs: MN II 49,18-24: Atha kho, Ānanda, Kikī Kāsirājā bhadrāni bhadrāni [throughout instead of bhadda] 
yānāni yojāpetvā bhadraṃ yānaṃ abhirūhitvā bhadrehi bhadrehi yānehi Bārāṇasiyā niyyāsi mahatā rājānub-
hāvena Kassapaṃ bhagavantaṃ arahantaṃ sammāsambuddhaṃ dassanāya; yāvatikā yānassa bhūmi yānena 
gantvā yānā paccorohitvā pattiko va yena Kassapo bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho ten’ upasaṃkami; 
upasaṃkamitvā … 
451
 Cp. also Allon’s summary as in support of my argument (1997: 41): “As the preparations for an approach or 
the actual travel that must be involved in visiting someone are rarely depicted, it is certain that their inclusion 
in some approach passages functions to emphasise something particular about the approacher or the approach. 
In the case of chariot/elephant approaches it is to emphasise the status of the individuals who approach and 
hence, by association, the importance of the Buddha.”   
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Furthermore, the king shows the highest form of respect towards the Buddha Kassapa on 
his visit. Noteworthy in this respect is the address of the Buddha Kassapa with ‘bhante’ as he ap-
proaches (MN II 50,1). As Allon has found out452, when used in the approach-formulas (“B 5-7”), 
the address bhante, “Venerable Sir”, almost always goes together with the most formal of saluta-
tions, i.e. the abhivādetvā-salutation. Similarly, his taking leave of the Blessed One is very re-
spectful with the ‘paying-homage’ and ‘circumambulating’ formulas.453 This means, that in this 
respect he is similar to the lay follower Ghaṭīkāra, and indeed the text is suggestive of the king 
being a follower or devotee of the Buddha Kassapa already. 
However, that the “meal-narrative ‘frame’” is not coupled – as it otherwise often is – with 
the “conversion ‘frame’” is conspicuous here, because in most suttas this is the case.454 The king 
does not even ask to be accepted as a lay follower or the like, and the text seems to invite readers 
to surmise that the sole motivation of Kikī is either to gain prestige by hosting the Buddha455, 
which would also explain for his depression after being rejected to host the Buddha and his 
monks during the rains retreat (his aspiration was disappointed), or that he must be a follower al-
ready. His gesture of taking a lower seat to sit next to the Buddha after the meal, though highly 
formulaic too, adds to the general impression of Kikī being a devotee of the Buddha Kassapa. 
Yet, the text does not expressedly state that. What is more, when the Buddha praises Ghaṭīkāra’s 
qualities, he particularly – and in the first place – mentions that the potter has gone for refuge to 
the Buddha, his teachings, and the saṅgha. With his statement, “You, on the other hand, maha-
raja, [just] thought: ‘Kassapa, the Blessed One, accomplished and fully awakened, does not con-
sent to my [offer of a] rains residence in Benares’, and you became depressed and dejected. [But] 
this is not so with the potter Ghaṭīkāra and it will/can not be so (i.e. the potter does not and could 
never think thus!)”, Kassapa Buddha states implicitly that king Kikī is the actual opposite of 
good Ghaṭīkāra in terms of the qualities listed next. 
                                                 
452
 Cp. Allon 1997: 57&59. 
453
 MN II 50,3-7: Atha kho, ānanda, kikī kāsirājā kassapassa bhagavato sammāsambuddhassa adhivāsanaṃ 
viditvā uṭṭhāyāsanā kassapaṃ bhagavantaṃ arahantaṃ sammāsambuddhaṃ abhivādetvā padakkhiṇaṃ katvā 
pakkāmi. 
454
 Cp. Allon 1997: 136f.; Bailey & Mabbett 2003: 240. 
455
 Cp. Bailey & Mabbett 2003: 248f. 
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Kikī’s real motivation, therefore, to serve the Buddha Kassapa appears rather covert. His 
demeanour, betrays that he regards himself as a follower or devotee of the Buddha. I have al-
ready stated earlier my own reading of a passage that is crucial for Kikī’s view of himself. Here, 
let me elaborate on this.456 On my view, the translations by the Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi as well as by 
I. B. Horner miss the point of the statement made in king Kikī’s words: Horner (1957: 247) 
translates: “Revered sir, may the Lord consent to (accept) my rains-residence in Benares; there 
will be suitable support for the Order.” Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi (2001: 673,17.) translate: “Venerable 
sir, let the Blessed One accept from me a residence for the Rains in Benares; that will be helpful 
for the Sangha.” On my reading of the passage, the king is in fact trying to gain the Buddha Kas-
sapa’s favour by, in a sense, “bribing” him: “If you accept me as your donor and main supporter 
here in Benares (= meaning prestige for the king), this (evarūpaṃ, referring to something at hand 
= the sumptuous meal just enjoyed!) is what you can expect every day for yourself and your 
monks”!457 The Buddha Kassapa’s reaction is prompt and determined: “Enough, great king! I 
have [already] consented to a residence during the Rains.”458 Begging thus three times and de-
clined always, consequently the king is disappointed and depressed.459 and asks: “Venerable sir, 
have you a better supporter than myself?”460 Because Kassapa, the Buddha does have a better 
supporter, the king is depressed. In terms of what, then, is Ghaṭīkāra a better supporter than the 
rich king (because it is very doubtful, and appears almost as a logical flaw in the story, how ex-
actly the potter will be able to support the Buddha Kassapa and his entire assembly of monks 
mentioned in beginning of the sutta as accompanying him!)? The Buddha Kassapa himself gives 
the answer, as previously described in Ghaṭīkāra’s characterisation.  
Thus, in regards to his view of himself, king Kikī shares features with Jotipāla: he shows 
a similarly arrogant and over-confident attitude towards the Buddha. But other than Jotipāla, the 
king is reprimanded for his attitude by the Blessed One Kassapa who reads Kikī’s thoughts: “But 
                                                 
456
 See n. 315 above. The Pāli text of the passage is MN II 50,24f.: Adhivāsetu me, bhante, Bhagavā 
Bārāṇasiyaṃ vassāvāsaṃ; evarūpaṃ saṃghassa upaṭṭhānaṃ bhavissatīti. 
457
 See Bailey & Mabbett 2003: 237-256 for “The importance of meals as a measure of social interaction”, and 
the discussion below in 4.8. “Interpretation.” 
458
 MN II 50,26: Alaṃ, maharaja, adhivuttho me vassāvāso ti. 
459
 MN II 50,31-51,2: Atha kho Ānanda, Kikissa Kāsirañño: Na me Kassapo bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsam-
buddho adhivāseti Bārāṇasiyaṃ vassāvāsan ti. Ahu-d-eva aññathattaṃ ahu domanassaṃ. 
460
 tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 673,18. MN II 51,4f.: Atthi nu te, bhante, añño koci mayā upaṭṭhākataro ti? 
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you, great king, thought: ‘The Blessed One Kassapa […] does not consent to my offering a resi-
dence for the Rains’, and became […] depressed.”461  
4.8 Interpretation 
Although the king made a deliberate effort by inviting the Buddha to a meal, and although the 
‘meal-narrative frame’ is in most of its occasions followed by the ‘conversion frame’462 (perhaps 
it was even the king’s intention to become a convert, a lay follower at least, or at least receive a 
Dhamma discourse? The text, however, does not state this), he goes away empty-handed. Yet, 
the Brahmin youth Jotipāla, who in the beginning is even opposed to the idea of seeing the Bud-
dha, eventually obtains the full admission to the order (which had even to be requested by 
Ghaṭīkāra on his behalf!). What role in the narrative progression does Ghaṭīkāra play, then? He 
appears as the driving force behind the action (he introduces Jotipāla to the Buddha; he asks on 
his behalf for the ordination, etc.).  
As G. Bailey and I. Mabbett have stated463, there are striking parallels and even a certain 
complementarity between King Kikī and the lay disciple Ghaṭīkāra which merit that we have a 
closer look at them.     
For a satisfactory interpretation of the sutta, as G. Bailey and I. Mabbett have also 
demomnstrated, the social connotations of some of its events have to be taken into consideration. 
Bailey and Mabbett wish to interpret the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta against the background of the doctrine 
of the transfer of merit and the concept of “gift exchange”.464 The authors argue, however, that 
the earliest and simplest form of alms-giving and -receiving may not have included the notion of 
direct reciprocity, while the meal-invitation, on the other hand, did, and it is likely that it was a 
highly ritualised and prestigious event for both parties. G. Bailey and I. Mabbett write: 
                                                 
461
 MN II 51: Tuyhaṃ kho pana, mahārāja: Na me Kassapo bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho adhivāseti 
Bārāṇasiyaṃ vassāvāsan ti atthi aññathattaṃ atthi domanassaṃ; […].   
462
 Cp. Bailey & Mabbett 2003: 238. 
463
 See ibid.: 248: “The size and the nature of the meals is perfectly consonant with the social and economic 
standings of the respective donors and as such there is no message of status disjunction being expressed here. 
Where the latter assumes its full force is in Kassapa’s refusal of Kikī’s invitation to spend the rains retreat with 
him. The contrasting emotions experienced by the favoured donor and the one who is refused are quite sym-
metrical, but do not explicitly turn on status disjunction so much as failure and joy in the wake of Kassapa’s 
refusal.” 
464
 Cp. Bailey & Mabbett 2003: 233, 236.   
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“It is normal in such cases for the meal to be enframed in the larger context of conversion, a common 
frame in Buddhist literature and not always including the kind of meal with which we are concerned 
here. All the meals presented in such cases are large, highly demonstrative and deliberately ritualized 
offering possibility for sumptuary display on the part of the patron who pays for the meal and an ex-
alted status for the Buddha who receives it. […] But if the attitude of the monk is to be one of absolute 
indifference […], the text [the authors have just cited the Jīvaka Sutta to illustrate the perfect attitude 
of a monk following a meal-invitation] tells us nothing of the attitude of the donor. As we will see this 
is often characterised by competitive zeal.”465   
This situation, when seen in connection with the king’s getting depressed when the Bud-
dha refuses his offer to provide large-scale for monks’ rains retreat, may be interpretetd as re-
vealing the king’s prestige as the only motive his invitations. At the moment in the ‘meal frame’ 
when the donour is supposed to ask for a talk on Dhamma, the king makes yet another invitation. 
The Buddha Kassapa, in response, delivers a sermon nonetheless: Having emphasised 
Ghaṭīkāra’s qualities, he relates the three episodes of visiting Ghaṭīkāra’s house and being of-
fered his food by his blind parents as an illustration of the potter’s virtue(s) (i.e. humility coupled 
with pefect generosity). It is difficult to believe that that much zeal is involved in the king’s offer 
– he is a king after all! Then again, comparing the king and the potter in terms of wealth, the con-
trast could hardly be more blatant. That the Buddha Kassapa calls the poor potter his chief at-
tendant must be utterly humiliating for the generous and wealthy king. Now, what should listen-
ers/readers make of this? When re-reading the passage another instance of contrast occurred to 
me: remembering the description of the circumstances in the beginning of the sutta (the Buddha 
travels with a large group of monks!), the fact that Buddha Kassapa is now depicted in quite 
poor, but apparently happy, circumstances (suggestive of a much earlier stage in his career?) 
struck me as strange. I think that here we can make out a hidden criticism by the Buddha Kas-
sapa of the apparently historical practice of arranging sumptuous meals for the Buddha and his 
                                                 
465
 Ibid.: 237f. 
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saṅgha as public ‘dāna-events’ on a large scale.466 Perhaps the Buddha Kassapa does even nostal-
gically long to return to these earlier days? If so, it would indeed be a very personal and private 
statement. Yet, this might be an over-interpretation. 
Concerning the social reality depicted in the sutta, Bailey and Mabbett write, “[b]oth Kikī 
and Ghaṭīkāra play the traditional roles expected of members of their group. In the magnitude 
and the opulence of the meal Kikī supplies to Kassapa and then subsequently to Ghaṭīkāra, pre-
sumably as a mediating figure in respect of Kassapa, the role of the political elites as providers of 
large-scale support to the order is expressed.”467 About the potter Ghaṭīkāra the authors state that 
“[…] he is the archetypal image of the village lay Buddhist who supports the individual monk in 
whatever manner he can. The symbolism of his blind parents […] lends more dramatic emphasis 
to his domestic responsibilities than would the simple declaration that he has a family to support. 
He must perform his household responsibilities whilst continuing to function as a Buddhist and 
modifying his behavior accordingly.”468 “[…] Above all”, they argue, “this narrative is about the 
means of measuring the status of people who interact with the Buddha.”469 
                                                 
466
 Cp. Bailey & Mabbett 2003: 243: “All of the meal narratives are given within the context of the Buddha be-
ing on tour at a particular time. No doubt touring occupied the majority of his time except during the rainy sea-
son. Though we would not want to suggest these tours were carefully stage-managed, they were centred on the 
figure of the Buddha himself and the evidence from the texts, especially given the elite background of those 
who host the meals, is that his fame preceded him. Most people are very eager to see him, an eagerness played 
down dramatically by the inevitably formulaic wording used in the narratives, and this bespeaks a fame, possi-
bly cultivated […], apparently enabling him to remain aloof form the hustle and bustle of the tour and daily life 
in the places where he stops and definitely giving him all the more esteem because of this. In no sense does he 
need to pursue converts, they come to him. Their eagerness to approach him directly and the forewarning many 
of those who give meals have of his coming must have worked to build up the anticipation of the people who 
lived in the areas through which he travelled, and would ultimately contribute to the creation of the public 
spectacle the meals must often have been.”  
467
 Bailey & Mabbett 2003: 247. 
468
 Ibid.: 247. 
469
 As n. 468.  
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Without a doubt, the meaning or significance of certain details in the Ghaṭīkāra narrative, 
as well as of the sutta as a whole, gain in importance when considering the historical socio-cul-
tural background that Bailey and Mabbett attempt to reconstruct for the “meal narratives”.470 
Thus, it would be possible even to say that it is not only the past which serves to elucidate the 
present (= ‘Jātaka’), but also that with the (reconstruction of the) present conditions (of the Bud-
dha’s or the discourse-time, Ger. “Erzählte Zeit”) as a backdrop, that the rhetoric of the tale of 
the past can be revealed.  
Certainly, a lot more remains to be said about this sutta and G. Bailey and I. Mabbett 
have many illuminig things to say from the point of view of their “text-of-its-day mode” reading, 
and I agree with many of their findings.471 However, I do not agree with all of their interpretations 
                                                 
470
 Cp. ibid.: 232-256; especially p. 240: “Apart from the frame, virtually standard in all ‘meal narratives’, 
formed by the set structuring of the events of the meal, there is a conversation frame operative here; it offers us 
different possibilities for the interpretation of these ‘meal narratives’.” [Mabbett and Bailey’s use of the word 
‘frame’ here fits exactly the narratological sense of it (cp. ‘frame’ and ‘script’)!] See the sequence of the meal 
narrative ibid. p. 240.; cp. nn. 284 and 313 above). 
471
 Cp. ibid.: 246f.: “A folk-tale theme may lie at the basis of this narrative. The poor potter Ghaṭīkāra outdoes 
the wealthy king by his piety and (measured by his commitment to his blind parents as much as by anything 
else) gains a material fortune from the very same king, a fortune matched by the religious fortune he has re-
ceived from the Buddha’s recognition of the potter’s devotion towards him, this confirming the persistent Bud-
dhist view that a person’s measure is determined by conduct, not by source of birth.”  
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based on their readings of the Pāli text.472 But, my interest in the suttas lies elsewhere: in its rhe-
torical-narratological peculiarities.  
4.9 Conclusion 
The narrative of the sutta progresses through different stages, settings, and so forth, but does so 
in a very dynamic manner, as my analysis has shown. Some issues, however, must remain unre-
solved. For insance, the question of why the protagonist Jotipāla disappears from the story at the 
height of the plot. Answers to this question might be found in a diachronic investigation of dif-
ferent versions of the text. Did the two traditions of the Theravādins and the Mahāsaṅghika-Lo-
kottaravādins take quite different roads in their versions (/interpretations) of the story, or as a 
synchronic reading suggests, did Jotipāla not really “disappear”? Indeed, he leaves a particular 
‘frame’, but he does not leave the “narrative universe” of the suttas on the whole. 
An interesting feature of this and similar narrative suttas is the characteristic employment 
of focalization at a crucial, dramatic (turning) point of the story. Furthermore, the presentation of 
change or development occurring in persons/characters as the narrative progresses is noteworthy. 
However, development always seems to follow concrete lines, delineated by a soteriological 
model of early Buddhism as posited in the suttas: the overall grid is that of the 
saṃsāra―mokṣa/nibbāna dichotomy; to reach the latter, virtues are the currency by which one 
travels, not wealth, social status or birth.  
Richard Gombrich has expressed his suspicion that the authors/compilers/reciters of this 
sutta had confounded the identities of the true Buddha-to-be of the Jātaka-tale, Ghaṭīkāra, and 
Jotipāla.473 However, in my interpretation, the narrative is not about Jotipāla. When Jotipāla (re-
)discovers that he must become a monk and follow the Buddha Kassapa’s teachings or, in other 
words, when it is (re-)revealed to him that he is bound for Awakening due to past aspirations 
(that is not expressed directly by the text, but it is implicit), then Jotipāla, the future Buddha’s, 
part in the story is done with. The moment he is “set back on track”, there remains nothing for 
him to do in the sutta (except, now that he had met a Buddha who has appeared in the world and 
has taught the dhamma, to pass through the Path of spiritual training etc.474). 
Reflecting on the embedded narrative within the Jātaka-tale and the Jātaka itself, one 
might question its purpose. The narrative technique of embedded stories or embedding stories 
“goes back to the very origins of epic narrating [the Odyssey]”, as Genette has observed, and is a 
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472
 E.g. this: Bailey & Mabbett 2003: 248: “King Kikī then sent five hundred cartloads of food to Ghaṭīkāra. 
The potter expressed his satisfaction to the king’s messenger, saying he knew the king had much to do.” 
(“Alaṃ me rañño va hotū ti” [MN I 54,15]). Although the authors do not mention whether they have consulted 
Buddhaghosa’s commentary on this passage or not, on the grounds of their interpretation of the passage as 
given above, Bailey and Mabbett appear to have decided for a reading against the commentary (or vice versa, 
their interpretation is based on their understanding of the Pāli. They find a comrade-in-arms in Isaline Blew 
Horner’s translation “[Ghaṭīkāra:] ’The king is very busy, there is much to be done. I am quite satisfied since 
this is for me by the king.’ (Horner 1957: 250) However, her understanding of the passage is not warranted by 
the PTS edition of Buddhaghosa’s commentary (Ps), which was also edited by herself, and which reads (Ps III 
287,21 [II. 54.15]): “Alaṃ me [S. eva] rañño va hotū ti kasmā paṭikkhipi?”   
Frankly, I do not understand how exactly the authors understand this phrase and they do not provide a literal 
translation of it in their book. I can only surmise that they understand alaṃ as meaning “sufficient, adequate”, 
and rañño va as (perhaps owing to the imitation of everyday speech) incomplete for rañño va laddha-lābhaṃ 
or the like: “This [gift, profit, gain] of [= subjective Genetive = “from” the king] the king himself should (hotu) 
be adequate (alaṃ) for me”.  
Unfortunately, the narrator does not tell us anything about the whereabouts of the five-hundred cartloads of 
foodstuffs. Also, the speech act seems to have failed in this instance – the potter has not at all made himself 
clear here. Therefore, I take – as the Be(R) suggests (see note 472) – Alaṃ me and rañño va hotu as units of 
meaning respectively belonging together. I imagine the potter Ghaṭīkāra, from all that we have said above 
about his characterisation, as a simple person (not as a simpleton, though! Rem.: Bailey & Mabbett 2003: 247: 
“As for Ghaṭīkāra, he is the archetypal image of the village lay Buddhist …”), who, day in, day out, goes about 
his (hard) work. He is not even thinking about his going forth under Buddha Kassapa when asked by his friend 
Jotipāla. Since the narrative lets us assume that he and the Buddha are quite intimate, he has obviously never 
even thought about it. Instead, his only interest is to care for his parents and to support the Buddha, not for a 
single instant thinking of what he might gain for himself in all this. This is a fact (in the story-world) that once 
again just adds to the narrative’s intended character-portrait of Ghaṭīkāra and thus contributes to the narrative’s 
consistence. Thus, I can easily imagine an answer given by a surprised Ghaṭīkāra at the sight of such richness 
suddenly appearing in front of his hut: “I have got enough. Let [this] be for the king himself!” Although Bai-
ley’s and Mabbett’s understanding may reflect an ‘interpretatio difficilior’, I opt for the simpler reading here, 
which, makes more sense given the context and the occasion in the narrative’s course of events, and, last but 
not least, on the grounds of Ghaṭīkāra’s overall characterization in the story. 
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well-known phenomenon also in the ancient Indian context (cp., e.g., the Pañcatantra, or the 
well-known collection of “One Thousand and One Nights”, Persian hazār-o-yak šab, which ulti-
mately goes back to an Indian origin). Genette distinguishes three kinds of relationships the 
metadiegetic narrative can have with the diegesis: causal, thematic, or digressive (i.e. no particu-
lar function for the diegetic narrative, but rather for the act of narrating).475 The first type gives an 
answer to the question, “What events have led to the present situation?”476 Thus, there exists a 
more or less defined spatio-temporal relationship between the two narratives. But it is important 
to note that the difference between a second-order narrative and an analepsis is that that the real 
embedded narrative is characterised by a shift of the narrating instance (i.e. a character of the 
                                                 
After the king’s messanger reaches the potter together with the five-hundred cartloads of choice foods and hav-
ing listed them, Ghaṭīkāra says: (MN I 54,14-15) Rājā kho bahukicco bahukaraṇīyo: alaṃ me rañño va hotūti. 
The electronic version of the Burmese edition (Be(R)) seems to support Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi’s interpretation (in 
any case, the Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi follows the commentarial tradition rather closely in his MN translation!) of 
the passage by adding Western punctuation in decisive places: ‘Rājā kho bahukicco bahukaraṇīyo. Alaṃ me! 
[my emphasis] raññova hotūti.’ (Be(R) Majjhimapaṇṇāsa-atthakathā 292.) The PTS edition (Ps) does not con-
tain this punctuation: [= Ps III 287,21]: “Alaṃ me raññova hotū ti kasmā paṭikkhipi?” Adhigamaappicchatāya 
…. Bodhi’s translation (Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 676,22.) reads: “’The king is very busy and has much to do. I 
have enough. Let this be for the king himself.’” In the notes, Bodhi also gives a summary-translation of the 
commentary: “[…] he [Ghaṭīkāra] refused because of his fewness of wishes (appicchatā). He realised that the 
king had sent the foodstuffs because he had heard the Buddha’s report about his own virtues, but he thought: ‘I 
have no need of this. With what I acquire through my work I can support my parents and make offerings to the 
Buddha.’” According to Buddhaghosa (Ps III 287,22-288,4) the potter realized that since he did not have a part 
in the fame gained by the words of praise the Buddha had presumably uttered when staying in Benares with the 
king, this is like what a dancer or a singer gets for his performance [= applause, fame, recognition?]. But 
through his (own hands’) work he is able to support his parents and the Buddha – which seems to be all he 
wants. Thus, in the real sense, Buddhaghosa says, the potter has no use for fame and praise.  
473
 Personal communication, 28.05.2012. 
474
 Cp. the stock phrase (DN II 62f. and passim): Idha mahārāja tathāgato loke uppajjati arahaṃ sammāsam-
buddho vijjācaraṇasampanno sugato lokavidū anuttaro purisadammasārathī satthā devamanussānaṃ buddho 
bhagavā. So imaṃ lokaṃ sadevakaṃ samārakaṃ sabrahmakaṃ assamaṇabrāhmaṇiṃ pajaṃ sadevamanussaṃ 
sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti. So dhammaṃ deseti ādikalyāṇaṃ majjhekalyāṇaṃ pariyosānakalyāṇaṃ 
sātthaṃ sabyañjanaṃ kevalaparipuṇṇaṃ parisuddhaṃ. Brahmacariyaṃ pakāseti. Taṃ dhammaṃ suṇāti 
gahapati vā gahapatiputto vā aññatarasmiṃ vā kulepaccājāto. So taṃ dhammaṃ sutvā tathāgate saddhaṃ 
paṭilabhati. So tena saddhāpaṭilābhena samannāgato iti paṭisaṃcikkhati: ‘sambādho gharāvaso rajāpatho. 
Abbhokāso pabbajjā. Nayidaṃ sukaraṃ agāraṃ ajjhāvasatā ekantaparipuṇṇaṃ ekantaparisuddhaṃ saṃkha-
likhitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ carituṃ. Yannūnāhaṃ kesamassuṃ ohāretvā kāsāyāni vatthāni acchādetvā agārasmā 
anagāriyaṃ pabbajeyyanti.  
475
 Cp. Genette 1980: 231-234.  
476
 Cp. Genette 1980: 232. 
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diegesis becoming the narrator).477 The second type knows two basic distinctions: analogy (like, 
e.g., the parable or the example) or contrast. In the third type the function of the meta-diegetic 
narrative lies not in the relationship of the two narrative levels but in the act of narrating itself, 
like Scheherazade who manages to escape her lot by continuing to narrate on and on.478 The rela-
tionship of the narrative materials or plot lines in our sutta, that is the episode told by Buddha 
Kassapa (meta-metadiegetic), and the metadiegesis, that is the actual Jātaka-story (itself being a 
metadiegesis) told by the Buddha Gotama, is one of explanation or causality: In the king Kikī ep-
isode, the Buddha Kassapa explains to the king why he had chosen the potter Ghaṭīkāra to pro-
vide for his imminent rains retreat and how their relationship had developed over a period of 
time. At the end of Kassapa Buddha’s episode, the narrative levels shift back with a barely per-
ceptible or, better, abrupt transition to the metadiegesis (recognisable only through the different 
addressee: once more Ānanda, instead of the maharaja). 
The relationship between the extradiegetic narration (diegesis) and the metadiegesis, that 
is the actual Jātaka for which the diegesis provides a framestory, however, is slightly more com-
plex and it is here that where another key for the interpretation of the sutta lies. While the 
Jātaka-tale seems to have an explanatory function with regard to a certain place (and thus an ex-
planatory or causal relationship to the first narrative), the relationship is essentially a thematic 
one. In the form of an analogy, the Jātaka functions as an exemplification of the relationship be-
tween Ānanda and the Buddha Gotama, although the identification of Ānanda is not explicitly 
stated in the samodhāna. Although this may be obvious, the explanation for this is that they are 
fictional beings, invented characters (invented by the original narrator, the Buddha Gotama!). 
Moreover, at least the character Ghaṭīkāra with its predominance of the thematic function and the 
                                                 
477
 Cp. ibid.: 231, n. 45; cp. also Coste, Didier & Pier, John: “Narrative Levels”, Paragraph 4. In: Hühn, Peter et 
al. (eds.): LHN. Hamburg: Hamburg University Press. URL = hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/lhn/index.php?ti-
tle=Narrative Levels&oldid=1571 (last accessed: 6th April 2013): “What distinguishes narrative level from the 
traditional notion of embedding is that it marks a “threshold” in the transition from one diegesis (spatiotem-
poral universe within which the action takes place) to another.” This “transition”, in turn, is indicated by the 
text through a change of the narrating instance (or the “level of enunciation”), see ibid.: Paragraph 5.  
478
 Cp. ibid.: 233. 
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authorial hints at his synthetic aspect (“’Potter’ by name” etc.) represents a type rather than an 
individual.479 
Embedded stories often have the function to mirror character constellations of the 
frame/main-narrative. That which is, in my reading of this sutta, really exemplified in the Jātaka, 
is the relationship between Ānanda and the Buddha Gotama. For instance, both Ghaṭīkāra and 
Ānanda share an identical quality: being the foremost among attendants (aggupaṭṭhākānaṃ). It 
illustrates a certain character, which was later developed or systematized into a type: the one who 
follows the Buddha out of faith (saddhānusārin). The sutta ultimately illustrates that quality or 
type. The (deliberately sought-after) “reward” of the quality consists in, at least (in this case) be-
coming a Once-Returner. But even more than that, its function in the story is perfectly clear: 
What the Buddha is actually saying by way of analogy (pariyāyena) is, that if it hadn’t been for 
Ghaṭīkāra (= Ānanda?), there would not have been a future Buddha (Gotama). That is, ulti-
mately, a thematisation. But the way it is dramatically presented (pulling at/touching the hair of a 
Brahmin) serves to illustrates “how far faith/trust will go” – not for his, Ghaṭīkāra’s own sake 
and advantage, but only because it is a positive quality in itself. Ghaṭīkāra does not think goal-
orientated: “If I have trust in the Tathāgata, I will become a Once-Returner.” Faith is just a qual-
ity or a trait that people have (even if they do not know what it is good for), and the Bud-
dha/Buddhism values it greatly. But the Buddha also values Ānanda greatly by telling this story. 
Thus, their personal relationship finds an expression in this sutta, even though in a rather formal 
way. (The really interesting thing for a modern Western audience to know would of course be 
the events prior to when the sutta commences! Was there a particular event involving Ānanda 
and the Buddha, a private conversation along the way, while the group was wandering, a certain 
action carried out by Ānanda, that instilled the Buddha to covertly praise him, and so forth? 
These, however, are perhaps typical questions of a greatly psychologically influenced modern 
Western audience.) Nevertheless, besides the thematic aspect already mentioned, the sutta illus-
trates its ‘mimetic undercurrent’, i.e. the personal relationship between the Buddha and Ānanda, 
which is clearly expressed in this beautifully artistic sutta.      
                                                 
479
 Comparing his characterisation (as being an opapātika) with the standardised description of an anāgāmī in 
the Pp. (cp. Gombrich 2006: 98: “kalyāṇa-dhammo”; 102,4.: “insight into the four noble truths”), it becomes 
apparent that the text is modelled upon the standard description of the ariya-puggalā (= types).  
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As aforementioned, the sutta itself does not clearly state this identification. In that way, 
the ending of the sutta does not really suspend the tension although it solves the story’s instabili-
ties. One can go about this problem also from another angle. When the Buddha (Gotama) finally 
reveals his identity in the samodhāna (“Now, Ānanda, you may think: ‘Someone else surely was 
the Brahmin youth Jotipāla during that time.’ But you should not regard this to be thus, Ānanda! 
I myself was the Brahmin youth Jotipāla at that time.”480), any reader/listener who is only re-
motely familiar with the Jātaka genre will certainly ask himself, “Fair enough! But who is 
Ghaṭīkāra?”, because this naturally appears to be the more pressing question after all one has 
learned about him. With regard to the communicative structure, one can find a parallel in another 
sutta of the “Chapter on kings”, the Rājavagga, in sutta 83, the Makhadeva Sutta. Ānanda is ad-
dressed throughout the text by the Buddha and the sutta finally closes with an admonition to 
Ānanda to uphold the good tradition (of the noble eightfold path) introduced by the Buddha lest 
he not be “the last man”.  The “message”, then, of the story is that even a prospective Buddha 
may be forgetful and arrogant481, and that it is the Buddha’s dear friend who gets all the credit. 
Without such a selfless friend, there might even be no future Buddha. Therefore, the “hidden” 
meaning of the story and the intention of the original author-narrator482 (Buddha Gotama) may be 
to covertly praise the selfless companion of the Bodhisatta – Ānanda. The fact that the Buddha is 
constantly addressing Ānanda directly throughout, although the introductory passage mentions a 
large following of monks, aslo seem to corroborate this interpretation. Last but not least, my in-
terpretation is intended to reflect the state of knowledge of an authorial audience or an intended 
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 MN II 54,16-19: Siyā kho pana te, Ānanda, evam assa: Añño nūna tena samayena Jotipālo māṇavo ahosīti. 
Na kho pan’ etaṃ, Ānanda, evaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Ahaṃ tena samayena Jotipālo māṇavo ahosin ti. Cp. also n. 
338. 
481
 The presentation of Jotipāla, on the other hand, must strike one as strange. Naturally, if one were to think of 
anybody in the story to reach enlightenment quickly, one would almost certainly think of virtuous Ghaṭīkāra. 
However, it is Jotipāla who is clearly identified as the Bodhisatta in the samodhāna, which calls for an expla-
nation. The tradition, of course believing that Jotipāla must be the main character in the sutta because he is, 
after all, the Buddha himself, found an explanation to account for this inconsistency of the story by tracking 
the Bodhisattva’s career: According to the late canonical Apadāna (Ap I 301,29ff.), the bodhisattva had to en-
dure the extreme hardship of six years of austerities (longer than his predecessors, cp. DPPN, s.v. Jotipāla 2.) 
because of his insulting the Buddha Kassapa. This explanation, however, is not found, not even hinted at, in 
the Ps! 
482




listener/reader that engages the story, and who picks up the hints given in the narrative that re-




5. The Presentation of Characters in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta (MN 86) 
This chapter will look at the notorious character Aṅgulimāla mainly as he is presented in the 
Aṅgulimāla Sutta, but also in other sources. The character Aṅgulimāla is perhaps one of the best-
known and most popular figures of Buddhism. His story is unique, and interest in this character 
has been and remains to be expressed by scholars and practitioners of Buddhism alike. 
In particular, after a summarising statement of the progression and structure of the sutta, I 
will present two important but rival interpretations of who (or what) Aṅgulimāla might have 
been historically, then address the conclusion(s) one can draw from these interpretations, and fi-
nally suggest a “middle way” that is based on a strongly text-based approach to character that we 
have already employed in the foregoing chapter 4. Although narratological terminology will ra-
ther take a backseat in this chapter, narratological analyses and certain insights owed to narratol-
ogy’s method of textual analysis will always be present in the background. 
5.1 Introduction & the Commentaries 
Information about the notorious mass-murderer Aṅgulimāla and the story of his peaceful conver-
sion by the Buddha are found in the 26 stanzas attributed to the “elder” (thera) Aṅgulimāla in the 
Theragāthā483 (Th), and in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta (MN 86) respectively. Furthermore, there are 
two commentaries, the one on the Theragāthā, the Paramattha-dīpanī ascribed to Dhammapāla, 
and the one on the Majjhima Nikāya, the Papañcasūdanī ascribed to Buddhaghosa, both of 
which contain much background information concerning the character Aṅgulimāla. In fact, the 
Papañcasūdanī claims to provide a “successive (chronological?) narration”.484 However, this 
background narration, as Gombrich calls it, is not very credible and also quite inconsistent. Gom-
brich485 has dealt with both commentaries extensively and he comes to the conclusion that, 
                                                 
483
 Th 866-891. The vv. Th 866-870 also occur at the dramatic climax in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta, Aṅgulimāla’s 
conversion, and the rest but the last five vv. of the Th occur also at the end of the Aṅgulimāla Sutta. 
484
 Be(R): Evaṃ me sutanti aṅgulimālasuttaṃ. Tattha aṅgulīnaṃ mālaṃ dhāretīti kasmā dhāreti? ācariyava-
canena. Tatrāyaṃ anupubbikathā: …. For anupubbikathā see CPD, s.v. 
485
 See Gombrich 2006a: 137-42. 
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“[o]bviously we do not expect from such sources a story which has verisimilitude, but we do ex-
pect somewhat more coherence.”486 Since I share his view in this regard, I will refer to the Pa-
pañcasūdanī only occasionally here.487  
 The story of Aṅgulimāla is also found (fragmentary) in a Sanskrit fragment of the 
Saṃyuktāgama of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivādins, wholly translated in the Chinese Tripiṭaka, and – in 
a somewhat altered version – in the Tibetan ’Dzangs blun zhes bya ba’i mdo, the “Sūtra of the 
Wise and the Fool”.488 However, they will not concern my analysis here very much. First, be-
cause this book’s interest is not to present a comparative historical-critical study, and second, be-
cause the differences between the Pāli and the Chinese versions have been dealt with most ex-
pertly elsewhere.489 
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 Gombrich 2006a: 142. 
487
 I think that, as Monika Zin has shown, what we find in the cty. is already a confusion of different versions 
of a story that must have been around at a later time (2nd cent.), as we can deduct from the different sources and 
datable representations in Buddhist art; see Zin 2006. 
488
 An excellent and probably exhaustive overview of all the versions can be found in Zin 2006: 101-107. Also 
several versions of the story exist in the Chinese Canon, see again Zin 2006 for an overview. A Mahāyāna 
Sūtra bearing the name of Aṅgulimāla has, however, not much to do with our story (and with Aṅgulimāla him-
self), cp. Aṅgulimālīya-nāma-mahāyānasūtra (’phags pa sor m’i phreng ba la phan pa zhes bya ba theg pa 
chen po’i mdo). Tôh. no. 213. Dergé Kanjur, vol. TSHA, folios 126r.1-206v.7. 
489




5.2 Content of the sutta & its Narrative Structure 
Aṅgulimāla is certainly one of the most popular Buddhist figures. Besides his great popularity in 
Asia, he has also been dealt with extensively in the (modern) West (and still the interpretation of 
his character seems to have some impact).490 
The story of Aṅgulimāla in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta can be subdivided into three major 
parts: I) the conversion of the mass-murderer Aṅgulimāla by the Buddha through peaceful 
means, that is, by an “exercise of his magical or superhuman powers” (iddhābhisaṃkhāraṃ ab-
hisaṃkhāsi, MN II 97-100); II) Aṅgulimāla’s ‘second life’ as a completely transformed/purified 
monk; this second part, in turn, can be subdivided into two significant episodes (MN II 100-103): 
a) the suspension of a criminal prosecution or the statement of Aṅgulimāla’s immunity, as it 
were, by king Pasenadi of Kosala, and b) an ‘act of truth’ (sacca-kiriyā), eventually becoming 
famous in the Theravāda-tradition as the Aṅgulimāla-paritta (Aṅgulimāla pirit)491; and finally 
part III) Aṅgulimāla’s attainment of Arhatship or ‘extinction of [all] taints’ (āsava-kkhaya) (MN 
II 103-106). The following provides a brief summary and analysis of the most important struc-
tural aspects of the sutta.    
                                                 
490
 For a probably preliminary and not fully exhaustive list, containing eight titles see Dan Martin’s ‘Tibskrit’ 
(http://tibeto-logic.blogspot.co.uk/2011/02/tibskrit-reloaded.html (last accessed: 28th March 2012). Most of the 
entries list works in which Aṅgulimāla is mentioned in one context or another etc. and are not relevant for our 
purposes here. For the sake of providing the interested reader with a complete overview, however, I cite Mar-
tin’s entire entry here:  
“Aṅgulimāla (Sor mo’i phreng ba) 
—Nakamura, Hajime. 1980. Indian buddhism: a survey with bibliographical notes. Hirakata: KUFS Publ. 
Kansai University of Foreign Studies., p. 20. 
— EoB. His birth name was Ahiṃsaka (or perhaps Hiṃsaka, which was later 
changed to Ahiṃsaka). 
— Stearns, Luminous Lives, pp. 81, 203. 
— Pia Brancaccio, Aṅgulimāla or the Taming of the Forest, East and West, vol. 49 
(1999), pp. 105-118. 
— Indiana University masters thesis by the late Nathan S. Cutler. 
455 
— Satish Kumar (b. 1936), The Buddha and the Terrorist: The Story of Angulimala, 
Viveka Foundation (New Delhi 2004). 
— John Snelling, Angulimala: Old Finger-Necklace, Middle Way, vol. 60, no. 4 
(February 1986), pp. 239-240. 
— Monika Zin, The Unknown Ajanta Painting of the Angulimala Story, contained 
in: C. Jarrige, V. Lefèvre, eds., South Asian Archaeology 2001 (Paris 2005), pp. 
704-713. 
491




Part I. The conversion of the mass-murderer Aṅgulimāla by the Buddha through peaceful means 
Part I, following the usual ‘Introductory formula’ (I.1), as always provides the setting or the 
‘Buddha-frame’, mentioning the (unspecified) time and the place of the events (I.1.1 Sāvatthī, 
Jetavana). The following descriptive introductory passage (I.1.2 tena kho pana samayena + pre-
sent tense predicate) introduces the main character of the sutta Aṅgulimala by providing the first 
explicit characterisation statement (see below), which is repeated several times by different fig-
ures in course of the narrative. It conveys the reputation that precedes Aṅgulimāla. The perspec-
tive up to this point is not restricted in any way, thus making it ‘zero-focalisation’.  
 
I.2 Story beginning: diegesis; beginning of narrative action (MN II 98,2-98,27) 
The commencement of narrative action consists in the (formulaic) description of the Buddha go-
ing on his alms-round, returning, setting his resting-place in order, and setting out on the road 
where the notorious robber Aṅgulimāla is known to be up to mischief. Although the expression, 
“having set his resting place in order”492, is a common formula depicting the everyday duties of a 
monk, it gives seemingly superfluous detail to the Buddha’s quite regular course of actions on 
this day, and thus adds to the tranquil atmosphere of this sutta-narrator passage. The text itself 
does not state the motivation of the Buddha to turn to the road leading to Aṅgulimāla. However, 
that he does so on purpose, or that he is simply unperturbed, can be inferred by the fact that he 
does not shy away from proceeding after being warned of Aṅgulimāla three times by local peo-
ple that “although people had gathered in groups of up to 40 before entering that road, they all 
have fallen into Aṅgulimala’s hands.”493  
Seemingly, the text reflects the perspective of the people warning the Buddha; a focalisa-
tion of perception to the “cowherds, shepherds, ploughmen, and travellers” meeting the Buddha 
is indicated by a verb of perception, “seeing” (addasāsuṃ), in sentence-initial position, and by 
their address of the Buddha as “ascetic” (samaṇa).494 Nevertheless, the focalised object in this 
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 MN II 98,5: senāsanaṃ saṃsametvā 
493
 MN II 98,15-18: Etam hi, samaṇa, maggaṃ dasa pi purisā vīsatim pi purisā tiṃsatim pi purisā cattārīsam pi 
purisā saṃharitvā saṃharitvā paṭipajjanti, te pi corassa Aṅgulimālassa hatthatthaṃ gacchantīti. 
494
 That means that they do not recognise the wandering ascetic or monk as the Buddha himself! MN II 98,7-10: 
Addasāsuṃ kho gopālakā pasupālakā kassakā padhāvino Bhagavantaṃ yena coro Aṅgulimālo ten’ 
addhānamaggaṃ paṭipannaṃ; disvā Bhagavantaṃ etad avocuṃ:… 
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passage is still the Buddha because the meaning of the passage concerns, or refers to, the Bud-
dha, and its significance lies in the Buddha’s reaction to the information about a notorious, fierce 
robber staying nearby – three times, hearing the message, “the Blessed One went on in si-
lence”.495 In other words, while the sutta-narrator presents the perceptual perspective of several 
groups of people in his discourse, his “interest-vantage” is related to the figure of the Buddha.496 
Thus, the sutta-narator’s point of view is stated indirectly instead of directly in form of a narra-
tor-commentary as, for example: “despite the warnings, the Buddha went on in silence because 
he was not afraid of Aṅgulimāla/ his intention was to convert Aṅgulimāla/ in order to stop Aṅgu-
limāla in his wrong-doing [for the benefit of the people]”, and so forth. Once again, ‘showing’ as 
opposed to ‘telling’ seems to be the preferred mode of presentation also in this suttas.  
I.3 Aṅgulimāla is converted by the performance of a miracle by the Buddha and becomes or-
dained (MN II 98,27-100,12) 
Part I.3 represents the dramatic apex of the Aṅgulimāla narrative. And to come to the 
point: ‘internal focalization’ plays a key role in its presentation. The focalising instance in this 
whole passage497 is clearly Aṅgulimāla (analysed in detail below, ch. 5.7). The event of the Bud-
dha approaching and performing a “feat of [his] superhuman power”498 is presented in a ‘showing 
mode’ from Aṅgulimāla’s point of view (through direct thought representation), and eventually 
leads to his ordination by the Buddha after a versified dialogue has taken place between them.  
 A particular item of interest in this passage is the “converting magic”499 attributed to the 
Buddha. In the Upāli Sutta (MN 56), Mahāvīra, the leader of a group of ascetics (the nigaṇṭhā), 
which later became known as the Jain sect, who in the Pāli Canon bears the name (Nigaṇṭha) 
Nātaputta, and his men concoct a scheme to refute the Buddha in a public debate. They choose 
the householder Upāli to carry out the plan, whereupon another member of the sect named Dīgha 
Tapassī objects to it, saying “the [ascetic] Gotama is a magician and knows a converting magic 
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 MN II 98,18,21f.,26: … Bhagavā tuṇhībhūto agamāsi. 
496
 Cp. Chatman 1989: 152.  
497
 MN II 98,27-100,12. 
498
 Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 711, 5. 
499
 Cp. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 480, 8. MN I 375,11-14: Na kho metaṃ bhante ruccati yaṃ Upāli gahapati 
samaṇassa Gotamassa vādaṃ āropeyya; samaṇo hi bhante Gotamo māyāvī, āvaṭṭaṇiṃ māyaṃ jānāti yāya 
aññatitthiyānaṃ sāvake āvaṭṭetīti. 
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by which he converts disciples of other sectarians.”500 The scheme fails, of course, and the house-
holder Upāli is converted by reason, not by magic. Eventually, because “the Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta 
was unable to bear this honour done to the Blessed One”, “hot blood then and there gushed from 
his mouth.”501 In this case, the Buddha’s “converting magic” turns out to be superstition and the 
householder is actually won over by the more compelling inner logic of the Buddha’s teachings 
and his superior skill in debate.  
But the Buddha apparently did have other means to make people comply, if he so wished. 
In the Cūl̥asaccaka Sutta (MN 35), an incident is related in which Saccaka, the son of Jain par-
ents and renowned as a skilled debater, two times refuses to reply to a question put to him by the 
Buddha. After the Blessed One had posed his question for the second time, the sutta goes on to 
report:  
“Then the Blessed One said to him: ‘Aggivessana, answer now. Now is not the time to be silent. If 
anyone, when asked a reasonable question up to the third time by the Tathāgata, still does not answer, 
his head splits into seven pieces there and then.’ 
Now on that occasion a thunderbolt-wielding spirit [vajirapāṇi yakkho] holding an iron thunderbolt 
that burned, blazed, and glowed, appeared in the air above Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha’s son, thinking: ‘If 
this Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha’s son, when asked a reasonable question up to the third time by the Blessed 
One, still does not answer, I shall split his head into seven pieces here and now.’ The Blessed One saw 
the thunderbolt-wielding spirit and so did Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha’s son. Then Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha’s 
son was frightened, alarmed, and terrified. Seeking his shelter, asylum, and refuge in the Blessed One 
himself, he said: ‘Ask me, Master Gotama, I will answer.’”502 
In contrast, this does indeed make appear the conversion of Aṅgulimāla somewhat pecu-
liar. Neither is Aṅgulimāla up for a debate with the Buddha, nor does the Buddha use force, 
which he could clearly could have, to stop the brigand. What brings about Aṅgulimāla’s change 
                                                 
500
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 480, 8. 
501
 Ibid.: 492, 31. 
502
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 326, 13.f. = MN I 231,25-232,3. Bhikkhu Bodhi apparently decided not to take 
vajirapāṇi as a proper name, whereas Walshe, translating a verbatim passage in the DN, does; cp. Walshe 
1987: 116 (3.1.21) = D I 95 (Ambhaṭṭha Sutta, DN 3). The yakṣa Vajirapāṇī is identified by Buddhaghosa as 
Sakka/Indra; cp. PED, s.v. yakkha. A bodhisattva figure named Vajrapāṇi is known in the Mahāyāna and Va-
jrayāna traditions of Indian Buddhism. Furthermore, a bearded figure wielding a thunderbolt and attending the 
Buddha is depicted on numerous narrative reliefs from Gandhāra, and is usually identified with Vajrapāṇi.  
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of heart is his own insight facilitated by the Buddha’s “miracle”. Thus, the sutta’s narrative is in-
deed about Aṅgulimāla, as its title (or ‘Paratext’) already indicates, rather than about the Bud-
dha’s “converting magic”.   
 
Part II.  Aṅgulimāla’s ‘second life’ (MN II 100,13-105,24) 
According to Joy B. Manné’s categorisation of Pāli suttas – by implication – corresponding to 
their formulaic beginnings and endings, at this point of the Aṅgulimāla Sutta a ‘new’ sutta 
should start (or might originally have started).503 The brigand Aṅgulimāla is disarmed and even 
converted, and linguistically a new narrative frame is opened by the formulaic, “Then the 
Blessed One set out to wander towards Sāvatthī with Aṅgulimāla as his attendant. Wandering in 
stages, he eventually arrived at Sāvatthī. Having arrived there, he dwelled in Sāvatthī504, in 
[prince] Jeta’s grove in the park [donated by] Anāthapiṇḍika. At the same time, at the gates of 
king Pasenadi of Kosala’s palace, a large crowd of people had gathered, making a loud noise, a 
great uproar […].”505  
Now, if the story was about the Buddha and a display of his superhuman power of con-
version506, the sutta could easily end here. However, since it is about Aṅgulimāla, the lis-
tener/reader is curious about his future development. So far, the narrative has left several ques-
tions unanswered for the audience, whose curiosity in the character Aṅgulimāla and his further 
development is piqued after having been provided access to his thoughts. For instance, will 
Aṅgulimāla reach enlightenment, and if so, how can it be possible for a mass-murderer given the 
stress laid in the Buddha’s system on moral discipline (sīla); what happens with the accumula-
tion of Aṅgulimāla’s bad karma; how will the king and the populace react to his admission to the 
saṅgha, and so forth? As we will see, the sutta continues to satisfy its audience’s curiosity. 
 
                                                 
503
 Cp. Manné 1990: 82. 
504
 The repeated mentioning of Sāvatthī here is superfluous, which makes the highly formulaic character of the 
passage visible.  
505
 MN II 100,13-19: Atha kho Bhagavā āyasmatā Aṅgulimālena pacchāsamaṇena yena Sāvatthi tena cārikaṃ 
pakkāmi; anupubbena cārikaṃ caramāno yena Sāvatthi tad avasari. Tatra sudaṃ Bhagavā Sāvatthiyaṃ viha-
rati Jetavane Anāthapiṇḍikassa ārāme. Tena kho pana samayena rañño Pasenadissa Kosalassa antepuradvāre 
mahājanakāyo sannipatitvā uccāsaddo mahāsaddo hoti: … 
506
 This is what Monika Zin suggests in her book Mitleid und Wunderkraft: Schwierige Bekehrungen und ihre 
Ikonographie im indischen Buddhismus; see below. 
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II.2 Suspension of a criminal prosecution: Aṅgulimāla meets king Pasenadi (MN II 100,13-
102,27) 
The parts II) and III) of the sutta can be summarized as follows. After his ‘ehi-bhikkhu (“Come, 
monk”) ordination’, probably the simplest and oldest form of ordination that was first performed 
by the Buddha himself507, Aṅgulimāla accompanies the Buddha as his attendant (pacchāsa-
maṇena) back to Sāvatthī. There, in the Jetavana, the killer escapes being pursued and, most 
probably, executed by king Pasenadi for his crimes through the fact that he had entered the 
saṅgha.508 Pasenadi had set out with an entire cavalry of five-hundredmen (pañcamattehi assa-
satehi) at the urging of the population to save them from the dreaded robber Aṅgulimāla (they 
use the same phrase to describe Aṅgulimāla as the sutta-narrator in I.1.2). However, the king 
first sets out for the Jetavana, though the text does not state directly the reason why.509 Here, the 
formula for approaching with a carriage is used, as encountered already in the Ghaṭikāra Sutta: 
“He drove thus as far as the road was passable for carriages, and then he dismounted from his 
carriage and went on as a mere pedestrian to where the Blessed One was […].”510 The 
‘abhivādetvā-approach’ accounts for Pasenadi being a devoted follower of the Buddha, as also 
seen in the previous chapters. One might infer from this that his motivation to visit the Buddha 
before setting out to hunt down Aṅgulimāla is to ask for advice or get the Buddha’s blessing, or 
simply to inform him about the situation. Beholding the king being accompanied by a cavalry in-
duces the Buddha to make the teasingly ironic remark as to whether some neighbouring hostile 
                                                 
507
 Cp. Horner 1951: ix.  
508
 This was probably the one and only exception one can deduce from a Vinaya-rule; see below. 
509
 There is perhaps a reason given later in the text when the Buddha is having a conversation with the king. 
According to the PTS-edition’s reading, the king says at MN II 101,10f.: Nāhaṃ, bhante, paṭisedhissāmīti, “I 
will not be able to ward him [= Aṅgulimāla] off, venerable sir.” Thus, one could infer that the king is seeking 
advice from the Buddha about what to do. The Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyaṇa-edition, however, reads tāhaṃ (ChS p. 304) 
instead of Nāhaṃ. No matter which reading I choose, either of them do not affect my interpretation. In the case 
of the PTS-edition’s reading, however, it would simply mean that the king admits his ‘defeat’ (i.e. that he feels 
that he is no match for Aṅgulimāla) already earlier, and that the text states it explicitly.     
510
 Tr., with my modifications, Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 712, 9.MN II 100,26-101,3: Atha kho rājā Pasenadi 
Kosalo pañcamattehi assasatehi Sāvatthiyā nikkhami divādivassa yen’ ārāmo tena pāyāsi; yāvatiko yānassa 
bhūmi yānena gantvā yānā paccārohitvā pattiko va yena Bhagavā ten’ upasaṅkami; upasaṅkamitvā Bhaga-
vantaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdi. Ekamantaṃ nisinnaṃ kho rājānaṃ Pasenadiṃ Kosalaṃ Bhagavā etad 
avoca: …  
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king had declared war on Pasenadi.511 In any case, the king does not know that Aṅgulimāla is pre-
sent among the saṅgha of monks surrounding the Buddha. The king, answering the Buddha’s 
question, repeats the same phrase that serves to characterise Aṅgulimāla throughout the first part 
of the sutta.512  
Next, the Buddha cleverly causes Pasenadi, perhaps without him recognising it, to grant 
Aṅgulimāla amnesty by posing a hypothetical question (the content of which the king in any case 
regards as fictive and impossible; at this point, the king is still convinced that it is he himself, 
who has to take Aṅgulimāla into custody and convict him): “But if you, maharaja, saw 
Aṅgulimāla having shaved off his hair and beard, put on yellow robes, gone forth from home life 
into homelessness, abstaining from killing living beings, abstaining from stealing and from tell-
ing lies, having become a one-meal eater, living the chaste life, virtuous, and good – what would 
you do to him?”513 The king replies that he would of course highly honour him, provide for his 
necessities, his alms-food and his protection – but, he finishes, “how could such an immoral 
man, one of evil character, ever have such virtue and restraint?”514 The question put into the Bud-
dha’s mouth is indeed wily, for the optative mode is used which implies a hypothetical condition 
and result.515 When the Buddha finally points out Aṅgulimāla to the king, the latter becomes terri-
fied. After the Blessed One managed to allay the “great” king’s fears, Pasenadi enquires after 
Aṅgulimāla’s clan and family, and then, as it appertains to a king, offers to keep his word that he 
had given earlier in response to a seemingly hypothetical question (that he has pledged to the 
Buddha earlier without recognising that the Buddha was outflanking him). Aṅgulimāla, however, 
refuses the king’s offer because, the text states, “at that time he was [already] a forest-dweller, 
                                                 
511
 MN II 101,3-6. The text just states that the king alone (singular) proceeds towards the Buddha. However, the 
Buddha apparently knows about the cavalry. It would be highly implausible to assume that such a great num-
ber of soldiers on horses may approach without being noticed, even if they stayed in a considerable distance 
from where the Buddha stayed.    
512
 MN II 101,6-11. 
513
 MN II 101,12-16: »Sace pana tvaṃ, mahārāja, Aṅgulimālaṃ passeyyāsi kesamassuṃ ohāretvā kāsāyāni  
vatthāni acchādetvā agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajitaṃ virataṃ pāṇātipātā virataṃ adinnādānā virataṃ 
musāvādā ekabhattikaṃ brahmacāriṃ sīlavantaṃ kalyāṇadhammaṃ, kinti naṃ kareyyāsīti? 
514
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 713, 11. = MN II 101,16-22. 
515
 Cp. Warder 2001: 333. 
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and alms-food eater, and a refuse-rag wearer, one wearing [only] the three robes.”516 Once more, 
the Buddha has presented the king with a fait accompli.  
Thus, nothing much remains to do for king Pasenadi than to turn to the Buddha and 
acknowledge his superior prowess in taming the untamed517: “It is wonderful, venerable sir, it is 
marvellous, venerable sir, how great a tamer the Blessed One is of the untamed, a pacifier of the 
disordered [/un-peaceful], one who leads to Nirvana those who have not yet attained Nirvana. 
The Blessed One has tamed without violence and weapons him, whom we were not able to tame 
by either violence or weapons.” Thus, while in truth Pasenadi only purports to save his subjects 
from a notorious brigand who is terrorising the kingdom by setting out with a whole cavalry, 
four (or respectively three depending on which reading we decide for) actions of the king can 
serve as signposts that the text offers to an ‘ideal narrative audience’ for the king’s inability to 
protect his realm from Aṅgulimāla: 1. his riding out with five-hundred armed soldiers on horses 
to hunt down one man518; 2. his statement in front of the Buddha that he could not ward off Aṅgu-
limala519; 3. his panic when being confronted with Aṅgulimāla520; 4. his formally “admitting de-
feat” in front of the Blessed One521. The ‘ideal narrative audience’ is aided in noticing the implicit 
characterisation of Pasenadi by the Buddha’s ironic remark. Thus, the audience is invited to read 
two possible implications into this. First, that king Pasenadi is a coward and/or secondly, that, 
affected by the relationship of contrast between the Buddha and the king, the Buddha’s might 
and his capabilities shine even brighter, for he accomplishes by literally doing nothing what a 
powerful king could not even accomplish by force with five-hundred armed men on horses. Ac-
cording to this reading, the king is probably happy that the Buddha presented a solution to the 
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 MN II 102,12f.: Tena kho pana samayena āyasmā Aṅgulimālo āraññako hoti piṇḍapātiko paṃsukūliko 
tecīvariko. 
517
 MN II 102,16-27: Atha kho rājā Pasenadi Kosalo yena Bhagavā ten’ upasaṅkami, upasaṅkamitvā 
Bhagavantaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdi. Ekamantaṃ nisinno kho rājā Pasenadi Kosalo Bhagavantaṃ 
etad avoca: »Acchariyaṃ, bhante; abbhutaṃ bhante yāvañ c’ idaṃ, bhante, Bhagavā adantānaṃ dametā 
asantānaṃ sametā aparinibbutānaṃ parinibbāpetā. Yaṃ hi mayaṃ, bhante, nāsakkhimhā daṇḍena pi satthena 
pi dametuṃ, so Bhagavatā adaṇḍena asatthen’ eva danto. Handa dāni mayaṃ, bhante, gacchāma; bahukiccā 
mayaṃ bahukaraṇīyā ti. »Yassa dāni tvaṃ, mahārāja, kālaṃ maññasīti. Atha kho rājā Pasenadi Kosalo 
uṭṭhāy’ āsanā Bhagavantaṃ abhivādetvā padakkhiṇaṃ katvā pakkāmi. 
518
 MN II 100,24. 
519
 MN II 101,10f. 
520
 MN II 101,27f. 
521
 MN II 102,16-27. 
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problem, which he is obviously unable to solve (what is more, he does not insist on his kingly 
right to act out his executive authority in spite of the Buddha’s action). This reading is from the 
point of view of the ‘narrative audience’ that subscribes to the mimetic illusion that the narrative 
offers and that regards characters as possible persons.  
On another reading, from the perspective of an instance located outside of the narrative 
communication model, namely, from the perspective of the “reconstructing literary scholar” or 
the scholar of early Buddhism,522  the king is apparently duped by the Buddha because Aṅgulim-
āla is most probably, at least according to the Vinaya, the first and only case of a notorious crimi-
nal to be accepted to the saṅgha and escape conviction.523 Already, this singles out Aṅgulimāla as 
a ‘plausible (real, historic) person’. The Vinaya-passage in question is Vin I 74 [= Mahāvagga 
1,41]. This, and the following paragraphs, explain the rule that no dhajabaddha [Be(R): -
bandha]-thief (dhajabhaddo coro), “jail-breaker” (kārabhedako coro), or “outlaw” (likhitako 
coro) should be ordained. The passage reads:  
“At that time, the brigand Aṅgulimāla had gone forth as one of the Buddha’s monks. When the people 
saw [Aṅgulimāla on his alms-round], they shied away, or were frightened, or ran away; they went 
elsewhere, or turned around, or closed their doors. The people complained, publicly criticised, and 
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 Cp. Jannidis 2004: 27f.: “Nimmt man die oben ausgeführte Verankerung auch der literarischen Kommuni-
kation in jeweils historisch und kulturell spezifischen Situationstypen ernst, dann kann der Literaturwissen-
schaftler jedoch nur in den seltensten Fällen die übliche Rezipienten-Position einnehmen. Er hat im Regelfall 
sehr viel mehr historisches Textwissen als ein Gegenwartsleser und weiß bei nicht zeitgenössischen Texten, 
selbst bei langzeitiger Spezialisierung, sehr viel weniger über die sprachlichen und literarischen Konventionen 
als ein Zeitgenosse. Vor allem aber weiß er es anders, d.h. es ist nicht das prozedurale Wissen der lebenswelti-
chen Verwendung. Gleiches gilt auch für die Sprache sowie die Skripte und konzeptuellem Schemata des In-
halts. Die Position des Literaturwissenschaftlers ist demnach außerhalb des bislang skizzierten Rahmens der 
narrativen Kommunikation zu suchen. Seine Aufgabe ist tatsächlich die Rekonstruktion der Kommunikation 
insgesamt, der sie ermöglichenden Codes und Konventionen und der Verwendung, die ein Autor in einem spe-
zifischen Werk davon macht, um sein kommunikatives Ziel zu erreichen. Diese Gesamtrekonstruktion ist immer 
etwas anderes als die narrative Kommunikation selbst.” 
523
 Isaline B. Horner opined that the person bearing the name Aṅgulimāla in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta is not the 
same as the one mentioned in the following Vinaya rule, and therefore she translates, “Now at that time a thief 
(wearing) a garland of fingers came to have gone forth among the monks.” (1951: 93, especially no. 1) How-
ever, I do not find this very convincing and cannot agree with her. Further evidence would have to be provided 
for the idea that “wearing a necklace or garland of fingers” was a kind of a peculiar custom for some robbers, 
murderers, a certain tribe or members of a particular religious sect. However, it seems very unlikely that this 
was the case. Nevertheless, if such a ‘custom’ did exist, it would indeed support Richard Gombrich’s thesis 
about Aṅgulimāla’s identity; see below.      
 172 
 
spoke disparagingly524 [thus]: ‘How could these ascetics the sons of the Sakyan [i.e. the followers of 
the Buddha] possibly ordain a dhajabaddha-robber?’ The monks heard of those complaints. Then, the 
monks informed the Blessed One about this matter, whereupon the Blessed One answered: ‘A dhajab-
addha-robber is not to be ordained. Whoever should ordain a dhajabaddha-robber, commits a dukkaṭa-
offence525.’”526 
There is a linguistic problem in this passage which is relevant for the discussion of the 
character Aṅgulimāla: The exact translation of the notion dhajabaddho poses some questions. 
Monika Zin (2006: 104) suggests the meaning “one for whom ‘Wanted’ posters have been put 
up” (“steckbrieflich gesucht”), which I find a rather creative interpretation.527 The PED lists the 
meaning “captured”, but cites as the only reference this same Vinaya passage, which therefore 
bears very weak testimony. Both suggestions are not satisfying. Dissatisfaction with the PED en-
try was already expressed by Franklin Edgerton in his BHSD528: “It is not clear where PTSD [= 
PED], which renders captured, gets authority for the allegation that āhaṭa is meant, since this is 
not in the comm. on the above Vin. Passage, the only one quoted in PTSD s.v.” I share Edger-
ton’s view because according to the story in MN 86 no mention is made that Aṅgulimāla was 
ever captured. Furthermore, the Sanskrit-expression dhvajāhr̥ta (dhajāhaṭa) seems rather to refer 
to a battlefield-context or the like.529 For this reason, and the references cited in the BHSD, I 
adopt Edgerton’s rendering ‘notorious’, which makes good sense, and can also be understood 
from the commentary on the Vinaya-passage: 
“In this passage [he, Aṅgulimāla] is called dhajabandho, i.e., one who wanders about as if having 
bound (i.e. “attached to himself”?) a (victory-)banner or a standard, i.e., well-known in the world, like 
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 For the standard expression in the Vinaya, ujjhāyanti khiyyanti vipācenti, the origin and etymology of which 
is not entirely clear, see the discussion in PED, ss.vv.   
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 Literally, a “wrong action”, a particular kind of offence laid down in the Vinaya.  
526
 Vin I 74,26-35: tena kho pana samayena coro aṅgulimālo bhikkhūsu pabbajito hoti. manussā passitvā ubbi-
jjanti pi uttasanti pi palāyanti pi aññena pi gacchanti aññena pi mukhaṃ karonti dvāram pi thakenti. manussā 
ujjhāyanti khiyyanti vipācenti: kathaṃ hi nāma samaṇā Sakyaputtiyā dhajabaddhaṃ [Be(R) dhajabandhaṃ] 
coraṃ pabbājessantīti. assosuṃ kho bhikkhū tesaṃ manussānaṃ ujjhāyantānaṃ khiyyantānaṃ vipācentānaṃ. 
atha kho te bhikkhū bhagavato etamatthaṃ ārocesuṃ [Be(R) – pe –] bhagavā bhikkhū āmantesi [Be(R) omits 
these three words]: na, bhikkhave, dhajabaddho coro pabbājetabbo. yo pabbājeyya, āpatti dukkaṭassā ’ti.   
527
 Horner (1951: 93) translates: “a thief wearing an emblem”.   
528
 Cp. BHSD, s.v. dhvaja-baddhaka. 
529




Mūladeva [= Kaṃsa, an ancient king of Mathurā and archenemy of Kr̥ṣṇa530], and so on. Therefore, 
one who wanders about as a marauder or a robber, waylaying at roads, or one who breaks into houses 
in the city and so forth, and who is well-known [among the people who say] ‘a certain such-and-such 
does this and that’, should not be ordained.”531 
It is noteworthy that here as well as in the eponymous sutta, Aṅgulimāla is referred to as 
a robber (coro) together with other categories of thieves, as, for instance, the “outlaw” (likhitako 
coro)532 mentioned above, which would be a good example for one who is “steckbrieflich ge-
sucht”. Waylaying at roads and marauding villages is precisely what Aṅgulimala is described to 
be doing: “by him towns had been turned into non-towns, market-towns into non-market-towns, 
inhabited land into non-inhabited land” (he had depopulated whole towns etc.). He, repeatedly 
killing people, wears a necklace of fingers [Ps: the fingers of his victims]. […] Do not take this 
road, ascetic, for on that road is the brigand Aṅgulimāla, bloody-handed […].”533 
Now, the Vinaya-rule is clearly contradictory to the story told in MN 86 and creates an 
“intertextual tension”, so to speak. Isaline Blew Horner wished to solve this tension in an annota-
tion to the above cited passage in her translation of the Mahāvagga in the following way:  
“It is difficult to reconcile the above Vinaya ruling with the story of Aṅgulimāla’s going forth, for the 
Lord recognised his unusual potentialities, hardly to be expected in the common run of thieves.”534 
Thus, Horner places the Vinaya-rule, historically and regarding importance, first. If one, 
however, wanted to identify the person depicted in MN 86 with the “coro aṅgulimālo” of Vin I 
74, one would probably rather have to come to the conclusion that the case of Aṅgulimāla must 
be the historic precedent for the Vinaya-rule. Although Horner’s conclusion is not as unlikely as 
it may first seem, given that Aṅgulimāla’s story is surely highly interesting and unusual, the lat-
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 Cp. MW, s.v. mūladeva.  
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 Be(R): Vinayapiṭake Mahāvagga-aṭṭhakathā, 1. Mahākhandhakaṃ, Coravatthukathā: 
Tattha dhajaṃ bandhitvā viya vicaratīti dhajabandho. Mūladevādayo viya loke pākaṭoti vuttaṃ hoti. Tasmā yo 
gāmaghātaṃ vā panthaduhanaṃ vā nagare sandhicchedādikammaṃ vā karonto vicarati, paññāyati ca ''asuko 
nāma idaṃ idaṃ karotīti, so na pabbājetabbo. 
532
 Cp. Vin I 75,21 (1,43). 
533
 MN II 98,12f.: Tena gāmāpi agāmā katā, nigamāpi anigamā katā, janapadāpi ajanapadā katā. So manusse 
vadhitvā vadhitvā aṅgulīnaṃ mālaṃ dhāreti […], and MN II 98,10f.:… “mā, samaṇa, etaṃ maggaṃ paṭipajji, 
etasmiṃ samaṇa magge coro aṅgulimālo nāma luddo lohitapāṇi …”. 
534
 Horner 1951: 93, n. 1. 
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ter explanation seems more plausible. In effect, this episode communicates that the Buddha’s au-
thority stands – in this particular case – above that of King Pasenadi.535 The Buddha presented Pa-
senadi with a fait accompli, and he accepts it – has to accept it, for it is in general impossible, 
and specifically for kings, to depart from one’s word (= ‘Cultural Code’536).537 The relationship 
between Pasenadi (and maybe all kings) and the Buddha is supported by the use of the formula 
depicting approach by chariot: “He drove thus as far as the road was passable for carriages, and 
then he dismounted from his carriage and went as a mere pedestrian (pattiko va) to where the 
Buddha was”.538 Thus, here as well as in the case of the criminal Aṅgulimāla being ‘taken care 
of’ by the Buddha instead of the ordinary jurisdiction, secular affairs and the spiritual/religious 
realm intertwine to the effect that the Buddha’s authority and power does not stop at the margin 
of the Jetavana, so to speak, i.e., where secular power begins. Moreover, in the Bāhitika Sutta 
(MN 88), a formal ‘elephant-approach formula’ is used in a quite peculiar manner twice in short 
sequence to depict Pasenadi visiting Ānanda to ask him a simple question. When the king sees 
Ānanda coming on a road, he first sends out a messenger to ask if Ānanda would be free to an-
swer a question for the king. When he agrees, the king approaches Ānanda personally by ele-
phant: “Then King Pasenadi went by elephant as far as the ground was passable for the elephant, 
then dismounted the elephant, and went as a mere pedestrian to where the venerable Ānanda 
was.”539 After greeting Ānanda appropriately, he suggests going to a more pleasant place at the 
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 The Buddha’s relationship with other kings would probably be highly informative regarding in particular to 
the character of Pasenadi. This, however, is a question for a separate study.  
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 The “Referential or Gnomic or Cultural Code” is a term coined by Roland Barthes; cp. Chatman 1989: 39, 
123, 125. It means that, e.g., (psychological) traits are not ‘traits’ but rather culturally accepted, recognized, 
and named personal (psychological) qualities, or culturally sanctioned behavior (cp. ibid.: 125).  
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 Cp., e.g., the Ramāyaṇa, Ayodhyā-kāṇḍa, in which king Daśaratha has to banish his son Rāma because of a 
boon he had granted a long time ago to one of his wives, Kaikeyī, who became jealous and wanted her own 
son, Bharata. There are also numerous examples in the Jātaka literature; cp., e.g., the story of Sutasoma below 
(see n. 587). 
538
 MN II 100,26f.: yāvatiko yānassa bhūmi yānena gantvā yānā paccārohitvā pattiko va yena Bhagavā ten’ 
upasaṅkami. Cp. also Allon 1997: 36-40. However, in the SN, Pasenadi does not approach the Buddha in this 
way, which could nevertheless be explained by the fact that the suttas of the SN are much shorter; neverthe-
less, the relationship between the Buddha and Pasenadi depicted in the SN seems much more cordial. Again, 
this is a question for a separate study.  
539
 MN II 113,10-12: Atha kho raja Pasenadi Kosalo yāvatikā nāgassa bhūmi nāgena gantvā nāgā paccarohitvā 
pattiko va yen’ āyasmā Ānando ten’ upasaṃkami. 
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river Aciravatī. In turn, Ānanda agrees, he goes ahead, and the king follows and again ap-
proaches by elephant.540 In the first instance, which is located on a road, the elephant-approach 
does not make sense (it is reasonable to assume from the description that the road on which the 
king went towards Ānanda was all the way very well passable for elephants!) except solely for 
the showing of utmost respect towards Ānanda. In this peculiar instance, Pasenadi’s complicated 
approach is out of proportion to the question asked (“Venerable Ānanda, would the Blessed One 
behave with the body in such a way that he could be censured by wise recluses and Brah-
mins?”541), even if one takes the commentary’s background story at face value.542 The Buddha on 
his part resumes the whole meeting with the words: “It is good, monks, for king Pasenadi of 
Kosala; it is a well-gotten gain, monks, for king Pasenadi of Kosala that he has had the oppor-
tunity to see and pay homage to Ānanda.”543  
Nevertheless, readers learn from the Vinaya-passage cited above that the Buddha was 
anxious to establish or maintain a good reputation of his saṅgha among the populace and that he 
therefore forbade ordaining criminals after people had started complaining about the ordination 
of Aṅgulimāla.544  
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that once again an approach-formula is used to depict the 
king turning back to the Buddha after he had turned to Aṅgulimāla, although they do not sit wide 
apart. (“Now on that occasion the venerable Aṅgulimāla was sitting not far from the Blessed 
One.”545) Now, it is possible to believe that this is merely due to the highly formulaic nature of 
                                                 
540
 MN II 113,21-24. 
541
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 724,8. 
542
 Buddhaghosa explains at Ps 346,17 that the Bāhitika Sutta, and Pasenadi’s question in particular, was related 
to the case of the female ascetic named Sundarī who was used in a scheme by some wandering ascetics to dis-
credit the Buddha (the story is related in Ud 43; cp. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 1294, n. 831.  
543
 MN II 117,23-26: Lābhā, bhikkhave, rañño Pasenadissa Kosalassa; suladdhalābhā, bhikkhave, rañño Pa-
senadissa Kosalassa, yaṃ raja Pasenadi Kosalo labhati Ānandaṃ dassanāya labhati payirupāsanāyāti. 
544
 I assume here that the Vinaya-passage and the story narrated in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta are related, i.e. that 
they are about the same person. For the Buddha’s concern with public opinion, cp. Gombrich 2009: 52: “The 
same reason lies behind the Buddha’s establishment of a rains retreat for the Saṅgha. The Vinaya says that 
originally they kept moving all year round; but this meant that they trod on lots of fresh grass (the term ‘with 
one sense organ’ is used) and killed tiny insects. Other sects, they said, avoided this by settling in one place for 
the monsoon. The Buddha therefore decreed that his Saṅgha should do likewise. We find that often the reason 
why the Buddha formulates a Vinaya rule is to placate public criticism.” 
545
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 713,12. = MN II 101,23f.: Tena kho pana samayena āyasmā Aṅgulimālo Bha-
gavato avidūre nisinno hoti. 
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the texts (because to depict a renewed elaborate approach is superfluous in this instance). How-
ever, an explanation that incorporates both alternatives is much more likely, namely, that the au-
thors of the text deployed this formula because Pasenadi submits to the superior faculties of the 
Buddha in this passage, and it is therefore only appropriate that he approaches him with the high-
est possible form of respect. The use of a formula is subject to the narrated event or situation on 
the story-level.546  
II.3 The origin of the Aṅgulimāla-paritta (MN II 102,28-103,27) 
The focalising instance of this passage is clearly Aṅgulimāla.547 Later on, during one of his alms-
rounds, the monk Aṅgulimāla witnesses a protracted and probably extremely painful parturition 
(aññataraṃ itthiṃ mūḷhagabbhaṃ visātagabbhaṃ548; a breech presentation perhaps?). Over-
whelmed by sympathy and compassion for the pain beings have to experience in saṃsāra, he 
asks the Buddha for advice. (Having brutally murdered hundreds, this sudden flash of compas-
sion appears rather implausible and contrived! Nevertheless, it “works” for a narrative audience.) 
The Buddha’s advice is to perform an “act of truth” (sacca-kiriyā) in the presence of the women 
in labour. This proves to be effective and eventually leads to the revocation or dissolution of his 
bad karma of extensive killing.549 The way it becomes efficacious, however, is quite interesting. 
The Buddha first advises Aṅgulimāla to go to the woman and say: “In that case, Aṅgulimāla, go 
into Sāvatthī and say to that woman: ‘Sister, since I was born, I do not recall that I have ever in-
tentionally deprived a living being of life. By this truth, may you be well and may your infant be 
                                                 
546
 Cp. also Allon 1997: 162ff. Ibid.: 162: “The examples of complicated and particularly detailed approaches 
and of those which do not quite conform to the norm show that these structures were not blindly imposed on 
the material. The authors of this material were fully capable of breaking with the norm where necessary. Mean-
ing was still the ultimate determinant of the diction.”  
547
 This is obvious not only due to Aṅgulimāla being the subject of the whole paragraph’s actions (the narra-
tor’s focus is on Aṅgulimāla), but first and foremost due to the sutta-narrator’s adoption of Aṅgulimāla’s per-
ceptual perspective, indicated by the use of words of seeing (“he saw”, addasā; “having seen”, disvāna) in sen-
tence initial position, and direct thought representation (“he thought”, assa etad ahosi); see MN II 102,28-
103,1. 
548
 MN II 102,31. 
549
 For the ‘Cultural Code’ of performing a (verbal) act of truth, cp. Lüders, Heinrich (1959). Varuṇa. Aus dem 
Nachlaß herausgegeben von Ludwig Asdorf. Bd. II, Varuṇa und das R̥ta. Vandenheock&Ruprecht, Göttingen: 




well!’”550 Aṅgulimāla hesitates and replies to the Buddha: “Venerable sir, wouldn’t I be telling a 
deliberate lie, for I have intentionally deprived many living beings of life?” In turn, the Buddha 
says, “In that case, Aṅgulimāla, go into Sāvatthī and say to that woman: ‘Sister, since I was born 
with the noble birth [ariyāya jātiyā; i.e. having been “twice-born” as a disciple of the Buddha], I 
do not recall having ever intentionally deprived a living being of life. By this truth, may you be 
well and may our infant be well!’”551  
Now, what could be the reason for this failed first attempt of the Buddha’s advice? Has 
the Buddha forgotten that Aṅgulimāla not long ago was a mass-murderer; or has the sutta just 
recorded a slip of the tongue of the Buddha? The answer to these questions depends, among 
other things, on the respective text-model that one takes as a basis. If one regards the suttas as 
literary productions, i.e. (narrative) literature – oral or written does not matter –, one assumes 
that no element in the narrative is there accidentally but has a certain function within the process 
of narrative communication. Now, on the one hand, the act of truth can only be efficacious, of 
course, if a truth is uttered. Moreover, it is very unlikely that the Buddha would have forgotten 
what Aṅgulimāla has done. Thus, one may first assume the standpoint of the ‘authorial audience’ 
and surmise that the Buddha enunciates this ‘first version’ of his advice intentionally and not 
randomly. One can safely assume that the Buddha can implicitly be understood to know that 
Aṅgulimāla, perhaps as good as any other, has the potentiality to overcome his evil past and at-
tain liberation. This is expressed in a verse that Aṅgulimāla utters at the end of the sutta, which is 
also found at Th 872 (Dhp = 173). The episode with the labouring woman perfectly illustrates 
the principle mentioned in this verse, which states that all of one’s negative actions can be out-
weighed by positive ones, after – most importantly – one has repented and given up one’s “Evil 
done”:  
Yassa pāpaṃ kataṃ kammaṃ kusalena pithīyati | Somaṃ lokaṃ pabhāseti, abbhā muttova candimā || 
                                                 
550
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 714,15. = MN II 103,12-15: »Tena hi tvaṃ, Aṅgulimāla, yena Sāvatthi ten’ up-
asaṅkama, upasaṅkamitvā taṃ itthiṃ evaṃ vadehi: ›Yato ahaṃ, bhagini, jāto nābhijānāmi sañcicca pāṇaṃ 
jīvitā voropetā. Tena saccena sotthi te hotu, sotthi gabbhassāti. 
551
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 714,15. = MN II 103,16-21: »So hi nuna me, bhante, sampajānamusāvādo 
bhavissati; mayā hi, bhante, bahū sañcicca pāṇā jīvitā voropitā ti. »Tena hi tvaṃ, Aṅgulimāla, yena Sāvatthi 
ten’ upasaṅkama, upasaṅkamitvā taṃ itthiṃ evaṃ vadehi: ›Yato ahaṃ, bhagini, ariyāya jātiyā jāto 
nābhijānāmisañcicca pāṇaṃ jīvitā voropetā; tena saccena sotthi te hotu, sotthi gabbhassāti. 
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“He whose Evil done is covered by Good/Wholesome, illuminates the world like the moon freed from 
clouds.” 
The passage is of some interest for its dogmatic content, on which it is necessary to di-
gress for a moment. The law of karma in Buddhism, especially what concerns the later commen-
tarial traditions (e.g. of the Visuddhimagga or the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya552), is a complicated 
and subtle matter.553 According to Richard Gombrich, one of the main accomplishments of the 
Buddha was his re-definition of the notion of karma, Skt. karman “[ritual] action”, in moral 
terms as volition (cetanā): “Volition, monks, is what I call karma”.554 The causes or “roots” 
(mūlā) for the performance of unwholesome actions are said to be greed (lobha), hatred (dosa), 
and delusion (moha).555 In general, according to the law of karmic retribution that the Buddha has 
taught, each individual has to experience the corresponding results (vipāka) of the deeds he or 
she has done. Specifically, the exact corresponding (theoretical) result awaits Aṅgulimāla for the 
negative actions he has done described in the Cūl̥akammavibhaṅga Sutta (MN 135), and with the 
same wording as in the characterisation of Aṅgulimāla. A Brahmin student visits the Buddha to 
enquire about the reason that some people are seen to be ugly, inferior, or sickly, while others are 
fair, superior, and healthy. The Buddha explains that this was so because “people are owners of 
their actions, heirs of their actions […], it is action (kamma) that distinguishes beings as inferior 
and superior”. In particular, the Buddha explains the result of killing: 
“Here, young man, some man or woman kills/injures living beings, is fierce, with blood on his/her 
hands, a killer, merciless towards living beings. He, through undertaking and succeeding [in doing] 
                                                 
552
 For references, cp. Bodhi 2012: 1639f., n. 372. 
553
 The celebrated commentator Buddhaghosa has dealt with the topic and its aspects and subdivisions in de-
tails in his standard work the Visuddhimagga; cp. Vism II 600,28-603,16 = tr. Ñāṇamoli 1964: 696-701. 
554
 Gombrich 2009: 49: “’By karma I mean intention.’ Karma, whatever its instrument, is mental, a matter of 
the agent’s intention (or lack of it – negligence is taken into account), and has its effect through the agent’s 
mental condition, each state of mind influencing the next, even from one life to the next. One effect of this 
shift to intention is that in Buddhism there is more of a symmetry than in Jainism between good and bad 
karma. In Jainism, even good karma empedes liberation by weighing down the soul; in Buddhism good karma 
is the essential first stage of spiritual progress.” The canonical reference is: AN III 410, Cetanā ’haṃ, bhik-
khave, kammaṃ vadāmi. 
The translator of the Aṅguttara Nikāya, Bhikkhu Bodhi, comments on this definition that volition should prob-
ably rather be understood as a necessary factor in the production of karma and that “[i]t can […] be seen as a 
counterfoil to the Jain position that any action, even and unintentional one, creates kamma.” (Bodhi 2012: 
1768, n. 1417)  
555
 Cp. AN I 134 = Bodhi 2012: 230 [34 (4)].  
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such action, will be reborn in a wretched existence, in a low rebirth-destination556, in a place of suffer-
ing, [or] in hell after the breaking up of the body, after death. However, if not reborn in a wretched 
existence, in a low rebirth-destination, in a place of suffering, [or] in hell after the breaking up of the 
body, after death, but if coming back to the human state, then, wherever he is reborn, he will be short-
lived. This is the way, young man, that leads to being short-lived, namely, being one who kills/injures 
living beings, who is fierce, with blood on his/her hands, a killer, merciless towards living beings.”557  
The underlined passages are verbatim the same as the sutta-narrator’s and the peoples’ 
description of Aṅgulimāla in MN 86.  
Now, from a Buddhist understanding, the reason that Aṅgulimala is ultimately able to 
avoid the ripening of his actions through his attainment of the state of an Arhat lies in the Bud-
dhist understanding of the impersonality (anattā) of phenomena, which is perhaps especially 
charactersitic of Buddhism. Buddhaghosa cites several verses “of the Ancients (?)” (Ten’ āhu 
porāṇā) in chapter XIX of his Visuddhimagga, poetically rendered by Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, which 
elucidate that the wise (paṇḍitā) know that in fact the karmic process goes on without a doer:  
“There is no doer of a deed 
Or one who reaps the deed’s result; 
Phenomena alone flow on –  
No other view than this is right. 
 
And so, while kamma and result 
Thus causally maintain their round, 
As seed and tree succeed in turn, 
No first beginning can be shown. 
[…] 
A monk, disciple of the Buddha,  
With direct knowledge of this fact 
                                                 
556
 Cp. CPD, s.v. apāya: “the four bad states (in the saṁsāra) = niraya-tiracchāna-pettivisaya-asurakāyā”, i.e. 
in hell, the animal-realm, as a ghost, or among the ‘former gods’.  
557
 MN III 203,16-25: Idha, māṇava, ekacco itthī vā puriso vā pāṇātipātī hoti luddo lohitapāṇī, hatapahate 
niviṭṭho adayāpanno pāṇabhūtesu. So tena kammena evaṃ samattena evaṃ samādiṇṇena kāyassa bhedā 
paraṃ maraṇā apāyaṃ duggatiṃ vinipātaṃ nirayaṃ upapajjati. No ce kāyassa bhedā paraṃ maraṇā apāyaṃ 
duggatiṃ vinipātaṃ nirayaṃ upapajjati, sace manussattaṃ āgacchati, yattha yattha paccājāyati appāyuko 
hoti. Appāyukasaṃvattanikā esā, māṇava, paṭipadā, yadidaṃ pāṇātipātī hoti luddo lohitapāṇī hatapahate 




Can penetrate this deep and subtle 
Void conditionality. 
 
There is no kamma in result, 
Nor does result exist in kamma; 
Though they are void of one another,  
There is no fruit without the kamma. 
 
As fire does not exist inside  
The sun, a gem, cowdung, nor yet 
Outside them, but is brought to be 
By means of its component parts, 
 
So neither can result be found 
Within the kamma, nor without; 
Nor does the kamma still persist 
In the result it has produced. 
[…]”558 
Accordingly, because kamma and its fruit are neither the same nor unrelated, there is the-
oretically a way to avoid or ‘purify’ the ‘ripening’ of one’s deeds, for instance, by removing the 
base for its ripening: the future existence of one’s being (= the “mentality-materiality”, nāma-
rūpa, or the “five khandhā”). Technically, this is called ahosi-kamma, literally “karma that has 
been” or “suspended/lapsed karma”, or simply karma that does not come to its full corresponding 
fruition. This category is one of four scholastic categories that explain how karma can ripen. 
Buddhaghosa explains:  
“Herein, kamma is fourfold: to be experienced here and now [diṭṭhadhammavedaniyaṃ; sic Vism!], to 
be experienced on rebirth [upapajjavedaniyaṃ], to be experienced in some subsequent becoming 
[aparāpariyavedaniyaṃ], and lapsed kamma [ahosi-kamma].”559  
Thus, karma “lapses” on the condition that the basis for its ripening falls away particu-
larly through the attainment of Arahantship.  
                                                 
558
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli 1964: 700 = Vism II 602,32-603,14. 
559
 Tr. ibid.: 696 = Vism II 601,1-3. Cp. also AN III 415. 
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The passages describing Aṅgulimāla’s ‘new life’ as a purified Buddhist monk, as well as 
that in the episode in part II.5, in which he – though already an Arhat – is attacked by some vil-
lagers whom he had probably harassed in his earlier life, is an illustration of this type of karma. 
Nevertheless, it is regarded as a very rare case and the Aṅgulimāla Sutta is considered its canoni-
cal locus classicus.560 Moreover, the suspension of karmic ripening is ultimately brought about by 
Aṅgulimāla’s act of truth (and possibly the merit accrued thereby). The verse the Buddha recom-
mends Aṅgulimāla to tell to the labouring woman later became known as an important paritta or 
“protective verse”, namely the Aṅgulimāla paritta (Singh. Aṅgulimāla pirit). 
Therefore, with this knowledge one may infer that, first, the compilers of the text have the 
Buddha say the “protective verse” because this good deed (the act of truth), which is motivated 
by compassion and represents the opposite of killing, is able to outweigh Aṅgulimāla’s evil ac-
tions and, secondly, the Buddha’s suggested first version of the verse instills Aṅgulimāla to 
acknowledge, reflect on, and repent the evil he has done, which is a necessary prerequisite to the 
decision to henceforth do the opposite.561  
Seen from a standpoint of the story-level, as ‘narrative audience’, this dialogic event tak-
ing place between the Buddha and the former brigand, with minimal presence of the hetero-
diegetic, extradiegetic sutta-narrator, also indirectly characterises Aṅgulimāla: His statement 
gives proof that he is honest, not telling “deliberate lies” (sampajānamusāvādo), and that he has 
really changed and has truly “renounced evil forever”.562  
In narratological terms, however, one can discern Aṅgulimala’s ‘thematic aspect’ in this 
episode as a prime example (or even precedent?) for the rare and rather scholastic case of ahosi-
kamma. Yet, this aspect is probably not that which could explain the interest in the lis-
tener’s/readers’s interest in the character and its continuing popularity.  
II.4 Aṅgulimāla becomes one of the Arhats (MN II 103,27-104,2) 
                                                 
560
 Cp. Gombrich [1971] 1991: 251ff. According to Theravāda doctrine, each person is responsible for his or 
her own deeds and must experience the fruit of one’s actions. Usually, there is no way around this. 
561
 In the Mahāyāna tradition of Indian Buddhism, this is called the “power of regret” and constitutes the first 
of the so-called Four Powers necessary to purify negative karma; cp. Bodhicaryāvatāraḥ by Śāntideva, 
ch. 2, vv. 27-56 :(http://www2.hf.uio.no/common/apps/permlink/permlink.php?app=polyglotta&context=rec-
ord&uid=a62407b8-6bec-11df-870c-00215aecadea, (last accessed: 11th May 2013).   
562
 Cp. MN II 100,3f.: So ’haṃ cirassā pahāssaṃ pāpaṃ, sutvāna gāthaṃ tava dhammayuttaṃ.  
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Even though Aṅgulimāla has changed, he has not completely purified his extremely nega-
tive deeds. Although he attains the state of an Arhat after the event with the labouring woman 
who activated his compassion and his insight into the suffering of saṃsāra, which is described 
with one of the stock phrases in the Canon for this ‘Summum Bonum’ of Buddhist practice563, he 
still has to purify or expiate a ‘dilute solution’ of residual karma.  
II.5 ‘Residual karma’ (MN II 104,3-17) 
While on some other almsround (the text is unspecific and very formulaic here564), Aṅgulimāla is 
hit first by a clod, then by a stick, and finally by gravel (or a potsherd?) that people have thrown 
at him. It is apparent that this first sentence describing the event is an understatement.565 This is 
clear from the description of Aṅgulimāla’s appearance when he returns from his round to see the 
Buddha: he is really broken – something more must have happened to him than a few pebbles or 
clods could do. The sutta-narrator relates what happened then: “Then, with blood running from 
his cut head, with his bowl broken, and with his outer robe torn, the venerable Aṅgulimāla went 
to the Blessed One.”566 That does rather sound as if a rout had pressed Aṅgulimāla really hard and 
battered him, perhaps even tried to kill him. The Buddha, however, seeing Aṅgulimāla coming in 
the distance, calls out to him encouragingly (this is not an approach-formula): “Endure it, Brah-
min; endure it!” Had he not reached Arhatship and thereby circumvented the ripening of his evil 
deeds in the next existence, he would have had to experience the full corresponding result of his 
                                                 
563
 Cp. PED, s.v. arahant; here, we find a combination of the PED’s formula A and B (MN II 103,27-104,2): 
Atha kho āyasmā Aṅgulimālo eko vūpakaṭṭho appamatto ātāpī pahitatto viharanto na cirass’ eva yass’ at-
thāya kulaputtā sammadeva agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajanti, tad anuttaraṃ brahmacariyapariyosānaṃ 
diṭṭheva dhamme sayaṃ abhiññā  sacchikatvā upasampajja vihāsi. »Khīṇā jāti, vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, 
kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ itthattāyāti abbhaññāsi, “Before long, dwelling alone, withdrawn, diligent, ar-
dent, and resolute, the venerable Aṅgulimāla, by realising for himself with direct knowledge, here and now 
entered upon and abided in that supreme goal of the holy lifefor the sake of which clansmen rightly go forth 
from the homelife into homelessness. He directly knew: ‘Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, what 
had to be done has been done, there is no more coming to any state of being.’ And the venerable Aṅgulimāla 
became one of the arahats.” (tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 714,16.) 
564
 The formula just describes one of the daily duties of the Buddhist monk: “Then, in the morning, the venera-
ble Aṅgulimāla dressed, took up his begging bowl and his upper garment, and went into Sāvatthī for alms.” 
MNII 104,3f.: Atha kho āyasmā Aṅgulimālo pubbaṇhasamayaṃ nivāsetvā pattacīvaraṃ ādāya Sāvatthiṃ 
piṇḍāya pāvisi.  
565
 However, the question remains as to whether this would have also been recognized as an understatement by 
a historic, non-Western listener/reader, as Scholes & Kellogg (2006: 165-167) point out in their discussion of 
the notion of the ‘classic restraint’.  
566
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 715,17. = MN II 104,8ff. 
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actions in the next life (aparāpariyavedaniyaṃ), namely, falling “into hell for many years, many 
hundred years, many thousand years”. That means that arahants too still have to experience the 
ripening of karma in their last existence, though in a weakened form. This event, in turn, enables 
him to purify the rest of his negative karma in the form of being attacked and injured (part II.5). 
Against the background of the concept of ahosi-kamma, one can see how the events com-
mencing in part II.2, when Aṅgulimāla escapes his lawful conviction, up to part II.5, seem to fol-
low a certain line of development. While the interest of the ‘narrative audience’ in Aṅgulimala’s 
story is maintained by the initial ‘instability’ of his surprise-conversion (representatively ex-
pressed for the narrative audience by King Pasenadi: “But venerable sir, how could such an im-
moral man, one of evil character, ever have such virtue and restraint?”), the ‘authorial audience’ 
is invited to see/understand through Aṅgulimāla’s example how effective the path offered by the 
Buddha is, and that the law of karma is still working unmistakably – this is to assure the king that 
the Buddha’s saṅgha will not be a haven for all sorts of criminals to evade conviction. By the 
same token, there may even be a historico-political implication, namely, that the Buddha proves 
that he and his saṅgha are not posing a potential threat to the state. If there is some historical 
truth in the Aṅgulimāla story as well as in ‘Sundarī-case’ referred to above567, at this point the 
Buddha had still to establish his reputation and stand up to rival samaṇa-sects in Kosala.  
The whole process and the result reached is additionally described poetically in verses 
“uttered [in a] solemn utterance”568, allegedly by the thera Aṅgulimāla himself, some of which 
are also found in the Theragāthā and the Dhammapada, at the end of the sutta (MN II 104,21-
105,24).  
Before coming to a fuller narratological assessement of the character Aṅgulimāla, how-
ever, it is imperative to first look at two rival interpretations of Aṅgulimāla’s identity. 
5.3 Richard Gombrich: “Who was Aṅgulimāla?” 
As is widely known among Buddhologists, and by now probably itself notorious, the interpreta-
tion of the ‘notorious robber’ Aṅgulimāla was presented by Richard Gombrich in an essay with 
                                                 
567
 Cp. n. 542 above.  
568
 MN II 104,19: Atha kho āyasmā Aṅgulimālo rahogato patisallīno568 vimuttisukhaṃ paṭisaṃvedī tāyaṃ 
velāyaṃ imaṃ udānaṃ udānesi. Cp. CPD, s.v. udāna: “a solemn utterance, mostly, but not necessarily, in met-
rical form, inspired by intense emotion and made without regard to any listeners.” 
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the title “Who was Aṅgulimāla?”, first published in 1996.569 In this essay Gombrich treats only 
part I) of the Aṅgulimāla Sutta, which narrates his conversion. He compares the commentaries on 
the Theragāthā, the Paramattha-dīpanī, with the MN-commentary, the Papañcasūdanī, and con-
cludes that both are incoherent and useless for answering the question of the identity of Aṅgu-
limāla, which is his objective. He then systematically examines the canonical text itself and espe-
cially the verses ascribed to Aṅgulimāla from the Theragāthā, and formulates the hypothesis that 
Aṅgulimāla must have been an early prototype, as it were, of a Śaiva-vratin. Gombrich accom-
plishes this by a simple but momentous conjecture, by which he changes a ‘seer’ (mahesi) into 
Śiva (maheso), which – almost literally with one stroke of the pen – turns Aṅgulimāla into a 
proto-Śaiva/Śākta.570 His conjecture, and his restoring metrically what he deems a corrupt verse 
(= Th 868), solves a problem posed by the first pāda of Th 868 (MN II 100,1) with regard to the 
plot of the story in connection with the intertwined verses. (A closer look at the linguistic aspect 
will be inspected again later on.)  
His thesis has met with severe criticism by Alexis Sanderson and others, who mainly find 
fault with the lack of evidence for related cults at such an early date.571 However, Gombrich, not 
deviating from his view in the face of this criticism, bases his argument on an interesting obser-
vation regarding the representation of persons in the Sutta Piṭaka. Gombrich writes: 
“[...] For the most part he [the Buddha] interacts with, and in particular preaches to, human beings, 
and they seem to be realistically portrayed by our modern criteria of realism [...] none of the Buddha’s 
interlocutors seem to do anything which, to our way of thinking, they could not possibly have 
done.”572 
Moreover (ibid. p. 143): 
                                                 
569
 Henceforth = Gombrich 2006a. 
570
 See Gombrich 2006a: 151. 
571
 Cp. Gombrich 2006: 152, especially n. 7 in which Gombrich cites parts of a private correspondence between 
him and Sanderson, in which Sanderson severely criticises Gombrich’s ideas as wrong and unverifiable; there 
had been no sanguinary vows or rites in connection with Śiva at any time, and the vows in connection with the 
Goddess (Kālī) or Bhairava would rather be classed as mortuary rites, and there was no evidence whatsoever 
of the adherents being enjoined to wear the severed body parts of their victims; cp. also Zin 2006: 111, where 
she cites the criticism on this view by Maithrimurthi and von Rospatt, who basically seem to find fault with the 
fact that certain sanguinary vows in connection with the goddess (Kālī) appear much later (ca. 1000 years 
later).  
572
 Gombrich 2006a: 142. 
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“One can go further, once one has defined what would have struck the Buddha's followers as a realis-
tic account. They accepted that by ascetic or meditative practices people could attain certain super-
normal powers called iddhi or iddhi-pāṭihāriya.” 
In these quotes, Gombrich makes two most interesting statements in connection with our 
study of the presentation of characters in Buddhist narrative texts. One might even go so far to 
call his remark narratological: He offers a description or analysis of some of the rules of the nar-
rated world (the story-world) and thereby “defines” the role or the necessary abilities of a real 
historical reader/recipient. This approach, however, is at the same time highly problematic from 
a narratological perspective because it confounds two instances on the recipient’s side of the nar-
rative communication, namely the addressee and the actual recipient.573 This is simply because of 
the fact that we have no data that would enable one to know what part of the story in particular, 
and how exactly, a historical listener/reader might have received the narrative when hear-
ing/reading a sutta. What one can deduct strictly on the basis of the words of a given text is the 
intended real addressee of the respective text. Although this distinction may seem insignificant at 
first, it is absolutely necessary. The problem basically boils down to this: While one probably 
can, as Gombrich does, deduce Cultural Codes prevalent during Buddha’s time from the Pāli 
texts, one cannot tell whether these facts of the story-world were also accepted as facts in the real 
world as experienced in the mind of a recipient at Buddha’s times. In other words, Gombrich 
does not distinguish ontologically between the story-world and the world of history of ancient 
India at the time of the Buddha – for him as for many other scholars of early Buddhism – they 
are just the same. This is, of course, not a criticism in and by itself. It simply identifies the view 
of the suttas lying at the basis of his method to be what Jonathan Walters has called the ‘histori-
cal source mode’.574 
I argue that an ontological difference must be made between Cultural Codes of a given 
epoch and a certain place – which are reflected in literature (fictional or not) – and the lived real-
ity of people. All human beings share the same physical universe – except maybe for a few more 
                                                 
573
 See Schmid 2008: 43: “Der Empfänger zerfällt nämlich in zwei Instanzen, die funktional oder intensional zu 
scheiden sind, auch wenn sie material oder extensional zusammenfallen: den Adressaten und den Rezipienten. 
Der Adressat ist der vom Sender unterstellte oder intendierte Empfänger […], der Rezipient ist der faktische 
Empfänger.” 
574
 Cp. Walters 1999. 
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technical amenities –, as much then as we do now. (How this universe is perceived and ex-
plained, of course, can be very different!). That the people living in the ancient Indian civilisa-
tion would have inhabited a different universe, in which it was quite common to fly up to the sky 
to have a chat with Sakka, king of the gods, can hardly be accepted as a physical fact. However, 
that a historical audience perhaps firmly believed that it was possible and that Sakka existed may 
be true, but still, this discussion concerns Cultural Codes as reflected in literature and not about 
physical facts. As Jannidis has convincingly argued by means of the example of the human dis-
position to attribute intentionality to the actions of their fellow human beings and the transfer of 
this disposition to the human-like figures in literature575, a narrative text, fictional as well as non-
fictional, reflects the human perception of the world, not the world itself (Ger. “Abbild”). Thus, 
there are elements in narratives that people may have believed in at a certain time and place, or 
explanations of phenomena, which were common currency in a certain culture, and which at a 
later time may not make sense or be intelligible any longer because they have been replaced by 
other beliefs and views on reality.  
 Having said that, I cannot agree with Gombrich’s assessment that, “[…] none of the 
Buddha’s interlocutors seem to do anything which, to our way of thinking, they could not possi-
bly have done”. On the contrary, the Pāli Canon abounds in the description of things that people 
ordinarily cannot do, and which thus for a contemporary reader primarily count among the rules 
of the story-world, not the real world (though they may nevertheless reflect Cultural Codes!). 
Yet, people are interestingly nevertheless ready to accept the characters in the Pāli suttas as 
‘plausible persons’, despite the fact they obviously often elude the narratological criteria of, as 
Gombrich states, “[being] realistically portrayed by our modern criteria of realism”. 
                                                 
575
 Cp. Part II, ch. 3.1 above; Jannidis 2004: 128: “So steht hinter der Figurenkategorie ‚Fähigkeit zum intenti-
onalen Handeln‘ nicht dieselbe Kategorie auf der personalen Ebene, sondern vielmehr – so zumindest der heu-
tige Kenntnisstand der Psychologie – eine angeborene Disposition, sich und anderen intentionales Handeln 
zuzuschreiben. Nicht diese Disposition geht in die Regeln der fiktionalen Welten und des Basistypus ein, son-
dern das vollendete Faktum. In der aktualen Welt gibt es eine vererbte Tendenz, sich und anderen Intentionen 
zuzuschreiben und damit die psychische Realität von Intentionen. Daraus wird in fiktionalen Welten eine ob-
jektive Tatsache. In der erzählten Welt haben Figuren Intentionen, da diese Welten ja nicht analog zur aktua-
len Welt gestaltet sind, sondern immer nur analog zur menschlichen Wahrnehmung der Welt.”  
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In his analysis, Gombrich does not make this distinction and seems to take it for granted 
that all the “people” occurring in the Pali Canon must be historical and, by implication, their ac-
tions historical facts.576 In contrast, the argument could possibly have been made acceptable even 
for a narratologist by saying that it is highly probable that there are “real-life” accounts in the 
suttas for the simple reason that the characters and, for example, the environment in the suttas 
are never, unlike in the realistic novel, described in realistic detail (the physical appearance of 
people is never described, as is the landscape), and that this suggests the conclusion that the au-
thors of the suttas presupposed the details to be known by their audience (or that they did not re-
gard them essential to their aims). However, it is surprising that the Buddha should have con-
verted a dreaded notorious killer by a rather simple play on words.577 This does not strike me as a 
very realistic or even plausible account. 
Be that as it may, his main argument against Sanderson’s critique is that also elsewhere in 
the Pāli Canon a series of very strange ascetic practices are described, for which also no other-
wise confirmed historical records exist. As an example, he cites the samaṇa Seniya of the Kukku-
ravatika Sutta (MN 57), whose ascetic practice consisted in the imitation of the behaviour of 
dogs. Gombrich writes, “What I’m trying to show is that, unless the AS [= Aṅgulimāla Sutta] is 
unique, Aṅgulimāla must have been a recognizable type of person in the environment of his 
day”.578  
                                                 
576
 Cp. the discussion in Jannidis 2004: 151ff. Already the “New Critics” have argued, on the basis of their ad-
vocacy for strictly text-based methods, against an interpretation of characters in texts as real people. An espe-
cially interesting remark in this connection was formulated by Marvin Mudrick in 1961 (cited in Jannidis 
2004: 152, n. 2): “One of the recurrent anxieties of literary critics concerns the way in which a character in 
drama or fiction may be said to exist. The ›purist‹ argument – in the ascendancy nowadays among critics – 
points out that characters do not exist at all except insofar as they are part of the images and events which bear 
and move them, that any effort to extract them from their context and to discuss them as if they are real human 
beings is a sentimental misunderstanding of the nature of literature. The ›realistic‹ argument – on the defensive 
nowadays – insists that characters acquire, in the course of an action, a kind of independence from the events 
in which they live, and that they can be usefully discussed at some distance from their context.” 
577
 Gombrich 2006a: 135: “The Buddha converts Aṅgulimāla by one of the commonest of his skillful means: 
playing upon words.” And on p. 154 he states: “It only remains to point out that the first three verses would 
make sense as a summary account of Aṅgulimāla’s conversion without positing the miraculous element that he 
was running fast but could not catch the walking Buddha. That piece of the story could have arisen as a mere 
over-interpretation of the word-play [= ṭhito—aṭṭhito].” 
578
 Gombrich 2006a: 144. 
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The conversion of criminals or bad characters, however, is a common theme in religious 
literature, throughout history and in many cultures.579 
It is questionable whether anyone will ever be able to pinpoint Aṅgulimāla’s historical 
identity to any degree of satisfaction by employing a ‘historical-source mode’ reading of the sut-
tas. The question that interests me altogether more, therefore, is whether a definite answer to this 
question is necessary for an understanding of the communicative structure of the text itself and 
its intended effect on the listener/reader. Furthermore, the question of Aṅgulimāla’s ‘real’ iden-
tity does not seem to be so important when looking upon the suttas as (religious) narrative litera-
ture. Historical questions, namely the attitude of historical as the only questions worth asking of 
the suttas, express the historical-critical interest of the ones who ask them, which presupposes 
that a layer of historical reality lies in the suttas that is possible to lay open by merely eliminating 
all the mythical and magical “stuff”. At least, this seems to have been the idea of great 19th-cen-
tury Buddhologists like Herman Oldenberg.580 
5.4 Monika Zin 
Another attempt at an interpretation of the character of Aṅgulimāla was presented in 2006 by 
Monika Zin in her book Mitleid und Wunderkraft: Schwierige Bekehrungen und ihre Ikonogra-
phie im indischen Buddhismus.581 In her account, she seeks to link the story of Aṅgulimāla di-
rectly with the story-material (Ger. “Erzählstoff”) of the cannibal Saudāsa/Kalmāṣapāda of the 
Mahābharata, who can be traced back in time as far as the R̥gveda. Her book deals with what 
she terms ‘conversion-tales’ (Ger. “Bekehrungsgeschichten”) in early Buddhist literature and 
their depiction in art. Particular kinds of ‘conversion-tales’, which relate how certain individuals 
are converted to the buddha-dhamma, are those, according to Zin, in which the conversion is 
forced upon the respective individuals. Zin surely presents a strong argument by stating that the 
                                                 
579
 Cp. Nyanaponika & Hecker 2000: 335f: “Auch im Christentum finden wir Beispiele für radikale Verände-
rungen im moralischen Verhalten eines Menschen. Da ist der Schächer am Kreuz von Golgotha, dem Jesus 
versprach, er werde noch am selben Tage mit ihm im Paradies sein. Der heilige Franz von Assisi bekehrte ei-
nen Räuberhauptmann und machte ihn zum Mönch. Immer wieder haben solche Fälle die Gemüter religiöser 
Menschen bewegt. Die Skeptiker werfen allerdings die Frage auf, wie ein derartiger Wandel möglich ist. 
Aṅgulimālas Geschichte kann uns vielleicht eine Antwort hierauf geben.” 
580
 Cp. Oldenberg 1882. 
581
 Zin’s account of Aṅgulimāla understands itself as a criticism and alterantive to Gombrich’s essay; Monika 
Zin, personal communication, 23rd June 2011. 
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opponents of the Buddha are usually depicted as examples of extremely negative states of 
mind582, and often pose a threat to the common people, who then beseech the Buddha for help.583 
The Buddha’s appearance, in turn, serves to highlight the superior qualities of the Buddha, like 
his superior compassion and his ability to perform all sorts of miracles demonstrating his special 
or superhuman powers (iddhis) and therefore, symbolically, his overcoming or taming of the 
those three poisons. However, whether this interpretation, which is essentially a ‘thematising in-
terpretation’, can also be applied to the canonical text of the Aṅgulimāla Sutta, is doubtful. Fur-
thermore, Zin argues that the character as well as the canonical story of Aṅgulimāla is the result 
of a development of distinct literary motifs, which can be traced also in other Buddhist literature, 
and, as aforementioned, even back to the figure of Saudāsa in the great Sanskrit epics and even 
the R̥gveda. In the chapter on Aṅgulimāla in her book, Zin seeks to trace a straight line of devel-
opment of the Aṅgulimala story, the root of which – as far as the Buddhist context is concerned – 
she sees represented in the verses of the Theragāthā. She proposes the existence of a now lost, 
intermediary version of the tale that developed after the Majjhima Nikāya-version, on which the 
version of the Majjhima Nikāya-commentary and the later versions deriving from it must de-
pend.584 Her underlying/implicit methodological approach is therefore entirely different from that 
of Gombrich’s: Zin, as is her wont, looks for narrative motifs and elements in the many different 
version of the story and tries to trace their development. Although Zin’s theory is convincing and 
her arguments are plausible, her approach could be problematic as well for its positing of non-
                                                 
582
 According to the Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana (reference in Zin 2006: Introduction (Einleitung), a 
Sārvāstivada-Abhidharma text, as popular examples of people who are difficult to tame (durdamana) are men-
tioned Nanda, Aṅgulimāla, and Kāśyapa, who are said respectively to be extremely captured by desire (rāga), 
hatred (dveṣa), and delusion (moha). This can clearly be seen as a later attempt at systematisation of the availa-
ble material in terms of the path, a procedure which is often found in the Abhidhamma and the later Sanskrit 
tradition. 
583
 In this scheme, since the Buddha is the only one with the ability/capacity to help, i.e. to stop the murderer or 
the cannibal; cp. Aṅgulimāla Sutta at MN I 101, where the king Pasenadi is full of fear at the sight of Aṅgulim-
āla (eso mahārāja aṅgulimālo ti. Atha kho rañño Pasenadissa kosalassa ahudeva bhayaṃ, ahu chambitattaṃ, 
ahu lomahaṃso), or the Mahāsutasoma Jātaka at Jā V 474,2-10, where neither the four digpālas (the ‘Four 
Kings’, residing in the lowest of the six devalokas) including retinue, nor Sakka (Indra) himself are able to stop 
the cannibal. Sakka, then, refers the tree-spirit to the Bodhisatta who is then the prince Sutasoma ([…] cātum-
mahārājikānaṃ santikaṃ gantvā kathetvā “nivāretha nan” ti āha, tehi “na mayaṃ sakkhissāmā” ti vutte Sak-
kaṃ upasaṃkamitvā tam atthaṃ kathetvā “nivarehi nan” ti āha, so pi “nāhaṃ sakkomi nivāretuṃ, samatthaṃ 
pana ācikkhissāmīti” vatvā “ko nāma” ti vutte “sadevake loke añño n’ atthi, Kururaṭṭhe pana Indapattana-
gare Korabyarājaputto Sutasoma nāma, taṃ nibbisevanaṃ damessati rājūnañ ca jīvitaṃ dassati […]”).  
584
 Cp. Zin 2006: 108. 
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extant intermediary text-versions as “missing links” and rather free correlation of narrative mo-
tifs. 
The identification of Aṅgulimāla with the cannibal Kalmāṣapāda (Pāli: Kammāsapada) in 
the Buddhist tradition itself is not new: the cannibal Kammāsapada, who is Brahmadattakumāra, 
the ghoul longing for human flesh in the Mahāsutasoma Jataka (Jā 537, Asītinipāta), is revealed 
by the Buddha to be an earlier incarnation of Aṅgulimāla in the samodhāna of this Jātaka.585 Alt-
hough Zin’s identification seems plausible at first sight, it presents some difficulties upon closer 
inspection. The Mahāsutasoma Jātaka (Jā 537) belongs to the group of the longer or ‘epic Jāta-
kas’.586 The plot, summarised in brief, is as follows: Koravya, the king of Indapatta (= the mod-
ern-day Delhi) in the Kuru-country sends his son Sutsoma to be educated in Takkasilā. On his 
way to the capital of Gandhāra, Sutasoma meets the son of another king, Brahmadatta, king of 
Kāsī and Benares, Brahmadattaputta, who is also on his way to Takkasilā for seeking an educa-
tion. They become friends and later on study together. After some time has elapsed and Suta-
soma has made considerable progress in his studies (faster than all the other student-princes), he 
eventually becomes Brahmadattaputta’s tutor (piṭṭhi-ācariyo). Eventually, the story goes on and 
after having returned to their respective kingdoms after finishing their studies, the princes ascend 
to the thrones of their home-kingdoms. All adhere to a rule of righteousness and virtue except for 
Brahmadattaputta who, through mere unhappy coincidence and the negligence of his cook, de-
velops a fondness for human flesh. This develops into a dreadful debauchment of the king’s, and 
as more and more people in Benares fall victim to the king, the king’s commander-in-chief, 
Kāl̥ahatthi, mounts an enquiry and, the trail eventually leading to the king via his cook, Brah-
madatta is banished from the kingdom because he declares himself unable to abandon his horri-
ble addiction. From then on, Brahmadattaputta goes about his cannibalism in a nearby forest, 
killing and eating people as they pass by. At one point in the story, an episode occurs in which a 
certain tree spirit (rukkha-devatā) plays an important role. In order to offer a promised blood sac-
rifice to this tree spirit, Brahmadatta starts to catch one-hundred warrior-kings, all his former 
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 Jā V 511,18-20: Satthā imaṃ dhammadesanaṃ āharitvā “nāhaṃ bhikkhave idān’ eva Aṅgulimālaṃ damemi, 
pubbe p’ esa mayā damito yevā” ti vatvā jātakaṃ samodhānesi: “Tadā porisādarājā Aṅgulimālo ahosi […]”. 
But cp. also Jā V 456,19ff. That the prince Brahmadatta is identified with the cannibal Kammāsapāda in the Jā. 
is clear from him being mentioned in vv. 471&472 (Jā V 503= Be(R): 475&476).  
586
 See von Hinüber 1996: §114, p. 57. 
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classmates, except for Sutasoma. The tree spirit, however, who is not very fond of blood sacri-
fices, convinces Brahmadattaputta that he must catch Sutasoma by whatever means possible, or 
else the blood sacrifice would not be effective. (In truth, this is a ploy of the tree spirit to avoid 
the sacrifice, in the course of which the cannibal is to be converted.) He actually captures Suta-
soma eventually, but sets him free again, so that he can redeem a promise made to a Brahmin be-
fore his capture. Sutasoma, who is always veracious, as this is his sva-dharma as a khattiya – a 
central theme in the story –, promises to return to the ogre.587 Sutasoma, after having actually re-
turned to the cannibal, succeeds with his skill and his unconditional honesty, to convert the can-
nibal, to free the khattiya-kings and, including Brahmadattaputta, re-establish them in their king-
doms. 
Although there are obvious parallels between the story of the Mahāsutasoma Jātaka and 
the Aṅgulimāla Sutta, there are also a number of problems connected with Zin’s interpretation of 
Aṅgulimāla Sutta being a developed stage or derivative of the Jātaka story, and her identification 
of Aṅgulimala with the cannibal Saudāsa/Kalmāṣapāda.588 One of the problems is that Zin does 
not explain convincingly the important eponymous finger-necklace of Aṅgulimāla, which she ex-
plains to be a motif that was developed out of the imprisoned one-hundred khattiya-princes, 
which the cannibal had tied up on a rope pierced through the palms of their hands in the 
Mahāsutasoma Jātaka.589 Nor does she explain the past participle mahito in that crucial verse in 
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 Jā V 475 vv. 390-392 (=Be(R) 393-395): 
Tiṭṭhāhīti mayā vutto, so tvaṃ gacchasi yaṃmukho [Be(R): pammukho; Be(R) c.a.: pāmukho (ka.)] 
aṭhito ṭhito ’mhīti [Be(R): Aṭṭhito tvaṃ ṭhitomhīti] lapasi 
brahmacāri [Be(R): brahmacārini] idaṃ te samaṇa ayuttaṃ,  
asiñca me maññasi kaṅkapattan ti [B(eR) c.a.: kaṅkhapattaṃ (syā. ka.)]. 
 
Ṭhito ’ham asmi [B(eR): asmī] sadddhammesu [B(eR): sadhammesu] rāja, 
na nāmagottaṃ parivattayāmi,  
corañ ca loke aṭhitaṃ vadanti, 
apāyikaṃ [B(eR): āpāyikaṃ] nerayikaṃ ito cutaṃ. 
588
 In an important work on the development of the figure of the cannibal Kalmāṣapāda in the epic and Bud-
dhist traditions by Watanabe (1909), no direct line is drawn between the Aṅgulimāla Sutta and Kalmāṣapāda, 
and therefore between Aṅgulimāla and the cannibal, apart from the traditional identification in the Jātakas 
(which is most probably a secondary development). This is so for certain reasons, as I will try to demonstrate 
in the following. 
589
 Jā V 473,19f: […] hatthatalesu chiddāni katvā rajjuyā nigrodharukkhe olambesi […]. We will come back to 
the finger-necklace and offer an alternative interpretation below. 
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the Aṅgulimāla Sutta, which causes some interpretational problems. The problem with this parti-
ciple, as Gombrich states, is this: 
“And like Norman he [i.e. the translation of the Ven. Nyanamoli] produces an implausible meaning, 
for his translation suggests that Aṅgulimāla had been honouring the Buddha (‘this monk’) before the 
moment at which he speaks the verse, but that is manifestly not the case.”590  
The persons are identified differently in Zin’s interpretation (the Brahmin, mahesi, of the 
verse is really the shape-shifted rukkha-devatā in Zin’s argument, detailed further later on), but 
the problem remains because neither does Kammāsapāda know that the Brahmin is really the tree 
spirit in disguise he was honouring before, nor did he venerate this Brahmin before.  
Furthermore, and certainly one of the main arguments against a direct connection with the 
figure of Kalmāṣapāda, there is no evidence whatsoever in the Aṅgulimāla story for cannibalism. 
However, a crucial element in the Jātaka-story (and the other versions outside the Buddhist con-
text) is precisely Kalmāṣapāda’s appetite for human flesh, and his abjuration from this terrible 
vice. 
Likewise, it is not at all evident how Zin arrives at the conclusion that the basic theme of 
Sutasoma’s story in the Jātaka and the theme of the Aṅgulimāla-story were identical, namely 
“true Brahmanism”.591 In all the versions of the story, which Watanabe discusses in his important 
essay (1909) on the development of the Kalmāṣapāda-story in the Sanskrit epics and the Bud-
dhist tradition, the protagonists are khattiyas, and the moral always comes down to the theme of 
the sva-dharma of the kṣatriya, to always and under all circumstances – even at the risk of one’s 
lives – tell the truth. In the Buddhist context, respectively, the point to be illustrated is the ‘per-
fection of truthfulness’ (i.e. the seventh ‘perfection’ or pāramī: sacca-pāramitā, or that of sīla in 
the Chinese versions592). 
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 Gombrich 2006a: 146. 
591
 Cp. Zin 2006: 111. 
592
 Cp. Watanabe 1909: 258. 
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According to my understanding of the text, however, there is no mention of any criticism 
of Brahminism. On the contrary, King Sutasoma offers sacrifices to Brahmins.593 Indeed, identi-
cal in both the Aṅgulimāla Sutta and in the Jātaka is the element or motif of the vow of truthful-
ness: Aṅgulimāla, respectively Kammāsapāda, says in the Aṅgulimala Sutta: “These monks, sons 
of the Sakyan, speak [always] the truth, keep a truth-vow”594; the Sutasoma Jātaka has the tree-
spirit say: “Ascetics never speak untrue, even at the risk of their life.”595 The elements that are not 
found in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta are Sutasoma’s capture, his promise given to the Brahmin, and the 
promise to the ogre to return to him after having granted the boon to the Brahmin. It could be ar-
gued that these elements have been left out in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta in order to give the plot its 
present twist, which serves, according to Zin’s interpretation, only to demonstrate the superiority 
of the Buddha and his dhamma. Such an interpretation must be based on an assumption that ad-
mits a very high degree of creativity and transformation of narrative “material” in ancient India, 
which is generally thinkable and even probable, but which necessarily also entails a very high 
degree of speculation.  
However, there is an even bigger problem in Zin’s explanation of the word mahesi. In-
stead of carrying out such a daring conjecture as Gombrich’s maheso, Zin keeps the great ‘seer’ 
(maharṣi/mahesi) of Th 868 but identifies him with the tree-spirit (yakkhinī or rukkha-devatā) in 
the disguise of an ascetic (samaṇa/pabbajita). She then explains the existence of this line and the 
whole stanza in the verses of the Aṅgulimāla Sutta and the Theragāthā as a residue of the “origi-
nal” Saudāsa/Kalmāṣapāda-narrative and assumes that originally – i.e. in a hypothetical, no 
longer extant version – also in the Aṅgulimāla-story Aṅgulimāla must have been prophesied the 
coming of the Buddha by a Brahmin: 
                                                 
593
 Jā V v. 393: 
Kasmin nu raṭṭhe tava jātabhūmi, 
atha kena atthena idhānupatto, 
akkhāhi me brāhmaṇa etam atthaṃ, 
kim icchasī demi tay-ajja patthitan ti.  
“In which kingdom lies your birthplace, for what reason have you come here, tell me, Brahmin, what is your 
purpose, what do you wish for? I will give you whatever you desire today.” 
594
 […] corassa aṅgulimālassa etadahosi: “ime kho samaṇā sakyaputtiyā saccavādino saccapaṭiññā […]”. 
595
 Jā V 474,24f.: […] bho pabbajitā nāma jīvitahetu pi alikaṃ na bhaṇanti […]. 
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“As the cannibal was prophesied the arrival of Sutasoma (probably a long time ago), so may the arri-
val of the Buddha have been predicted to Aṅgulimāla in the original version, of which the gāthā with 
mahesi and cirassaṃ seems to report.”596  
This is one of the possible clues that lead Zin to the conclusion that the version of the 
story in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta may depend on – via no longer extant intermediate version(s) – the 
version in the Mahāsutasoma Jātaka. However, the fact that we find an explanation for an ele-
ment of a story in one version, which is not found in another, although it does contain the same 
element, does not mean that the former version must therefore be the origin. Nevertheless, to 
identify this suddenly emerging, and difficult to account for, Brahmin (mahesi) in Th 868 with 
the shape-shifting tree spirit by no means solves the problem. Such a Brahmin makes no appear-
ance anywhere in the canonical Th-verses, or in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta. Apparently, Zin gets the 
Brahmin from the prose part (i.e. really the Jātaka-commentary) of the Mahāsutasoma Jātaka.597 
But it is not just that not only this Brahmin is not a real Brahmin, but a tree-spirit in disguise. 
Moreover, the only one of the many variants of the story in which a real Brahmin occurs (the 
Brahmin Uttaṅka), is contained in the Mahābhārata.598 On the contrary, this Brahmin is consid-
ered by Watanabe, quite convincingly, to be the result of the influence of a Buddhist version: 
“The scene is the forest, where the ex-king Kalmāṣapāda is roaming, terrible to see. A certain Brah-
min, Uttaṅka, ordered by his teacher, comes to beg of the cannibal king jewelled earrings, worn by his 
queen, Madayantī. The king intended to devour him, but the Brahmin promised him to come again as 
victim after the fulfilment of his duty, as a Brahmin always keeps his word. In the hope of his deliver-
ance from the curse through the merit of giving such precious thing, the king agreed to the request of 
the Brahmin, and also refrained from killing him afterwards. This episode has a striking analogy with 
the Sutasomajātakas, the main object of which teaches truthfulness. It would not be unnatural to sup-
pose that here the Epic had received an unconscious influence from Buddhist writings.”599 
                                                 
596
 „Wie dem Menschenfresser das Ankommen des Sutasoma (wohl vor langer Zeit) prophezeit wurde, so 
wurde möglicherweise in der ursprünglichen Fassung das Ankommen des Buddha dem Aṅgulimāla angekün-
digt, wovon die gāthā mit mahesi und cirassaṃ zu berichten scheint.“ (Zin 2006: 111) 
597
 Or possibly from the v. 390, Jā V 475,1-4: Tiṭṭhāhīti mayā vutto so tvaṃ gacchasi yammukho, aṭhito ṭhoto 
’mhīti lapasi brahmacāri, idaṃ te samaṇa ayuttaṃ, asiñ ca me maññasi kaṃkapattan ti? However, in the Bud-
dhist context the compound brahmacārin does not necessarily always refer to Brahmins; in fact, it does so ra-
ther seldom.  
598
 Aśvamedha Parvan, 56, 30 et. seq. 
599
 See Watanabe 1909: 276&291. 
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In general, the whole episode in this prose section of the Mahāsutasoma Jātaka seems 
contrived and raises serious questions about its credibility/originality. 
 The following contains a brief summary of this episode in the prose commentary of the 
Mahāsutasoma Jātaka.600 The man-eating prince Brahmadattakumāra injures his foot by stepping 
on the thorn of an acacia tree (khadira-khāṇuka) during a chase through the woods where he am-
bushes people to kill them and eat them. He then prays to a tree-spirit (rukkha-devatā/yakkhinī): 
if she made his wound heal within a week, he would offer her a blood-sacrifice of 100 (or 101? 
“ekasata”) khattiya-kings. His wound does actually heal within a week, but rather because it 
dries up because his injury forces him to a week’s complete abstinence from any food and drink, 
and without the assistance of the tree-spirit, as the text states.601 However, the cannibal, full of 
gratitude to the tree-spirit, announces to fulfill his oath, which upsets the tree-spirit because she 
does not want to be responsible for such an atrocity. Yet the cannibal goes about to assemble the 
100 khattiya-kings he needs to perform his sacrifice with the help of a mantra which imparts the 
supernatural power to walk very fast (agghapadalakkhaṇaṃ nāma mantaṃ), except for Suta-
soma because he had been his former tutor in Takkasilā. Assembling his victims one by one, he 
pierces the palms of their hands and hangs them like a necklace on the Nyagrodha-tree in which 
the tree-spirit lives. But she, in her dismay and perplexity, turns first to the Four Great Kings (ca-
tur-mahārājikā), asking them to prevent the ogre from the completion of his terrible plan. But 
they cannot help and refer her to Indra, king of the gods. Unfortunately, he also professes himself 
unable to help in this matter, but recommends the tree-spirit to convince Kammāsapāda some-
how to catch Sutasoma, because only he had the power and the karma to prevent the cannibal 
from carrying out his sinister plan, and would even be able to cure him once and for all of canni-
balism. The tree-spirit then cooks up a trick: she magically changes her appearance into that of 
an (Brahmin-)ascetic and approaches the man-eater. At this point, the story becomes even odder: 
The cannibal hears footsteps behind him and thinks that maybe one of the kings had managed to 
break away and wanted to flee. But then he sees that the noise comes from an ascetic. He thinks, 
“Jolly good! Ascetics are khattiyas, indeed. If I just catch that one, I have gathered my 101 kings 
and can offer my sacrifice.” He thus takes his sword and starts to follow the ascetic. He runs as 
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 Cp. Jā V 472,11-475,12.  
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fast as he can, yet is unable to catch him, although the ascetic seems to walk at a normal pace. 
The cannibal is quite puzzled about this because earlier, he remembers, he was easily capable of 
following after and catching a running horse, a running elephant or a chariot in motion. Sud-
denly, he gets an idea: “Ascetics always do what they are told to do, don’t they? Suppose I 
simply ordered him to stop; when he has stopped, I will catch him.” Then he shouts: “Stop, as-
cetic!” Hereafter a little dialogue unfolds between the tree-spirit and the man-eater, which – sim-
ilar to the Aṅgulimala Sutta – features a pun on ṭhito-aṭṭhito. The interpretation, however, is 
completely different from the pun in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta and serves to illustrate the virtue of 
truthfulness. 
The similarities between this little episode and the Aṅgulimāla Sutta are obvious. The 
verses themselves, however, are quite different.602 In short, not only that the story of the tree-
spirit in disguise is itself very odd (take, e.g., the statement “Ascetics are khattiyas, indeed.”), the 
whole story sounds so contrived that one easily gets the impression that perhaps some verses had 
become mixed up, for which the commentator later on felt compelled to provide an explanation 
in the prose text. Regarding contents, that is because the verses would actually fit better into the 
context of the last encounter of Sutasoma, who is identified with the Buddha in the Jātaka’s 
samodhāna, with the cannibal (= Brahmadattakumāra), which eventually leads to his conversion 
– a dialogue between the cannibal and Sutasoma, which would insofar show similarities with the 
Aṅgulimāla story, as the critical dialogue then appeared at the most dramatic moment in the plot, 
                                                 
602
 The episode is also not found in any of the early Chinese translations of those texts, which feature the Kal-
māṣapāda story; cp. Watanabe 1909: 241ff. 15. The Mahāprajñāpāpamitā-śāstra, translated by Kumārajīva in 
A. D. 405, (see op. cit. p. 247) contains the capturing of the 100 kings, but not the tree-spirit. Another text, in 
Sanskrit, the Ṣaṭpāramitā-samuccaya, features an episode with a tree-sprit and a blood-sacrifice, but no men-
tion is made of the tree-spirit disguising itself as an ascetic and playing a trick on Sutasoma (Watanabe 1909: 
248). It goes on like this in the texts Watanabe analyses, which supports the thesis that the tree-spirit episode as 
it appears in the Mahāsutasoma Jātaka is very odd and most probably contrived.  
 197 
 
namely the conversion of the cannibal, respectively, the murderer. However, this has to remain 
mere speculation.603 
In summary, it is even more plausible – although Zin rejects this view604 – that the old and 
perhaps widely-known story of Kalmāṣapāda had to serve as the Jātaka-story of the previous in-
carnation of Aṅgulimāla (maybe because of its similarities with the Aṅgulimāla Sutta). From the 
examples presented here, it is likewise thinkable that the narrator (or author(s)/ editor(s)) of the 
Jātaka’s prose-commentary knew the Aṅgulimāla Sutta, and took certain (stock) phrases and for-
mulaic expressions from it to reproduce them, more or less faithful to the original, in his story to 
                                                 
603
 It is interesting to note that Be(R), a Burmese ms. (“Bd”), and the Kopenhagen palm-leaf ms. used by 
Fausbøll in the PTS edition all read brahmacārini in pāda three of v. 390 Jā V 475 (=Be(R) 393) instead of 
brahmacāri, as if the redactor wanted to indicate the true identity of the suddenly occurring ascetic (= the tree-
spirit in disguise?). Also interesting to note is the occurrence of the word cora in pāda three of v. 391, whereas 
the prose usually speaks of Brahmadattaputta/Kammāsapāda as a porisāda, “cannibal”, throughout (the cty. is 
not very helpful here, since it just moralizingly explains cora to be a designation for someone who has left the 
path of wholesome action: Corañcāti loke corañca dasakusalakammapathesu aṭhitaṃ nāma vadanti.). The 
problem with the verses is that they cannot be fully understood without the prose, which provides the contex-
tual frame story. From the verses alone, we could not always state with absolute certainty who is speaking and 
to whom. Pāda two of verse 391 Jā V 475,8, e.g., does not really make sense as the words of the tree-spirit (na 
nāmagottaṃ parivattayāmi). Although there are strong indications that a certain tree-spirit plays a role in the 
Kammāsapāda story already from an early stage, I still suspect that the story as we now have it in the Jātaka is 
somewhat contrived, and last but not least, that the evidence is too little to construct a direct link to the Aṅgu-
limāla story, as Zin wishes to do. Also other associations Zin arouses, e.g. that the narrative element of Aṅgu-
limāla’s mother bringing food into the woods in the later ‘northern’ versions of the story was derived from Th 
882 (pāda d: …anaṇo bhuñjāmi bhojanaṃ), are in my opinion very vague, cp. Zin 2006: 108. 
Other added elements of the so called ‘northern versions’, with which the Pāli commentaries (Paramattha-
dīpanī and Papañcasūdanī) must have had a common textual witness, as Zin argues, are: ‘background-story’; 
the evil teacher in Takkasilā and his wife (who gave A. the order); mother bringing food to the woods where 
Aṅgulimāla stays; Aṅgulimāla about to kill his last victim (his own mother bringing him food) in order to full-
fil his vow. The details, however, differ as to the explanation why exactly the teacher sends Aṅgulimāla away 
(see Zin 2006: 104-106). I think Zin is right in assuming that the background stories of Aṅgulimala’s 
youth/former rebirths were invented in order to pass responsibility for Aṅgulimāla’s evil deeds to someone 
else, namely, in the Pāli commentaries e.g., to the evil teacher, because his attaining Arhatship despite being a 
mass murderer, and therefore amassing very bad karma, obviously caused a doctrinal problem for orthodox 
Theravāda and other Hīnayāna schools, cp. Zin 2006: 108. Compare, however, the verse (Th 872 = Dhp 
173=MN II,104):  
yassa pāpaṃ kataṃ kammaṃ kusalena pithīyati | so ’maṃ lokaṃ pabhāseti abbhā mutto ’va candimā ||, 
which does not seem to exhibit any particular problem with this. 
604
 Cp. Zin 2006: 110. 
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illustrate the Jātaka verses.605 Although it is not possible to establish the chronological depend-
ency of the textual version from only two textual examples (which moreover stem from different 
genres), the following table illustrates, to a certain degree, the general impression one gets from 
comparing the texts. (Since most of the Jātaka-prose is generally deemed to be younger than the 
Majjhima Nikāya material and more loosely narrated, as was stated above, the idea seems to sug-
gest itself more naturally.) 
Mahāsutasoma Jātaka (Jā V 474,16-
475,4) 
Aṅgulimāla Sutta (MN II 99) 
[…] uṭṭhāya asihattho anubandhi, 
tiyojanaṃ anubandhitvāpi taṃ pāpuṇituṃ 
nāsakkhi, gattehi sedā mucciṃsu. So cintesi: 
“ahaṃ pubbe hatthimpi assampi rathampi 
dhāvantaṃ anubandhitvā gaṇhāmi, ajj’ 
imaṃ pabbajitaṃ sakāya gatiyā gac-
chantaṃ sabbatthāmena dhāvanto pi 
gaṇhituṃ na sakkomi, kin nu kho kāraṇan” 
ti, tato “pabbajitā nāma vacanakārakā hontī 
ti, tiṭṭhā” ti naṃ vatvā “ṭhitaṃ gahessāmīti” 
cintetvā “tiṭṭha, samaṇā” ti ā[ha], “ahaṃ 
tāva ṭhito, tvaṃ pana ṭhātuṃ vāyāmā ’ti 
ā[ha], atha naṃ “bho pabbajitā nāma 
jīvitahetu pi alikaṃ na bhaṇanti, tvaṃ pana 
musāvādaṃ kathesīti” vatvā g[āthā]m ā[ha]:  
Tiṭṭhāhīti mayā vutto, so tvaṃ gac-
chasi yammukho, 
aṭhito ṭhito ’mhīti, lapasi 
brahmacāri idaṃ te samaṇa ayuttaṃ 
asiñ ca me maññasi kaṅkapattan ti. 
390. 
Atha kho coro aṅgulimālo asi-
cammaṃ gahetvā dhanukalāpaṃ 
sannayhitvā bhagavantaṃ piṭṭhito piṭṭhito 
anubandhi. Atha kho Bhagavā tathārūpaṃ 
iddhābhisaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkhāsi […] 
Yathā coro aṅgulimālo bhagavantaṃ 
pakatiyā gacchantaṃ sabbatthāmena gac-
chanto na sakkoti sampāpuṇituṃ. Atha kho 
corassa aṅgulimālassa etadahosi: acchari-
yaṃ vata bho abbhūtaṃ vata bho, ahaṃ hi 
pubbe hatthimpi dhāvantaṃ anupatitvā 
gaṇhāmi, assampi dhāvantaṃ anupatitvā 
gaṇhāmi, rathampi dhāvantaṃ anupatitvā 
gaṇhāmi, migampi dhāvantaṃ anupatitvā 
gaṇhāmi. Atha ca panāhaṃ imaṃ sa-
maṇaṃ pakatiyā gacchantaṃ sabbat-
thāmena gacchanto na sakkomi 
sampāpuṇitu’nti ṭhito bhagavantaṃ 
etadavoca: tiṭṭha samaṇa, tiṭṭha samaṇāti. 
ṭhito ahaṃ aṅgulimāla, tvañca tiṭṭhāti. 
                                                 
605
 The the Jātakas accompanying prose is in fact generally held to have been a rather freely narrated commen-
tary in most cases, cp. von Hinüber 1996: §113.  
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 Atha kho corassa aṅgulimālassa eta-
dahosi: ''ime kho samaṇā sakyaputtiyā sac-
cavādino saccapaṭiññā. Atha panāyaṃ sa-
maṇo gacchaṃ yevāha: ’ṭhito ahaṃ, aṅgu-
limāla, tvañ ca tiṭṭhā ’ti. Yaṃnūnāhaṃ imaṃ 
samaṇaṃ puccheyyanti.  
 Atha kho coro aṅgulimālo bhaga-
vantaṃ āthāya ajjhabhāsi:  
“Gacchaṃ vadesi samaṇa ṭhitomhi,  
mamañca brūsi ṭhitam aṭṭhito ’ti.  
pucchāmi taṃ samaṇa etamatthaṃ,  
kathaṃ ṭhito tvaṃ aham aṭṭhitomhī 
’ti. […] 
 
Perhaps, it is also possible to think of the existence of two different parallel narrative tra-
ditions or stories, namely that of the robber Aṅgulimāla and that of the cannibal Kalmāṣapāda, 
which were linked retrospectively.  
Now, it is not unthinkable that the Aṅgulimāla Sutta belongs to a class of texts, the pecu-
liarities of which Moritz Winternitz606 has already recognised and thus referred to as ākhyāna 
(quite freely narrated prose narrative with intermittent verses), and which therefore would de-
mand a special place within the Majjhima Nikāya or even the entire Sutta Piṭaka. This would 
come as no surprise though, since also elsewhere in the Canon echos of other genres are found, 
such as the suttas of the “Jātaka-type”.607 This, however, would make the Aṅgulimāla Sutta a 
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 Winternitz 1993, 46: “Some of the Suttas (of the Majjhima-Nikāya) are neither dialogues nor sermons, but 
they are simply stories. Thus no. 86 [= Aṅgulimālasutta] is a regular old Ākhyāna in which in prose and verse 
the story of the terrible robber Aṅgulimāla is told who became a monk and reached even the height of an Arhat 
(the holyman who is sure of Nirvāṇa) – a valuable piece of ancient Buddhist poetry.” = Winternitz 1913: 35: 
“So ist Nr. 86 [=Aṅgulimāla-Sutta, MN] ein regelrechtes Ākhyāna, in welchem in Prosa und Versen von dem 
schrecklichen Räuber Aṅgulimāla erzählt wird, […] - ein wertvolles Stück altbuddhistischer Dichtung.” 
607
 Passages starting with bhūtapubbaṃ (instead of asite, as in the Therāvada-version), for instance, are indica-
tive of an early form of the Jātaka-genre; see von Hinüber 1996: §113.  
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special case or unique within the group of the longer suttas.608 An origin of the “paper-being” 
Aṅgulimāla in old Indian narrative material (and therefore no historical, real-life origin), mainly 
“drawn” from the template of the old Kalmāṣapāda narrative, would thus not be very unlikely. 
But it is impossible to verify and establish this beyond any doubt. Nevertheless, that would not 
pose any problem to my treatment of the characters of the Pāli suttas. Whether a literary charac-
ter originates in a historical person or in some older story-material does not make any difference 
for (1) his synchronic narratological analysis, and (2) for, according to Margolin and others, 
when he/it enters the story-world, his/its ontological status also changes.609   
Zin’s view ultimately regards the character Aṅgulimāla – and this is diametrically op-
posed to Gombrich’s interpretation – as the result of a purely literary development of an old nar-
rative motif or older narrative ‘material’. Then, Aṅgulimāla is really Kalmāṣapāda/ Saudāsa, the 
“King ‘with speckled feet’” (Skt. Kalmāṣapādaḥ) of the Mahābhārata, who is in a dispute with 
and gets cursed by the Brahmins Vasiṣṭha and his son Śakti, and Viśvāmitra. In turn, may 
Saudāsa perhaps be identical with the historical king Sudās of the R̥gveda? This would mean that 
there is no real-life origin of the character Aṅgulimāla. The implication of this situation could 
then sound like the following, then: Victory of “Buddho”, Emile Senart’s ancient sun-hero610, 
over Sudās Paijavana, the famous winner of the battle of the ten kings in the R̥gveda, an ancient 
                                                 
608
 Funnily enough, although part of the Rāja Vagga, the “section about kings”, the main character in the Āṅgu-
limāla Sutta is the brigand Aṅgulimāla. 
609
 Cp., again, Jannidis 2004: 128, and Schmid 2008: 39-41.  
610
 See Oldenberg 1882: 74: “In Senart’s opinion, Buddha, the real Buddha, did exist, it is true: his reality, he 
admits, is a logical necessity, inasmuch as we see the reality of the Church founded by him; but beyond this 
bare reality there is nothing substantial. The fancy of his followers attached to his person the great allegorical 
ballad of the life of the sun-god in human guise; the life of the man Buddha had been forgotten.” 
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myth newly arranged and reenacted, as it were, in an ākhyāna with the title Aṅgulimāla Sutta?611 
Or, by the same token, is it the result of a progressing confusion, due to an ignorance of the old 
sources, a thicket of versions of a story, enlarged, tailored to new contexts, and/or messed up as 
time went on? These are, eventually, the possible implications of Zin’s ‘thematising’ interpreta-
tion. Although I do not find this categorically unthinkable – at least as regards specifically the 
Aṅgulimāla Sutta – it completely ignores the ‘mimetic aspect’ of characters, which undoubtedly 
has an essential part in the effect of the story (which is already proven, I think, by the continuous 
popularity of the character), no matter what its origin is. 
In any case, these two opposed interpretations of the same story tell us much more about 
its authors’ view of the character Aṅgulimāla and the presuppositions their theories and views on 
persons in pre-modern Indian texts is based on. Funnily enough, in both presentations, the char-
acter Aṅgulimāla has become, in a way, independent of its textual origin. The incident of the fic-
tive literary character Sherlock Holmes comes to mind, who receives circa seven-hundred letters 
each year from all parts of the world at “his” address, Baker Street 221b, London.612 As Monika 
Zin has demonstrated, there are several consonances between the Aṅgulimāla-story and the story 
of the cannibal Kalmāṣapāda. However, Zin’s argument is not entirely convincing that, and how 
exactly, the Aṅgulimāla Sutta might have been developed from the earlier material of the canni-
bal stories as, for instance, that contained in the Mahāsutasoma Jātaka, specifically considering 
the general assumption that the Sutta Piṭaka as textual composition is generally held to be older 
                                                 
611
 However, more problems are lurking already in the early stages of the Kalmāṣapāda story: The name 
Saudāsa does not yet occur in the Buddhist adaption of the story, which, according to Watanabe, probably sug-
gests that the mixing up of identities must have happened at a later stage, when the motifs were taken over into 
the epics, cp. Watanabe 1909: 290. 
As to Sudās and Klamāṣapāda, see also Watanabe 1909: 281: „The original materials of the first act of the Epic 
story can be traced in the R̥g-Veda. Sudās, the king of Tr̥tsus, who had won a great victory in the famous ‘bat-
tle of ten kings,’ may be one of the greatest heroes in the Vedic period, having perhaps a historical character. 
He is called, also, Paijavana, the son of Pijavana, and occurs several times in the R̥g-Veda. The name Paija-
vana is found in the later Vedic writings, but it is never mentioned in the Epic or in the Puranic literature. This 
Sudās Paijavana is the original and perhaps historical form of the Epic Kalmāṣapāda.” According to Watanabe 
(1909: 284) a confusion of names happened already at a fairly early stage: Saudāsa, according to a passage in 
the R̥gveda, refers to the adherents or menials of Sudās, who become revolutionized by the jealous Viśvāmitra 
to kill Vasiṣṭha’s son Śakti: “Saudāsa, the followers of Sudās, killed Śakti, stirred up by Viśvāmitra. But the 
Epic changed the original meaning of the word, and took it for the son of Sudās. The innocent Tr̥tsus king him-
self became, therefore, guilty of the murder of Vasiṣṭha’s son. The Epic gave a new dress to the old tradition of 
the struggle between the two sages, Viśvāmitra keeping his odious character as an instigator.” 
612
 Cp. Westerhoff 2010: 97. 
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than the bulk of prose portions of the Jātaka literature.613 It is indisputable that already the Bud-
dhist tradition itself saw some similarities between the two stories, which is why in the 
Mahāsutasoma Jātaka Brahmadattaputta, i.e. Kammāsapada (= Kalmāṣapāda/Saudāsa), was 
identified as a previous incarnation of Aṅgulimāla. Nevertheless, that does not solve convinc-
ingly the problem of Aṅgulimāla’s real identity. Furthermore, Zin does not elucidate the charac-
ter Aṅgulimala himself, let alone that her approach could provide any convincing explanation as 
to the nature of the characters. 614 However, the seminal passage of internal focalisation in the 
Aṅgulimāla Sutta (part I.3) virtually calls for a character-model that takes the psychological di-
mension of persons, respectively characters into account. 
5.5 A Critical Verse 
In this chapter, a closer look will be taken at the verses ascribed to Aṅgulimāla in the 
Theragāthā, because they deserve more attention and a view from another angle.615 I argue that 
the verses of the Th do appear to be worked neatly into the Aṅgulimāla-narrative of MN 86. The 
import of my argument, however, will be presented at the end of this excursus. 
Upon comparing the Th-verses with MN 86, one finds that Th 866-870 correspond to the 
verses MN II 99,25-100,12, which relate Aṅgulimāla’s encounter with the Buddha and his subse-
quent conversion from a gruesome criminal to a peaceful and ordained Buddhist monk. Th 871-
886 are the same (never mind variant readings, which are not relevant here) as MN II 104,21-
105,24. The remaining verses of the Th (887-891) are not found in MN 86. 
Specifically, one verse, Th 868, as previously discussed, eventually gave rise to Gom-
brich’s ingenious interpretation, and others’ responses. The verse also seems to have caught the 
                                                 
613
 This is, however, not true for the narrative material of the Jātakas, of course, which is often much older than 
Buddhism itself; cp. von Hinüber 1996: §110, p. 55. 
614
 In this regard, it is not unthinkable that by the time of Buddhaghosa, the identity of Aṅgulimāla was already 
forgotten. This could perhaps explain for the awkward background-stories in both commentaries (either that 
two stories – that of the cannibal Kalmāṣapāda and that of the robber Aṅgulimāla) were somehow muddled up 
or that the background stories are altogether inventions of the commentators in order to elucidate certain ele-
ments found in the text.  
615
 These verses thematically represent, in a way, the nucleus of the story of Aṅgulimāla. But one certainly can-
not go so far as to say that they must represent the earliest version of the story to be found in the Canon only 
because they are composed in verse, as Monika Zin implicitly, i.e., without further explanation, seems to pre-
suppose; cp. Zin 2006: 101.  
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attention of scholars and translators and led to numerous different translations and interpreta-
tions. In the following I will look at this verse in further detail, summarise Gombrich’s main ar-
gument for his interpretation616 and some of the grammatical and metrical problems involved, be-
fore finally offering a simple but new way of looking at the verse and what it can reveal about 
the presentation of the character Aṅgulimāla. 
The verse in question reads as follows (the PTS-edition’s reading is given on the left with 
Norman’s translation underneath, and opposite Gombrich’s conjectured first pāda together with 
his translation underneath):  
 
cirassaṃ vata me mahito mahesi 
mahāvanaṃ samaṇoyam paccavādi 
so ’haṃ cirassā pahāssaṃ pāpaṃ 
sutvāna gāthaṃ tava dhammayuttaṃ 
ciraṃ vatā me mahito maheso 
mahāvanaṃ pāpuni saccavādī 
so ’haṃ cajissāmi sahassapāpaṃ 
sutvāna gāthaṃ tava dhammayuttaṃ 
 
“Truly it is a long time since a great seer, an 
ascetic, honoured by me, entered the great 
wood. Having heard your righteous verse, I 
shall abandon my numerous evils.” (tr. Nor-
man 1969: 82)  
 
“For a long time to fulfill a vow I have been 
honouring Śiva. You have arrived in the for-
est, speaking truth. So, I shall give up my 
thousand crimes, for I have heard your verse, 
which teaches what is right.” (tr. Gombrich 
2006: 154) 
 
The verses in the Theragāthā and the Therīgāthā are generally held to have been sung or recited 
by the theras and therīs as spontaneous expressions of their spiritual attainments and/or experi-
ences. Although spontaneous compositions of inspired verses or “songs of realisation” may be a 
widespread phenomenon in the Indian religious landscape, the collection of the Theragāthā was 
probably compiled over a long period of time, and the text is clearly the result of an editing pro-
cess.617 Another peculiar aspect of this genre is the absence of the idea of authorship. What is 
more, different schools of reciters (bhāṇakas) did exist, a fact that can explain the transmission 
                                                 
616
 For a detailed discussion of all existing translations of this verse and all the grammatical and metrical issues 
raised by Gombrich, see Gombrich 2006: 145-54. 
617
 Cp. Norman 1983: 73. 
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of different versions (which in this case, a comparison of the verses in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta and 
Theragāthā (Th) shows). K. R. Norman wrote:  
“This shows nothing more than the absence in ancient times of a law of copyright, and anyone could 
repeat any verse, which then became “his” verse when it was remembered in connection with his 
name.”618 
 Therefore, the verses in the Th ascribed to Aṅgulimāla were probably not recorded in-
stantly619 in exactly that form and sequence as it is found in the version that has come down to us. 
In other words, there are good reasons to believe that the current text is the result of an inten-
tional editing process of some sort in the different versions.620 Thus, the text in its present form 
must have made sense at least for the saṃgītikāras (= authors/compilers/editors/redactors/recit-
ers). Obviously someone felt compelled, or free, to insert three verses (Th 870-873) into an oth-
erwise coherent first-person account without being disturbed by the different ‘voices’ (narrator’s 
text and character’s, i.e. Aṅgulimala’s, text) within verses of the Th as well as in the sutta.621 My 
own analysis and interpretation below tries to account for this fact. The verses just mentioned in-
deed make the impression of being interpolated; the verses Th 869 & 870, because, as just men-
                                                 
618
 Norman 1983: 74. 
619
 This conclusion seems to present itself, since several of the verses are also found in different places in the 
Dhammapada (Dhp): Th 871f. = Dhp 172f.; Th 873 = Dhp 382 (here the idea suggests itself that the verse was 
taken over from this different place in the Dhp because of the identical pādas c and d, so as to create identical 
half verse-endings in three sequential verses); Th 877 = Dhp 80. However, it is also possible, and the idea 
probably suggests itself more naturally, that the verses originally belonged together and were taken altogether 
from a third source, cp. Norman 1983: 59. 
620
 In my opinion, this editing process is or has been very often underrated by Western scholars. It is fair to as-
sume that the editing process in most cases would have been undertaken by someone with a considerable com-
mand of the Pāli language, though this was perhaps not always the case. Compliation was a widespread ‘liter-
ary’ technique in ancient cultures, and we are in no position to judge the treatment of texts in ancient cultures 
from the point of view of a (post-)modern Western notion of originality. Tradition and “correct” (whatever that 
may have entailed) transmission were held in high esteem.     
621
 Cp. Norman 1997: §2: “Since Winternitz wrote, investigations have suggested that in many cases the 
Dhammapada did not borrow from elsewhere in the canon, but that in the canon as a whole borrowing took 
place from a store of verses which in all probability pre-dates the canon in its present form. Although we talk 
about Dharmapada literature, the Pāli parallels of verses in the other Dharmapada texts are sometimes to be 
found, not in the Dhammapada, but in the Suttanipāta, or the Saṃyutta-nikāya, or the Jātaka, or occasionally in 
other canonical texts.” 
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tioned, in them the enunciating ‘voice’ changes from a first-person account to a third-person nar-
rative instance, and the other three verses (Th 871-873) because they are additonally found in the 
Dhammapada (Dhp 172, 173 & 382) in different contexts (Loka-, Bhikkhuvagga respectively).  
These last verses express rather general statements that are not related specifically with 
Aṅgulimāla’s situation, but which were adapted or attributed – precisely due to their general na-
ture – to Aṅgulimāla’s story.622 (However, in the case of Th 869f., still the possibility has to be 
taken into consideration that it does not seem to have been very uncommon to speak about one-
self in the third person.623) 
Nevertheless, coming back to Th 868, the main problems in the first pāda of the verse are 
the corrupted metre, the adverb cirassaṃ and – as far as Gombrich’s conjecture is concerned – 
the noun mahesi. Furthermore, Gombrich writes: “A further problem is that the adverb cirassaṃ 
seems naturally to go with the verb nearest to it”624, i.e., mahito “honoured”. However, I do not 
see a problem in rating the possibility of cirassaṃ going with the main verb in the second pāda, 
opted for by Norman in his translation625, among poetic licence.626 As to the meaning of cirassaṃ 
I think we are not lead astray by sticking to the meanings recorded in the PED, “after a long 
time” and “at last”, instead of ‘borrowing’ a meaning “for a long time” from Sanskrit-usage, as 
Gombrich does.627 He writes: 
“The problem here is that in the story (of the AS [=Aṅgulimāla Sutta] – never mind the commentaries) 
it is not a long time since the Buddha entered the forest.”628 
                                                 
622
 See n. 619.  
623
 Cp., e.g., Th 892 and 894-897, where the thera Anuruddha appears to speak about himself in the refrain: 
“[…] Anuruddho ’va jhāyati” and “[…] Anuruddho anāsavo”. Cp. also Tubb/Bose 2007: pp. 227-229, alt-
hough the context is completely different (scientific and scholastic Sanskrit of the commentaries). 
624
 Gombrich 2006a: 145. 
625
 Cp. the citation in Gombrich 2006a: 145. He later emends to ciraṃ which better conveys the meaning of a 
stretch of time, cp. also Warder 2001: 18. 
626
 Cp. Warder 2001: 354. 
627
 Cp. Gombrich 2006a: 145. 
628
 Ibid.: 145. 
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I agree with the objection Gombrich has raised with regard to the existing translations 
mentioned earlier that the meanings they produce are “implausible”629. They suggest that either 
Aṅgulimāla had been worshipping the Buddha already before his arrival to the “great forest” 
(Norman) or that Aṅgulimāla just realises in that very moment that the Buddha had finally come 
to rescue him (Bhikkhu Bodhi/Buddhaghosa). Furthermore, Gombrich remarks that both com-
mentators were obviously aware of the problem that Aṅgulimāla could not possibly have vener-
ated the Buddha before his conversion, and therefore explain the personal pronoun me as the da-
tive, meaning “for me, for my sake”.630 Gombrich suggested that therefore mahesi could not refer 
to the Buddha at all – thus his conjecture. The following pursues another direction of thought 
which keeps the Buddha addressed as mahesi (this seems plausible because already in the next 
but one verse, MN II 100,9 (= Th 870), the expressions karuṇiko mahesi are explicitly attributed 
to the Buddha), and venture to explain the temporal puzzle brought up by the verse.631  
Gombric’s interpretation needs the third pāda of the Th version in his restored verse be-
cause it mentions “a thousand crimes” (sahassapāpaṃ), which in his reading is alluding to the 
                                                 
629
 Cp. n. 590 above. Ñāṇamoli’s and Bodhi’s translation, which follows closely the explanation of the Ps that 
Aṅgulimāla in this moment recognises the Buddha in front of him, is closest to my understanding of the pas-
sage. The cty explains that although with regard to bodily activity Aṅgulimāla stands still (iriyāpathena ṭhito 
pi), he is running towards rebirth in the lower realms. Aṅgulimāla realises that this is a “great lion’s roar” and 
that such a “lion’s roar” can be “roared” by no one else than the son of Mahāmāyā, Siddhattha, king of the sa-
maṇas. Thus, the one in front of him must be the Buddha himself, who came for his sake. This is what Aṅgu-
limāla thought. Therefore, he said cirassaṃ vata me and so forth; cp. Ps III 333,11-17. We can see here, as also 
in many other instances in his cty, that Buddhaghosa is not squeamish in ascribing thoughts to characters that 
are not explicitly stated by the text. Although I would line up with Buddhaghosa in that the text depicts a sud-
den moment of insight, however, with the perhaps subtle distinction or addition, if one wills, that I would not 
stress the idea too much that Aṅgulimāla recognises the Buddha (which he of course must have, because he 
asks for ordination right away), but rather that Aṅgulimāla experiences a sort of epiphany, the crucial point of 
which is not only the presence of the Buddha himself but his sudden insight that his actions are utterly wrong 
and evil.  
630
 Cp. Gombrich 2006a: 149. 
631
 Additionally, for Aṅgulimāla to speak of the Buddha as “seer” (mahesi) would not at all be odd, mainly be-
cause it is a fact in the narrated world (the story) that Aṅgulimāla is of brahminical descent; cp. Th 889: brah-
majacco pure āsiṃ, udicco ubhato ahuṃ | (so ’jja putto sugatassa dhammarājassa satthuno ||), and the men-
tioning of his Brahmin parents MN 86 (Be(R)): Kathaṃgotto ayyassa pitā, kathaṃgottā mātāti? Gaggo kho, 
mahārāja, pitā, mantāṇī mātāti. Abhiramatu, bhante, ayyo gaggo mantāṇiputto. There is als more evidence 
that the Buddha is sometimes addressed as mahesi in the Pali Canon, see CPD s.v. isi. Cp. also, e.g., just the 
gāthā following Aṅgulimāla’s verses in the Theragāthā (the verses of Anuruddho thero, Th 900), where the 
Buddha is referred to with what is obviously meant as an epithet of his, mahesi:  
[…] tassa dhammā ime honti kusalā bodhipakkhikā 
anāsavo ca so hoti, iti vuttaṃ mahesinā || 900 || 
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thousands finger Aṅgulimāla is out for when he encounters the Buddha. (According to the com-
mentary, Aṅgulimāla collects fingers of his victims to repay a debt to his former teacher in Tak-
kasilā.) This element of the story is not mentioned explicitly in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta, but for 
some reason the commentators seemed to feel an urgent need to find an explanation for it.632 Yet, 
not to have the “thousand” in the verse or in the actual sutta-story would not pose any problem 
for an interpretation of Aṅgulimāla as a notorious criminal. In any case, it seems to be an ele-
ment that was added later.633 However, deciding for a reading that keeps the “thousand” does not 
necessarily mean that it must refer to 1000 fingers because no fingers are mentioned, but 
“crimes” (pāpaṃ).    
Since the first pada is the same in all available editions, and there does not seem to be 
further textual evidence, altogether I take it to be good as we have it, although it does not scan 
and may be corrupt.634 Gombrich’s conjecture has met with strong criticism and given the fact 
that there is no variant reading available for this first pada, I am very much inclined to stick to 
Norman’s emendation, which is much less invasive. He suggested dropping the anusvāra in ci-
rassaṃ (= common metrical licence) and reading vata as resolution of the fourth syllable of the 
                                                 
632
 See Gombrich 2006a: 149. 
633
 Cp. Zin 2006: 118: “Die Anwesenheit der Mutter (welche die Episode mit dem Lehrer impliziert) in den 
meisten Darstellungen deutet darauf hin, dass sich die bildliche Tradition an der entwickelten Version (d.h. 
nicht an Majjhimanikāya, T 99 oder T 100) orientierte. Da manche der Reliefs in das 2. Jh. zu datieren sind, 
zeigt, dass eine entsprechende Erzählung bereits damals vorhanden war.” “Bereits”, however, here doubtlessly 
means a terminus post quem and definitely after the sutta-version. That means, if the story about the mother is 
connected to the story about the teacher in Takṣaśilā, then the thousand fingers as a ritual gift are also con-
nected to the story of the teacher, and therefore quite possibly a later development/version. 
634
 There exists a permitted variant of the tuṭṭhubha metre that has 12 syllables per pāda, which, however, still 
does not scan in this example because of the two laghu syllables in “vata”; cp. Warder 2001: 359. I think that 
the problem could not be solved (until further textual evidence might be discovered), unless one regards one-
self really on firm ground to modify the text as Gombrich does by his grave conjectures. However, there are no 
indications that could justify such an alteration of the text.  
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first pada, thus resulting in a 12-syllable tuṭṭhubha verse.635 Therefore, I take the Thergāthā-edi-
tion’s reading as a basis and start from scratch in making sense of the verse through a close read-
ing from a narratological viewpoint: 
Cirassaṃ vata me mahito mahesī,  
Mahāvanaṃ samaṇo paccupādi636 
So ’haṃ cajissāmi sahassapāpaṃ637 
Sutvāna gāthaṃ tava dhammayuttaṃ.638 
Vata, the second word in the first line, is, according to the PED, a “particle of exclama-
tion” with the meaning “surely, certainly, indeed, alas!” In this verse and in the preceding ones 
the speaker is Aṅgulimāla, who is directly addressed in verse Th 867 by the Buddha in their little 
dialogue (ṭhito ahaṃ Aṅgulimāla sabbadā | sabbesu bhūtesu nidhāya daṇḍaṃ), and who is thus 
the one saying ‘Alas!’ This particle, nevertheless, has also another function: as an exclamatory 
particle, it refers back to the person/instance uttering the exclamation, that is, Aṅgulimāla. It 
therefore denotes Aṅgulimāla as the perspectival centre from which the event is perceived, or 
from which the utterance originates. Similar to the term ‘deixis’ in linguistics, the expression 
                                                 
635
 Cp. Norman 1969: xxxvi, and his arguments summarised in Gombrich 2006: 150. The problem, however, as 
Gombrich criticised, with this emendation is that such a case of resolution of the fourth syllable in a tuṭṭhubha 
verse is not found elsewhere in the Th.  
I am inclined to think that the reason the text was left as it is (in the Burmese edition) by the redactors at the 
occasion of the last council in Yangon in 1954, may be that there was no better solution on offer in any of the 
readings that were consulted at the council. However, religious or traditionalist reasons such as that that the 
buddhavacana must not be altered cannot be ruled out here. For that reason, I deem it proper first to see if the 
text as we have it makes any sense or not. 
636
 Variant readings as cited in the PTS edition of the Aṅgulimāla Sutta (cp. also Gombrich 2006a: 144): Sin-
hala MSS: mahāvana samaṇo ’yaṃ paccupādi; Se/Ke: mahāvanaṃ samaṇa paccupādi; Be: mahāvanaṃ pāpuṇi 
saccavādī. Clearly, the Se and the Ce are directly dependent on each other. The PTS-edition’s reading ‘pacca-
vādi’ is, as Gombrich already noted, most probably the lectio difficilior chosen by the editor of the PTS edi-
tion, which is only attested in the cty of the Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition. 
637
 Variant readings as cited in the Be(R): Ce: sohaṃ cirassāpi pahāssaṃ pāpaṃ, Se/Ke sohaṃ carissāmi pa-
jahissaṃ pāpaṃ; Be: So ’haṃ carissāmi pahāya pāpaṃ. 
638
 As Richard Gombrich already noted, and as I have stated above, all pādas, except for the first, scan in the 
PTS edition of the text. Although that means that the text is most probably corrupt and cannot be restored with 
absolute certainty, and thus it is even harder (or probably altogether impossible) to assure its one/original 




‘Alas!’ here marks the centre of orientation within the text.639 The personal pronoun “me” has the 
same effect, and even more obviously. Although it may be obvious, it is still of utmost im-
portance to mention that the listener/reader deduces that Aṅgulimāla is the centre of narrative 
orientation (Ger. “Orientierungszentrum”) in this sentence because the personal pronoun refers 
back to the vocative ‘Aṅgulimāla’ in the previous verse, which means they have to be understood 
as belonging together. Read in a sequence with the two opening verses (the word “opening” may 
be somewhat misleading here since the verses start really in medias res), this whole third verse 
gives the impression of being a kind of internal reflection on what is happening during that en-
counter with the Buddha, as if the words represented Aṅgulimāla’s thoughts. In fact, it is gram-
matically unclear if these lines are meant to represent speech or thought, since no speech tag or 
other enunciatory context is provided. 
If for cirassaṃ one adopts the meaning the PED records foremost, “at last”, the transla-
tion of the verse-beginning would be: “At last, alas …!”. Why does this translation make sense in 
consideration of the situation portrayed in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta, in which Aṅgulimāla is about to 
be miraculously converted and subsequently ordained by the Buddha, and thus changes his evil 
ways? Does it mean that Aṅgulimāla was prophesied the arrival of the Buddha, as Zin suggested, 
and that he remembers in this very moment that a dramatic change of his destiny now dawns on 
him? It is possible to find another explanation, which is inherent in the text, without having to 
resort to other sources, destinies, or conjectures, in order to make sense of it. Let us proceed with 
the analysis in small steps. I now take ‘me’ to mean “for me, for my sake”, as suggested by the 
commentators, but for a different reason: it adds to the dramatic situation in which Aṅgulimāla 
finds himself in, his moment of realisation: “At last, alas! For my sake …”. After all, he is about 
to change fundamentally in the next few moments. A translation “for my sake” would lend the 
situation a very personal and subjective touch. However, the other possible interpretation, to link 
‘me’ with ‘mahito’ “praised”, is also possible and makes good sense in my interpretation of the 
verse if we understand it to signify “the sage revered by me [now, i.e., at the time of narration] 
entered [back then] the great forest” (the reason for this we shall see in a little while). Because 
the crucial point here is – and this is what I want to suggest as the decisive alternative reading of 
                                                 
639
 This is what Karl Bühler had called the Hier-Jetzt-Ich-Origo (lat. hic-nunc-ego-Origo), the neutral point, as 
it were, to or from which relations are defined; cp. Weber 1998: 43-48. 
 210 
 
this passage – that the sense of gravity or of the significance of what happens does not neces-
sarily have to be explained by some sort of prophecy or the like, but makes perfect sense when 
explained as perceived or remembered from a retrospective. Already a cursory look at the subse-
quent verses reveals that in fact all the verses ascribed to Aṅgulimāla in the Th, are conceptual-
ised as Aṅgulimāla’s retrospection or recapitulation of the events that lead to his final emancipa-
tion from the cycle of rebirths. In the Th, he, of course, utters them from the perspective of an 
arahant. A look at the tense (Aorist) and the temporal deixis (pure “formerly”) used, can prove 
this assumption (the last verse cited, then, mentions his attainment of Arhatship): 
coro ahaṃ pure āsiṃ | Aṅgulimālo ’ti vissuto (880) 
lohitapāṇi pure āsiṃ Aṅgulimālo ’ti vissuto | (881) 
araññe rukkhamūle vā pabbatesu gūhāsu vā | tattha tatth’ eva aṭṭhāsiṃ ubbigamanaso tadā || (887) 
brahmajacco pure āsiṃ udicco ubhato ahuṃ | etc. (889) 
vītataṇho anādāno guttadvāro susaṃvuto | aghamūlaṃ vamitvāna patto me āsavakkhayo || (890) 
pariciṇṇo mayā satthā kataṃ buddhassa sāsanaṃ | ohito garuko bhāro bhavanetti samūhatā ’ti || 
(891) 
The impression of non-mediatedness, as found in most of the Th-verses when dealing 
with words uttered in direct speech is effected through the use of the first person pronoun and 
through what Plato called “mimesis” and Henry James “showing” or, in Genette’s words, by “the 
poet ‘deliver[ing] a speech as if he were someone else’.”640 However, one must be aware that this 
is the illusion of non-mediatedness, in which the narrative instance is just hidden or covert to the 
highest possible degree, as one can see in the following two verses, Th 869, 870. In these verses, 
the situation is viewed from the outside or “from above”, as it were, and the scene is mediated 
through a witnessing or mediating narrative instance, which is reporting the events and refers to 
both the Buddha and Aṅgulimāla in the third person: 
itv eva coro asim āvudhañ ca sobbhe papāte narake anvakāsi | avandi coro sugatassa pāde, tatth’ eva 
pabbajjaṃ ayāci buddhaṃ || 869 || 
“With these words the robber hurled his sword and other weapons down a hole, a precipice, a chasm. 
The robber paid homage to the well-farer’s feet. On that very spot he asked the Buddha for admission 
to the Order.” 
buddho ca kho kāruṇiko mahesi yo satthā lokassa sadevakassa | tam ehi bhikkhū ’ti tadā avoca; es’ 
eva tassa āhu bhikkhubhāvo || 870 || 
                                                 
640
 Cp. Genette 1980: 162f. 
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“And then the Buddha, the compassionate great seer who is the teacher of the world including the de-
vas, said to him, ‘Come, bhikkhu’; this in itself was bhikkhu-status for him.”641 
From a narratological point of view, considering the category of narrative voice, it means 
nothing more and nothing less than that these verses are narrated by someone else than Aṅgulim-
āla.642 The other verses, then, appear as put into Aṅgulimāla’s mouth, or as a narrator’s report, 
rendered in direct speech, about what Aṅgulimāla himself has said or thought, just in a different 
narrative mode (i.e. ‘showing’), the enunciator of which vanishes completely behind the reported 
speech.643 Nevertheless, the main point is that Aṅgulimāla reports what has happened as a 
memory, his own memory, reported, but somewhat re-experienced, from a later stance in time, in 
retrospective. This becomes clear from the context of the verses as a whole, as already stated, but 
also from the use of the Aorist tense in the second pāda of verse 868: paccupādi, “he entered”, 
which can also be interpreted as designating the deeper past (although the distinction among past 
tenses is almost lost in the Pāli language). The preterite in the speech of the person narrating (in 
this verse) determines (reflexively, as it were,) the narrative centre of orientation in a time past 
the event/occurrence, as it is described, seen or remembered from the perspective of a reformed 
or purified Aṅgulimāla at the time of the narration. This is a phenomenon that is well known 
from the genre of autobiography (or ‘quasi-autobiography’, if ficticious), in which the diegetic 
‘narrating self’ and the ‘narrated self’644 stand in a quasi-heterodiegetic relation to each other. The 
‘two selfs’ are very often not only temporally separated, as representing different stages of the 
same psychophysical continuum645, but they can be separated from eachother by a considerable 
ethical and psychological distance as well, as is expressed, for instance, in Th 879: 
                                                 
641
 Tr. Norman 1969: 82f. 
642
 Which – in order to prevent possible jumping at conclusions here – means nothing as to the origin of the 
verses or any possible historical development. I am purely operating on the synchronic level of the discourse in 
the analysis. It is inherent in this kind of analysis that it does not allow for diachronic conclusions but first tries 
to make sense of the text as it is. 
643
 However, the idea that the following five verses are an interpolation of an editing hand intuitively suggests 
itself, namely, through the sudden switch into a different narrative mode (‘telling’), which is alien to the rest of 
the verses ascribed to Aṅgulimāla. Furthermore, the verses 871-873 are also found in the Dhammapada; see 
note 619 above. 
644
 Cp. Schmid, http://lecture2go.uni-hamburg.de/veranstaltungen/-/v/10689; „8. Sitzung, 12. Januar 2010”, 
00.01.00 min. 
645
 Cp. Schmid 2008: 97. 
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Ahiṃsako ’ti me nāmaṃ hiṃsakassa pure sato | ajjāhaṃ saccanāmo ’mhi na naṃ hiṃsāmi kañcinaṃ || 
“Although a killer/harming people in the past, my name [was from the beginning] Ahiṃsaka [“Harm-
less”]; Today my name speaks truth [because] I certainly do not harm anyone.”   
In the next pada (so ’haṃ cajissāmi sahassapāpaṃ646) the ‘narrated self’ is again more 
palpable –  the main verb in the future tense is perfectly apt to express a wish or intention of 
Aṅgulimāla’s, which at that moment in the past, he recollects, appeared in his mind.647 Grammati-
cally, by what has been termed ‘free indirect style’, it is again not stated definitely whether the 
words Th verses 868 and 869 (= MN II 100,1-4) represent Aṅgulimāla’s speech (re-reporting his 
past words in the moment of narration) or his thoughts. A verbum dicendi is neither found in the 
verses themselves nor in the surrounding verses, so that theoretically itveva (Th 869, pada a = 
MN II 100,5) could just as well render Aṅgulimāla’s thoughts. Thus, it is theoretically possible to 
interpret the line as representating Aṅgulimāla’s thoughts in the moment of the event, which are 
reported (in speech) at a later time of narration.  I, for one, can think of no argument that could 
prove that the verse Th 868 must have been spoken (in verse!) by Aṅgulimāla on the very spot in 
the great forest (mahāvanaṃ).    
Thus, while the situation sketched is consistent for the collection of verses in the 
Theragāthā, it is still necessary to exlain the situation at that the time of narration in the Aṅgu-
limāla Sutta itself, for which my explanation of the Th verses does not seem to fit. Here, in MN 
86, the contextual time frame (the time of the utterance of the verses) is different. Here is a prob-
lem which is out of the scope of a discourse-oriented narratological approach. Yet, this is exactly 
what a synchronic analysis is, among other things, supposed or expected to provide, namely, to 
detect remaining inconsistencies, at which point a diachronic investigation may follow. Never-
                                                 
646
 I.e. depending on which reading someone decides on; variant readings as cited in the Be(R): Ce: sohaṃ ci-
rassāpi pahāssaṃ pāpaṃ, Se/Ke sohaṃ carissāmi pajahissaṃ pāpaṃ; Be: So ’haṃ carissāmi pahāya pāpaṃ. 
647
 Cp. Warder 1963: 55. 
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theless, I can confidently conclude that the verses were (from whereever) inserted in the narra-
tive to highlight and underline the most crucial or dramatic events of the plot.648 My reading of 
the Th verses is consistent when assuming that the collection of verses attributed to Āgulimāla, 
give or take a couple of verses, was already existent. Thus, the conclusion suggests itself that a 
more or less coherent stock of (auto-?) biographical verses about Aṅgulimāla existed, which 
were used at what the authors/reciters/compliers of the Aṅgulimāla story, i.e. sutta, thought to be 
the appropriate position. If one furthermore presumes that some artistic and/or poetic flair was 
present in this process of narrating (oral or written, again, does not make much difference in this 
case), one may find MN II 100,1-4 (= Th 868) Aṅgulimāla’s thoughts at this dramatic apex of his 
development, respectively as his experience of epiphany, to be perfectly compatible with the 
foregoing passage (MN II 98,27-99,23) which likewise provided the listener/reader with an ac-
count of what happened as for most of its parts focalised through the perspective of the character 
Aṅgulimāla.649 Nevertheless, this must remain speculative for the time being, and it is evident that 
the textual history of the verses is somewhat messy and perhaps difficult to disentangle.650         
                                                 
648
 The idea simply seems to suggest itself that the verses in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta were selectively taken over 
from the Theragāthā without much consideration of their narrative context or, presumed that the commentators 
really already felt that there was a problem with this verse, as Gombrich assumes [Gombrich 2006a: 149: 
“Thus the commentators have a very clear perception of the problems with the first line, but cannot offer a 
plausible solution.”], simply because verses were traditionally regarded as buddhavacana and therefore exempt 
from alteration/editing/conjecture, except for taking them (also partially) over and “implanting” them some-
where else. Cp. also Cp. von Hinüber: “Jātaka Manuscripts from the National Library in Bangkok.” In: JPTS, 
Vol X (1985), p. 19: “The syntactical difficulties felt when reading this verse, […], are probably due to the 
somewhat careless combination of verses or parts of verses taken from different contexts and put together 
again mechanically, a procedure for which ample evidence has been collected by R. O. Franke, e.g. in his 
‘Jātaka-Mahābhārata-Parallelen’ or ‘Die gāthās des Vinaya-Piṭaka und ihre Parallelen’ (both reprinted in 
Kleine Schriften, Wiesbaden 1978).” Apart from what I have said about the inclusion of verses from some-
where else into MN 86, I refrain from positing any hypothesis as to the development of the narrative elements 
and the plot – not even in the form of a chronology. 
649
 Note that the Burmese Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition (Be(R) > Majjhimapaṇṇāsapāḷi 349.) contains the reading, 
Tasmā ṭhitohaṃ tuvamaṭṭhitosīti (and that despite the final ti seems to unnecessarily rape the metre), which 
may indicate the end of the spoken dialogue between the Buddha and Aṅgulimāla. However, for metrical rea-
sons we must probably discard this reading as corrupt.  
650
 I see two major problems that remain with my interpretation of the verses in question: 1) we cannot be abso-
lutely sure that the direct speech ends at MN II 99,32 (= Th 867) because an iti is only attested by the Be(R) 
reading (although, on the other hand, the critical apparatus of the PTS edition of the sutta records a v.l. idh’ 
eva for MN itveva/ icceva at MN II 100,5 for one Sinhalese edition of Buddhaghosa’s cty, which would mean 
that in that case we also do not have an indication that the direct speech ends, although it is clear that it does 
through the change of the narrating voice!); 2) the pronoun tava “your” at MN II 100,4 (Th 868), seems very 
likely to be a direct address to the Buddha. 
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However, coming back to the main objective of this book, my conclusion to what has 
been said so far is that, viewed together with the progression of the Aṅgulimāla-narrative as 
found in MN 86, it is now time to sketch a line of development of the character Aṅgulimāla, to 
which the verses add not only substantial details for the plot but also poetic (and ‘emotional’? – 
Aṅgulimālo … udānaṃ udānesi) utterance. The story of Aṅgulimāla in MN 86, which does per-
haps not cover more than a few months to a couple of years, for all that one can say about this 
given the very vague and unspecific time indications provided in the suttas, starts out to charac-
terise Aṅgulimāla as a “gruesome killer, with blood on his hands, etc.”. Then he appears in per-
son at a point in the narrative (up to that point, his characterisation was based on what people 
told about him and his actions) that is to become the dramatic climax of the whole story, namely, 
his awakening or epiphany, to which the listeners/readers are invited to “co-experience” through 
the presentation of the event as filtered through Aṅgulimāla’s mind and perception. The subse-
quent verses poetically and emotionally express his experience of epiphany and conversion from 
a later perspective, as seen in the above analysis. Nevertheless, the editors may have found it 
suitable to insert them at this decisive moment. The story, then, is propelled forward through 
what Phelan called a ‘complication’ (Aṅgulimāla has to undergo a comparatively mild but obvi-
ously unpleasant purification of some ‘residual karma’), until a complete resolution, and thus 
‘closure’, is arrived at the end of the sutta, which is again perfectly (and poetically) expressed by 
Aṅgulimāla’s “solemn utterance” – in essence a summary-statement of his way from a murderer 
to an arahant. Thus, the plot perfectly exhibits the abstract scheme: instability  [dramatic cli-
max/ change/ epiphany]  complication  resolution651, in which the verses serve to highlight 
and underline the most important events (epiphany and resolution).  
Now for a more detailed analysis of the main character, Aṅgulimāla, and how it is pre-
sented by the text, employing as before the ‘tools’ of narratological textual analysis of characteri-
sation and narrative communication.  
                                                 
651
 Cp. Phelan 2007: 212. 
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5.6 A “paper-being” named Aṅgulimāla  
As to the name “Aṅgulimāla”, it is obviously a description rather than a proper name, derived 
from his distinguishing mark, the aṅguli-mālā or “finger-necklace” that he wears. The sutta sug-
gests that it is more an appellation under which he was widely known for his gruesome actions.652 
His characteristic feature, the “finger-necklace”, seems to have bothered the commentators a lot. 
A hint towards a possible answer to the question why Aṅgulimāla is said to have worn a neck-
lace of severed fingers can be found in Stith Thompson’s Motif-index of folk-literature653, which 
records a rich motif-context for cut-off limbs (including fingers), heads, nose, etc. as “proof of 
killing” (a monster, demons, enemies, etc.) or the victim’s “identification”, and so forth. There-
fore, an alternative explanation of the necklace of fingers that Aṅgulimāla was allegedly wearing 
could be that it was just his trophy, a token of his cruelty, not necessarily for him maybe, but for 
everyone to see and thereby to instill fear in others. That he speaks of himself as formerly having 
been “renowned” (vissuto) in Th 880 (see n. 652 below), seems to suggest that a certain feeling 
of pride was attendant on his reputation.  This interpretation is additionally backed by the expres-
sion pasayha maññe, “[as if] by force”, in the presentation of Aṅgulimāla’s thoughts at MN II 
99,4. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation, “as if driven by fate”654, may be (too much) influenced by the 
commentary, which explains the background to Aṅgulimāla’s thoughts: Aṅgulimala is under the 
obligation to pay off his former teacher in Takkasilā with the gift of one thousand fingers. At this 
point in the story, he realised that only one finger is left to round off the thousand (imagine the 
size and weight of a necklace made of 999 fingers!), so he decides to kill the next best person he 
sees (addasā) to fulfil his duty (before he can finally go back to his parents).655 Therefore, the ap-
pearance of the samaṇa seems like as fate to Aṅgulimāla. However, restricting my analysis syn-
chronically to the text of the suttas, I interpret the phrase pasayha maññe differently than Bhik-
khu Bodhi (and the commentary) does. The expression pasayha appears only twice in the 
                                                 
652
 Th 880: coro ahaṃ pure āsiṃ Aṅgulimāla ’ti vissuto […], “A brigand I formerly was, renowned as ‘Aṅgu-
limāla’.”  
653
 Cp. Thompson 1955-1958, s.v. Fingers. The following search-result may be closest to our example: 
“H.105.5: Ears, fingers and noses of demons cut off as proof of killing them.” However, the keyword ‘fingers, 
cut-off’ might also suggest a cannibalistic context (as Zin has suggested), for which, however, no sources or 
references specifically to India are given in the Index, which I find problematic.  
654
 Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 711,4. 
655
 Cp. Ps III 331,22-332,9. 
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Majjhima Nikāya, the other occurrence being a verse in the Raṭṭhapāla Sutta (MN II 72,30), 
which reads (and is translated by Bikkhu Bodhi accordingly):  
Rājā pasayha paṭhaviṃ vijitvā sasāgarantaṃ mahiṃ āvasanto. 
Oraṃ samuddassa atittarūpo pāraṃ samuddassa pi patthayetha. 
“A king who may conquer the earth by force and inhabit the great earth confined [only] by the ocean 
[= a cakravartin], would yet not be satisfied with this shore, but desiring also the further shore.656  
There is little doubt that pasayha means the active application of force by a subject rather 
than that a force (such as “fate”) is affecting a patient. Therefore, it is clear that the Buddha ap-
pears to Aṅgulimāla (as to the important aspect of focalization in this passage, see below) as if 
he wished to provoke or tempt him. What Aṅgulimāla is really after is perhaps to be the most 
dreaded robber around. Aṅgulimāla accepts the dare, buckles his weapons on and goes after the 
samaṇa who enters stupidly, as it were, the road alone – an easy target.657  
According to the Theragāthā-verses attributed to him, the name given to him at his birth 
by his parents was Ahiṃsaka “Non-Harmer”.658 His proper name, however, is mentioned in part 
II.2 of the Aṅgulimāla Sutta, on request of king Pasenadi, as Gaggo Mantāṇīputto.659 Thus, his 
parents, whose gotta-names (Skt. gotra) are given as Gaggo (his father)660 and Mantāṇī/Mantānī 
(his mother), both are suggested to have been Brahmins.661 Malalasekera writes:  
“Gagga, whose wife was Mantānī, was chaplain to the king of Kosala [Ps II 743]. Gagga may have 
been a gotta-name. Thus when, after his ordination, Angulimāla is introduced to Pasenadi, the latter 
addresses him as Gagga Mantāniputta. [MN II 102].”662  
                                                 
656
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 690,42.: “A king who has conquered the earth by force, And rules over the 
land the ocean bounds […].” 
657
 MN II 99,3-7: Atha ca panāyaṃ samaṇo eko adutiyo pasayha maññe āgacchati. Yaṃnūnāhaṃ imaṃ sa-
maṇaṃ jīvitā voropeyyanti. Atha kho coro Aṅgulimālo asicammaṃ gahetvā dhanukalāpaṃ sannayhitvā Bha-
gavantaṃ piṭṭhito piṭṭhito anubandhi. 
658
 Th 879: Ahiṃsako ’ti me nāmaṃ hiṃsakassa pure sato […] 
659
 MN II 102,6-9. 
660
 The Burmese ms. (Bm), according to the vv.ll. in the notes of the PTS edition, has Bhaggo (Skt. bhārgya? 
Cp. MW, s.v.) – according to the DPPN a term for the inhabitants of a country between Vesāli and Sāvatthī 
(cp. DPPN, s.v. Bhaggā).  
661
 MN II 102,6-9: Kathaṃgotto, bhante, ayyassa pita? Kathaṃgottā mātā ti? Gaggo kho, mahārāja, pita; Man-
tāṇī mātāti. Abhiramatu, bhante, ayyo Gaggo Mantāṇiputto; … 
662
 See DPPN, s.v. 2. Gaggo. 
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However, it is not clear whether Gaggo is really a clan-name as is mentioned in the sutta 
(kathaṃ gotto), or – as also the variant reading in one Burmese manuscript suggests (see n. 660) 
– the designation of a local people or tribe.663 
Kare Manohar Gupta, moreover, provides a very curious interpretation of the name 
Aṅgulimāla, isolating it from the context of the narrative itself, and proposes that it pointed to a 
higher semantic level. He writes:  
“While the narrative of the story on plain reading reveals the might of the master in taming even such 
a great criminal, it still has a deep message to convey. The name of the criminal Aṅgulimāla literally 
means one who is wearing a garland of fingers. The fingers that are sought by the criminal in 
Aṅgulimāla represent the various teachers. It was the practice of ancient days to approach a teacher 
for wisdom. But the ancient beings were not content with a single teacher. Thus wandering in search 
of teachers, they finally were accustomed to the habit of wandering. […] Various schools of thought 
were prevalent during the time of the master, and the master with one stroke denounced all of them 
that promote wrong views.”664 [my emphasis] 
Furthermore, Gupta purports, “there is a euphemistic remark that is hidden in the mean-
ing of his name that exhibits an ancient practice of approaching various teachers who are re-
garded as mere fingers that symbolise the indicating of the way.”665 
  Now, Gupta does not only give an interpretation of the name Aṅgulimāla, but in the 
same breath a ‘thematising’ interpretation of the Aṅgulimāla story: The fingers Aṅgulimāla col-
lects are representative of the various ‘heretic’ teachers at the Buddha’s time, and the Buddha fi-
nally puts an end to Aṅgulimāla’s futile search for wisdom by converting him to his teachings 
through a display of his magical powers. Apart from the missing reference to that “ancient Indian 
practice” and its connection with the simile of the fingers Gupta alludes to, readers/listeners have 
already encountered (and shared) Phelan’s demur and suspicion of this kind of ‘thematising 
                                                 
663
 Malalasekera seems to be sure that his mother’s name, Mantāṇī, is of brahminic origin; cp. DPPN, s.v.: “2. 
Mantānī. A brahminee, mother of Angulimāla; her husband was Gagga. M.ii.102; ThagA.ii.58.” 
664
 Gupta 2006: 125. 
665
 Cp. Gupta 2006: 125. Unfortunately, Gupta does not give a reference for this “ancient practice of approach-
ing various teachers” symbolised by the fingers. I was not able to secure a reference to the symbolism of the 
‘finger showing the way’, but an online-discussion in the “Indology-list” seems to suggest that a similar pic-
ture, that of the “finger pointing at the moon” as a symbol of the distinction between “meaning” (artha) and 
“letter” (vyañjana) which is often attributed to Nāgārjuna, can only be determined for sure in Chinese transla-




leap’666, which perfectly illustrates Phelan’s proposition of the necessity for an analysis of charac-
ter that takes the narrative’s progression into account.667  
The first explicit characterisation statement about the character Aṅgulimāla or, according 
to Manfred Pfister’s system of characterisation668, the first “figural, explicit alterocharacteriza-
tion” uttered in public and in the absence of the person concerned (i.e. Aṅgulimāla), first pro-
vided by the sutta-narrator, and subsequently repeated by the local people warning the wandering 
Buddha about Aṅgulimāla, is as follows: 
[…] coro aṅgulimālo nāma luddo lohitapāṇi hatapahate niviṭṭho adayāpanno pāṇabhūtesu. Tena 
gāmāpi agāmā katā, nigamāpi anigamā katā, janapadāpi ajanapadā katā. So manusse vadhitvā 
vadhitvā aṅgulīnaṃ mālaṃ dhāreti […].669 
“[…] Aṅgulimāla, the robber, fierce/ gruesome, with blood on his hands, a serial killer670, merciless 
towards living beings”. 
Furthermore, readers/listerners learn that because of Aṅgulimāla, “towns had been turned 
into non-towns, market-towns into non-market-towns, inhabited land into non-inhabited land” 
(i.e. he had depopulated whole towns, etc.). He, repeatedly killing people, wore a necklace of fin-
gers [Ps: the fingers of his victims].” This direct characterisation does in fact occur altogether six 
times (inclusive of one repetition, abbreviated in the Pāli text by peyyālaṃ) throughout the story. 
After its first appearance671, the formula is repeated verbatim (and collectively) three times in the 
voices of some cowherds, shepherds, people working (ploughing) on a field, and travellers whom 
the Buddha meets on his way672, and later on by a large crowd of people, the subjects of the king 
Pasenadi of Kosala673, and last by the king himself at his meeting with the Buddha and Aṅgulim-
āla674. 
                                                 
666
 Cp. also Phelan 1989: 11. 
667
 Cp. Phelan 1989: Introduction, p. ix. 
668
 As cited in figure 3.3 in Neumann & Nünning 2008: 56. 
669
 MN II 97,24ff.  
670
 R. Gombrich, personal communication: “The trivialising translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi (1995: 710), “given 
to blows and violence” (hatapahate niviṭṭho) is not strong enough and does not carry the meaning of the Pāli.” 
671
 MN II 97,23-98,2. 
672
 MN II 98,7-14. 
673
 MN II 100,17-23. 
674
 MN II 101,6-10. 
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The relatively high number of repetitions of this same information, and the fact that it is 
repeated in different ‘voices’, from different perspectives and at different times in the progres-
sion of the story, is indicative of it as being a relatively stable character-information, respectively 
a ‘fact in the narrated world’.675 Therefore, the information is reliable, and even moreso because it 
is confirmed by the verses attributed to Aṅgulimāla himself.676  Thus, up to this point of the nar-
rative, before his conversion by the Buddha, the text has established the character of Aṅgulimāla 
as being an unscrupulous, “bloody-handed” and merciless murderer (/ “robber”) before he has 
actually appeared as an acting character in the story. The insistence on this characterisation by 
different characters in the narrative seems furthermore to suggest a permanent character trait. We 
will see later in the story that this is not the case, but that it rather represents the public opinion (a 
phenomenon that is not entirely unheard of in the modern world). 
In stark contrast to this stand the descriptions given of him later on in the sutta, after his 
conversion by the Buddha. One learns, for instance, that Aṅgulimāla serves as the Buddha’s at-
tendant after his conversion and ordination on their way back to Sāvatthī.677 Later on, in Jeta’s 
Grove near Sāvatthī, the sutta presents (in a very formulaic expression) in what way Aṅgulimāla 
has changed, namely, into a proper “son of the Sakyan”: Outwardly his hair and beard are shaven 
(which could give us an interesting clue about his former appearance, if this was not the stock 
phrase for becoming a monk that it usually is in the suttas) and he wears the yellow robe. In-
wardly, he has gone forth, has become completely dispassionate and has completely given up his 
former evil ways.678 Although the optative mode of the verb used (passeyyāsi) expresses a hypo-
thetical condition, this is implicitly the Buddha’s characterisation of Aṅgulimāla. Furthermore, 
                                                 
675
 Cp. Jannidis 2004: 205. 
676
 Coro ahaṃ pure āsiṃ, aṅgulimāloti vissuto. [= Th 880 a,b] 
Vuyhamāno mahoghena, buddhaṃ saraṇamāgamaṃ.  
Lohitapāṇi pure āsiṃ, aṅgulimāloti vissuto.  
Saraṇagamanaṃ passa, bhavanetti samūhatā. 
(reading of the Be(R); cp. also MN II 105 for the PTS edition’s reading) 
677
 MN II 100,13f.: Atha kho Bhagavā āyasmatā aṅgulimālena pacchā samaṇena […]. Personal communication 
with Prof Gombrich: “That [aṅgulimālena pacchā samaṇena] means with Aṅgulimāla as his attendant: this is a 
regular duty of newly ordained monks.” 
678
 MN II 100,13f.: Sace pana tvaṃ, mahārāja, aṅgulimālaṃ passeyyāsi kesamassuṃ ohāretvā kāsāyāni vat-
thāni acchādetvā agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajitaṃ, virataṃ pāṇātipātā, virataṃ adinnādānā, virataṃ 
musāvādā, ekabhattikaṃ, brahmacāriṃ, sīlavantaṃ, kalyāṇadhammaṃ, kinti naṃ kareyyāsīti? 
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listeners/readers learn that something like this to happen is generally deemed impossible by pub-
lic opinion, which in part II.2 is represented by King Pasenadi.679 This is the real miracle happen-
ing in the sutta. Because the listeners/readers also learn (through direct characterisation) that 
Aṅgulimāla and his renown was such that even a man as powerful as King Pasenadi, despite be-
ing accompanied by almost an entire army (pañcamattehi assasatehi)680, trembled at his sight.681 
Besides hinting at the image of frightfulness public opinion has fostered about Aṅgulim-
āla, the tinge of mockery in the Buddha’s comment on Pasenadi cannot possibly slip the attention 
of the experienced or observant listener/reader of this passage, when Pasenadi arrives to where 
the Buddha is dwelling with his “cavalry”: “What is it, maharaja? Is king Seniya Bimbisāra of 
Magadhā attacking you, or the Licchavis of Vesālī, or other hostile kings?”682 Additionally, what 
is interesting to note is that Pasenadi obviously does not recognise Aṅgulimāla who is sitting 
among the other monks during the Buddha’s conversation with the king. Thus stating what one 
does not see, can also be quite telling – the king obviously acts upon hearsay, without himself 
knowing the enemy, so to speak, and it may very well be that the ridgidness of the public opinion 
about Aṅgulimāla as represented by the explicit characterisation statement is suggested to be 
challenged by this mocking remark of the Buddha.683 Although Pasenadi did not recognise Aṅgu-
limāla, as soon as the Buddha points him out, the king becomes afraid: “Now, all the while, the 
venerable Aṅgulimāla was sitting not far from the Blessed One. Then, the Blessed One extended 
his right arm and said this to the king: ‘Maharaja, this is Aṅgulimāla.’ Then king Pasenadi be-
came so (eva) frightened (bhayaṃ) that he was paralysed with fear (chambhitattaṃ) and his hairs 
stood on end (lomahaṃso).”684  
                                                 
679
 King Pasendai says MN II 101,20f.: Kuto panassa, bhante, dussīlassa pāpadhammassa evarūpo 
sīlasaṃyamo bhavissatīti?  “But how, venerable sir, could someone of bad conduct and evil intention become 
thus restrained by virtue?”  
680
 MN II 100,24f.: Atha kho rājā Pasenadi Kosalo pañcamattehi assasatehi Sāvatthiyā nikkhami.   
681
 MN II 101,27f.: Tena kho pana samayena āyasmā aṅgulimālo bhagavato avidūre nisinno hoti. Atha kho 
Bhagavā dakkhiṇaṃ bāhuṃ paggahetvā rājānaṃ pasenadiṃ kosalaṃ etadavoca: eso, mahārāja, aṅgulimāloti. 
Atha kho rañño pasenadissa kosalassa ahudeva bhayaṃ, ahu chambhitattaṃ, ahu lomahaṃso. 
682
 MN II 101,3f.: »Kin nu te mahārāja rājā Māgadho Seniyo Bimbisāro kupito, Vesālikā vā Licchavī, aññe vā 
paṭirājāno ti? 
683
 Alternatively, the passage could also be interpreted with regard to the relationship between the Buddha and 
Pasenadi, in that the Buddha’s ironic remark is intended to expresses his superiority over the king.  
684




If the intention inferred from the text’s diction is understood in this way, that is, by as-
suming the position of the ‘ideal narrative audience’, and if one allows this retrospective ‘reader 
respone’ to occur that the passage invites for, it does surely have an implication for how to read 
into the ‘conversion’ episode (part I.3) – it puts it into perspective: Aṅgulimāla’s vileness is not a 
kernel or permanent trait of his personality. It is not the Buddha’s “converting magic” that is to 
be demonstrated in this sutta. Otherwise, how could this fundamental change in Aṅgulimāla pos-
sibly happen through the Buddha’s peaceful means? The Buddha just facilitates for Aṅgulimāla 
to realise the vileness of his actions and the illusioriness of the self-image he has cultivated. The 
insight, though, is Aṅgulimāla’s alone.  
By the same token, then, it is possible to interpret the passage in which Aṅgulimāla re-
fuses to have king Pasenadi himself as his donor – which would, besides renown, most probably 
have meant regular meal-invitations to the palace – as proof that his change of heart is real and 
that he complies with the rules of the saṅgha, when he says: “Now at that time the venerable 
Aṅgulimāla was [already] a forest dweller, an almsfood eater, a refuse-rag wearer, and restricted 
himself to three robes. He replied: ‘Enough, maharaja, my triple robe is complete.’”685 Again, the 
other implication the passage bears from the perspective of the ‘authorial audience’ is delivering 
the message that the king has no reason to be afraid that the saṅgha could become a safe haven 
for all sorts of criminals. 
Still later, Aṅgulimāla, standardly expressed in the formulas of the Pāli language, through 
his own effort in seclusion becomes one of the arahants.686 
                                                 
685
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 713,13. = MN II 102,12-15: Tena kho pana samayena āyasmā Aṅgulimālo 
āraññako hoti piṇḍapātiko paṃsukūliko tecīvariko. Atha kho āyasmā Aṅgulimālo rājānaṃ Pasenadiṃ Kosalaṃ 
etad avoca: »Alaṃ, mahārāja; paripuṇṇaṃ me ticīvaran ti. 
686
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 714,16.: “Before long dwelling alone, withdrawn, diligent, ardent, and reso-
lute, the venerable Aṅgulimāla, by realising for himself with direct knowledge, here and now entered upon and 
abided in that supreme goal of the holy life for the sake of which clansmen rightly go forth from the home life 
into homelessness. He directly knew: ‘Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has 
been done, there is no more coming to any state of being.’ And the venerable Aṅgulimāla became one of the 
arahants.” = MN II 103,27-104,2: Atha kho āyasmā Aṅgulimālo eko vūpakaṭṭho appamatto ātāpī pahitatto vi-
haranto na cirass’ eva yass’ atthāya kulaputtā sammadeva agārasmā anagāriyaṃ pabbajanti, tad anuttaraṃ 
brahmacariyapariyosānaṃ diṭṭheva dhamme sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja vihāsi. »Khīṇā jāti, 
vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ, kataṃ karaṇīyaṃ, nāparaṃ itthattāyāti abbhaññāsi; aññataro kho pan’ āyasmā 
Aṅgulimālo arahataṃ ahosi. For the ‘Arhat-formulae’ cp. PED s.v. arahant: II.B. + A. For wordplay on the t.t. 
arahant see MN I 280,30ff. 
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So much for the more or less direct characterisation statements about Aṅgulimāla. There 
is, however, also other information to be gathered about a character in a given text which is not 
necessarily directly attributed to the character (i.e. to his name), but which are nevertheless re-
lated to it. Often the information is to be extracted, inferred, or interpreted from contextual infor-
mation provided by the discourse. 
For instance, Aṅgulimāla inhabits the forest (mahāvanaṃ) as a robber.687 This means that 
here, at this stage of his career, he represents the wild/wilderness. The opposition ‘populated, 
civilized areas’ and ‘wilderness’ is a very old one in the ancient Indian context (starting already 
from the R̥g Veda) and a common metaphor. In the context of Theravāda Buddhism, however, to 
live in the wilderness is one of the duties that come with being a monk688. But this implies an ele-
ment of taming. And at this stage of the story Aṅgulimāla has been tamed already: He tamed 
himself by following the Buddha’s path of becoming an ascetic. In the exegetical Pāli tradition, 
one word, by edifying etymology derived from one and the same root, with two meanings has 
been also allegorically joined: vana, “wilderness, jungle, forest”, and vana “lust, desire”.689 In the 
Aṅgulimāla Sutta, the reinterpretation virtually takes place through the transformation of the fig-
ure of Aṅgulimāla. Before, as a “wildling” (āraññiko) with a desire to kill, he was striking fear 
into the hearts of men; now, he leads the secluded life of an ascetic (āraññiko), one who has 
taken up special ascetic practices (dhutaṅgā).690 
Furthermore, as a brigand, Aṅgulimāla is staying in the vicinity of a major or high road691. 
This location indicates a certain distance from an inhabited place like a town or a village. In the 
                                                 
687
 MN II 100,1f.: Cirassaṃ vata me mahito mahesī,  
Mahāvanaṃ samaṇo paccupādi. 
So ‘haṃ cajissāmi sahassapāpaṃ, 
Sutvāna gāthaṃ tava dhammayuttaṃ. 
688
 MN II 102,12f.: āraññiko: Tena kho pana samayena āyasmā aṅgulimālo āraññiko hoti piṇḍapātiko 
paṃsukūliko tecīvariko. 
689
 Cp. PED, s.v. vana 1 & 2. 
690
 Cp. Cone 2010, s.v. dhutaṅga (487, II: 4.); the list and praise of 13 of such practices in the Milindapañha is 
surely a later development (cp. ibid. for references). Furthermore, the later discinction between hermits and 
those monks living in villages (gāmāraññavāsino) as “preachers” (dhammakathikā) is also a late development; 
cp. Geiger 1960: 202f. Thus, the practices Aṅgulimāla is said to have taken up (āraññako, piṇḍapātiko, 
paṃsukūliko, tecīvarako) were probably enjoined on all ordained monks in the early times of the saṅgha.   
691
 Cp. PED s.v. addhānamaggaṃ: “a long road between two towns”; cp. addhaṃ: “stretch, length, both of 
space and time”. 
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ancient Indian conception of the organisation of human society, the space or stretch between two 
inhabited places is tantamount to wilderness (araññaṃ), which since Vedic times692 naturally 
bears a connotation of savagery and danger as opposed to a settlement (gāma). One of the many 
epithets of the Buddha is quite apt in this connection, dametar693 “tamer”. While Buddhaghosa694 
rather scholasctically discusses where araññaṃ begins according to the different commentarial 
traditions, there are more vivid accounts of what makes life in the wilderness altogether possible 
for the monk, in the Bhayabherava Sutta (MN 4), the Cetokhila Sutta (MN 16), and the Vanapat-
tha Sutta (MN 17). The recurring theme in these (and many) suttas is that only taming oneself, 
through ethically flawless behaviour and firm concentration of mind, is what makes one fit to 
live in the wilderness as a monk without being carried away by fear. In the first-mentioned sutta, 
the Buddha explains to a Brahmin in a lively first-person account that for a recluse before setting 
out to live in the wilderness it is absolutely necessary to assure himself of the purity of his heart 
and intention. Otherwise, fear and dread would certainly overcome him. In another passage, the 
Buddha describes his own experience when he was still an un-enlightened bodhisatta, and how 
he overcame fear (by steadfastly keeping on doing what he was just about to do):  
“I considered thus: ‘There are the specially auspicious nights of the fourteenth, the fifteenth, and the 
eighth of the fortnight. Now what if, on such nights as these, I were to dwell in such awe-inspiring, 
horrifying abodes as orchard shrines, woodland shrines, and tree shrines? Perhaps I might encounter 
that fear and dread.’ And later, on such specially auspicious nights as the fourteenth, the fifteenth, and 
the eighth of the fortnight, I dwelt in such awe-inspiring, horrifying abodes as orchard shrines, wood-
land shrines, and tree shrines. And while I dwelt there, a wild animal would come up to me, or a pea-
cock would knock off a branch, or the wind would rustle the leaves. I thought: ‘What now if this is the 
fear and dread coming?’ I thought: ‘Why do I dwell always expecting fear and dread? What if I sub-
due that fear and dread while keeping the same posture that I am in when it comes upon me?’ While I 
                                                 
692
 Cp. Grassmann, Hermann. 1999. Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, s.v. áraṇya, ac-
cording to which it originally meant remoteness (“Ferne”), and since the Atharvaveda also ‘wilderness’ 
(“Wildnis”). 
693
 Usually in the phrase adantānaṃ dametā “tamer of the untamed”, as used by Pasenadi; cp. e.g. MN II 
102,20f. Cp. also one of the descriptions or designations of the Buddha in the ‘ten-names formula’ (“Zehn-
Namen-Formel”, daśanāmaka) which is different in phrasing but carries the same meaning: purisadammasāra-
thi, “charioteer for those who are to be tamed”, see Zin 2006: 4 (also for further references). However, here the 
Buddha is described rather as the one who leads the way or ‘drives’ the vehicle than the one who forecefully 
converts.  
694
 Vism 71f.: in general, he explains, a stone’s throw from the last house or the enclosure of any village marks 
the border of the village environment and, beyond that point, the wilderness. 
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walked, the fear and dread came upon me; I neither stood nor sat nor lay down till I had subdued that 
fear and dread.  While I stood […]. While I sat […]. While I lay down, the fear and dread came upon 
me; I neither walked nor stood nor sat down till I had subdued that fear and dread.”695 
The point is that in the Buddha’s system stress lays on the individual training696: To tame 
the wilderness for the Buddha means to tame the “wilderness of one’s own heart/mind”697. The 
only taming taking place is that the Buddha shows Aṅgulimāla that his raging in the wilderness 
is in fact a raging in his mind (he himself is the wilderness) and that it can come to a standstill, to 
peace. Here, a ‘thematic function’ of the character of the Buddha, respectively of his Teaching 
(sāsana), emerges: “Intention, monks, is what I call ‘karma’”.698 The Buddha’s Dhamma is per-
meated by this internalisation of ethics and actions.699 Thus, it would only be natural to find that 
this principle did also infuse the Buddha’s disciples, and via his disciples the scriptures of the 
                                                 
695
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 104,20. 
696
 Cp.Ven. Rahula (quoted in Gombrich 2006b: 150): “Buddhism is purely a personal religion.” For the sake 
of completion, I must add that this quote stands in the context of the establishment of Buddhism in a foreign 
country, a theme which Prof. Gombrich discusses in his book Therāvada Buddhism in the chapter ‘The Bud-
dhist Tradition in Sri Lanka’. However, he argues further that the Buddhist teachings (sāsana) as the means for 
one’s personal liberation, in Theravāda Buddhism are always rooted and institutionalized in the saṅgha, which 
in turn is based in, and dependent on, the material world (and thus in institutions that first have to be 
founded/established in a new country).  
697
 Cp. the Cetokhila Sutta, MN 16.  
698
 Cp., once again, AN III 410: Cetanā ’haṃ, bhikkhave, kammaṃ vadāmi. 
699
 Cp. Gombrich 2009: 55 et. seq.: Gombrich takes the term āsava to support his hypothesis that Jainism has 
had a massive influence on the Buddha and his teachings. In the context of the Jain idea that the ‘soul’ (jīva) is 
weighed down by these (impure) ‘influxes’ (āsavā) through/ of the (normally nearly unavoidable) actions of 
harming (hiṃsā) sentient beings, like dust sticking to something damp, the word makes perfect sense. In Bud-
dhism, however, it does not, which is why Gombrich suggests the translation ‘corruptions’. As with many 
other terms, the Buddha adopted the term but gave it another meaning. The wording in the Sabbāsava Sutta 
(MN 2) supports the hypothesis that the Buddha may have reacted to ideas that were around already for some 
time. When he is reported to have said, Jānato ahaṃ, bhikkhave, passato āsavānaṃ khayaṃ vadāmi, no 
ajānato no apassato, this makes the strong impression of being a kind of counterargument against a certain 
Jain formulation. Moreover, the whole sutta lends support to the idea that one of the most important and im-
pressive contributions of the Buddha was his ability to abstraction and internalisation of ethics and morality, 
etc. As Gombrich formulates it: “But the Buddha rejected these austerities [Gombrich links the Buddha’s six 
years of practicing extreme ascetiscism with Jain practices], as he rejected brahmin rituals, because they dealt 
with externals. The Buddha’s great insight was that everything that matters happens in the mind.” (ibid.: 58) 
Gombrich makes the same suggestion for two more terms, the exact origin of which is not clear, ñāṇa-dassana 
and arahant. All three terms are used in both Jainism and Buddhism in the context of describing the highest 
state/goal (ibid.: 65f.). 
 225 
 
tradition and thus the presentation of the characters therein, since, in the light of this idea or nov-
elty introduced by the Buddha, it was perhaps – for all its formulaic treatment – the inner life of 
the people that was more interesting than who people were and what they were doing. 
The Buddha knows from the beginning that Aṅgulimāla’s destiny will be rebirth in hell 
because of his evil deeds: “You are experiencing here and now the result of deeds because of 
which you might have been tortured in hell for many years, for many hundred years, for many 
thousand years.”700 (That the Buddha does not enter the road leading to where Aṅgulimāla is by 
mere chance, is communicated by the text three times through repeating the same warning in part 
I.2 – the Buddha knew what he was doing, so to speak. This may serve as just another example 
of the ‘showing’ mode that is characterstic for the suttas: Situations and/or intentions of charac-
ters are seldom expressed directly – either by the characters themselves or through a narrator-
comment – but ‘shown’.) Aṅgulimāla has not reflected on his misdeeds so far, but is made aware 
of it by the Buddha’s metaphorical illustration of the opposition “stopped  not stopped”. In 
early Buddhism, at least in the “ideal spirit” of early Buddhism, proselytisation by force does not 
exist.  
Next is an investigation of the seminal passage of internal focalization that accounts for 
the crucial dramatic climax of the Aṅgulimāla Sutta.  
5.7 Internal Focalization  
Moving forward, after this digression into a possible thematic aspect or dimension of the presen-
tation of the character Aṅgulimāla, the time is ripe to return to the more interesting aspect, the 
‘mimetic’ one.  
One of my main arguments is that what makes a readers’ experience of characters in 
many early Buddhist suttas such a lively experience is the presence in the texts of modes of 
presentation that skilfully minimise distance mainly either by a ‘showing’ mode of presentation 
(dialogues, direct speech and thought represetation) or by the sutta-narrator’s assuming the per-
spective of one of the charaters (‘focalization’). A striking, unusually extensive example is found 
in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta at MN II 98,27-100,12. The following provides a translation and an in-
depth analysis of the passage:      
                                                 
700
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 715,17. = MN II 104,14-17. 
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Addasā kho coro Aṅgulimālo Bhagavantaṃ dūrato va āgacchantaṃ, disvān’ assa etad ahosi: Ac-
chariyaṃ vata bho, abbhutaṃ vata bho. Imaṃ hi maggaṃ dasa pi purisā vīsatim pi purisā tiṃsatim pi 
purisā cattārīsam pi purisā paññāsam pi purisā saṃharitvā saṃharitvā paṭipajjanti, te pi mama hat-
thatthaṃ gacchanti; atha ca panāyaṃ samaṇo eko adutiyo pasayha maññe āgacchati. Yan nūnāhaṃ 
imaṃ samaṇaṃ jīvitā voropeyyan ti? 
“The robber Aṅgulimāla saw the Blessed One coming in the distance. When he saw him, he 
thought: ‘It is [surprising], it is [astonishing]!701 Men have come along this road [after having gath-
ered] in groups of ten, twenty, thirty, and even forty, but still they have fallen into my hands. But now 
this [ascetic] comes alone, unaccompanied, [forcibly, as it were]. Why shouldn’t I take this [as-
cetic’s] life?’”702 
Remember that the Buddha, staying near Sāvatthī, after finishing his meal, and casting all 
the warnings by the locals into the wind, sets out to meet Aṅgulimāla. Next, the narrating in-
stance clearly assumes the stance or perspective of Aṅgulimāla. The following linguistic signs 
indicate this: the sentence-initial position of the verb form addasā “he saw” is not the usual posi-
tion of a verb in the Pāli language, in which the word order is usually of the ‘SOV-type’ (subject 
– object – verb). Therefore, the deviation can be interpreted in the sense that it is intended or, at 
least, functions to raise attention to something – here, to the verbal action and thus the perceptual 
process that is occurring. The subject of the perception is Aṅgulimāla, addressed in the third per-
son by the narrating instance (remember that the ‘voice’ and the ‘focalising instance’ do not al-
ways coincide). The phrase dūrato va āgacchantaṃ, “coming in the distance”, betrays Aṅgulim-
āla’s physical position from which the happening is seen. Thus, the sutta-narrator presents the 
event as realised or perceived by a character, Aṅgulimāla. Schmid calls this parameter of per-
spective “spatial point of view”.703 
Next, this same narrating voice becomes even more covert by directly giving the lis-
tener/reader access to Aṅgulimāla’s thoughts, introduced by the idiomatic speech-tag assa etad 
                                                 
701
 For a similar passage in the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta, which suggests that we translate the words acchariyaṃ and 
abbhutaṃ in these contexts with “surprising” and “astonishing”, rather than with “wonderful” and “marvel-
lous” (Bhikkhu Bodhi), cp. above, passim in ‘The presentation of characters in the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta’. 
702
 The translation is taken from Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 711,4., but modified where I thought it necessary as 
indicated by square brackets. For the meanings of acchariyaṃ and abbhutaṃ cp. CPD, s.v.; the Ven. Bhikkhu 
Bodhi (2001) leaves out in his transaltion that the people had actually gathered, out of fear presumably, before 
entering the road where Aṅgulimāla was (“saṃharitvā saṃharitvā”). 
703
 Cp. Schmid 2008: 131 = 2010: 100f., which, according to Schmid, is the original import of the terms ‘point 
of view’ and ‘perspective’. 
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ahosi “the following [thought] appeared [in his mind]”. Furthermore, the language is indicative 
of colloquial speech, e.g. in the incomplete sentence “Acchariyaṃ vata bho, abbhutaṃ vata 
bho”, and the idiomatic expression “pasayha maññe”, “forcibly (i.e. wilfully), as it were”, as de-
scribed above.704 Another clear indicator for Aṅgulimāla’s point of view is the fact that he ad-
dresses the Buddha as samaṇa “ascetic”. This indicates that Aṅgulimāla at this moment is not 
recognising who is crossing his way.705 The sutta-narrator never uses this designation for the 
Buddha, but instead always uses Bhagavā, etc. This means that here the sutta-narrator’s dis-
course is presenting not what he comprehends, but the character’s comprehension. Schmid’s 
model describes this phenomenon as the linguistic or “language parameter” of narrative perspec-
tive, which constitutes thus another clear marker of Aṅgulimāla’s point of view.706 Whether, how-
ever, one could interpret this also as an expression of Aṅgulimāla’s “ideological point of view”707 
is no definite matter. Although the word samaṇa, “ascetic”, does often appear in the speech of 
Brahmins or adherents of other sects when addressing the Buddha, it is unclear in this particular 
instance whether Aṅgulimāla’s use of the word intends to express any judgement or just indi-
cates his “linguistic point of view”, or, for that matter, his knowledge, namely, that he simply 
does not recognise the approaching as the Buddha himself. I opt for the latter explanation. Nev-
ertheless, he seems to recognise him as an adherent of the Buddha by his outward appearance 
and to think highly of them, as one can infer from his statement: “These ascetics the sons of the 
Skayan are speakers of truth, they have a truth-vow.”708 Now, what makes this discussion highly 
interesting with regard to characterisation, is the implication that Aṅgulimāla does recognise the 
approaching as a Buddhist ascetic/monk without, however, recognising the identity of this partic-
ular “Buddhist monk”. Aṅgulimāla seems to discover his identity only through his performance 
                                                 
704
 Schmid deals with this phenomenon under the heading ‘linguistic perspective’; cp. ibid.: 134. Although the 
adoption of this term for my analysis would surely be warranted, it has to be considered that in the suttas this 
aspect of perspective can only be relevant for the very broad distinction between character’s text and narrator’s 
text in general, because the cited phrase, e.g., is highly formulaic and cannot, or simply does not, serve as a 
feature indivualising characters.       
705
 The commentator Buddhaghosa has obviously also picked this up; if, however, for linguistic or other rea-
sons, he does not make clear; cp. Ps 331,23f.: Kim pana the Bhagvantaṃ sañjānitvā etaṃ vadanti asañjānitvā 
ti? Asañjānitvā.  
706
 Cp. Schmid 2008: 134f. = 2010: 103f. 
707
 Cp. ibid. 2008: 131ff. = 2010: 101f. 
708
 MN II 99,19f. 
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of a miracle (see below). This means, first, that although he has knowledge of the Buddha and 
his saṅgha he has obviously never met with the Buddha in person (which in turn, as an ancillary 
finding, corroborates Gombrich’s argument that the reading of the verse MN II 100,1f. is prob-
lematic, from a text-internal point of view709). Secondly, it could implicate an interesting fact 
about the Buddha himself, namely, that he was not distinguishable from any of his monks merely 
through his outward appearance. As a matter of fact, one can find further textual evidence for 
this hypothesis. I will return to this discussion in the Conclusion. Here, again, I suggest that for 
the time being one clearly distinguish between ‘facts of the narrated world’ and historical facts. 
(In any case, it is a matter of an inferred and not an explicitly stated fact of the narrated world. 
For the same reason I shall also refrain here from an interpretation or “rational explanation” of 
the miracle performed by the Buddha. My interest in the suttas in this book is not the excavation 
of a “realistic” historical core.)     
The text goes on to depict what happens “through the prism”710 Aṅgulimāla, interspersed 
with descriptions by the narrating instance711 but without leaving Aṅgulimāla’s perspective, thus 
presenting a somewhat extensive passage of what Genette termed “internal focalization”712. After 
Aṅgulimāla has decided that “this ascetic, coming alone” was an easy target, he takes up his 
sword and shield, buckles on his bow and quiver, and follows the Buddha “on the foot” (Bhaga-
vantaṃ piṭṭhito piṭṭhito anubandhi). But no matter how hard he tries, he is unable to catch the 
Buddha, because he performs “such a feat of his miraculous powers” (tathārūpaṃ iddhābhi-
saṃkhāraṃ abhisaṃkāsi) that it appears that although Aṅgulimāla is running with full power, the 
ascetic is walking at normal speed. Again, readers/listeners are presented directly with Aṅgulim-
āla’s thoughts: 
“It is [surprising]; it is [astonishing]! Formerly, I could even catch up with a swift running elephant 
and seize it; I could catch up even with a swift running horse and seize it; I could catch up even with a 
                                                 
709
 See n. 628 above. 
710
 The metaphor is used by Schmid to describe the narratorial act of ‘seeing the world through the eyes of the 
character’ (= “perceptual point of view”), in other words, “it is the subject or the prism of perception through 
which the narrator sees the narrated world”; cp. Schmid 2010: 104. 
711
 In these passages, the sutta-narrator does not access directly the consciousness of the character to see 
through his eyes, but still, through a mixing of perspectives, i.e. through a mixing of the narrator’s text and the 
character’s text, as I will show in an example later on, the character’s consciousness is still indicated to be the 
object of the narrator’s presentation or perception; cp. Schmid 2010: 104. 
712
 Cp. Genette 1980: 189, et passim.  
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swift running chariot and seize it; I could catch up even with a swift running deer and seize it; but 
now, though I am walking as fast as I can, I cannot catch up with this [ascetic] who is walking at his 
normal pace!”713 
Eventually, he calls out, “Stop!” to the Buddha, and the Buddha replies enigmatically, “I 
have stopped, Aṅgulimāla, you stop too.” Aṅgulimāla, even more puzzled by this strange state-
ment, thinks, “These ascetics the sons of the Sakyan are speakers of truth, they have a truth-vow. 
Now this one, though walking, says, ‘I have stopped, Aṅgulimāla. You stop, too!’ What if I 
asked him about it?”714 In this way, the content of Aṅgulimāla’s thoughts about the happening is 
continuously the object of the sutta-narator’s presentation or perception. This is a subtle but im-
portant distinction. 715 While the actual statement of the event of the miracle happening is now (as 
opposed to the beginning of the passage) presented from the point of view of the sutta-narrator 
(“Then the Blessed One performed such a feat of his miraculous powers […]”), how it is per-
ceived or experienced is reflected in, or expressed through, Aṅgulimāla’s “ideological” and “per-
ceptual point of view” (“It is [surprising]; it is [astonishing]! Formerly, I could even catch up 
with a swift elephant […]”). Moreover, the use of the same expression in both the narrator’s text 
and the character’s text (“although the Blessed one/this ascetic [seemed/seems] to walk at a nor-
mal pace, Aṅgulimāla/I, who is/am running with full power, is/am not able to catch him”716) is 
noteworthy, for it indicates the mixing of two perspectives. However, it is unlikely that there is 
any authorial intentionality to it.   
The direct speech following upon the presentation of Aṅgulimāla’s thoughts commences 
a versified dialogue between the two, which eventually leads to Aṅgulimāla’s conversion and, 
shortly thereafter, his ordination, and thus embodies his actual conversion. It is the actual expres-
sion of his change of heart already anticipated in his statement that the sons of the Buddha are 
“speakers of truth, they have a truth-vow”. In the famous verse, Th 867 the pun “stopped  
                                                 
713
 Tr., with minor modifications, Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 711, 5. 
714
 MN II 98,27-100,12. 
715
 Cp. Schmid 2010: 104f. 
716
 MN II 99,8-10 & 15f.: coro Aṅgulimālo/ ahaṃ Bhagavantaṃ/ imaṃ samaṇaṃ pakatiyā gacchantaṃ sab-
batthāmena gacchanto na sakkoti/ sakkomi sampāpuṇituṃ. Note furthermore the present tense (sakkoti) in the 
narrator’s text, which clearly adds to the immediacy of the presentation of the event (but which from a histori-
cal-critical viewpoint might be explained as a copy error through analogy). 
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not-stopped” (ṭhito―aṭṭhito) signifies the Buddha’s complete abstention from harming other be-
ings (ṭhito). Aṅgulimāla, on the other hand, is completely unrestrained towards living beings and 
therefore “not-stopped” (aṭṭhito). The following is a modified translation of the dialogue based 
on Norman’s Th translation717:  
“While walking, ascetic, you say ‘I am standing still’; and about me, who is standing, you say that I 
am not standing still. I ask you this, ascetic, ‘in what way are you standing still and I am not standing 
still?’” 
“I am always standing still, Aṅgulimāla, having given up violence towards all beings; but you are un-
restrained towards all living creatures. Therefore, I am standing still, you are not standing still.” 
“Truly it is [now] a long time since the great seer [who is now (time of enunciation)] honoured by me 
entered the great wood. Having heard your verse, which [taught] what is right, I [thought (itveva) that 
I] will abandon my numerous evils.”  
[sutta-narrator:] [itveva see foregoing verse!) Then the robber hurled his sword and other weapons 
down a hole, a precipice, a chasm. The robber paid homage to the well-farer’s feet. On that very spot 
he asked the Buddha for admission to the Order. 
And then the Buddha, the compassionate great seer who is the teacher of the world including the de-
vas, said to him, “Come, monk”; this in itself was bhikkhu-status for him. 
With this dialogue, the most dramatic and crucial part with regard to Aṅgulimāla’s con-
version in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta ends. As seen earlier, however, the verses relating this signifi-
cant event are in parts problematic. Nevertheless, one can get a general picture of what the text 
wants to express. The commentator also specifies the kind of insight that had occurred to Aṅgu-
limāla, perhaps because the little pun seemed too minimalistic to explain such a dramatic insight. 
He is once again not at all hesitant to ascribe motivations and thoughts to the characters. Bud-
dhaghosa explains, in short, that either the Buddha had meant to express, or that Aṅgulimāla had 
realised in that moment (which of the two the text does not make explicitly clear, although the 
first mentioned seems to be more likely), that aṭṭhito si implicated that, although regarding bold-
ily posture Aṅgulimāla is standing still, he will nevertheless run into hell, into rebirth as an ani-
mal, into the realm of the unhappy ghosts, or into the state of being a demon [as the karmic result 
his evil actions]. Thereupon (i.e. having heard these words, or having thought these thoughts?) 
the realisation dawns upon Aṅgulimāla that such a “lion’s roar” can be no other’s than the lion’s 
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 Cp. Norman 1969: 82f. (vv. 866-871). See also above, ch. 5.5, “A critical verse”, for my attempt at reinter-
preting this versified account from a narratological perspective.  
 231 
 
roar of the Buddha Gotama himself. Surely, Aṅgulimāla thinks, he must have seen me with his 
very sharp eye, and now has come to me out of kindness. That is why, Buddhaghosa glosses, “he 
said, ‘At last, for my sake’ (cirassaṃ vata me), and so forth.718        
Now, there are several interesting aspects to the phenomenon of internal focalization. The 
first pertains to the fact that narrative theory calls the presentation of the thoughts of a character 
one of the ‘signposts of fictionality’, because such a phenomenon as having access to the mind of 
others is not possible in everyday-reality. There are several explanations for this. One made ear-
lier is that what passages of internal focalization in pre-modern texts actually present are the mo-
tivations underlying the actions of characters, which become clear from the actual, physical 
and/or verbal actions narrated afterwards. This translates to a simple and straight line from moti-
vation or trait to narrative action. Modern Western literature is said to be specifically character-
ised by a more complicated relationship between trait and actions and by the condition that those 
two do not have to be identical at all. Very often in the modern Western novel tradition, the traits 
of a character contradict each other or remain just ‘dimensions’ (i.e. they do not lead to actions at 
all, or the cahracter’s actions contradict her/his inner states or thoughts, attitudes, etc.). Interest-
ingly, in this sutta, Aṅgulimāla’s conversion does not seem to have much to do with his former 
intention to kill the Buddha – for what reason he wants to kill him, the text itself, never mind the 
commentary, does not even state unambiguously. The question here is who has access to Aṅgu-
limāla’s mind? The answer must be: an omniscient narrator. Alternatively, was what was perhaps 
remembered by someone to have been narrated by the thera Aṅgulimāla himself on some occa-
sion, put again into Aṅgulimāla’s thoughts by the redactors/authors of the Pāli Canon, and, if so, 
why was it put into another ‘voice’ then? Or does it, as often happens in the Canon or in the 
Commentaries, just represent what Aṅgulimāla was allegedly thinking? But then, by whom was 
it so alleged? Be that as it may – what this episode at least reveals is that some redaction must 
have taken place.  
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 Ps III 333,11-17: Idāni iriyāpathena ṭhito pi “niraye dhāvissasī ti tiracchānayoniyaṃ pettivisaye asurakāye” 
dhāvissasī ti vuttaṃ hoti. Tato coro mhāyaṃ sīhanādo mahantaṃ gajjitaṃ na idaṃ aññassa bhavissati 
mahāmāyāya pana puttassa Siddhatthassa samaṇarañño etaṃ gajjitaṃ diṭṭho vat’ amhi maññe 




The problem here is partly a typical aspect of pre-modern narration in an oral culture: Af-
ter some time has passed, it becomes more and more difficult to trace an utterance back to its ex-
act origin. (The other potential problem of oral transmission, namely that the content of what is 
to be transmitted undergoes slight alterations with each transmission, is most probably not true 
for the highly conservative Theravāda tradition with its highly trained experts, the bhāṇakas.) 
While the oral origin of the sutta narration may have been something like a multi-perspectival, 
many-voiced or ‘polyphonic’ situation, the transmission process with its continuous linguistic 
revision, its ‘smoothing out’, and formalisation of its texts, has created a situation which resem-
bles the structure (i.e. the double-structured narrative communication) of fictional texts. Alt-
hough in a strict sense there is no narrator-figure in a Pāli sutta, structurally it appears as if there 
was one.719   
Secondly, the passage above stretches over nearly one printed book page (exclusive the 
versified dialogue immediately following it)720, which is, crudely put, “an awful lot” of internal 
focalization focusing on one character for a pre-modern, non-Western narrative. Now, while I do 
not think that this presentation was consciously intended to facilitate a listener’s/reader’s identifi-
cation specifically with the indivudal Aṅgulimāla (difficulties may accrue from identifying with 
a serial killer), I believe that similar to what we have seen in the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta, internal focali-
zation is used to dramatically highlight a narrated situation or event, and thus serves the progres-
sion of the narrative.    
Indirectly, listeners/readers learn something about Aṅgulimāla’s state of mind in a later 
passage too, in which Aṅgulimāla returns from an alms-round (part II.5) during which he was 
attacked by some villagers who had probably recognized him as the former murderer Aṅgulim-
āla. Obviously, the Buddha has to cheer up Aṅgulimāla, who returns with his head broken and 
bleeding, his robe torn, and his begging-bowl broken. Only after the Buddha encourages him to 
endure it, press on and assures him that what had just happened was a good sign, and necessary 
at that (which means that he had now purified karma, which otherwise would have led him di-
rectly into hell), Aṅgulimāla retreats into seclusion (to meditate) and experiences the bliss 
brought about by liberation. Then, he has reached the final goal with all karmic traces eliminated, 
which gives rise to an in parts quite individual “solemn utterance” (udānaṃ udānesi) that ends 
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 Cp. below, Part III, n.  163. 
720
 MN II 98,27-99,23. 
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the sutta with a summarising statement, as it were, of Aṅgulimāla’s career from a bloody-handed 
robber to an arahant.  
Pasenadi’s behaviour in part II.2 also sheds some light on his character. Similar to his 
presentation in the Piyajātika Sutta, here again the king seems to not believe that the Buddha(s) 
always speak(s) true. Aṅgulimāla, by contrast, does: “These ascetics the sons of the Skayans are 
speakers of truth; they have a truth-vow”721. Add to this that he is rather outthought by the Bud-
dha when it comes to Aṅgulimāla’s criminal persecution. (We will see another example in chap-
ter 6, in the Piyajātika Sutta. There, queen Mallikā has to elucidate the meaning of a short state-
ment of the Buddha through basic, practical examples.) Thus, a picture of Pasenadi starts to 
emerge as a character whose traits may be described as being a basically good person but not ter-
ribly smart or a quick thinker.   
Concerning the character of Aṅgulimāla, one can once more discern the theme of trust 
and faith (saddhā) in the Buddha that appears to be a prerequisite in order to enter the path 
pointed out by him. Aṅgulimāla’s seemingly trivial statement expressing his belief that, “these 
ascetics the sons of the Skayans are speakers of truth, they have a truth-vow”, is crucial for the 
‘ideal narrative audience’s’ understanding of and trust in the mere possibility of the whole pro-
cess of his ‘conversion’ and future spiritual career. Had Aṅgulimāla not had the very idea that 
some truth lies in the ascetic’s words, the story would not have a compelling reason to go on – 
either he would have killed the Buddha (which is, of course, impossible for genre-conventional 
reasons, as one may know from the stories about Devadatta), or he would have just left the scene 
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 MN II 99,19f. sacca-paṭiññā is translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi as “[they] assert truth” (Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 
2001: 711,5.); Horner has “approving of truth” (Horner 1956: 286). However, my translation of the bahubbīhi-
compound is also justifiable and perhaps closer to the ‘intention of the text’ because we are invited to ‘see’ 
from Aṅgulimāla’s perspective in this passage, and speaking the truth and keeping vows of truth plays a very 
important role as a Cultural Code, as we have seen in ch. 5.4, when discussing some parallels of the Aṅgulim-
āla-story in the Jātakas.  
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(like Upaka the Ājīvika, the first person the Buddha met after his experience of Enlighten-
ment722). His faith or trust, however, is what ultimately saves him (= the story-level), but it is also 
what propels the miracle-story to continue (= the discourse-level; otherwise, there would not 
have been a reason for the versified dialogue, MN II 99,25-100,12, to occur); this is the actual 
miracle happening in the sutta. It demonstrates the very concept of saddhā, faith, in the Buddha 
and his claim to have discovered the truth.723 Faith, but not blind belief as also seen in the Piyaj-
ātika Sutta, is metaphorically said to be the “seed of all wholesome states”, and it is one of the 
five indriyāni or “faculties”.724 In a famous verse in the Dhammapada, it is said: “By you the ef-
fort must be made, the Buddha(s) are the teachers [i.e., they only show the way].”725 
Another interesting question suggests itself following a subjective reading-experience: 
Why do I, as reader of the Aṅgulimala Sutta, even sympathise with Aṅgulimāla – a man who has 
brutally murdered hundreds at certain moments in the text –, for instance, when he sees the la-
bouring woman, or when he is attacked by the villagers? It is because of a “trick” of the text, I 
propose: the mimetic aspect. The text invites the listener/reader to adopt Aṅgulimāla’s perspec-
tive through employing the technique of internal focalization, and at a very early and crucial 
point in the plot at that (i.e. his encounter with the Buddha, leading to the ‘primacy effect’) – no 
force is used, no Yakka appears and threatens to split his head into seven pieces, and Aṅgulimāla 
penetrates by himself to the truth – he changes by himself through the help of the Buddha, not by 
force. The audience is thus guided by the text to the understanding that Aṅgulimāla possesses a 
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 In the Ariyapariyesana Sutta, the just recently awakened Buddha meets Upaka, an adherent of the Ājīvikas 
and boasts about his experience, stating that he is ‘self-enlightened’, etc. Upaka, seemingly unimpressed by all 
this just replies, “That might be so”, and goes his way. MN I 170f: Atha khvāhaṃ bhikkhave uruvelāyaṃ 
yathābhirantaṃ viharitvā yena bārāṇasī tena cārikaṃ pakkamiṃ. Addasā kho maṃ bhikkhave upako ājīvako 
antarā ca gayaṃ antarā ca bodhiṃ addhānamaggapaṭipannaṃ. Disvāna maṃ etadavoca: vippasannāni kho te 
āvuso indriyāni, parisuddho chavivaṇṇo pariyodāto. Kaṃsi tvaṃ āvuso uddissa pabbajito? Ko vā te satthā? 
Kassa vā tvaṃ dhammaṃ rocesīti? Evaṃ vutte ahaṃ bhikkhave upakaṃ ājīvakaṃ gāthāhi ajjhabhāsiṃ: […] 
Mādisā ve jinā honti ye pattā āsavakkhayaṃ, Jitā me pāpakā dhammā tasmāhaṃ upakā jino ’ti. Evaṃ vutte 
bhikkhave upako ājīvako ‘huveyyapāvuo’ti vatvā sīsaṃ okampetvā ummaggaṃ gahetvā pakkāmi.  
723
 For this claim and the Buddha’s general advice against blindly following hearsay or traditional ‘truths’ (i.e. 
the Veda), the Caṅkī Sutta (MN 95) may serve as an illustrative example.  
724
 Cp. Nyanatiloka 1980: s.v. saddhā; “faith” is the first of the five so-called faculties or ‘powers’ (which are: 
saddhā, faith; viriyā, energy; sati, mindfulness; samādhi, concentration, and paññā, wisdom); see also Sn 77 
(tr. Norman 1995: 9): “Faith is the seed, penance is the rain, wisdom is my yoke and plough; modesty is the 
pole, mind is the (yoke-)tie, mindfulness is my ploughshare and goad.” 
725
 Cp. Dhp 276. 
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good core, and that the nature of his being is not really that of a mass-murderer or, if it is, then 
even mass-murderers have the potential to reach liberation from saṃsāra. However, the text does 
not suggest that this is something which could or should be generalised (remember the Vinaya-
rule). Therefore, Horner’s conclusion that Aṅgulimāla must be a special case is perhaps not so 
much beside the point. It is thus the text itself and the manner of the composition of its discourse 
(i.e. a strong emphasis on the ‘mimetic aspect’ through the narrative technique of focalization) 
that invite the reader to take part in the mimetic illusion and make Aṅgulimāla such a lively and 
life-like character. Traditionally, then, these techniques contribute to this impression: First and 
foremost, internal focalization; the inherent potential of the character to change, combined with a 
rather dramatic change, that is, E. M. Forster’s famous statement of the ability of the character to 
surprise us. Aṅgulimāla surprises us because, when he encounters the Buddha, without recognis-
ing him as the Buddha, the text has already established Aṅgulimāla’s traits of character as “grue-
some/fierce, bloody-handeded etc.” In the following events, he shows quite opposed features, 
like empathy, compassion, repentence, and last not least, unshakeable faith in the Buddha as the 
Awakened One.    
5.8 Conclusion and Prospects 
In the end, it is precisely Aṅgulimāla’s development as a character that makes his story so fasci-
nating. He seems to be a ‘flat’ character in the beginning, as is expressed by the stereotype for-
mula at the beginning of the Sutta translated above. But after, and most of all due to, his encoun-
ter with the Buddha, things take an unexpected turn. The question back then might be just as rel-
evant nowadays, judging from frequent controversies regarding the rehabilitation of prisoners, 
for example: How is it possible that a mass-murderer turns into a placid monk? On the website of 
the British Buddhist Prison Chaplaincy, which even goes under the name ‘Aṅgulimāla’, after a 
summary of a mixture of the contents of the actual canonical sutta and the commentarial ‘back-
ground-story’726, we read the following:  
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 All of the summaries Aṅgulimāla available to a wider public published in the World Wide Web mix the 
background-story given in the commentaries with the actual account in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta. See, e.g., 
http://www.buddhanet.net/e-learning/buddhism/disciples01.htm. Often these accounts omit details of the 
(main) story and sometimes add details, which can nowhere be found in the original text, like the following: 
“He simply smiled and continued on his way”, or “The terrible things that he had done and the wretchedness of 




“The story of Angulimala teaches us that the possibility of Enlightenment may be awakened in the 
most extreme of circumstances, that people can and do change and that people are best influenced by 
persuasion and above all, example.”727 
In any case, whoever Aṅgulimāla might have been historically, it is safe to say that the 
Aṅgulimāla Sutta reads – apart from the formulaic expressions mentioned – as a highly individu-
alised account. The emphasis in this sutta clearly is on Aṅgulimāla as an individual. This effect 
is especially achieved through the narrative technique of internal focalization. This stands in di-
rect opposition to the theme of another sutta, the Piyajātika Sutta, which will be seen in the fol-
lowing chapter, in which one of the main characters could be described as “Mr Everyman”. 
Aṅgulimāla is clearly a ‘round character’ in E. M. Forster’s sense: he changes (dramatically) and 
the reader is even invited to share in his struggle through the presentation of his thoughts, be it in 
the passage on the eve of his conversion or when the Buddha encourages him to be steadfast af-
ter he had been badly attacked by the villagers. What also makes the character Aṅgulimāla 
unique is that his story is one of the rare actual cases of ahosi-kamma, beyond its mere theoreti-
cal possibility.   
Monika Zin and Richard Gombrich in their studies both focus on Aṅgulimāla’s identity. 
Not, however, in the sense of a purely (intra-)textual aspect of re-cognition of characters, but on 
his probable/likely real-life identity (even if, in the case of Zin, the “real-life” origin of Aṅgulim-
āla is a text or a legend: the Kalmāṣapāda and other narratives, from which Aṅgulimāla has been 
“synthesized” over time). Certainly, the textual evidence alone is not sufficient to establish the 
factuality of its statements in the real, physical world (even if, however, in the case of the Pāli 
suttas, it is likely). Although the interest in Aṅgulimāla’s real-life identity is, as a matter of fact, 
a natural one and an appropriate question for the historian of religion, one can sidestep this com-
plex problem without missing out on anything of Aṅgulimāla’s story and its purport in the Aṅgu-
limāla Sutta. On the contrary, in researching texts, Biblical studies have established the syn-
chronic analysis as a precondition for all follow-up questions on the text. Thus, accordingly, 
what could otherwise be regarded as incoherence of a character in a given text allegedly caused 
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by its diachronic development, may eventually just prove as the judgement of the character by 
the “wrong” personality concept.728  
The interpretation thus far is partly based on the structuralist theory of characters because 
it avoids speculation about the ‘mimetic aspect’ of the character729 and concentrates on the ‘me-
chanics’ of characterisation (proper name + attribute/trait = literary character), and partly on the 
specific idea of man in ancient India, respectively especially in the Buddhist context, because it 
is evident that the model of the ariya-puggalā demarcates the limits, or determines the possible 
directions, of the character-development. However, what is striking about this sutta – and what 
thus makes it so appealing through the times – is that in one particular aspect it does go even be-
yond this otherwise rigid pattern, and Aṅgulimāla is able to surprise readers/listeners, as would 
befit a ‘round character’ in Forster’s sense, within the framework of the ariya-puggalā. The im-
portant moment of Aṅgulimāla’s insight is the decisive factor for all that follows; from the mo-
ment of his “conversion” on, the rest happens seemingly automatically. Aṅgulimāla is one of the 
very rare instances in which all the evil deeds/negative kamma one has done are outweighed by 
just one good (kusalena) – the ‘good’ here being not an action, but insight.  
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 Cp. Grabes 1978: 418: “In diesem Fall haben wir es mit dem sogenannten ‚Bruch‘ im Charakter oder mit 
einer gewollten Zerstörung der Einheit der Figur zum Zwecke der Bewußtmachung des hier geschilderten 
Konstitutionsprozesses zu tun [cp. Grabes 1978: 417 (previous page)]. Allerdings ist hinzuzufügen, daß die 
Fähigkeit, zunächst widersprüchliche oder disparat erscheinende Informationen über eine Figur dennoch zu 
synthetisieren, mindestens so sehr von der ‚impliziten Persönlichkeitstheorie‘ des Lesers und seiner ‚kogniti-
ven Komplexität‘ abhängt wie von der Art und Reihenfolge der aus dem Text zu entnehmenden Informationen. 
Es kann demnach leicht zur Konstatierung eines ‚Charakterbruchs‘ kommen, wenn man den Syntheti-
sierungsversuch mit Hilfe einer völlig anderen Persönlichkeitstheorie unternimmt, asl sie der Autor 
beim Konzipieren seiner literarischen Figuren benutzt hat. Ein typisches Beispiel dafür etwa ist der un-
taugliche Versuch, an die Gestalt des Lear in Shakespeares Komödie die Forderung nach psychologisch konse-
quentem Verhalten anzulegen. Man kommt dann auf die umständlichsten Spekulationen, um die vermeintliche 
Inkonsistenz des Charakters aus der Entstehungsgeschichte des Stückes, der Herkunft des Stoffes usw. zu er-
klären. Dabei genügt es völlig die Figurenkonvention des rhetorisch ausgerichteten elisabethanischen Theaters, 
die eine direkte und offene Selbstaussprache einer Figur in bezug auf ihr Inneres, ihre Gedanken und Gefühle, 
trotz aller psychologischen Unglaubwürdigkeit nicht nur erlaubte, sondern voraussetzte, in die Beurteilung des 
Lear einzubeziehen, um Lears Verhalten gegenüber Cordelia zu verstehen und den ‚Charakterbruch‘ zu elimi-
nieren. Die kognitive Komplexität des Lesers bestünde in diesem Fall darin, über die zu seiner Zeit vorherr-
schende Persönlichkeitstheorie hinaus noch eine weitere, zur Entstehungszeit des Textes übliche, zur Verfü-
gung zu haben.” [my emphasis] 
729
 Cp. Phelan 1989: 4, and Chapter 3.1.1 above. Moreover, the question does not even have to arise: That the 
narrative explores or employs or presents Aṅgulimāla as a possible person, with an inner life, with thoughts 
and emotions, etc., is a narrative end in itself (‘mimetic aspect’ of character) and does not (and perhaps did not 
even intend to) tell us anything about a (possible!) historical person.  
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To put the theme into another popular Buddhist context, the debate between gradual and 
spontaneous realisation of the Buddha’s Path: What the moment of Aṅgulimāla’s conversion sig-
nifies is a spontaneous, direct insight that has a massive effect: In ‘seeing the Buddha, Aṅgulim-
āla beholds the Dhamma’ – after having seen the goal, what remains for him to do is remove the 
subtle obstacles, habitual tendencies, etc. which prevent him from realising the goal for himself. 
Analyzed further, the sutta would move in the context of the ‘insight’ versus ‘concentration’ dis-
cussion and the division of the monks into meditators and scholars, and the question of how, why 
or under which circumstances enlightenment can be reached without (too much) meditation (i.e. 
without experiencing the jhānas).730   
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 Cp. Gombrich: “Retracing an Ancient Debate: How Insight Worsted Concentration in the Pali Canon.” In: 
Gombrich 2006a: 96-134. 
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6. The presentation of characters in the Piyajātika Sutta (MN 87) 
In this chapter we will look at a very interesting piece among the ‘narrative suttas’ of the 
Majjhima Nikāya, the Piyajātika Sutta. The focus in this chapter will be on ‘narrative progres-
sion’ and the role of characters therein.  
Therefore, it may be good to start the chapter off with a quote from J. Phelan about his 
definition of narrative progression, and thereby set the stage for the following analysis of the 
sutta:  
 “Progression, as I use the term, refers to a narrative as a dynamic event, one that must move, in both 
its telling and its reception, through time. In examining progression, then, we are concerned with how 
authors generate, sustain, develop, and resolve readers’ interests in narrative. I postulate that such 
movement is given shape and direction by the way in which an author introduces, complicates, and 
resolves (or fails to resolve) certain instabilities which are the developing focus of the authorial audi-
ence’s interest in the narrative. Authors may take advantage of numerous variables in the narrative 
situation to generate the movement of a tale. In general, the story-discourse model of narrative helps to 
differentiate between two main kinds of instabilities: the first are those occurring within the story, in-
stabilities between characters, created by situations, and complicated and resolved through actions. 
The second are those created by the discourse, instabilities—of value, belief, opinion, knowledge, ex-
pectation—between authors and/or narrators, on the one hand, and the authorial audience on the other. 
To recognize this difference in kind I reserve the term ‘instabilities’ for unstable relations within story 
and introduce the term ‘tension’ for those in discourse.”731  
6.1 Introduction 
The Piyajātika Sutta is the 87th sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya and is, like the two Ghaṭīkāra and 
the Aṅgulimāla Suttas, found in the Rājavagga or “Section on Kings”. The sutta is dominated by 
a single theme, indicated by the title of the sutta, “That which is born from those who are dear 
[to one] (piyakjātika)”: the loss of loved one’s, and the right or wrong views of what are the con-
sequences of holding, and losing, someone dear. The sutta can be divided into two main parts732 
(MN II 106,1-107,21 and 107,21-112,7) according to its two different settings in which the theme 
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is explored. The first part narrates the story of a householder who mourns the loss of his dear lit-
tle son. The second part, then, situated in the palace of Pasenadi, the King of Kosala and Kāsī, 
has the Buddha himself as well as Pasenadi’s queen Mallikā explicate a short utterance made by 
the Buddha to the householder in part I in more detail by means of analogy. 
Some scholars have summarised the sutta as being an explanation as to why sorrow and 
pain arise from dear ones.733 However, in my understanding of the text, the “explication by anal-
ogy” (pariyāyena) does not provide a proper explanation as to why, but does rather state how, or 
simply the fact that, the loss of a loved one is and has always been a cause for pain (dukkha). 
What is more, the Buddha is not said anywhere in the text to have advised against holding some-
one dear. Even if it is within the realm of possibilities to come to this conclusion, it is not explic-
itly taught or advised in the sutta, but is presented simply as a “natural” consequence of certain 
attitudes and actions. The Buddha is said at many places in the Canon to have simply stated 
“how things are” (yathābhūtaṃ), which is perhaps characteristic for his first Noble Truth which 
diagnoses the existence of the ubiquitous unsatisfactory nature of the human condition (dukkha). 
The story of the Piyajātka Sutta thus also illustrates that certain existential truths are not neces-
sarily something that everybody can or wants to accept simply because it’s the truth. It is some-
times also very true that the truths taught by the Buddha can be quite counter-intuitive.  
6.2 The Commentary 
The commentary to the Piyajātika Sutta is perhaps worth mentioning only insofar as it counts 
among the shortest of the sutta-commentaries found in the Papañcasūdanī (Ps).734 My hypothesis 
is that the great commentator Buddhaghosa did not really find too much in the sutta that seemed 
to him worth commenting on. Perhaps for him, I presume, the sutta just contained very little of 
what could have been relevant for doctrinal discussion and elucidation (except really for the 
Buddha’s short statement, “So it is, householder, so it is! Sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and 
                                                 
733
 Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 70: “87. Piyajātika Sutta: Born from Those Who Are Dear. Why the Buddha 
teaches that sorrow and grief arise from those who are dear.” And Anālayo (2011: 502): “[…] the ‘discourse 
on [the consequences that] arise from affection’, explains why sorrow arises from those one holds dear.”  
734
 Ps III 344-346. 
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despair are born from those who are dear, arise from those who are dear” – the sutta’s sole doc-
trinal theme).735 My assumption is perhaps corroborated by thematic considerations. The Ven. 
Bhikkhu Anālayo records that one parallel version of our sutta in the Ekottarika-Āgama, “seems 
to draw out the implications of the short comment made by the Buddha in the other versions [in 
the Chinese Canon and the Pāli sutta], where he only gives a brief pointer to the first Noble 
Truth, in the sense that dissociation from what is liked causes the arising of dukkha […]”, and he 
refers to a similar statement at SN V 421,22, which says, “separation from pleasure/whom one 
holds dear is suffering” (piyehi vippayogo dukkho).736 In other words, the Piyajātika Sutta was 
obviously held to be “just” an exemplification of the first Noble Truth of suffering (dukkha).   
The Pāli text itself has two minor difficulties, both of which the commentary explains un-
satisfactorily. The first is the term aññathattaṃ “change, alteration” in a short statement the Bud-
dha is said to have directly addressed to the householder737, and the effect of his disproportionate 
(i.e. disproportionate in the eyes of the Buddha) grief. The term is explained by the commentary 
in the following manner: Aññathattanti vivaṇṇatāya aññathābhāvo “[the term] aññathattaṃ 
means aññathābhāvo (‘change of state’)738 due to/with regard to vivaṇṇatā” (= paleness739? Per-
haps the colour of the skin of the householder was pale suggesting a state of sickliness?). While 
the Pāli text does not seem to be corrupt,740 the exact translation of the phrase is not entirely clear. 
The Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi offers the following translation of the respective sentence addressed by 
the Buddha to the householder in the sutta, in its diction closely following the original Pāli: 
“Householder, your faculties are not those of one in control of his own mind. Your faculties are 
                                                 
735
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 718; MN II 106,17f.: Evam etaṃ, gahapati [Be(R), Bm repeat evam etaṃ, gaha-
pati]; piyajātikā hi, gahapati, sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā [Bm s-ūpāyāsā] piyappabhavikā ti. 
736
 Anālayo 2011: 503, n. 306. 
737
  MN II 106,10f.: Na kho te, gahapati, sake citte ṭhitassa indriyāni atthi; te indriyānaṃ aññathattan ti; for a 
detailed discussion of the phrase, see below. 
738
 Cp. CPD, s.v. aññathābhāva = antonym: itthabhāva; synonym: vipariṇāma “change (for the worse); vicissi-
tude”. 
739
 The other meaning of the word vivaṇṇatā (Skt. vivarṇatā, see MW s.v.) recorded in MW is: “a low condi-
tion of life”, which does not fit the context here. For other possible meanings, no references are give in Apte 
(s.v. vivarṇa).  
740
 There are no variant readings of this passage given in either the apparatus of the PTS edition or in the two 
editions that I have consulted (PTS, ChS), except for a slightly different punctuation in the print editions of the 
PTS and the electronic ChS version, which are, however, anyway secondary editorial addenda. The ChS has: 
“na kho te, gahapati, sake citte ṭhitassa indriyāni, atthi te indriyānaṃ aññathattanti, while the PTS edition 
reads: Na kho te, gahapati, sake citte ṭhitassa indriyāni atthi; te indriyānaṃ aññathattan ti.  
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deranged.”741 I. B. Horner translated quite literally: “Have not you, householder, controlling fac-
ulties for stilling your own mind? There is a change in your faculties.”742 The statement seems 
terse, and the nominal style sounds rather cumbersome and “abhidharmic”, especially when one 
considers this comment being pronounced in a conversation.  
Nevertheless, the translation very much depends on one’s interpretation of the terms 
aññathattaṃ and indriyāni, the first of which often occurs in contexts that indicate deterioration 
of some kind or change for the worse, specifically with regard to the mind or mental states.743 In-
driya, on the other hand, has as its basic meaning (in Pāli as well as in Skt.) “power”, “faculty”, 
or “controlling principle”, but is also often short for “the five senses” (cakkhu’ndriya)744, which is 
a derived or specialised meaning (in the plural, indriyāni) together with other specific ‘faculties’ 
and factors.745 
Therefore, as a worKing translation, I translate literally: “You do not have/possess, 
householder, the faculties of one who remains standing [firmly] within his own mind [i.e. per-
haps: you are “out of your mind”]. Your faculties are clouded.” 
The second problem concerns the imperative or verbal order cara pi re, perhaps “off with 
you!”, uttered by the King Pasenadi in a rage towards his favourite queen, Mallikā who, in his 
opinion, just pays lip service to the Buddha. The commentator explains that it could mean either 
of two things. First, he glosses the phrase with “Leave (= apehi = ‘cara’) as another/an outsider 
(= pare = ‘pire’: a locative used as an indeclinable), as you are no longer one of us (amhākaṃ)/as 
you no longer belong to our (amhākaṃ) household (anajjhattikabhūte).” Thus, as one possibility, 
                                                 
741
 Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 718, 3. 
742
 Horner 1957: 292. 
743
 Cp. Cone 2001, s.v. aññathā: “1. (n.) change, alteration; change of mind; doubt, anxiety”, and CPD s.v. 
aññathattaṃ (b) (and references): “in the same sense, esp. the change of mind into delusion, depression, anxi-
ety, remorse, etc.”  Cp. also MN II 52,2 (Ghaṭīkāra Sutta): Ahu-d-eva aññathattaṃ ahu domanassaṃ, which is 
said to be the state of mind of king Kikī after the Buddha Kassapa had refused his offer for a rains retreat. The 
cty explains that the king is sad because now he will miss out the opportunity for gaining merit by three 
months nurturing the saṅgha as well as hearing teachings from the Buddha, and that he is not sad not because 
of the Buddha himself [declining his offer] (Ps III 284,6 [512]). Aññathattaṃ is glossed with cittaññathattaṃ, 
as is domanassaṃ (citta-°). 
744
 Cp. Cone 2001: s.v.; and CPD, s.v.: the five cakkhu’ndriya are: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch (“to 
which was added […] mind as the ‘sixth sense’”).   
745
 Cp. CPD, s.v. indriya: “male sex, masculinity, life, vitality; pleasure, pain; joy, grief; indifference, equanim-
ity; faith; energy; mindfulness; concentration; intellect, wisdom. 
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Buddhaghosa interprets Pasenadi to be so angry that he expells one his queen from his life and 
palace or in other words, to get ‘divorced’.746 However, more likely (atha vā), Buddhaghosa says, 
it means, “Go [far] away from [me]! Do not stay here!” 747  
Oskar von Hinüber identified the expression re as an old depreciatory form of address for 
males, which, however, already in the Pāli had become a linguistic particle, and subsequently 
used without gender distinction, as our passage proofs.748 This latter observation naturally raises 
the question as to the age of the Piyajātika Sutta or, to be more precise, it raises the question as 
to the age of the phrasing of the direct speech. If von Hinüber is right, then the diction of the 
sutta most likely belongs to a relatively younger (edited) stratum within the Majjhima Nikāya be-
cause it does not preserve the phrasing von Hinüber has concluded to be the original colloquial 
wording. However, even if this is so, it does not have any consequences for my analysis and 
reading of the sutta as an example of a “narrative sutta”.  
6.3 Content of the sutta & its Narrative Structure: 
As all the suttas of the Majjhima Nikāya, the Piyajātika Sutta begins with the introductory for-
mula “Thus have I heard” (0. Introductory formula). 
 
Part I: The Buddha and the mourning householder. 
I.1 (MN II 106,1-6); First narrative, diegesis; extradiegetic, heterodiegetic sutta-narrator; (de-
scriptive) ‘pause’; focalization: zero/householder 
Immediately following the introductory or expository sentence that informs the listener/reader 
about the whereabouts of the Buddha (in Sāvatthī, in Jeta’s Grove, the park sponsored by the rich 
                                                 
746
 Buddhaghosa may be influenced in this interpretation by the meaning the phrase has in the Vinaya, where 
vinassa means the expulsion of a monk or a nun from the order; Cp. Sp IV 871: “dūsako nāsetabbo mettiyaṃ 
bhikkhuniṃ nāsethā” ti [= Vin III 384] ayaṃ liṅganāsanā nāma. “ajjatagge te āvuso samaṇuddesa na ceva so 
bhagavā satthā apadisitabbo” ti ayaṃ daṇḍakammanāsanā nāma. ayaṃ idha adhippetā. tenāha — “evañ ca 
pana bhikkhave nāsetabbo … pe … vinassā” ti. tattha carā ti gaccha. pire ti para amāmaka. vinassā ti nassa; 
yattha te na passāma, tattha gacchā ti. (I owe this suggestion to Mr. Lance S. Cousins, Oxford; personal com-
munication 18.04.2013). 
747
 Ps III 344 [1081]: “Cara pi re” ti apehi amhākaṃ pare anajjhattikabhūte ti attho. Atha vā cara pi re ti par-
ato gaccha, mā idha tiṭṭhā ti pi attho. 
748
 Von Hinüber 1997: 9: “Das maskuline Gegenstück zu je ist re, das nur noch sehr selten als eine verächtliche 
Anrede an Männer in sprachlich alten Abschnitten des Theravāda-Kanons greifbar wird […]. In der Regel ist 
jedoch re […] bereits im Pāli zu einer Partikel geworden.”  
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supporter Anāthapiṇḍika749), a second narrative strand is introduced by the standard formula tena 
kho pana samayena, perhaps “at the same time; meanwhile”.750 The formula, furthermore, betrays 
the (covert) ‘presence’ of an omniscient (extradiegetic) sutta-narrator due the formula’s charac-
teristic of (re-)introducing (new) characters or a changes of place751. It is reported that a certain 
householder’s little only son has died and that the householder is in mourning: He is seen repeat-
edly visiting the cemetery (i.e. the cremation place), crying and whining, “My only little son, 
where are you?”752 Formally, this descriptive part is iterative with respect to the frequency of the 
narrated events, but it furthermore has the effect of bringing the progress of the narrative to a halt 
or delaying it. Narratological textual analysis calls this narrative device a ‘pause’753. However, it 
is not a typical ‘descriptive pause’ as, for instance, the description of a landscape or the like, with 
which Western readers of novels may be familiar. The description is clearly related to a larger 
time frame (tena kho pana samayena), and does not provide the reader/listener with a description 
of physical attributes or the like. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to designate this passage as 
‘pause’ because it serves this purpose here; the diegesis has not yet begun, and it serves, as a 
kind of narratorial comment to introduce and characterise one of the main figures of the story, as 
well as provides important background information of the character of the householder that is 
necessary for the reader in order to understand the following events. 
I.2 (MN II 106,6-23); focalization: external(?) 
While up to this point the listener/reader was presented with a description of a situation (indi-
cated by the present tense754), with the following sentence the plotline of the sutta commences, 
                                                 
749
 MN II 106,1f.: Sāvatthiyaṃ … Jetavane Anāthapiṇḍikassa ārāme. 
750
 Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi (2001: 719, 2.) translate: “Now on that occasion”; Cp. Galasek 2009: 89-91 (2.2.2), 
where I have discussed the grammatical features of the formula tena kho pana samayena and its function in the 
suttas (of the MN) as a narrative technique to depict the contemporaneity of two actions or states/situations.  
751
 Cp. Galasek 2009: 91. 
752
 MN II 106,5f.: So al̥āhanaṃ gantvā gantvā kandati: Kahaṃ, ekaputtaka? Kahaṃ, ekaputtaka? 
753
 Cp. Neumann & Nünning 2008: 74. 
754
 Cp. Galasek 2009: 90. The present tense predicates function as descriptions of (durative) states of being in 
the narrated world. These descriptive passages serve to provide the background-information or setting for the 
plot that is to unfold, and they have an interesting effect on the listener/reader: The narration appears sus-
pensed, perhaps comparable to the camera-work known from the beginning of films, when the camera is 
zooming (without a commentator’s voice) into the locale of a scene. 
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indicated by the formula atha kho + a past tense verb, here upasaṃkami. We can observe an in-
teresting aspect also here, one which was pointed out already in connection with the Ghaṭīkāra 
Sutta755: The ‘frame’ opened in the exposition (part I.1, introducing the Buddha’s dwelling place 
in Sāvatthī) may strike the listener/reader as purely formulaic and customary (it is an essential 
narrative strategy of the suttas to mention the Buddha, even if he does not play the main role in a 
sutta!) or even as misplaced. However, following the story line with its different episodes, we 
can observe this ‘frame’ resurfacing two more times during the progression of the narrative. 
First, immediately after the description in part I.1, when the householder pays a visit to the Bud-
dha, and secondly, when queen Mallikā sends a messenger to the Buddha (part II.2). This means 
that the ‘frame’ does not disappear altogether but remains covertly present in the background in 
favour of other narrative strands which are then foregrounded, and thus that the passage is not 
misplaced at all but even necessary. (We will also see later in this analysis that the Buddha is in-
deed never absent from any of the narrative strands, although he does not figure in them in per-
son.) 
The householder, then, visits the Buddha756 who is quite outspoken and addresses him di-
rectly with a short statement, the gist of which is, “You are out of control, householder”.757 Here-
upon the householder blurts out the reply that it was only natural that “his faculties were de-
ranged”758 – after all, his little only son had died! The Buddha, in turn, comments on this with the 
lapidary statement, “So it is, householder, so it is. Sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair 
are born from those who are dear…”759), which resurfaces several times throughout the sutta, thus 
serving as a connector running through the text like a thread. After a short argument, in which 
the householder states the opposite of the Buddha’s words (“[…] happiness and joy arise from 
those who are dear…”760), he rejects the Buddha’s view and leaves dissatisfied. The focalization 
in this passage appears to be external: everything that the (extradiegetic, heterodiegetic) narrator 
                                                 
755
 Cp. chapter 4. above, “The Presentation of characters in the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta.” 
756
 The usual formula (formula B) 6.; Allon 1997: 172) is employed for the approach: Atha kho so gahapati 
yena Bhagavā ten’ upasaṃkami, upasaṃkamitvā Bhagavantaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdi. Ekamantaṃ 
nisinnaṃ kho taṃ Bhagavā etad avoca: …   
757
 MN II 106,10f.: Na kho te, gahapati, sake citte ṭhitassa indriyāni atthi; te indriyānaṃ aññathattan ti. 
758
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 718, 3. 
759
 MN II 106,17-18; tr. Ibid. 
760
 MN II 106,19-23; tr. Ibid. 
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describes can be seen from the outside – he does neither show to have access to the conscious-
ness of a character nor, for instance, knowledge of events happening at two spatially and tempo-
rally separated places.761   
I.3 (MN II 106,24-107,21) ‘Gamblers-episode’; Metadiegesis; Narrator: sutta-narrator/house-
holder; focalization: householder 
The following episode is likewise introduced with the formula “at the same time; meanwhile” 
(tena kho pana samayena). This episode is self-contained, and it brings to a close the whole part 
I of the sutta. After a narratorial introduction of the situation (“At that time, a large group of 
gamblers (dicers) was playing dice not far from where the Blessed One dwelled…”762), the house-
holder steps forward in this short episode as ‘autodiegetic’ narrator (i.e. he is not only part of the 
story he recounts, but a main character) on the metadiegetic level (‘secondary narrative’). He ad-
dresses the gamblers as his equals and tells them all that has happened – that he had lost his son, 
up to that he had left the Buddha dissatisfied – with exactly the same words by which the sutta-
narrator had introduced the listeners/readers (the narrative audience) to the story earlier. The 
gamblers for their part (appear to) listen to his story and eventually confirm the householder’s 
view saying, “So it is, householder, so it is! Happiness and joy are born from those who are dear, 
arise from those who are dear.”763 Now the householder is satisfied, agrees with the gamblers and 
leaves.764 Through the ‘showing’ mode of presentation, and the householder as autodiegetic nar-
rator, the text adopts or presents the perspective of the householder.   
 
Part II. King Pasenadi and Queen Mallikā discuss the meaning of the Buddha’s short statement 
(MN II 107,21-112,7) 
II.1 Setting: Pasenadi’s palace; characters: King Pasenadi, queen Mallikā, the Brahmin 
Nāl̥ijhaṅga, the Buddha; narrator: sutta-narrator/ Gotama Buddha; focalization: zero 
                                                 
761
 Cp. Genette 1980: 190. 
762
 MN II 106,24-27: Tena kho pana samayena sambahulā akkhadhuttā Bhagavato avidūre akkhehi dibbanti. 
Atha kho so gahapati yena te akkhadhuttā ten’ upasaṅkami; upasaṃkamitvā akkhadhutte etad avoca: … 
763
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 719, 4; MN II 107,18f.: Evam etaṃ, gahapati, evam etaṃ, gahapati. Piyajātikā 
hi, gahapati, ānanda-somanassā piyappabhavikā ti.  
764
 MN II 107,20f.: Atha kho so gahapati: Sameti me akkhadhuttehīti pakkāmi. 
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Here – structurally similar to the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta – the householder leaves the story and the lis-
tener/reader is introduced to a new setting and new characters. Nevertheless, the narrative contin-
ues the theme introduced by the householder’s story. Before the speed of the narrative deceler-
ates in another ‘scene’765, a dialogue between the newly introduced characters King Pasenadi of 
Kosala and his favourite queen Mallikā, an extremely short summary effects the transition from 
one part of the story to the other: “Eventually this story reached the King’s palace.”766 In the fol-
lowing dialogue, the King discusses with his queen what the Buddha allegedly had said to the 
householder. When Mallikā replies to the King’s apparently jeering remark (“This is what Go-
tama that recluse of yours has said, Mallikā: …”767) that, if the Blessed One had said so, it must 
be true, Pasenadi gets angry and dismisses Mallikā, accusing her of immature believe in anything 
the Buddha says and blindly following him just because he was her teacher: “It is in exactly this 
way (Evam evaṃ panāyaṃ) that whatever the drop-out768 Gotama says, Mallikā approves of it, 
[with the words] ‘If this, maharaja, was said by the Blessed One, it must be so.’ Like an appren-
tice approves of whatever his master says [with the words], ‘So it is, master. So it is, master’, so 
do you, Mallikā, approve of absolutely (eva) everything (yaṃ yad) the drop-out Gotama says 
[with the words], ‘If this, maharaja, was said by the Blessed One, it must be so.’ Go away, Mal-
likā, get lost!”769  
II.2 (MN II 108,3-110,7) Queen Mallikā sends a messenger to the Buddha for clarification 
                                                 
765
 Cp. Neumann & Nünning 2008: 73. 
766
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 719, 5. 
767
 MN II 107,23-25: Idan te, Mallike, samaṇena Gotamena bhāsitaṃ: ›Piyajātikā sokaparidevaduk-
khadomanassupāyāsā piyappabhavikā ti. 
768
 Cp. Walshe 1987: 22. Although, from all that we know, the samaṇas were an influential and probably much 
respected, at times and in certain individual case even revered (the Buddha counted among this group!), group 
of ascetics who taught very diverse, and sometimes very bizarre (cp., e.g., “The Sutta of the Dog-Duty As-
cetic”, the Kukkuravatika Sutta, MN 57), practices or tenets, the word samaṇa here is definitely used deprecia-
tory. This may be another instance, in which it becomes clear that the suttas can create or have shades of 
meaning beyond the mere words and phrasing, and that, therefore, the immediate context, always with an eye 
to its narrative situation and evolution, is important.     
769
 MN II 107,27-108,2: Evam evaṃ panāyaṃ Mallikā yaññadeva samaṇo Gotamo bhāsati taṃ tad ev’ assa 
abbhanumodati: ›Sace taṃ, mahārāja, Bhagavatā bhāsitaṃ, evam etan ti. Seyyathāpi nāma ācariyo 
yaññadeva antevāsissa bhāsati, taṃ tad ev’ assa antevāsī abbhanumodati: ›Evam etaṃ, ācariya; evam etaṃ, 
ācariyāti; evam eva kho tvaṃ, Mallike, yaññadeva samaṇo Gotamo bhāsati, taṃ tad ev’ assa abbhanumodasi: 
›sace taṃ, mahārāja, Bhagavatā bhāsitaṃ evam etan ti. Cara pi re, Mallike, vinassāti.  
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After queen Mallikā has apparently walked away from the King to her quarters (the following 
events show that the King did not divorce his favourite queen!), she summons a Brahmin called 
Nāl̥ijaṅgha. Him she instructs to approach the Buddha in order to enquire whether he had indeed 
made the short statement, which she had learned from hearsay, commit the exact wording to 
memory, and convey it to her in exactly the same words upon his return to the palace.770 This epi-
sode consists structurally of two parts: the queen instructing the Brahmin Nāl̥ijaṅgha and the 
meeting of Nāl̥ijaṅgha with the Buddha, during which the Buddha acts as the heterodiegetic nar-
rator on the metadiegetic level (intradiegetic).   
II.2.1 (MN II 108,3-13) Queen Mallikā and the Brahmin messenger Nāl̥ijhaṅgha 
Strictly speaKing, the text is elliptic at this point. It does not tell the listener/reader what Mallikā 
was doing after her husband dismissed her, or where she went, or how much time elapsed be-
tween her dismissal and the summoning of the Brahmin. After Pasenadi had sent her away, the 
text just continues with “And then the queen Mallikā summoned the Brahmin Nāl̥ijaṅgha.”771  
She instructs the Brahmin first to convey her regards for the Buddha in a most formal and 
respectful way772, and then to listen well to the explanations the Buddha would give about the 
wording and content of the short statement given to the householder. 
II.2.2 (MN II 108,13-22) The Brahmin Nāl̥ijaṅgha approaches the Buddha 
The Brahmin Nāl̥ijaṅgha approaches the Buddha in the usual formal way, conveys queen Mal-
likā’s regards and puts his question forward as he was instructed to do. This part serves a kind of 
a transition from the palace scene to the ‘Bhagavā-viharati frame’ opened at the opening of the 
sutta.  
II.3 (MN II 108,23-110,3) The Buddha illustrates his initial short statement by way of analogy; 
metadiegesis; Narrator (heterodiegetic): Gotama Buddha; focalization: Gotama Buddha. 
                                                 
770
 MN II 108,9-13: Bhāsitā nu kho, bhante, Bhagavatā esā vācā: ›Piyajātikā sokaparidevadukkhadomanas-
supāyāsā piyappabhavikā ti? Yathā ca te Bhagavā vyākaroti, taṃ sādhukaṃ uggahetvā mamaṃ āroceyyāsi. 
Na hi Tathāgatā vitathaṃ bhaṇantīti. 
771
 MN II 108,3: Atha kho Mallikā devī Nāḷijaṅghaṃ brāhmaṇaṃ āmantesi: … 
772
 Cp. Allon 1997: 176, formula D. 1b); Indeed, we may have a minor variant here of the formula recorded by 
Allon for the DN (having evañ ca vadeti at the end instead of so evam āha, and thus a “mixture” of formula D. 
1a) and 1b)): Mallikā, bho Gotama, devī bhoto Gotamassa pāde sirasā vandati, appābādhaṃ appātaṅkaṃ la-
huṭṭhānaṃ balaṃ phāsuvihāraṃ pucchati, evañ ca vadeti:… Interesting is also the transposition of this formula 
earlier in the text into the imperative mode, as instruction to the Brahmin.  
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Here, the Buddha, at the same time a character of the ‘primary narration’ (W. Schmid) or the ‘in-
tradiegetic’ level (G. Genette), appears as the extradiegetic narrator of an embedded story of the 
past (introduced with bhūtapubbaṃ773). However, we cannot call this embedded story a narration 
of the Jātaka-type proper, despite the standard introduction (“In old times/Formerly”).  
Asked by the Brahmin whether he had originated the utterance, “So it is, householder, so 
it is. Sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair are born from those who are dear…”774, the 
Buddha confirms that this is so and that this was indeed what he had said. Without being ques-
tioned further, the Buddha starts to explain how his statement could (or should?775) be understood 
“by the following analogy” (Tad aminā … pariyāyena).776 The then following analogous demon-
stration of particular instances – which, however, cannot really be regarded as concrete particular 
situations because they completely lack any individuality – of a loved one or relative who had 
died, is repeated altogether fourteen times throughout the sutta.777 The enumeration, which starts 
with a women whose father and, subsequently, brother, sister, son, daughter, and husband had 
died, and continues with the same instances happening to “a man”, culminates in an absurd 
sounding climax illustrative of where attachment to a loved one can lead. The Buddha tells (the 
Brahmin) that in former times there was a young couple living in Sāvatthī. One day the wife 
                                                 
773
 Cp. chapter 4.5, “Ur-Jātaka”, above. 
774
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 720, 7. 
775
 The participium necessitatis ‘veditabbaṃ’ can express both meanings “can” and “should”. 
776
 MN II 108,26-28: Tad aminā p’ etaṃ, brāhmaṇa, pariyāyena veditabbaṃ yathā ›Piyajātikā sokaparidevaduk-
khadomanassupāyāsā piyappabhavikā ti. 
The Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi appears to have decided to leave pariyāyena un-translated in his MN translation. 
(Mr. Lance Cousins, Oxford, made me aware of this; personal communication 21.11.2011.) However, the ex-
pression is important, for the Buddha here seems to ‘disclose’ a principle of his teaching style in the suttas. (Of 
course, we could not determine with certainty, whether it was indeed the Buddha himself who disclosed it or 
the editors/authors of the sutta!). Cp. PED, s.v. pariyāya: [acc. to Buddhaghosa 3 meanings: 1. vāra, “turn, 
course”; 2. desanā, “instruction, presentation (>dhamma-p° = dhamma-kathā)”; 3. kāraṇa, “cause, reason; 
matter”]; 5. Specifically, in Abhidhamma terminology, pariyāyena means the mode of teaching in the Suttan-
tas, which is: ad hominem, discursive, an applied method, illustrated discourse, figurative language as opposed 
to abstract language and the statements which are nippariyāyena, nippariyāyato, “not figuratively/discursive, 
as is characteristic of the Abhidhamma.” 
777
 MN II 108,26- 110,3; The printed text was already in the different mss. usually abbreviated with ‘pe’, 
peyyāla, a so-called Māgadhism for pariyāya (perhaps “etc.”), indicating to the reciter that a particular phrase 
or the exact wording of a passage was to be repeated either from memory or according to the preceding phrase. 
(In this case, that the same phrase (Iminā pi kho etaṃ … until Api me XY addasathāti?) should be repeated in 
the recitation each time with a new kinship term: “the father, brother, sister, son, daughter, husband of a 
woman had died…”).  
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went to visit her family who then informed her that they wished to divorce her and give her to 
another man (the text does not say why or to whom). But the woman said “no”, returned to her 
husband and told him what her family was up to, but that she had refused. Without further ado, 
the Buddha narrates, the man [took a knife and] “cut his wife in two” (dvidhā chetvā) before he 
killed himself with the thought: “After death we will be together [again]”. 
 
II.4 (MN II 110,4-112,7) Dialogue between the queen Mallikā and the King Pasenadi  
II.4.1 (MN II 110,4-7) Transition 
This part serves to make the transition from the Tathāgata-‘frame’ back to the King’s palace. It is 
highly formulaic and contains only a short summary (literally: “as much conversation as there 
was with the Blessed One, all that he [Nāl̥ijaṅgha] related to queen Mallikā”)778, which is in stark 
contrast to the elaboration of the event it summarises, as well as to the following dialogue 
between queen Mallikā and King Pasenadi, which is presented completely in ‘dramatic/showing 
mode’ without any narratorial indication as to who speaks (no speech tags are employed).    
II.4.2 (MN II 110,8-112,7) Mallikā skillfully proves the truth of the Buddha’s statement to King 
Pasenadi; dialogue (i.e. ‘showing’ mode)/ ‘scene’; Narrator: covert/ ‘absent’; focalization: 
external 
A dialogue between Mallikā and Pasenadi stretches over the last two pages of the PTS edition of 
the sutta. Queen Mallikā, having been informed by the Brahmin Nāl̥ijaṅgha about his 
conversation with the Buddha, goes back into the presence of the King and starts to confront him 
rather suddenly (i.e. without ant introduction) with some skillful questions: “What do you think, 
maharaja? Is the princess Vajīrī dear to you?” “So it is, Mallikā, the princess Vajīrī is dear to 
me.” She asks further whether “a change [to the worse]” affecting princess Vajīrī would cause 
him worries.779 It surely would, answers the King, since it would be the same for him as a 
                                                 
778
 A variation of the formula is used which usually stands at the end of a sutta (“The bhikkhus were satisfied 
and delighted in the Blessed One’s words”, [Idaṃ avoca Bhagavā;] attamanā te bhikkhū Bhagavato bhāsitaṃ 
abhinandun ti): “Then, delighting and rejoicing in the Blessed One’s words, the brahmin Nāl̥ijaṅgha rose from 
his seat, went to queen Mallikā, and reported to her his entire conversation with the Blessed One” (tr. Ñāṇa-
moli & Bodhi 2001: 721, 23.). 
779




deterioration of his own life.780 In return, Mallikā “reveals” to him that this was exactly what the 
Blessed One meant when he said, “Sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair are born from 
those who are dear, arise from those who are dear”.781 The rest of the unfolding dialogue is not 
very varied; the questions and replies follow the same structural pattern, substituting only the 
object of the King’s attachment (his second queen Vāsabhā; their son, the King’s general 
Viḍūḍabha; Mallikā herself; his Kingdom Kāsi-Kosala), quite similar in fact to the Buddha’s tale 
(part II.3).  
The sutta closes with Pasenadi acknowledging the superior wisdom of the Buddha (“It is 
surprising, Mallikā, it is astonishing, how far the Blessed One penetrates [the nature of things, 
scil. parama-saccaṃ782] with wisdom and sees with wisdom.”783 The King then orders Mallikā to 
get water for a ritual ablution including the rinsing of the mouth784, folds his hand in reverential 
salutation (añjaliṃ paṇāmetvā), and makes three times the “joyful utterance” (udānam udānesi): 
“Honour to the Blessed One, accomplished and fully enlightened.”785 
As we have seen above, the events are presented mainly in chronological order (except 
for the ‘analepsis’ in part I.3, the Gamblers episode), which means that story and discourse run 
predominantly parallel. This is characteristic of the narration in the suttas.786 Nevertheless, the 
discourse shows an arrangement of very different speeds of narration. The sutta starts off with a 
‘descriptive pause’ (part I.1) and then the plotline commences, to be followed again immediately 
by a ‘scene’ (part I.2). Part I.3 again starts with a ‘stasis statement’ (Tena kho pana samayena + 
                                                 
780
 MN II 110,16-18: Vajiriyā me, Mallike, kumāriyā vipariṇāmaññathābhāvā jīvitassa pi siyā aññathattaṃ. Kiṃ 
pana me na uppajjissanti sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā ti? 
781
 MN II 110,19-21: Idaṃ kho taṃ, mahārāja, tena Bhagavatā jānatā passatā arahatā sammāsambuddhena 
sandhāya bhāsitaṃ: Piyajātikā sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā piyappabhavikā ti. 
782
 Cp. CPD s.v. ativijjhati: “[…] (b) ativijjha (sometimes written ativijjhā): paññāya naṁ [scil. parama-sac-
cam] ~passati […].” 
783
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 721f., 29.: “It is wonderful, Mallikā, it is marvelous how far the Blessed One 
penetrates with wisdom and sees with wisdom!”  
784
 MN II 112,1f.: Ehi, Mallike, ācāmehīti. 
785
 MN II 112,5-7: Atha kho rājā Pasenadi Kosalo uṭṭhāy’ āsanā ekaṃsaṃ uttarāsaṅgaṃ karitvā  yena 
Bhagavā ten’ añjalim paṇāmetvā tikkhattuṃ udānaṃ udānesi: Namo tassa Bhagavato arahato sammāsambud-
dhassa; namo tassa – pe – sammāsambuddhassāti. This is the famous “itipiso-formula”. 
786
 We could easily think, for example, the sutta to begin in medias res, leaving out part I.1.2. That the edi-
tors/authors repeated the householder’s report to the Gamblers at the beginning of the sutta seems to indicate 
that a beginning in medias res would perhaps have gone against the expectations of the recipients of the sutta.  
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a present tense verb), followed by ‘process statements’ (= description of actions)787 and subse-
quently by a monologue. Part I.3 opens with an extreme, perhaps even elliptic, summary (Atha 
kho idaṃ kathāvatthuṃ anupubbena rājantepuraṃ pāvisi; ‘elliptic’, because we do not learn an-
ything about the lot of the householder afterwards.) In this way, the narrative flows onward, al-
ternatively accelerated or decelerated by ‘summary’, ‘pause’, and ‘scenes’ with intermittent nar-
ratorial ‘process statements’ (Atha kho + past tense verbs). This arrangement of the sutta, I want 
to argue, reveals the selecting and arraying hand of a narrator.788 
6.4 “Leitmotivik” and the characterisation of the Buddha 
Although the Buddha is personally absent from most of the story the Piyajātika Sutta (except for 
the parts I.1.1, I.2, II.3), he figures prominently throughout the whole sutta. This effect is pro-
duced by the use of a leitmotif that functions as substitute for the Buddha’s in-person appear-
ance. Throughout the sutta, the Buddha is represented by the sentence: “So it is, householder, so 
it is, householder. Sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair are born from those who are dear, 
arise from those who are dear”789, which was uttered by him on the occasion of the householder 
seeKing his counsel after he had lost his only small son. It is repeated verbatim twenty-nine 
times (including occurrences of parts of it) throughout the text. The use of leitmotifs as means 
for creating coherence in a text is well known in (Western) linguistics.790 Additionally, the use of 
a leitmotif to represent a person is well known in musical art. In the Piyajātika Sutta, the leitmo-
tif “sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā” achieves both the coherence of the sutta, with its 
very diverse episodes and its appearance and disappearance of characters791, and the standing in 
for the person of the Buddha. Each time the leitmotif appears in the text since its first enunciation 
by the Blessed One, the ‘Buddha-Gotama frame’ becomes ‘activated’ – the listener/reader knows 
that the Buddha is there without actually appearing in person. 
                                                 
787
 For the terms ‘stasis statement’ and ‘process statement’, see Chatman 1989: 31f. 
788
 Cp. also Galasek 2009: 98. 
789
 (Evam etaṃ, gahapati;) (Piyajātikā hi, gahapati,) sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā (piyappabhavikā 
ti). MN II 106,17f., 18f.; 107,10ff.13f., 24f.; 108,10f., 21f., 23ff., 27f.; 109,2ff.,11f., 18f., 27f.; 110,2f., 14f., 18, 20f., 25f., 29, 
31f.; 111,3f., 7, 9f., 14f., 18, 20f., 27f., 31, 33f. (the references marked in bold type contain the variant or the main part 
of the whole phrase, respectively: sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā). 
790
 Cp. Jannidis 2004: 64f. 
791
 Cp. also Galasek 2009: 92-94. 
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The core of this ‘Buddha-theme’, which is also repeated several times, appears to be a 
reference to the twelve links of ‘Dependent Origination’ (paṭicchasamuppāda), for the two for-
mulas share the phrase: sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā, “Sorrow, lamentation, pain, 
grief, and despair”. In the full description of the twelve links of the Dependent Origination for-
mula, our phrase is a detailed enumeration or exemplification of what is summarised as “this 
whole mass of suffering” (dukkha-kkhandha). This is the well-known phrase of Dependent Orig-
ination: “So, monks, with ignorance as condition there arise mental formations, with formations 
as condition there arises consciousness, with consciousness […] name-and-form, with name-and-
form […] the six senses, with the six senses […] sense-contact, with sense-contact […] feeling, 
with feeling […] craving, with craving […] grasping, with grasping […] becoming, with becom-
ing […] birth, with birth […] old age and death, distress, grief, suffering, sorrow and unrest.792 
Such is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.793 
Here, in the Piyajātika Sutta, we are presented with the cause of this ‘whole mass of suf-
fering’ (which is the Buddhist description of ‘existence’) as being piya-ppabhavika, arisen 
from/through those we love, which is, in other words, “attachment” (upādāna), which in turn 
forms the ninth link of the paṭiccasamuppāda-formula, and constitutes an alternative version of 
the first Noble Truth. 
As pointed out in the beginning, the phrase is also found in a detailed description of the 
four Noble Truths given in the Saccavibhaṅga Sutta (MN 141). In the narrative of this sutta, 
which is located in the Deer Park in Benares, the Buddha reminds the monks that this was the 
place, where he first expounded the four Noble Truths. Furthermore, he praises his favourite dis-
ciples Sāriputta and Moggallāna – by the way, an interesting passage for the characterisation of 
these two figures – and advises the monks to associate with and follow those two wise disciples 
of his: “They are wise and helpful to their companions in the holy life. Sāriputta is like a mother; 
Moggallāna is like a nurse. Sāriputta trains others for the fruit of stream-entry, Moggallāna for 
                                                 
792
 Bhikkhu Bodhi translates: “Sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair”; cp. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 
353, 17. 
793
 E.g. in the Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya Sutta (MN 38), MN I 261,24-31: Iti kho, bhikkhave, avijjāpaccayā 
saṅkhārā, saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ, viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ, nāmarūpapaccayā saḷāyatanaṃ, 
saḷāyatanapaccayā phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṃ, 
upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanas-
supāyāsā sambhavanti, evam-etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti. Tr. Collins 1982: 107; Cp. 
also Collins 1982: 103-111. 
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the supreme goal.”794 Having said this, the Buddha leaves and Sāriputta starts a detailed exposi-
tion on the four Noble Truths: “And what, friends, is the Noble Truth of suffering? Birth is suf-
fering; ageing is suffering; death is suffering; sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair 
are suffering; not to obtain what one wants is suffering; in short, the five aggregates affected by 
clinging are suffering.”795 LooKing at Sāriputta’s detailed exposition, one could indeed find an 
adequate (though still very general) description of the householder’s state (I shall restrict myself 
to one sample example): “And what, friends, is lamentation?” asks Sāriputta. “The wail and la-
ment, wailing and lamenting, bewailing and lamentation, of one who has encountered some mis-
fortune or is affected by some painful state – this is called lamentation.”796 The resemblance is 
with regard to content, however, and not with regard to wording, as is the case with “Sorrow, 
lamentation”, and so forth.  
 We have seen that the Buddha figures in this sutta mainly in a represented or substituted 
form. He is not really actualised as a ‘possible person’, except on a very basic level. He is identi-
fied: “Bhagavā”; he exists in the story world: Sāvatthiyaṃ viharati; he performs (very general-
ised) speech acts: “Evam etaṃ, gahapati …”; but that is about all that we can extract from the 
concrete text. There are other suttas, in which the mimetic aspect of the person of the Buddha 
comes much more to the fore, be it through his mere personal presence in the narrated events 
(i.e., e.g., occurrences in the actual text) or quasi-autobiographical accounts from his life and his 
quest for awakening.797 This virtual absence of the Buddha in the Piyajātika Sutta, while his utter-
ance lingers on, is especially interesting when one considers that the story itself thematises the 
                                                 
794
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 1097, 5. MN III 248,22-28: Sevatha, bhikkhave, Sāriputta-Moggallāne, bha-
jatha, bhikkhave, Sāriputta-Moggallāne, paṇḍitā bhikkhū anuggāhaka brahmacārīnaṃ. Seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, 
janettī, evaṃ Sāriputto; seyyathāpi jātassa āpādetā, evaṃ Moggallāno. Sāriputto, bhikkhave, sotāpattiphale 
vineti, Moggallāno uttamatthe; Sāriputto, bhikkhave, pahoti, cattāri ariyasaccāni vitthārena ācikkhituṃ de-
setuṃ paññāpetuṃ paṭṭhāpetuṃ vivarituṃ vibhajituṃ uttānīkatun ti.  
795
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 1098, 10. MN III 249,9-13: Katamañ c’ āvuso, dukkhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ? – Jāti 
pi dukkhā, jarā pi dukkhā, maraṇaṃ pi dukkhā, sokaparidevadukkhadommanassupāyāsā pi dukkhā. Yam p’ 
icchaṃ na labhati, tam pi dukkhaṃ; saṃkhittena pañcupādānakkhandhā dukkhā. 
796
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 1098, 15. MN III 249,31-250,2: Katamā c’, āvuso, paridevo? Yo kho, āvuso, 
aññataraññatarena byasanena samannāgatassa aññataraññatarena dukkhadhammena phuṭṭhassa ādevo 
paridevo, ādevanā paridevanā, ādevitattaṃ paridevitattaṃ; — ayaṃ vuccat’, āvuso, paridevo.    
797




importance of understanding (or not), interpreting, and remembering the exact words of the Bud-
dha. This ‘thematic dimension’ (or ‘potential’) of the Buddha’s representation is turned into a 
‘thematic function’ by the narrative progression when queen Mallikā instructs the Brahmin 
Nāl̥ijaṅgha: “Then ask this: ‘Venerable sir, have these words been uttered by the Blesse One: 
“Sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair are born from those who are dear, arise from those 
who are dear”?’ Learn well what the Blessed One replies and report it to me; for Tathāgatas do 
not speak untruth.”798 And upon returning, the Brahmin does report exactly “his entire conversa-
tion with the Blessed One”.799  
Thus, the story of the sutta itself thematises the importance of the accurate transmission 
of the Buddha’s words, a theme that has always been of great importance to the Theravāda tradi-
tion. Furthermore, it stresses the ‘thematic aspect’ of the Buddha.  
The movement of the narrative of the Piyajātika Sutta is initiated by an ‘instability’ (= a 
conflict of opinions) that involves the householder, i.e. his painful experience of the loss of his 
little son, and the Buddha, i.e. his seemingly unemotional and dry comment on the householder’s 
situation (part I.2). However, at the same time, the narrative progresses also by a ‘tension’, which 
is due to the slightly enigmatic character of the Buddha’s statement; the listener/reader taKing on 
the role of the authorial audience asks himself what the Buddha’s short utterance may mean. The 
‘tension’ thus created is significantly amplified by the Gamblers-episode (part I.3), which reveals 
the householder as an unreliable narrator. 
There seems to exist a peculiar break in the story after the Gamblers-episode, because the 
householder just disappears from the story (remember that also in the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta a main 
character, Jotipāla, leaves the story after roughly the first third of the sutta is completed!) The 
suddenness of the ending of part I.3 (the Gamblers episode) is highlighted by the extremely sum-
marising sentence “Eventually this story reached the King’s palace”. 
However, the reason that the story in the Piyajātika Sutta has to continue after the house-
holder has left the Buddha grudgingly, and the gamblers with satisfaction, is a ‘tension’ that is 
                                                 
798
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 719, 6. MN II 108,9-13: evañ ca vadehi – Bhāsitā nu kho, bhante, Bhagavatā 
esā vācā: Piyajātikā sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā piyappabhavikā ti? Yathā ca te Bhagavā vyāka-
roti, taṃ sādhukaṃ uggahetvā mamaṃ āroceyyāsi. Na hi Tathāgatā vitathaṃ bhaṇantīti.  
799
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 721, 23. MN II 110,6f.: … yāvatako ahosi Bhagavatā saddhiṃ kathāsallāpo 
taṃ sabbaṃ Mallikāya deviyā ārocesi. 
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created between the householder as narrator (part I.3) and the norms of the suttas as a genre, re-
spectively the authorial audience. The ‘thematic dimension’ of the householder (the nameless 
householder being a representative of a certain class of people) is thus turned into a ‘thematic 
function’ by his conversation and his unanimity with the gamblers. By his leaving the gamblers, 
and the story, satisfied, the text states that some people (the historical listener/reader?) did not 
like agree with what the Buddha said. By continuing the story, the implicit norms of the sutta(s) 
convey that some people did/do not understand what the Buddha taught. This makes the house-
holder, at this point of the narrative progression, a plausible representative of a class of people (= 
his ‘thematic function’) that the later Pāli texts and the commentaries call “ordinary persons” 
(puthujjanā).800 From the point of view of the authorial audience, however, the difference lies in 
the presence or absence of sammā-diṭṭhi, “right view”. Steven Collins has proposed three main 
meanings in which the term ‘right view’ occurs in the early Buddhist teachings: First, to have a 
general “pro-attitude” towards or “confidence” (saddhā) in such beliefs as karma and saṃsāra 
(without yet doing anything specifically Buddhist); second, an “acquaintance with Buddhist doc-
trine”, and third, as “liberating insight” (sammā-paññā) leading to “right release” (sammā-vi-
mutti).801 It is clear that our householder already disqualifies with regard to the first sense of ‘right 
view’. 
The Buddha’s terse initial statement is not only linguistically somewhat enigmatic, but 
also because it expresses, from a common-sense point of view, a counterintuitive ‘truth’. Never-
theless, while the listener/reader may first tend to sympathise and agree with the strongly empha-
sized ‘mimetic aspect’ of the householder in part I.2 (“How could my faculties not be deranged, 
venerable sir?” and “Venerable sir, who would ever think …?”802), he is finally made to become 
suspicious about the householder’s credulity through his meeting with a group of gamblers. Fur-
thermore, the progression towards the resolution of this ‘tension’ is complicated by the introduc-
tion of a new ‘instability’ between queen Mallikā and King Pasenadi (part II.1), which is in fact 
thematically the same instability as that between the householder and the Buddha, for whom the 
royal couple act as deputies, so to speak. 
                                                 
800
 Cp. Collins 1982: 92-95. 
801
 Cp. ibid. 87-92. 
802
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 718, 3.; MN II 106,12 and 19. 
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   The ‘tension’, then, has by the time that “the story reached the King’s palace”, not yet 
been resolved (the initial ‘instability’, on the other hand, has been resolved for the householder, 
however unsatisfactory for the authorial audience, because he does not appear in the further pro-
gression of the story). Perhaps one could say that the ‘tension’, which resides as the norms of the 
text throughout the narrative on a level beyond the text803, “suffusing” the text, finally resurfaces 
or is once more concretised on the level of the characters in the argument between Mallikā and 
Pasenadi. That is because the ostensible ‘resolution’ that the householder presents (“The gam-
blers agree with me”804) is not really capable of resolving the initial ‘instability’ (i.e. the question: 
is the consequence of holding someone dear suffering or happiness?) completely. 
Let us look at the narrative “mechanism” that is at work here in some more details. The 
householder’s assessment of the (/his) situation cannot not offer a real resolution because, while 
the householder’s grief has an effective ‘mimetic function’ (“Venerable sir, who would ever 
think that sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair are born from those who are dear, arise 
from those who are dear? [Rhetorical question – Nobody!] Venerable sir, happiness and joy are 
born from those who are dear, arise from those who are dear.”805 [my emphasis in italics; state-
ment of fact!]), the characters of the gamblers and the whole Gamblers-episode serve to make the 
householder an ‘unreliable narrator’. However, the nameless householder is not unreliable in 
terms of untruthfulness or lying – the words he speaks or repeats respectively quotes are true to 
the letter. His unreliability lies rather in his judgement. As mentioned in Part II, J. Phelan has 
distinguished six ways in which a narrator’s speech (remember: the householder is “the one who 
speaks” as well as the “one who sees” in the Gamblers episode) can be assessed as unreliable: 
“[…] they [narrators] can be unreliable in six ways: they can underreport or misreport; they can 
underread or misread (underinterpret or misinterpret); and they can underregard or misregard 
(underevaluate or misevaluate)”.806 A narrator can thus at the same time be a reliable reporter and 
                                                 
803
 Cp. Phelan 2007: 212: The second kind exists at the level of discourse, that is, the narration and its tech-
niques, and I call them tensions: they involve relations among authors, narrators, and audiences, and they in-
clude gaps between tellers and audiences of knowledge, beliefs, opinions, and values. Unreliable narration in-
volves a progression by tension.” 
804
 MN II 107,20: Sameti me akkhadhuttehīti. 
805
 MN II 107,19-23: Kassa kho nām’ etaṃ, bhante, evaṃ bhavissati: Piyajātikā sokaparidevadukkhadomanas-
supāyāsā piyappabhavikā? Piyajātikā hi kho, bhante, ānandasomanassā piyappabhavikā ti. 
806
 Phelan 2007: 205. 
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an unreliable interpreter. This is the case in the Gamblers-episode in the Piyajātika Sutta: By ac-
cusing the Buddha of having spoken nonsense and by seeKing support from the “wrong” people, 
the householder not only is blind (because he is too upset) to the facts of the situation, but also 
misevaluates the (spiritual) truth that lies “hidden”, as it were, in the Buddha’s words (i.e. the 
first Noble Truth that always entails the other Truths), and thereby bereaves himself of any 
chance to attain salvation or liberation. In effect, then, the episode of the conversation and dis-
cussion between King Pasenadi and his queen, Mallikā, serves as a complication of the ‘instabil-
ity’ before the story’s ‘tension’ can be resolved in a final resolution.807 (The ‘tension’ exists be-
tween the ‘authorial audience’ and the householder as unreliable narrator from the moment he 
rejects the Buddha’s “truth”.) The resolution of the ‘tension’ dawns on the listener/reader (i.e. 
here the narrative audience) only towards end of the narrative, when the “hidden” (i.e. the not di-
rectly obvious) truth in the Buddha’s words is finally “carved out” by the characters and 
acknowledged by a reliable, although initially also skeptical and highly critical, character: King 
Pasenadi. Eventually, Mallikā is able to “proof” to Pasenadi, as well as to the narrative audience, 
the truth that lies in the Buddha’s short statement. She accomplishes this in a very skilful, clever 
way: Instead of repeating what the Buddha had explained to the Brahmin Nāl̥ijaṅgha, and thus 
avoiding being once again accused by the King of just paying lip-service to the Blessed One 
(“As an apprentice who approves of whatever his master says [with the words], ‘So it is, master. 
So it is, master’, so do you, Mallikā, approve of absolutely (eva) everything (yaṃ yad) the drop-
out Gotama says [with the words], ‘If this, maharaja, was said by the Blessed One, it must be so.’ 
Go away, Mallikā! Get lost!”808), Mallikā herself makes Pasenadi understand by way of analogy 
(pariyāyena): “It was with reference to this, maharaja, that the Blessed One, who knows and 
                                                 
807
 Cp. Phelan 2007: 212: “The sixth principle involves the importance of narrative progressions. A narrative’s 
movement from its beginning to its end is governed by both a textual and a readerly dynamics, and understand-
ing their interaction provides a good means for recognizing a narrative’s purposes. On the textual side narra-
tives proceed by the introduction, complication, and resolution (in whole or in part) of two kinds of unstable 
situations. The first kind exists on the level of story, that is, the events and existents, including character and 
setting, of narrative, and I call them simply instabilities: they involve relations within, between, or among 
characters and their situations. The progression of “The Cask” is generated in part through the unstable rela-
tions between Montresor and Fortunato. The second kind exists at the level of discourse, that is, the narra-
tion and its techniques, and I call them tensions: they involve relations among authors, narrators, and 
audiences, and they include gaps between tellers and audiences of knowledge, beliefs, opinions, and val-
ues. Unreliable narration involves a progression by tension.” [my emphasis] 
808
 MN II 107,29-108,2. 
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sees, who is accomplished and fully awakened, said: ‘Sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and des-
pair are born from those who dear, arise from those who are dear.’”809. The examples she picks 
are from the King’s own realm of experience. She lets himself draw the conclusion (“Imperma-
nence and deterioration in Princess Vajīrī would mean deterioration of my own life, Mallikā. 
How could sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair not arise in me?”810), and she herself 
simply facilitates the King’s understanding by maKing the appropriate connections with the Bud-
dha’s statement.  
The ‘tension’, which is produced by an inherent genre convention and picked up by the 
‘authorial audience’, exists in the differences of knowledge of the ‘authorial audience’ and the 
householder as narrator: The ‘authorial audience’ knows that his estimation of the situation and 
his judgement about the Buddha’s wisdom must be wrong. Interestingly, the genre convention 
that the Buddha is always right and always sees with wisdom that surpasses that of ordinary peo-
ple is on the one hand manifest in the numerous instances in the suttas in which he is depicted to 
be victorious in a debate as well as in the narratorial statement at the end of most suttas that “the 
monks were satisfied and delighted in the Buddha’s words”. At the same time, it is verbalised in 
the Piyajātika Sutta in Mallikā’s statement that “[…] Tathāgatas do not speak untruth”.811 
One could thus say that ‘tensions’ created on the level of the different audiences seem ra-
ther to serve the thematic interests of a narrative, whereas the ‘instabilities’, supported by narra-
tive techniques like focalization, rather serve listeners/readers mimetic interest in the charac-
ters.812  
The remainder of the Piyajātika Sutta moves towards the resolution of the ‘tension’ (= 
parts II.3; II.4, in which Mallikā is able to convince Pasenadi of the Buddha’s original wisdom), 
after the ‘complication’ of part II.1 of the initial instability.  
After this analysis of the the narrative’s progression along general lines, the somewhat 
peculiar embedded story told by the Buddha deserves some more comment.  
                                                 
809
 MN II 110,19-22: Idaṃ kho taṃ, maharaja, tena Bhagavatā jānatā passatā arahatā sammāsambuddhena 
sandhāya bhāsitaṃ: Piyajātikā sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā piyappabhavikā ti. 
810
 MN II 110,27-29. 
811
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 719,6. MN II 108,12f.: Na hi Tathāgatā vitathaṃ bhaṇantīti. 
812
 Cp. Phelan 1989: 34. 
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6.5 The Embedded Narrative 
K. M. Gupta observes that in the short embedded story (part II.3), “the master [cites] various in-
stances and in all those, there is no mention of any being, though the master was citing the events 
as if they occurred”.813 Gupta further concludes that although the Buddha is well aware of death 
being a ubiquitous and inescapable lot for everyone and at all times (and thus could have stated it 
directly), this little embedded story with its “listing out several instances” served the narrative 
“to unfold the theme”814. I think that his statement partly hits the mark because the Buddha’s “ex-
planation” does not really serve as an explanation, but is more an ad nauseam repetition that “un-
folds” a (theoretically) infinite sequence of the same thing over and over again in ‘showing 
mode’. 
I have argued elsewhere that this tiringly repetitive episode, which does not bring any 
new information or insight to the listener/reader as it unfolds, is not to be taken literally.815 It is 
furthermore hard to imagine that these repetitions should have fulfilled a function for mnemon-
ics. Therefore, an answer as to its precise function must be sought elsewhere. I think that the 
Buddha’s little tale essentially serves two purposes and that its internal structure or composition 
builds up a kind of dramatic tension through repetition (not the ‘tension’ in the narratological 
sense) before it reaches its apex in the story of the young husband who first kills his wife and 
subsequently himself.816  
The first purpose the embedded story serves – as its “designation” already points to – is to 
provide an explanation by analogy (pariyāyena). In narratology, one speaks of the “correlative 
function”817 as one of the ‘syntactic functions’ that embedded stories can have in relation to the 
frame story. Therefore, the artificial and very general character of the ‘examples’ as observed by 
Gupta should not overly surprise us.  
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 Gupta 2006: 126. 
814
 Cp. ibid. 
815
 Cp. Galasek 2009.  
816
 Bhikkhu Anālayo states correctly that the last example the Buddha relates served “[t]o bring home the same 
point […]” as the foregoing repetitions (Anālayo 2011: 504). However, I think he missed the dramatic climax 
that builds up in the passage.  
817
 “Korrelative Funktionalisierung”; cp. Literaturwissenschaftliche Grundbegriffe Online:   
http://www.li-go.de/definitionsansicht/prosa/sekundaereserzaehlen.html (last accessed: 22nd April 2013). 
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Another possible explanation that comes to mind is that the passage was intended to be 
ironic. However, the ascription of a sense of irony to either the Buddha or other author(s)/com-
piler(s)/redactor(s) of the sutta(s) would ultimately depend upon our knowledge, whether or not 
the exact words (including the repetitions) did indeed originate in a concrete historical situa-
tion/speech act, which must remain speculative. The content of what the Buddha is trying to con-
vey in this enumeration is not terribly difficult to understand. The episode does not really explain 
the meaning of the Buddha’s short utterance, although it appears or even claims to do so (“It can 
be understood from this, Brahmin, how sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair, are born 
from those who are dear, arise from those who are dear.”818) The Buddha just enumerates similar 
cases from the past – nothing like a “real” explanation like that given in the Saccavibhaṅga Sutta 
(MN 141), which we have seen above.819 The seemingly endless monotonous repetition can be 
tiring for the listener/reader and seems exaggerated. Therefore, I do not find it unthinkable that 
the passage is intended to make fun either of the householder or the Brahmin Nāl̥ijaṅgha. How-
ever, that must remain mere speculation.   
6.6 The Householder (gahapati) (MN I 339-413) 
The first information about the character of the householder that the text provides us with stems 
from the sutta-narrator, and is as follows: There is “a certain householder” (aññatarassa gahapa-
tissa). He had a son (ekaputtako) who was very “dear” to him (piyo) and “charming” (manāpo820), 
and who had died, presumably, just recently (kālakato hoti). Since the text is specific that this 
was his “only son” (ekaputtako), we can perhaps infer that this householder was not a particu-
larly rich one, because some passages in the Pāli suttas suggest that polygamy was prevalent 
among this particular social group. (For a general depiction of householders in the Canon, see 
below.) Furthermore, we learn from the sutta-narrator that the householder was very upset be-
cause of his son’s death, and deeply in mourning. Apparently, he was so troubled that he found 
                                                 
818
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 720,8. MN II 108,26ff.: Tad aminā p’ etaṃ, brāhmaṇa, pariyāyena veditabbaṃ 
yathā piyajātikā sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā piyappabhavikā ti. 
819
 Cp. ch. 6.4 above. 
820
 Bhikkhu Bodhi translates “beloved” (Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 718, 2.), as did Horner (Horner 1957: 292). 
The PED and the BHSD both give the meaning “charming”. In my opinion, “beloved” would be more suitable 
to be the translation of piya.  
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himself unable to work or even eat (n’ eva kammantā paṭibhanti na bhattaṃ paṭibhāti). Fre-
quently he went to the cemetery (literally: “the cremation place”, āḷāhanaṃ) wailing (kandati).821  
The sutta-narrator text uses the same phrasing for the description of the inner state of the 
householder as the householder himself does later in the narrative when describing his own situa-
tion from the first-person perspective (part I.3). The repetition (in parts with slight variation) of 
the same wording in different voices (narrator-text and character-text) is not an unusual stylistic 
phenomenon of the Pāli suttas. Yet, here, I think, it has a certain function or effect. The sutta-
narrator’s ‘perceptive perspective’822 thus seemingly converges with that of the householder, 
which is indicated through his use of the verb paṭibhāti: … tassa kālakiriyāya n’ eva kammantā 
paṭibhanti na bhattaṃ paṭibhāti “Since his [son’s] death, work823 did not even occur to him [i.e. 
the householder], eating did not occur to him”.824 By this, the sutta-narrator, as the one ‘who 
speaks’, reports the reflexion in the consciousness of the householder825, who in turn is the one 
‘who sees’ (G. Genette) or, respectively, experiences in this situation. I have argued elsewhere826 
that the passage on the whole furthermore proofs, if nothing else, that an active emplotment has 
taken place: Given the oral nature and origin of the sutta-narratives, it is thinkable that the story 
which the householder later tells to the gamblers827, was passed on, and the same phrasing was 
then used as an ‘introduction’ to the story at the time of the compilation of the suttas. (Maybe be-
cause a beginning in medias res was considered not good ‘sutta-style’.) Whether the focalising 
effect was intended, is another question, and impossible to answer. 
For the entire parts I.1 and I.2, the narrator remains extremely covert through the use of 
the dramatic mode of presentation or ‘showing’ mode (i.e. direct speech/ dialogue – it is mainly 
                                                 
821
 MN II 106,3-5: … aññatarassa gahapatissa ekaputtako piyo manāpo kālakato hoti. Tassa kālakiriyāya n’ 
eva kammantā paṭibhanti na bhattaṃ paṭibhāti. So āḷāhanaṃ gantvā gantvā kandati: … 
822
 Cp. Schmid 2008: 142. 
823
 Cp. CPD, s.v.: “1. work, labor; especially farm work, hence in some cases = farming; […]; 5. Ploughing.”? 
[my emphasis]. 
824
 Schmid (2008: 137 = 2010: 117) calls this the “figural point of view”.  
825
 Cp. Franz K. Stanzel’s term of the “Reflektorfigur”. 
826
 Cp. Galasek 2009: 98. On p. 99 ibid., I called a passage in the Aṅgulimāla Sutta tentatively and cautiously 
“Annäherung an den Figurenhorizont”, which is without doubt ‘internal focalization’. The former description 
is in fact what we have in the passage analysed here. 
827
 MN II 107,8-12. 
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the householder who speaks in parts I.1. and 2.). This facilitates the listeners’/readers’ conver-
gence with the figural perspective828, without using ‘internal focalization’ exclusively over longer 
text passages. Certainly, this presentation is conducive to the creation of ‘mimetic illusion’ and 
the ‘narrative audience’s’ participation in a character’s perspectives. The narrative progression in 
the first part of the story lives largely on this mimetic representation of the householder (= his 
direct thoughts and speech, his feelings, his experience, his report to the gamblers) and his cur-
rent state of being in mourning, and it turns the householder’s ‘mimetic dimension’ (grieving 
deeply about the loss of a loved one) into a (mimetic) ‘function’ that causes the narrative to pro-
gress by his insistence in his conversation with the Buddha on his “right” to be “deranged”. In 
other words, the narrative is propelled forward because the householder does not agree with the 
Buddha, but on the grounds of the conventions of the sutta-genre, in order to provide a success-
ful closure of the story, the Buddha, or a proxy, is required to explain in detail what he meant 
with his short statement to the satisfaction of all, and thus be “victorious” at the end. If the story 
had ended after the Gamblers episode, the authorial audience’s expectations as well as the sutta-
authors’/-compilers’ intentions would not have been met with, and the ‘tension’ caused by the 
instability not resolved. 
The householder’s formulaic approach to the Buddha829 reveals, according to Allon830, the 
householder to be either a lay follower of the Buddha or a sympathizer. To know this ‘frame’ is 
perhaps all the more important here, for the text does not give any hint as to his motivation to 
visit the Buddha. We can only infer that he seeks counsel from the Buddha or – and this is per-
haps much more likely and would be supported by Allon’s findings concerning the ‘abhivādetvā-
approach formula’ – that he considered himself to be a follower of some sort of the Buddha al-
ready. In any case, by using this particular approach-formula, the text seems to presuppose that 
the Buddha is no stranger to him (either from hearsay or personally).  
The Buddha addresses the householder directly after his approach and thus gives the lis-
tener/reader the first ‘figural explicit alterocharacterisation’ (M. Pfister831) of the mourning 
                                                 
828
 Dietrich Weber (1998: 61) called this “erlebnisperspektivisches Erzählen” and “Annäherung an den Figu-
renhorizont“. 
829
 MN II 106,6-9: Atha kho so gahapati yena Bhagavā ten’ upasaṃkami, upasaṃkamitvā Bhagavantaṃ ab-
hivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdi. Ekamantaṃ nisinnaṃ kho taṃ Bhagavā etad avoca: … 
830
 Formula B 6a.); cp. Allon 1997: 52ff.; 84f.; 173. 
831
 Cp. Neumann & Nünning 2008: 56, figure 3.3. 
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householder (and thus the Buddha’s perspective on the situation): “You do not have/possess, 
householder, faculties/power of one who remains standing [firmly] within his own mind [= you 
are “out of your own mind”]. Your faculties are clouded.”832 Although the direct address of the 
one approaching the Buddha (ekamantaṃ nisinnaṃ kho [acc. XY] Bhagavā etad avoca) is part of 
the approach formula, its use here is interesting insofar as it remains unexpressed in the text 
whether the Buddha is informed about the householder’s situation or not. In fact, the householder 
only explains what had happened to him during his conversation with the Buddha. In any case, it 
seems that the Buddha in this passage is spontaneously reacting to the outward appearance of the 
householder. 
The Buddha’s lapidary statement in response to the householder’s sad story, however, 
sounds rather unimpressed, if not indifferent. At least, it must have sounded indifferent to the 
householder, as his reaction proofs. The text states that he could not believe that somebody 
would say this in such a case (“Who, Venerable Sir, would ever think thus: ‘Sorrow, lamenta-
tion, pain, grief, and despair are born from those whom one holds dear […]?’”833) and that he was 
“displeased with what the Buddha had said, scorned the Buddha’s words and rose from his seat 
and left”.834 In other words, the householder felt that the Buddha’s statement was an affront. In 
this whole passage, interestingly, the sutta-narrator appears especially neutral and the focaliza-
tion seems to be ‘external’.835 Nowhere in the parts II.1-2 does the narrator show unambiguously 
that he has access to the consciousness of a character.836 His statement that not even eating did 
occur to the householder could also be based on mere observation (or from the householder’s 
own statement of it in the conversation with the Buddha, in which he repeats verbatim what the 
sutta-narrator has told earlier in the exposition). The narrator limits himself purely, as it were, to 
the description of what is directly visible (or audible). This produces the effect of an ‘objective 
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 MN II 106,10f.: Na kho te, gahapati, sake citte ṭhitassa indriyāni atthi; te indriyānaṃ aññathattan ti. 
833
 MN II 106,19-22: Kassa kho nām’ etaṃ, bhante, evaṃ bhavissati: Piyajātikā sokaparidevadukkhadomanas-
supāyāsā piyappabhavikā? Piyajātikā hi kho, bhante, ānandasomanassā piyappabhavikā ti. 
834
 MN II 106,22f. Atha kho so gahapati Bhagavato bhāsitaṃ anabhinanditvā paṭikkositvā [Sk paṭikositvā; Si 
appaṭikkositvā, which is almost certainly an error] uṭṭhāy’ āsanā pakkāmi. 
835
 Cp. Genette as summarized in Schmid 2008: 119: the narrator knows or reports less than the character 
knows  “objective narrative”. 
836
 The first time that the sutta-narrator renders the thoughts of a characters is at MN II 107,20f.: Atha kho so 
gahapati: Sameti me akkhadhuttehīti pakkāmi. 
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narrative’ which is enhanced by the predominant use of the ‘showing’-mode of narration (i.e. di-
rect speech of the characters) by the covert narrator. The sutta-narrator eventually disappears en-
tirely from the narrative in the course of the conversion between the Buddha and the house-
holder, indicated by the disappearance of all speech tags.837 This facilitates for the listener/reader 
the entering of the ‘narrative audience’, whose empathy in the beginning lies with the house-
holder due to his position very likely being perceived as common sense, whereas the Buddha’s 
statement must appear opaque and even insensitive. This is another way of directing the readers’ 
response and introducing an initial instability that one can see in this sutta, for which end, as we 
have seen, in the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta and the Aṅgulimāla Sutta, the narrative technique of ‘internal 
focalization’ was employed. 
When their conversation does not reap the desired fruit for the householder, he leaves 
grudgingly. It appears that he is not only sad still, but that the whole conversation shifts into the 
direction of a ‘debate’ in which it somehow seems to be important for the householder to assert 
his ‘natural’ right to be ‘out of his mind’ due to the circumstances (“Who, venerable sir, would 
ever think thus: ‘Sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair are born from those who are 
dear …’?”), for he claims almost the exact opposite of what the Buddha838 said: “Happiness and 
joy are born from those who are dear, venerable sir, …”.  
After the moping householder has left the Buddha, his attitude towards the Buddha has 
changed significantly. This becomes tangible in the change of his address of the Buddha. While 
earlier – and provided Allon’s conclusions839 about the abhivādetvā-approach formula as the 
highest possible form of address are right (and compatible with the Majjhima Nikāya) – he had 
addressed the Buddha in the most formal and respectful way (with the abhivādetvā-formula and 
‘bhante’), in his account of the what had happened in the presence of the gamblers, he uses the 
pejorative expression “the ascetic (samaṇa) Gotama”840. 
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 MN II 106,12-22. 
838
 MN II 106,17f. Evam etaṃ, gahapati; piyajātikā hi, gahapati, sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā piyap-
pabhavikā ti. 
839
 Cp. Allon 1997: 52-54. 
840
 MN II 106,27-107,1: Idhāhaṃ, bhonto, yena samaṇo Gotamo ten’ upasaṃkami, … 
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The “householder’s lament” in the presence of the gamblers, although depicted as a dia-
logue, is really a monologue, or one may even call it a ‘soliloquy’ (although it is definitely a spo-
ken monologue and not a representation of his thoughts), which repeats the entire exchange be-
tween himself and the Buddha. By re-enacting their encounter in front of the gamblers, the 
householder exhibits no signs of doubt or reconsideration of his own position – he “is done with 
that ascetic Gotama” – and he seeks support instead from a group of gamblers. The passage thus 
serves to characterise the householder (‘autocharacterisation’) as not only being in mourning, up-
set, and deranged, but as stubborn. The decisive sentence, which concludes the first part of the 
sutta treating of the householder, leads the listener/reader to the identification of this trait of the 
householder’s: Atha kho so gahapati: Sameti me akkhadhuttehīti pakkāmi841 “Then the house-
holder left thinKing: ‘I agree with the gamblers.’”842 I think that, besides being an important ‘au-
tocharacterisation’ (trait), this sentence summarises the householder’s conviction, which is why I 
think that the Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation does not sufficiently bring this point to the fore. 
The difference may seem trivial, but I would suggest a more literal translation: “It fits [better]/ 
goes together for me with the gamblers”, instead of Bhikkhu Bodhi’s “I agree with the gam-
blers.” I want to argue, on the grounds of the effect of the development of the narrative up to this 
point, that the implication of the passage is not just that the householder agrees with someone 
else’s judgement. The gamblers are not even depicted by the text as presenting their own opinion 
in the matter. Rather, they just “nod the householder’s opinion through”. As I have argued above 
with regard to the narrative progression, the gamblers-episode on the whole serves the purpose of 
maKing the householder an ‘unreliable narrator/ judge’. The ‘tension’ thus produced is high-
lighted and summarised in this final and definitive statement of the householder, in which he de-
clares that he is no longer following the Buddha, and has now found more like-minded people. 
(We have to keep in mind here that in the beginning, the text depicts the householder as a fol-
lower of the Buddha through employment of the abhivādetvā approach-formula). Through that 
episode, a trait of the householder comes to the fore that was somewhat “hidden” behind his tem-
porary state of being depressed and mourning, but which was already indicated by his replying 
disapprovingly to the Buddha throughout their conversation. By his final sentence, this ‘mimetic 
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 MN II 107,20f.  
842
 Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 719, 4. 
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dimension’ is turned into a function that propels the narrative progression forward. The presenta-
tion of the character of the householder forces the story to resolve the ‘instability’ through his in-
sistent disagreement with the Buddha’s judgement and his subsequent disappearance from the 
story. What makes this instability so amusing and non-credible for the ‘authorial audience’, and 
the fact that his new camp is made up of perhaps the least trustworthy kind of people imaginable 
– even by ancient Indian standards – finally produces the ‘tension’. The gamblers’ mechanical 
repetition of the householder’s own words (“So it is, householder, so it is! Happiness and joy are 
born from those who are dear …”) in their reply may even lead one to think that they, emotion-
ally quite uninvolved, just parrot the householder with the intention to quickly return to their 
business (gambling). In any case, the householder’s final statement suggests to the authorial lis-
tener/reader that he must be a fool – though a suffering one.   
Thematic aspect 
Throughout the Piyajātika Sutta, the householder is addressed and described as “the house-
holder” (gahapati). Not only does the sutta-narrator continually address him as “householder” 
(gahapati), but also the other characters, i.e. the Buddha and the gamblers.843 This fact, seen in 
retrospect and in combination with the peculiar Gamblers-episode, certainly contributes to the 
impression of the figure of the householder as a narrative function or, using Phelan’s terminol-
ogy, his ‘thematic aspect’. 
The sutta itself makes it easy for the listener/reader to discover the ‘thematic dimension’ 
or ‘thematic aspect’ of the figure of the householder: When the Buddha “explains” to the Brah-
min messenger Nāl̥ijaṅgha the meaning of his short statement by way of an analogy, he makes it 
clear that death and loss are inescapable facts of life, sparing no one. Moreover, in narrating – 
repeatedly – how people went mad due to their losses of loved ones, just as the householder did, 
the Buddha even confirms that these emotions are natural. Inherent in the Buddha’s “explanation 
by analogy” (pariyāyena), is the message that there is no more sense in going mad because of 
people dying, than in getting upset about the sun setting each night. Thus, the text (i.e. his author; 
we are now on the level author(s)  authorial audience) makes us understand explicitly that the 
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householder represents everybody. Even the expressions used in the sutta to describe the ac-
tions/state of the householder and the examples given by the Buddha in his analogy are structur-
ally and with regard to contents very similar, as the following close comparison reveals: Both use 
the indefinite article aññatara “some, any”. Further parallels can be seen in the underlined pas-
sages:  
Householder: Tena kho pana samayena aññatarassa gahapatissa ekaputtako piyo manāpo kāla-
kato hoti. Tassa kālakiriyāya n’ eva kammantā paṭibhanti, na bhattaṃ paṭibhāti. So āḷāhanaṃ 
gantvā gantvā kandati: »Kahaṃ ekaputtaka? Kahaṃ ekaputtakā ti.844 
Buddha: Bhūtapubbaṃ, brāhmaṇa, imissā yeva sāvatthiyā aññatarassā itthiyā mātā kālam 
akāsi. Sā tassā kālakiriyāya ummattikā khittacittā rathiyāya rathiyaṃ siṅghāṭakena siṅghāṭakaṃ 
upasaṃkamitvā evam āha: ›api me mātaraṃ addasatha; api me mātaraṃ addasathā‹ ti.845 
Although the words used are different (rathiyāya rathiyaṃ instead of āḷāhanaṃ; api me 
mātaraṃ addasatha instead of Kahaṃ ekaputtaka), the structure and the actions described are 
very similar: At the beginning, a certain time-frame is given (“Meanwhile”, Tena kho pana sa-
mayena <> “Formerly”, Bhūtapubbaṃ); then, we are told that someone’s (aññatarassa <> 
aññatarassā) relative had died (Tassa kālakiriyāya <> tassā kālakiriyāya); thereupon/because of 
that, this someone becomes mentally ‘deranged’ (n’ eva kammantā paṭibhanti, na bhattaṃ 
paṭibhāti <> ummattikā khittacittā) and acts irrational in deed (āḷāhanaṃ gantvā gantvā <> 
rathiyāya rathiyaṃ siṅghāṭakena siṅghāṭakaṃ upasaṃkamitvā), and word (kandati: »Kahaṃ 
ekaputtaka? Kahaṃ ekaputtakā ti <> evam āha: ›api me mātaraṃ addasatha). Thus, as the nar-
rative progresses, it dawns on the listener/reader (having assumed the role of the authorial audi-
ence) that the householder is in fact “Mr. Everyman”. Conclusively, the householder, by not be-
ing able to accept a simple fact, just misses the chance for more detailed teachings and explana-
tions. After all, it was the householder, displeased and scornful, who left the Buddha, not the 
Buddhawho dismissed the householder. Although neither the Buddha nor the sutta-narrator say 
so explicitly, the householder has left the Buddha too early. 
At this point, I think, a short excursion may be of some interest. I believe that the Piyaj-
ātika Sutta reveals something about the Buddha’s teaching style. Just as the Piyajātika Sutta 
‘shows’ implicitly through its predominant employment of the ‘dramatic mode’ of presentation 
                                                 
844
 MN II 106,4-6. 
845
 MN II 108,28-32. 
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(and the highly covert narrator), other suttas comment on the Buddha’s style more explicitly. 
This ‘style’ of teaching may be circumscribed as follows: Make a short and essential statement; 
see how people react (whether they get it or not!); then explain or have someone else explain in 
details when asked for more information.846 This is, of course, not a new insight. The Pāli-Bud-
dhist tradition does possess terms for the description of this style of teaching in the suttas: the 
short initial statement is called uddesa, which is followed by a detailed exposition, niddesa, or 
vibhaṅga (“analysis”), which can include similes, and finally repeating or summarising the initial 
statement with a “conclusion”, niggamana. 
What is passed over silently in the Piyajātika Sutta, is stated explicitly, for instance, in 
the Kandaraka Sutta (MN 51). The two suttas are somewhat similar with respect to the inherent 
potential of an individual to understand and practice the Buddha’s teachings, and we may gain 
some insight as to why the story does possess a proper closure in the Piyajātika Sutta after the 
householder has left grudgingly.  
In the Kandaraka Sutta, in which the Buddha teaches four different kinds of persons that 
exist in the world, we find a similar situation as in the Piyajātika Sutta. The description of Pessa 
in the Kandaraka Sutta, the son of a mahout (hatthārohaputta), approaching the Buddha is the 
same as that of the householder (the ‘abhivādetvā-formula’): “[…] having paid homage to the 
Blessed One, [he] sat down to one side”847, which means that he is or regards himself as a fol-
lower of the Buddha. For the ascetic (paribbājaka) Kandaraka, on the other hand, as a follower 
of a different sect, the ‘sammodanīyaṃ-approach’ formula is used, which seems to suggest – if 
this is not just a random example – that Allon’s findings are also true for the Majjhima Nikāya.848  
                                                 
846
 A prominent example exhibiting this structure is the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta, MN 18, and generally all suttas in 
the Sutta Piṭaka that feature the Venerable Mahākaccāna (= MN 18, 84, 133, 138; SN 22,3, 22,4, 35,130; AN 
10,26, 10,127), who is said in the Canon to have been “foremost in giving detailed expositions (vitthārena at-
thaṃ vibhajantānaṃ) of short statements (Saṃkhittena bhāsitassa) given by the Buddha”; cp. AN I 23f.: 
Etadaggaṃ, bhikkhave, mama sāvakānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ rattaññūnaṃ yadidaṃ aññāsikoṇḍañño […]. Saṃkhit-
tena bhāsitassa vitthārena atthaṃ vibhajantānaṃ yadidaṃ mahākaccānoti. 
847
 MN I 339,5f. 
848
 MN I 339,3-8: Atha kho Pesso ca hatthārohaputto Kandarako ca paribbājako yena Bhagavā ten’ upasaṃka-
miṃsu, upasaṃkamitvā Pesso hatthārohaputto Bhagavantaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdi, Kandarako pana 
paribbājaka Bhagavatā saddhiṃ sammodi, samodanīyaṃ kathaṃ vītisāretvā ekamantaṃ aṭṭhāsi. Identical for 
the most part is also the approach of the two friends Ghaṭīkāra and Jotipāla in the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta (cp. MN II 
48,4-8), with the exception that Jotipāla also sits down. Cp. also Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 1252, n. 538: “From 
this difference in their manner of greeting the Buddha it is evident that Pessa is a follower of the Buddha, 
whereas Kandaraka – despite his respect and admiration – belongs to a different religious community.” 
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In the beginning of the sutta, the ascetic Kandaraka shows himself impressed with the 
discipline and calm among the Buddha’s disciples, whereupon the Buddha explains to him what 
kind of realised disciples are among his students – including arahants – and that that was due to 
their right training, quite similar to the disciples of former Buddhas. After that, Pessa rejoices in 
the Buddha’s words and remarks that also lay people like himself practiced the four foundations 
of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna) from time to time. The Buddha, thereupon, explains to Pessa four 
(metaphorical) distinctions of persons that exist in the world (the one who torments himself, oth-
ers, both himself and others, and the one who torments no one but lives a holy life), and asks 
Pessa whom he liked best. The mahout’s son answers correctly that he favoured the fourth type 
(for every sentient being strove for happiness and the avoidance of suffering). Then Pessa leaves 
and the Buddha comments:  
“‘Bhikkhus, Pessa, the elephant driver’s son, is wise, he has great wisdom.849’ If he had sat a while 
longer until I had expounded for him in detail these four kinds of persons, he would have greatly bene-
fitted. Still he has already greatly benefitted, even as it is.”850    
The sutta continues with a detailed explanation to the monks. The situation that is de-
picted in the Kandaraka Sutta is thus in essence similar to the one in the Piyajātika Sutta, only 
that in the latter the reason for the continuation of the narrative is not stated explicitly. Implicitly, 
however, it is clear from a silent ‘genre-convention’ that the short statement of the Buddha still 
needs to be expounded more elaborately. The major difference, of course, is that in the Piyaj-
ātika Sutta the householder does not rejoice in what the Buddha has said, and that he obviously 
does not have the potential to follow the Buddha’s teachings because he is not even able to ac-
cept the base, the first Noble Truth, although in the beginning he deports himself as if being a 
follower of the Buddha.  
                                                 
849
 The Buddha says this, not because Pessa has chosen “the right” kind of person among the four, but because 
of his earlier statement to, and praise of, the Buddha that according to his observation working with elephants 
he found that animals were much more open to guidance than human beings could ever be, because “those who 
are called our slaves, messengers, and servants behave in one way with the body, in another way by speech, 
while their minds work in still another way. It is wonderful, venerable sir, it is marvellous how amid man’s 
tangle, corruption, and deceptions, the Blessed One knows the welfare and the harm of beings.” (tr. Ñāṇamoli 
& Bodhi 2001: 444, 4.)  
850
 Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 446, 7. 
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This short excursion is meant to illustrate what I have called the inherent ‘genre conven-
tion’ of the suttas. In the light of the uddesa-niddesa-niggamana-structure of the Buddha’s teach-
ings, I think that the Piyajātika Sutta is an especially interesting sutta, for while it follows this 
structure on a deeper textual level, at the same time on the discourse-level it exhibits a vivid 
story through mimetic transformation.  
The ‘mimetic illusion’ of the nameless householder is effective because of its generality. 
From a common-sense point of view, the Buddha’s statement that loved ones’ are a source of 
pain seems equally counter-intuitive as his insistence on the non-existence of the Self. The 
householder’s basic reaction thus exemplifies the human predicament and humans’ shared expe-
riences: It is generally to be expected that most people naturally experience their own life as the 
most important and significant. This sense of self seems to be an inborn fact of human existence, 
as I have tried to show in Part I of this study.851 As Mark Siderits has aptly put it, most of our 
lives are “pleasure” or “happiness seeKing enterprises”. We may even have been raised in an al-
truistic spirit by our parents, have been socialised solidly united, may live a cherishing and car-
ing family-life and, being asked, we may even answer that our partner or our children are the 
most important persons in our lives, more important than ourselves. We may even have heard 
about the Buddha’s teaching and yet, at the end of the day, we are still intimately bound to our 
own perspective. Our own view on the world and the matters of life is an unconscious, all-under-
lying authority that judges everything that others do or say and everything that happens – “the 
way I experience the world, must be the way things are”. That is precisely the position of the 
nameless householder and it is perhaps also what most of us think, too. The next step, then, is to 
find approval for our intuition that we are right. The gamblers in our sutta willingly play this 
role. Since we exist in this world, we also think that we have the right to experience pleasure and 
not experience pain and mental suffering. If things happen differently, we resort to all kinds of 
hopes that things may change for the better. When they change for the better, all kinds of fears 
arise not to lose the favourable conditions again. And so it goes on forever. There is of course a 
                                                 
851
 In a later philosophical Mahāyāna school, the Yogācāra, this “natural” behaviour is even precisely explained 
to be a certain inborn aspect of consciousness which is called sahaja-satkāya-dr̥ṣṭi, (literally) “the [false] view 
that the body exists”/[Gombrich:] “the [false] view with regard to the category ‘existents’, which is inborn”, 
and which is taught to develop into parikalpita-satkāya-dr̥ṣṭi, “a conceptual [false] view about the category 
‘existents’” later on in one’s life. (cp. Schmithausen 1987: Ālayavijñāṇa).  
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kind of instinct ingrained in living beings to avoid pain on a more superficial level of conscious-
ness. The Buddha called this constant craving after pleasant things and experiences taṇhā, thirst. 
But on a yet deeper level of consciousness, it is really the view that we really and persistently ex-
ist as individuals that brings our whole situation about. The Buddha explained this as a general 
deep-rooted ignorance (aññāṇa). We really think that suffering and pain are just unfavourable 
conditions that could be avoided and will eventually, in our own case at least, subside. When dis-
aster strikes, we are speechless – or the opposite, as in the case of our householder: we cry our 
unfair lot out into the world.  
The Buddha claimed to simply teach how things are (yathābhūtaṃ) according to the truth 
or the simple facts of life. To the allegation that he taught the destruction of the person/living be-
ing at death, and therefore nihilism, he just replied: “Formerly as well as now, monks, I teach 
suffering and the cessation of suffering”.852 
6.7 Narrative progression: ‘Mimetic dimension’ and ‘thematic functions’ 
To clarify the meaning of ‘thematic functions’ (J. Phelan) in a narrative, we need to ask what im-
pact the actions of characters may have on (the behaviour and the feelings of) other characters or 
on the course of events in a story.853 The householder’s sadness and scepticism towards the Bud-
dha’s statement could hardly be seen as a (permanent) character trait/attribute of the householder 
because it is – we know that from our own life experience – a transitory state. However, it serves 
as a mimetic function in this particular story because most people can identify with the house-
holder and his tragic loss and grief. Moreover, this ‘mimetic aspect’ of the householder – which 
causes the initial instability and which in turn effects the following actions in the sutta’s progres-
sion – turns into a thematic function: first, through the endorsement of the householder’s judge-
ment about the Buddha’s obscure statement by the gamblers (who themselves have thematic 
function) and, secondly, through the reappearance of the theme of scepticism towards the Bud-
dha’s teachings in the character of King Pasenadi. Although both the householder and the gam-
blers vanish from the narrative of the Piyajātika Sutta, they do not so without leaving a trace. 
                                                 
852
 Alagaddūpama Sutta, MN I 140,14f. 
853
 Cp. Phelan 1989: 125. 
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The mimetic aspect of the householder and the gamblers that initially set in motion the 
unfolding/progression of the story through causing its major instability, has turned into a the-
matic function in that it reappears in King Pasenadi’s own scepticism towards the Buddha. The 
Queen-Mallikā-and-Pasenadi episode (part II), then, serves as the complication of the initial in-
stability in the middle of the narrative before it can be resolved in the end by Pasenadi’s final 
acknowledgement of the Buddha’s superior wisdom.  
My ‘thematising’ hypothesis that the nameless householder in the Piyajātika Sutta is 
eventually revealed in the course of the sutta as representative of a class of people is corrobo-
rated by the fact that in no other place in the Majjhima Nikāya a householder without proper 
name is the basis for a possible person in a concrete story. A not further specified collective body 
of people, “householders” (gahapatayo), though, is mentioned in very general statements, often 
in the phrase, “the Brahmin householders”854. More often, however, in the Majjhima Nikāya, 
‘householder’ occurs in the singular, but still generically, as part of the formula: 
“So too, Brahmin, here a Tathāgata appears in the world, accomplished, fully enlightened, perfect in 
true knowledge and conduct, sublime, knower of worlds, incomparable leader of persons to be tamed, 
teacher of gods and humans, enlightened, blessed. He declares this world with its gods, its Māras, and 
its Brahmās, this generation with its recluses and Brahmins, its princes and its people, which he has 
himself realised with direct knowledge. He teaches the Dhamma good in the beginning, good in the 
middle, and good in the end, with the right meaning and phrasing, and he reveals a holy life that is ut-
terly perfect and pure. A householder or householder’s son or one born in some other clan [/family, 
household855] hears that Dhamma. On hearing the Dhamma he aquires faith in the Tathāgata. Pos-
sessing that faith, he considers thus: ‘Household life is crowded and dusty; life gone forth is wide 
open. It is not easy, while living in a home, to lead the holy life utterly perfect and pure as a polished 
shell. Suppose I shave off my hair and beard, put on the yellow robe, and go forth from the home life 
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 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 379, 2; so, e.g., in the Sāleyyaka Sutta (MN 41), the Apaṇṇaka Sutta (MN 60), 
and the Nagaravindeyya Sutta (MN 150).  
855
 The Pāli word that the Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi translated as “clan” here is kula, which can have quite a range 
of meanings; cp. Cone 2010: s.v. kula (“assemblage; community, class, lineage; family, household; family res-
idence; good family; a noble or eminent family.”). The existence of several specifications in compositional 
forms with -kula as last part of a compound, however, rather suggests a translation like, e.g., “from a family 
other than the gahapati-class” (i.e. basically merchants, farmers etc.; cp. Cone 2010, s.v. gahapati(-kula)). 
Other ‘kulas’ mentioned in the Canon are, e.g., ācariya-kula, “family of a teacher”; kuṭumbika-k., “family of a 
landowner”; rāja-k., “royal family”; sindhava-k., “a family from [the region of] Sindh”; cp. ibid., s.v. kul – ifc. 




into homelessness.’ On a later occasion, abandoning a small or large fortune, abandoning a small or 
large circle of relatives, he shaves off his hair and beard, puts on the yellow robe, and goes forth from 
the home life into homelessness…”.856 
On another occasion, a householder occurs in a hypothetical case, where the Buddha ex-
plains to the Brahmin Caṅkī that the proof for a monk’s direct access to liberating knowledge or 
insight is the absence of greed (lobha), hate (dosa), and delusion (moha) in him.857 
The only instance, as far as I can see, in which a householder, or a man addressed as 
householder, as part of a concrete story occurs in the Dīgha Nikāya and the Majjhima Nikāya, is 
in the Raṭṭhapāla Sutta (MN 82), namely Raṭṭhapāla’s father. But again, although Raṭṭhapāla’s 
parents do not have proper names, they are more individualised than the householder in the 
Piyajātika Sutta: “At that time a youth of a noble family (kulaputta) named Raṭṭhapāla, the son 
of an esteemed family in that very town Thullakoṭṭhita, was also seated among the assembly.”858 
In general, householders (gahapatayo) as a social grouping term in the Pali Canon are as-
sociated with an “elite status”859 and material wealth, and are characterised or described as “rich, 
with great wealth and property”860, or as “[…] rich […] with great wealth and property, with a 
vast number of gold ingots, a vast number of granaries, a vast number of fields, a vast number of 
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 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 272, 11./ 12 = MN I 178,37-179,21 [my emphasis]. Other occurrences of gaha-
pati as part of this formula are, e.g.: MN I 267,21; 344,27; et passim.    
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 “Here, Bhāradvāja, a bhikkhu may be living in dependence on some village or town. Then a householder or 
a householder’s son goes to him and investigates him in regard to three kinds of states: in regard to states based 
on greed, in regard to states based on hate, and in regard to states based on delusion […]. And the Dhamma 
that this venerable one teaches is profound, hard to see and hard to understand, peaceful and sublime, unattain-
able by mere reasoning, subtle, to be experienced by the wise. This Dhamma cannot easily be taught by one 
affected by greed…”; tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 781, 17 (= MN II 171,31-172,16). 
858
 MN II 55,25ff.: Tena kho pana samayena Raṭṭhapālo nāma kulaputto tasmiṃ yeva Tullakoṭṭhite aggakuli-
kassa putto tissaṃ parisāyaṃ nissnno hoti. His father is addressed as gahapati several times throughout the 
sutta (MN II 62,18,27,28; 63,1,4; 64,3,6,17). 
859
 Cp. Bailey & Mabbett 2003: 46-55, and 43: “Wealth is […] a categorical feature and this is combined with 
vaṇṇa and what is essentially an agrarian elite (gahapati) category […]. Note this group is in no way marginal-
ized, being rather the accepted elite of the society described in the Pāli Canon.” 
860




land, a vast number of wives, and a vast number of men and women slaves”861. Moreover, the 
sixth of the (metaphorical) “seven treasures” of a “universal emperor” (cakkavatti) is said to be 
“the treasurer” (gahapati-ratana), for instance, in the Mahāsudassana Sutta of the Dīgha 
Nikāya.862 From a sociological perspective, the gahapatis, an often occurring designation in the 
early Buddhist texts, were most probably a “newly emergent” elite class during the times of the 
historical Buddha.863 Bailey and Mabbett draw a relatively coherent picture of this class and its 
relation to the other classes during the Buddha’s times. I summarise from them:   
“Gahapatis were heads of some smaller units in the kaleidoscope of semi-autonomous social units. 
[…] Sometimes they are enumerated as a class alongside (and thus not overlapping with) Brahmins 
and kṣatriyas, but at other times there is an overlap and the term gahapati is a label for the social emi-
nence of pillars of the community including Brahmins. […] The brāhmaṇa-gahapati has an ambiguous 
status in early Buddhist texts. On the one hand, he seems ideologically and actually to be the opposite 
of everything for which the bhikkhu stands. […] On the other hand, he was a source of material sup-
port for the saṅgha and its principal source of recruitment. Both monk and brāhmaṇa-gahapati were 
mirrors each of what the other was not. 
If the gahapati was anything in early Buddhist literature it was an overlapping social (householder = 
the male head of the family) and economic (landowner) category and was flexible enough to be at-
tached to some of the varṇa titles. […] 
What we note is a picture of a society focused on householders who showed a preference for agricul-
ture and rural life rather than residence in those areas unambiguously urban in character. The gahapati 
is the foundational economic position in the transformed agrarian economy centred on all of the rural 
areas now supplying the cities and other developing conurbations.”864 
However, whether the picture that G. Bailey and I. Mabbett draw was always so clear-cut is per-
haps debatable. (What about such specified designations as kuṭumbika-kula, “property-owner 
clan”, in the Canon, for instance?) The somewhat distinct status of the gahapatis as in reality nei-
ther always coincident with vaṇṇa (vessa; Skt. vaiśya), locality (negama, “townspeople”), nor 
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 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 555, 12. MN I 451,36-452,4: Seyyathā pi Udāyi gahapati vā gahapatiputto vā 
aḍḍho mahaddhano mahābhogo, nekānaṃ nikkhagaṇānaṃ cayo nekānaṃ dhaññagaṇānaṃ cayo nekānaṃ 
khettagaṇānaṃ cayo nekānaṃ vatthugaṇānaṃ cayo nekānaṃ bhariyāgaṇānaṃ cayo nekānaṃ dāsagaṇānaṃ 
cayo nekānaṃ dāsigaṇānaṃ cayo … 
862
 D II 176, 188. 
863
 Cp. Bailey & Mabbett 2003: 47f. 
864
 Ibid.: 50f. 
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occupation (jānapada, “farmer”), was already shown by Richard Fick.865 The focus of this study, 
however, is not in particular a “sociology of early Buddhism” as it plays out in the Pāli suttas, 
but rather the narrative discourse of characters and the effect that this discourse has on a lis-
tener/reader of that text. 
Thus, we have seen that householders, unless they are clearly identified by a proper name 
or otherwise concretised, occur as a generic term for a certain important social group of people 
(merchants, landowners/farmers?). But nowhere else in the Dīgha Nikāya and the Majjhima 
Nikāya except in the Piyajātika Sutta occurs a nameless householder as an unspecified repre-
sentative of that social group in a concrete story.  
If my interpretation is right, this means that the Piyajātika Sutta could even be interpreted 
(thematically) as depicting a certain social group (gahapatayo) as by trend rather unfit (for what-
ever reasons) or unwilling to understand the basic teachings of the Buddha and thus to enter onto 
the path offered by him (among other religious leaders at that time). That group, in turn, may 
have been singled out in the Piyajātika Sutta (for whatever reason) as representative for the Bud-
dhist category of the “worldling” (putthujjano). This would support Bailey’s and Mabbett’s find-
ing that the gahapati in the early Buddhist texts “seems ideologically and actually to be the op-
posite of everything for which the bhikkhu stands”.866 That finding finds additional support in a 
passage from the Anāthapiṇḍikovāda Sutta (MN 143), in which the terminally ill seṭṭhi-gahapati 
Anāthapiṇḍika bursts into tears after being precisely instructed on his deathbed by the venerable 
Sāriputta how to free his consciousness from any clinging to whatever might present itself as ex-
perience inwardly or outwardly:  
“When this was said, the householder Anāthapiṇḍika wept and shed tears. Then the venerable Ānanda 
asked him: ‘Are you foundering, householder, are you sinking?’ [Anāthapiṇḍika] ‘I am not founder-
ing, venerable Ānanda, I am not sinking. But although I have long waited upon the Teacher and bhik-
khus worthy of esteem, never before have I heard such talk on the Dhamma.’ [Ānanda:] ‘Such talk on 
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 Cp. Fick 1974: 164f. Also Anāthapiṇḍika, the rich benefactor of the Buddha, is called a gahapati (cp. MN 
III 258,3: Tena kho oana samayena Anāthapiṇḍiko gahapati ābādhiko hoti …), more specifically a seṭṭhi-gaha-
pati, cp. Fick 1974: 167, esp. 166, n. 2: “Das Amt eines seṭṭhi scheint stets in Händen eines gahapati gelegen zu 
haben nirgends wird erwähnt, dass ein Angehöriger einer andern Klasse oder Kaste, etwa ein reicher Brah-
mane, die Stellung innegehabt hätte. Wenn nicht kurzweg vom seṭṭhi, wird immer vom seṭṭhi gahapati gespro-
chen ….”  
866
 Bailey & Mabbett 2003: 50.  
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the Dhamma, householder, is not given to lay people clothed in white. Such talk on the Dhamma is 
given to those who have gone forth.’”867 
Surely, this passage perhaps made, and continues to make egalitarians protest, and the 
Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi in his commendable translation of the Majjhima Nikāya devotes an ex-
tended footnote to it, in which he seemingly circumvents what the text, quite straightforwardly, 
says.868 It is difficult to imagine, as the Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi states, that the Buddha was exclusive 
in his teachings of a whole class of ancient Indian society. But one certainly has to keep in mind 
also that the suttas cannot be regarded as exact maps or images of the social, political, historical, 
and so forth, reality of ancient India. We cannot always draw clear-cut conclusions or extrapolate 
to, say, real ancient Indian social conditions from what we find in the texts. While the suttas un-
doubtedly do contain elements from such realities, they are after all narratives, and narratives fol-
low their own ‘logic’ – “story-logic” (David Herman). For instance, we do still today find the hot 
springs near the modern day Rajgir (Rājagaha) mentioned at various places in the Canon.869 This 
fact, however, does not automatically put us in any position to assert that also the events reported 
in the Canon to have taken place there, must be historical, too. In the Mahākaccāna- 
bhaddekaratta Sutta (MN 133), for instance, a certain deity is reported to have approached the 
venerable Samiddhi, illuminating the whole of the Hot Springs Park.870 It is not so much that I 
want to argue that the text must be unhistorical because it is not verisimilar to believe that a non-
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 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 1111f., 15.  
868
 Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 1358, n. 1306: “This statement does not imply that there is any inherent exclusive-
ness or arbitrary discrimination in the Buddha’s way of presenting his teaching. But as those who remain in lay 
life must look after their families, possessions, and occupations, such talk leading to complete detachment 
would not have been appropriate for them.”  
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 See, e.g., Vin I, 100: Tapodā rājagahe yuddhaṃ nāgānogāhanena ca …; I 117: Tena samayena buddho 
bhagavā rājagahe viharati veḷuvane kalandakanivāpe. Tena kho pana samayena bhikkhu tapode nahāyanti; III 
108,19: “atha ca panāyaṃ Tapodā kuthitā sandati” (cited in: Selected Papers on Pāli Studies. PTS, Oxford, 
1994, p. 109f.); DN II 116f.: Ekamidāhaṃ ānanda samayaṃ tattheva rājagahe viharāmi tapodārāme. Tatra pi 
kho tāhaṃ ānanda āmantesiṃ: ramaṇīyaṃ ānanda rājagahaṃ ramaṇīyo tapodārāmo; MN III 192,2f. 
(Mahākaccānabhaddekaratta Sutta MN 133): Ekaṃ samayaṃ Bhagavā Rājagaha viharati Tapodārāme. Atha 
kho āyasmā Samiddhi rattiyā paccūsasamayaṃ paccuṭṭhāya yena Tapodo ten’ upasaṃkami gattāni parisiñci-
tuṃ. Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 1044, 1.: “On one occasion the Blessed One was living at Rājagaha in the 
Park of the Hot Springs. Then, when it was near dawn, the venerable Samiddhi went to the hot springs to bathe 
his limbs.” 
870
 MN III 192,6-9: Atha kho aññatara devatā abhikkantāya rattiyā abhikkantavaṇṇā kevalakappaṃ Tapodaṃ 
obhāsetvā yen’ āyasmā Samiddhi ten’ upasaṃkami upasaṃkamitvā ekamantaṃ aṭṭhāsi. 
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human being did actually appear there in this way (because perhaps most of us do not even be-
lieve that such beings really exist) but rather, that the way the events are depicted clearly shows 
the narrative transformation of story-material. When we simply ask ourselves who was present at 
the depicted event (the venerable Samiddhi and a certain deity), and ‘who speaks’ and ‘who sees’ 
on the discourse-level of the sutta, we are referred to an omniscient witnessing, narrating voice 
(in other words, our sutta-narrator). By simply accepting that the ontological status of ‘things’ 
changes once they crossed the threshold of story-world, the deity, then, just becomes an element 
of the ‘inventory’ of that story-world. Whether deities exist or once existed, or did not exist or 
are perhaps just another, culture-specific way of describing an inner experience of the venerable 
Samiddhi, does not have to trouble us any further. We can simply accept it as existent of the 
story-world. Therefore, while ‘historical source mode’ reading may constitute a (legitimate) 
Western academic interest in the suttas, that might not be identical with the interest or intention 
of their compilers/authors/reciters. By the same token are the characters depicted in the suttas 
like real people, and thus may be described and even analysed like real people, i.e. with the vo-
cabulary (and the mechanisms of inference) used for the description of fellow human beings (in 
the case of the Pāli suttas, however, always with an eye to the cultural and historical differences 
of historically and culturally remote situations). But that is not tantamount to saying that charac-
ters in narratives are real people.871  
6.8 The Gamblers: 
Frequent mention has been made so far of the group of gamblers in the Piyajātika sutta without 
giving a detailed character analysis. First, they certainly do have an important function in the 
progression of the sutta’s narrative, as we have seen above, they are not characters in a strict 
sense. Seymour Chatman has proposed three criteria to distinguish between major and minor 
characters, and elements of the setting of a story, “no one of which”, he adds, “is adequate in it-
self: (1) biology, (2) identity (that is, nomination), (3) importance [that means they must act or be 
affected by a plot-significant action of the story (= a so-called kernel event)]”.872 When all three 
                                                 
871
 Cp. Chatman 1989: 138. 
872
 Chatman 1989: 138-145. 
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criteria together are present in considerable elaboration, then an element of the discourse “is 
more likely to be a character […] than an object”873.  
Now the gamblers do not really match the proposed criteria in sufficient detail: they are 
presented as a homogeneous collective (sambahulā akkhadhuttā) rather than being individualised 
and named; they are human beings: they “play dice” (akkhehi dibbanti), they (seemingly, at 
least) listen to the householder’s story, and they answer or rather just repeat the householder’s 
own answer to an at any rate rhetorical question (Evam etaṃ, gahapati, evam etaṃ, gahapati. 
Piyajātikā hi, gahapati, ānanda-somanassā piyappabhavikā ti.), but none of these activities are 
plot-significant actions.  
However, as already mentioned, the gamblers have a significant function in relation to the 
householder for the narrative’s progression. As a collective group, they nevertheless possess the 
‘thematic dimension’ “unreliable” when it comes to assessing the truth of a statement of a wise 
person, and this attribute becomes effective towards the end of the sutta, when it finally becomes 
clear that the Buddha’s enigmatic statement was indeed an accurate and true description of “how 
things are”. 
In order to understand the ‘thematic dimension’ of the gamblers we have to consider the 
cultural background of this kind of activity. In his book Society in Ancient India, Sures Chandra 
Banerji traces several aspects of the social life and activities in different periods of ancient Indian 
history as manifest in their literary productions.874 Dice-playing and gambling, for one, seems to 
surface everywhere throughout ancient Indian history under different names and of different 
kinds, suggesting that it has always been a quite popular pastime in India. Especially dice-gam-
bling with stakes appears to have been very common in every period, and a problem with ruining 
results for many at that. According to the frequent mentioning in the sources875, it was wide-
spread in ancient India already from Vedic times: “Gambling with dice was a common vice [in 
the age of the Brāhmaṇas].”876 Banerji summarises a passage from the tenth maṇḍala of the 
R̥gveda (X 34.1): “RV X. 34.1 contains the lament and penitence of a gambler who, impelled by 
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 Chatman 1989: 141.  
874
 Banerji 2007: 160-177. 
875
 I.e. since the R̥gveda etc.; cp. Banerji 2007: 160ff. esp. 162. For dice-playing in the Jātakas, see Banerji 
2007: 175. 
876
 Cp. Banerji 2007: 160; 163. 
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an irresistible urge, repeatedly gambles in dice, and has lost his all besides the sympathy of his 
near and dear ones. It seems that even one’s wife was kept as a stake in this game. The deceptive 
activities of a gambler are referred to at several places […].”877  
We also learn, for instance, certain names in connection with special dice-games and 
throws from the Sanskrit Sūtra literature, and that a special public place was arranged or even 
permanently set up for gaming (Skt. sabhā). 878 The name for a person (i.e. a man – gambling was 
mens’ business apparently) regularly indulging in gambling with dice is kitavā, a word we do 
find in Middle-Indic, too, but there the semantics changed (widened) to mean “a cheat”, ‘one 
who plays false’ in a rather general sense. This shift in meaning is very well understandable from 
the moral code implicit in the Vedic Sūtra literature. Banerji observes: “From the Aśvalāyana 
Gr̥hya (I. 5.6) we learn that dice-play was common. It was regarded as a vice as is evident from 
the Gautama Dharmasūtra (XV. 17) and Baudhāyana D.S. (II. 1.2.8).”879 The designation used in 
the Piyajātika Sutta is akkhadhuttā (Skt. akṣadhūrtāḥ), which in Sanskrit can also mean some-
thing like a “cardsharper” of the game of dice880, which would make the general despicableness 
of this pastime explicit.881    
It is plausible to assume that the gamblers in the episode in part I.3 indicated non-credi-
bility for an ancient Indian audience, too. One can therefore say that their function in the narra-
tive is to underline the unreliability of the householder. They signal to the ‘authorial audience’ 
that there is something dubious about the householder and his rejection of the Buddha. 
Moreover, such a strong ‘tension’-creating signal for the authorial audience serves to di-
rect the audience’s attention to the ‘synthetic aspect’ or the factitiousness of the character in 
question, as Phelan has observed. However, this is very unlikely meant to deliberately undermine 
the mimetic illusion, a phenomenon that is well-known from post-modern literature and is thus 
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 Ibid.: 160. 
878
 Āpastamba Dharmasūtra (II. 10.25.12-13): referenced to and summarized in Banerji 2007: 163.  
879
 Banerji 2007: 163. 
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 Cp. MW, s.v. akṣa-dhūrta (the entry is, however, rather “weak” because the only reference that Sir Monier 
Monier-Williams gives is “L” (= indigenous Indic lexicographers). Pāṇinī in his Aṣṭādhyāyī records the term 
akṣa-dyūta, meaning “dicing” (referenced and cited in Banerji 2007: 165). In the epics (Rāmāṇaya), the word 
dhūrta “gamester”, and devana “playing with dice”, and several other terms, betray once more the popularity 
of dice-games (for references, see also ibid.: 166f.).  
881
 That the ideas as laid down in the Dharmaśāstra-literature were most probably already prevalent as “com-
munity standards” during the Buddha’s time, was put forward by Patrick Olivelle; cp. Olivelle 2006: 171. 
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probably not to be expected (as intentional) in pre-modern, non-European texts. Rather, the ‘au-
thorial audience’ is made aware of the fact that the gamblers are a narrative strategy to achieve 
certain narrative effects, thus highlighting their ‘thematic aspect’. Likewise, whether this is in-
tentional or not is impossible to know. That it can have an effect on the interpreter of the text, 
however, is evident. 
The main characters of the second part of the two main parts in which I have subdivided 
the Piyakātika Sutta are King Pasenadi, Queen Mallikā, and a Brahmin called Nāl̥ijaṅgha. The 
following will treat them one by one.  
6.9 Queen Mallikā 
Mallikā, the daughter of “the chief garland-maker” of Sāvatthī, as we learn from G. P. Mala-
lasekera, is the model of the wise woman – “wiser than Pasenadi would have desired”882! She ap-
pears in several instances in the Jātakas883 and is furthermore identified with Sujātā in the Sujāta 
Jātaka (Jā III 22), the Kinnarī in the Bhallātiya Jātaka (Jā IV 444), and Sambulā in the Sambulā 
Jātaka (Jā V 98). Furthermore, it is also in the Jātakas that Pasenadi and Mallikā are reported to 
have had serious quarrels884, which the Buddha had to reconcile. In both cases, which are told in 
the paccuppannavatthus of the respective Jātakas, Mallikā and Pasenadi are said to have gotten 
into a fight, as a consequence of which the King refused to speak to his queen (he possibly 
thought of divorcing her, too). In the Bhallātiya Jātaka, Pasenadi is of the opinion that the life of 
luxury that he provided her with through their marriage had turned her head, whereas in the 
Sujāta Jātaka the quarrel seems to have broken out over conjugal rights.885 The Buddha, then, de-
cides to reconcile the couple and he relates a stories of the past in which he relates that Pasenadi 
and Mallikā had been a couple many times in former lives and that, therefore, their quarrel was 
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 Cp. DPPN, s.v. Mallikā: “Mallikā, though an exemplary wife, was not without lapses. Reference is made to 
the quarrels she had with her husband, once, at least, on the question of conjugal rights, as a result of which 
they both sulked and had to be reconciled by the Buddha. J. iv.437; also J. iii.20; in these quarrels the king was 
probably more to blame than Mallikā; it is said that until reconciled by the Buddha he ignored her very exist-
ence, saying that prosperity had turned her head.” 
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 E.g. the Kummāsapinda Jātaka, Jā No. 415, and the Mahāsupina Jātaka, Jā No. 77. 
884
 Cp. Jā IV 437 = Bhallātiya Jātaka, No. 504; Jā III 20 = Sujāta Jātaka, No. 307. 
885
 The paccuppannavattthu of the Sujāta Jātaka (No. 306) relates: “One day, they say, there was a dispute at 
court between her [Mallikā] and the king [Pasenadi]. Men still speak of it as the ‘Harem Quarrel’.” (Tr. Cowell 
1990 (Vol. III): 13). The translation “Harem Quarrel” is a bit misleading here, for the Pāli text has 
sayanakalaho, which rather means “bedroom quarrel”.   
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trifle and pointless. It is difficult or impossible to ascertain whether the situations mentioned in 
the Jātakas have any relation to the Piyajātika Sutta story.886 
Similar to other characters of the Pāli Canon, Malalasekera draws an almost comprehen-
sive, very life-like and biography-like picture of Mallikā from when she was sixteen years old 
and first met her future husband Pasenadi, until her death. The information about Mallikā, how-
ever, is scattered throughout the Canon and the commentaries (mainly the Dhammapadattha-
kathā).  
The textual evidence shows that Mallikā was known for being a faithful disciple of the 
Buddha. From the Vinaya we learn that Ānanda was once sent by the Buddha on the king’s re-
quest to teach the dhamma regularly in Pasenadi’s harem (itthāgāraṃ).887 Moreover, in a sutta of 
the Aṅguttara Nikāya, we find one of the very rare (if not otherwise non-existent) references to 
the physical appearance of a person in the Pāli Canon. The background of the passage is as fol-
lows: one of King Pasenadi’s two wives, queen Mallikā, one day pays a visit to the Blessed One 
to ask for the reason, why some women are ugly while at the same time rich and influential, and 
some are fair but poor, and others again are both beautiful and rich. The Buddha answers with an 
explanation of the karmic fruits of one’s behaviour: being ugly is the result of being irritable 
when criticised, whereas wealth is the result of generosity. Furthermore, envy leads to being un-
influential and petty. The following statement of Mallikā’s in the presence of the Buddha is a re-
sponse to what he had just explained, and it is one of the very rare (self-) descriptions of the 
physical appearance of persons in the Pāli Canon. Following upon it, Mallikā goes for refuge to 
the Buddha and asks of him to accept her as a lay-follower: 
“When the Blessed One had spoken, Queen Mallikā said to him: ‘I suppose, Lord, that in some earlier 
birth I was irascible and irritable, and that when I was criticized even a little I lost my temper and be-
came angry and upset; therefore now I am ugly, ill-formed and unsightly. But, Lord, I suppose that in 
some earlier birth I gave things to an ascetic or a Brahmin; therefore now I am rich, affluent, with 
great wealth and property. And, Lord, I suppose that in some earlier birth I was un-envious, not one 
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 Strangely enough, each Jātaka ends by stating, “Ever afterwards the king of Kosala lived with her in har-
mony.” But it seems that the couple had more than one quarrel.  
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  Vin IV 157-161. 
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who envied, resented and begrudged the gain, honour, respect, esteem, homage and worship given to 
others; therefore now I am of great influence.’” 888 
Surprisingly, the introduction to the Kummāsapiṇḍa Jātaka mentions Mallikā to have been 
“extremely beautiful (and very good)”889. I think we can take this as an illustrative example that the 
compilation of character-information across the different collections, including the later commen-
taries, is a rather unpromising undertaking. 
I will therefore, now turn to the Piyajātika Sutta itself and examine from step by step this 
particular instance of characterisation and function of the character Queen Mallikā.  
The first information we can obtain, by implication, is that she is an inhabitant of the 
royal palace (“Eventually this story reached the harem [of the King’s palace]”890). She is named 
(Mallikā) and her social position and marital status is mentioned (“queen Mallikā”, Mallikāṃ 
deviṃ).891 Furthermore, she is referred to by the sutta-narrator as “queen” (devī) and addressed by 
a man designated “King Pasenadi” (rājā Pasenadi), which implicates that she must be the wife 
of the King of Kosala, Pasenadi.892 Kosala was one of the sixteen emergent ancient Indian states 
(mahājanapadā), or the country (desa) inhabited by the “Kosalans” (kosalā)893, the “King” of 
whom at the lifetime of the historical Buddha was a man named Pasenadi. The capital of this 
‘Kingdom’ was Sāvatthī, where the whole story of the sutta is located from the beginning (Bha-
gavā Sāvatthiyaṃ viharati Jetavane Anāthapiṇḍikassa ārāme).894 
Mallikā is directly characterised by her husband Pasenadi in the conversation with him 
about the story of the householder and the Buddha’s remark after it had reached the palace (= 
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 Cp. AN IV 197; tr. Nyanaponika Thera/Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000). Numerical Discourses of the Buddha. An 
Anthology of Suttas from the Aṅguttara Nikāya.Vistaar Publ., New Delhi [1st publ. Buddhist Publication Soci-
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 Cowell 1990 (Vol III): 244. 
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harem. 
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‘figural explicit alterocharacterisation’895). In his characterising statement, Pasenadi taunts Mal-
likā as being naïve and gullible, not thinking independently, when he says: 
“It is in exactly this way (evam evaṃ panāyaṃ) that whatever the drop-out (samaṇa) Gotama says, 
Mallikā approves of it, [with the words] ‘If this, maharaja, was said by the Blessed One, it must be so.’ 
As an apprentice who approves of whatever his master says [with the words], ‘So it is, master. So it is, 
master’, so do you, Mallikā, approve of absolutely (eva) everything (yaṃ yad) the drop-out Gotama 
says [with the words], ‘If this, maharaja, was said by the Blessed One, it must be so.’ Go away, Mal-
likā, get lost!”).896  
Seen in retrospect, that is, from the ending of the sutta, the listener/reader can understand 
that it is in fact the king himself, who does not think independently here, because he just follows 
public opinion. At this point of the story, however, this is not discernible for the ‘narrative audi-
ence’.  
Although outwardly Mallikā kowtows to the king after having been reproached (she re-
treats to her chambers, as must be inferred from the gap (Ger. “Leerstelle”) in the text), secretly 
she sends a Brahmin called Nāl̥ijaṅgha to a) ascertain whether the Buddha had indeed made this 
utterance (i.e. the exact wording of it)897, and b) to record well how the Buddha would explain his 
statement, in order to relate it to her upon returning.898 The way she instructs the Brahmin to greet 
the Buddha on her behalf shows the highest possible form of respect (bowing with the head to 
the Bhagavān’s feet) and employs a standard, respectful approach-formula.899 Now, we can infer 
at least two traits from Mallikā’s behaviour. First, the sending of the Brahmin depicts her as be-
ing disobedient to the king. Instead of “keeping quiet” and submit to the king’s judgement, what 
was perhaps expected from a woman at this time and in this environment, she takes initiative. 
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 Neumann & Nünning 2008: 56, Figure 3.3. 
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 MN II 107,27-108,2: Evam evaṃ panāyaṃ Mallikā yaññadeva samaṇo Gotamo bhāsati taṃ tad ev’ assa 
abbhanumodati: ›Sace taṃ, mahārāja, Bhagavatā bhāsitaṃ, evam etan ti. Seyyathāpi nāma ācariyo 
yaññadeva antevāsissa bhāsati, taṃ tad ev’ assa antevāsī abbhanumodati: ›Evam etaṃ, ācariya; evam etaṃ, 
ācariyāti; evam eva kho tvaṃ, Mallike, yaññadeva samaṇo Gotamo bhāsati, taṃ tad ev’ assa abbhanumodasi: 
›sace taṃ, mahārāja, Bhagavatā bhāsitaṃ evam etan ti. Cara pi re, Mallike, vinassāti.  
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 MN II 108,9ff.: evañ ca vadehi: Bhāsitā nu kho, bhante, Bhagavatā esā vācā: Piyajātikā sokaparidevaduk-
khadomanassupāyāsā piyappabhavikā ti? 
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 MN II 108,11f.: Yathā ca te Bhagavā vyākaroti, taṃ sādhukaṃ uggahetvā mamaṃ āroceyyāsi. Na hi 
Tathāgatā vitathaṃ bhaṇantīti. 
899
 Formula D1b); cp. Allon 1997: 176. 
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Secondly, this proves her to be the exact opposite of what Pasenadi accuses her of. She is dis-
cerning, critical, and conscientious (after all, she instructs the Brahmin not only to enquire the 
exact wording of the Buddha, but also an explanation), but also courageous and self-confident.900  
By Queen Mallikā’s decision to send the Brahmin, her ‘mimetic dimension’ is turned into 
a function that makes the narrative progress towards the resolution of its underlying ‘instability’, 
which consists in the conflict of opinions, respectively truth, concerning the Buddha’s statement.    
She proves that she is self-confident and courageous in that she, after the Brahmin’s re-
turn from the Buddha, faces Pasenadi again, and abruptly, as it were, confronts him with ques-
tions that are intended to make him understand the meaning of the Buddha’s statement. “What do 
you think, maharaja? Is the princess Vajīrī dear to you?” “So it is, Mallikā, the princess Vajīrī is 
dear to me.” “What do you think, maharaja? Would because of change [to the worse] and deteri-
oration concerning Princess Vajīrī sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair arise in you?” 
“Mallikā, change [to the worse] and deterioration with regard to Vajīrī would be change [to the 
worse] and deterioration with regard to my own life. How could sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, 
and despair not arise in me!”901 Mallikā asks in the same manner with regard to Pasenadi’s sec-
ond queen Vāsabhakhattiyā, his general Viḍūḍabha, herself, and finally his kingdom (Kāsi-
Kosala).  
Thus, most skillfully, by striking the right chords in King Pasenadi, so to speak, she man-
ages to make him understand the truth that lies in the Buddha’s utterance.  
Although, in my humble opinion, the credit for this insight of the king really goes to Mal-
likā, the Buddha alone is, of course, praised for his wisdom, and not the queen by Pasenadi: “It is 
wonderful, Mallikā, it is marvellous how far the Blessed One penetrates with wisdom and sees 
with wisdom!”902    
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 This trait of Mallikā’s seems to be in line with other passages in the Jātakas that Malalasekera adduces; cp. 
the discussion above, beginning of ch. 6.9. 
901
 MN II 110,13-18: Taṃ kim maññasi, mahārāja? Vajīriyā te kumāriyā vipariṇāmaññathābhāvā uppajjeyyuṃ 
sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā ti? Vajiriyā me, Mallike, kumāriyā vipariṇāmaññathābhāvā jīvitassa pi 
siyā aññathattaṃ. Kiṃ pana me na uppajjissanti sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā ti? 
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 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 721f., 29. MN II 111,35-112,2: Acchariyaṃ, Mallike, abbhutaṃ, Mallike, 
yāvañ ca so Bhagavā paññāya ativijjha paññāya passati. Ehi, Mallike, ācāmehīti.  
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6.10 The ‘Brahmin’ Nāl̥ijaṅgha 
The text does not give us any details about this figure or his function. We do not know whether 
he is perhaps the purohita (the king’s head priest) or a minister of the king. We only know his 
social position through his attribute, brāhmaṇa. One would normally think it unlikely that he 
held a high position or that he was of a high rank in the court hierarchy because this is not what 
one would usually expect of a messenger. By the (formulaic) description of his approach to the 
Buddha903, we can, following Allon, be sure that he was not a follower of the Buddha (‘saddhiṃ 
sammodi-approach’904 + “bho Gotama” form of address), but that he was favourable to him.905  
Gupta interprets this Brahmin as a simple messenger on the grounds of a linguistic analy-
sis of his name and its significance. He writes:  
“The name literally means the legs (jaṅghā) that appear like pipe or tube or stalk of a lotus (nāl̥i). The 
meaning of the name thus reveals the person’s job of going around using his legs for carrying out the 
duties of a messenger. A messenger’s chief work is to convey the information from one place to an-
other and walking is the main work involved. Instead of mentioning him as one of messengers 
(aññatara), a name was used to give the context an interesting narrative, though the names would not 
have been real.”906 
While I think Gupta could be right with his analysis of the name, which is admittedly 
strange and slightly artificial-sounding, and may thus point already to the ‘synthetic component’ 
of this figure, I cannot agree with his interpretation of him being a simple messenger, whose “chief 
work is to convey the information from one place to another”. In my view, the Brahmin signi-
fies/stands for more than just a messenger. The fact that Mallikā entrusts him with such an im-
portant task means that she, first of all, trusts him personally (she would not send someone hostile 
to the Buddha). Secondly, she trusted him of being capable of this task. In other words, she knew 
him as one who has the proper background or education for this task (you would perhaps not send 
the cook). This can be inferred from the text since her motivation is to proof her point to the king. 
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 Cp. Allon 1997: 64f., 79, 84, (B.4 formula, cp. ibid.: References: 171). For the Ehi tvaṃ, … form of sum-
moning someone, see ibid.: 32. 
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 MN II 108,14-18: »evaṃ bhotīti kho Nāḷijaṅgho brāhmaṇo Mallikāya deviyā paṭissutvā yena Bhagavā ten’ 
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ekamantaṃ nisīdi. Ekamantaṃ nisinno kho Nāḷijaṅgho brāhmaṇo Bhagavantaṃ etad avoca: … 
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 Cp. Allon 1997: 32f. 
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 Cp. Gupta 2006: 126. 
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In any case, it should be clear that she would definitely send someone who she could trust. The 
(textual) fact that Mallikā sends a Brahmin may thus have significance. Aside from the assumption 
that Mallikā would definitely have sent a trustworthy person, why would she send a Brahmin? We 
can assume that she, being confined to her chambers by the angry king, was not able to go by 
herself without causing a stir. Brahmins, after all, were well known for their extensive (and inten-
sive) training and achievements in memorisation and the oral transmission of their textual tradition. 
Several passages in the Majjhima Nikāya testify to this.907 Although the Buddha did criticise Brah-
manic teachings as such908, the relationship is mostly depicted as friendly and courteous.909 In addi-
tion, the Brahmin Nāl̥ijaṅgha in the Piyajātika Sutta is approaching the Buddha in a respectful 
way, as we have seen above.910 
In sum, the Brahmin may neither simply serve as a messenger, as Gupta proposes, nor is 
it mere chance that Mallikā sends a Brahmin (and not any messenger). The ‘thematic dimension’ 
of the Brahmin Nāl̥ijaṅgha, as outlined above, becomes apparent in his precise attending to his 
orders: “Then, […] the Brahmin Nāl̥ijaṅgha rose from his seat, went [back] to queen Mallikā, 
and reported to her his entire conversation with the Blessed One.”911 
In addition to the stress laid on the short statement of the Buddha through its constant rep-
etition (Piyajātikā sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā piyappabhavikā), the Brahmin’s ‘the-
matic function’ raises the ‘ideal narrative audience’s912’ awareness of the importance of memoris-
ing the exact wording of the Buddha’s teachings. This concept is explicitly verbalised in another 
sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, the Caṅkī Sutta (MN 95). In this sutta, the Buddha is asked by the 
Brahmin Caṅkī about the best way to preserve ‘the truth’ (= the liberating insight of the Buddha), 
                                                 
907
 Cp. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: (sutta-number, paragraph) 95,13f..; 100,7; 107,2 (= MN II 169,25-29 etc.; 
211,10-13; III 1,10-12).  
908
 See MN II 170,25-171,7. (= tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 780, 14.) “Bhāradvāja, earlier you relied on faith 
[as a criterion for truth], now on oral tradition. […]. Although, Bhāradvāja, [something] may have been trans-
mitted orally well, yet it may be empty, hollow, and false.” 
909
 Cp. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 49. 
910
 Note also that at the end of their meeting, the Brahmin leaves the Buddha “delighting and rejoicing” (abhi-
nanditvā anumoditvā) in the Blessed One’s words, which is the direct opposite, linguistically as well as regard-
ing content, of the householder’s reaction when taking leave of the Buddha after their conversation: “And then 
the householder, unappreciative of and rejecting the Blessed One’s words, rose from his seat and left”. MN II 
110,4ff.: Atha kho so gahapati Bhagavato bhāsitaṃ anabhinanditvā paṭikkositvā uṭṭhāy’ āsanā pakkāmi. 
911
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 721, 23. MN II 110,4-7. 
912
 Cp. Phelan 2007: 209. 
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to which the Buddha answers: “Memorising the teachings is most helpful for examining the mean-
ing, Bhāradvāja. If one does not memorise a teaching, one will not examine its meaning; but be-
cause one memorises a teaching, one examines its meaning.”913 
 Moreover, if Gupta is right with his proposition that the Brahmin’s name can be trans-
lated literally (‘Lotus-stalk Leg’), his name would indeed direct the reader’s/listener’s attention 
to his ‘synthetic component’. In other words, if the original name sounded as awkward to ancient 
Indian ears as it does in its English ‘translation’ to a modern Western recipient, a historical 
reader would have immediately picked up its artificiality.914 This must, however, remain pure 
speculation.915 It is furthermore much more likely that his name – independent of whether or not 
it did ever refer to a real historical person – was some kind of nickname for a Brahmin, as for in-
stance the Brahmin Ghoṭamukha “Horse-face”, in the Sela Sutta (MN 92).916   
6.11 Pasenadi 
The Kosalasaṃyutta917 of the Saṃyutta Nikāya devotes an entire chapter to the meetings that took 
place between king Pasenadi and the Buddha and their relationship. There, they are depicted to 
have spoken in their meetings about a wide range of topics, and the overall picture is suggestive 
of the king being a devout follower of the Buddha, starting from the time when the latter had just 
started his teaching career (see below). The picture of Pasenadi that the Piyajātika Sutta presents, 
is thus all the more interesting. 
That jeering remark of Pasenadi’s towards Mallikā with regard to the Buddha’s short 
statement characterises the king himself. We can infer from his contemptuous reference to the 
Buddha (“This is what Gotama, that ascetic of yours, has said, Mallikā …”) that he is, at this 
stage of the narrative, not very fond of the Buddha. In my reading of the passage, the tone of his 
remark, and the situation in which it occurs – perhaps in a casual everyday conversation or as a 
remark on the side – perhaps also reflects public opinion, which is very much aligned with the 
                                                 
913
 Tr. Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 2001: 784, 28. MN II 175,19-22. Atthupaparikkhāya, Bhāradvāja, dhammadhāranā 
bahukārā; no ce taṃ dhammaṃ dhāreyya, na-y-idaṃ atthaṃ upaparikkheyya. Yasmā ca kho dhammaṃ 
dhāreti, tasmā atthaṃ upaparikkhati, tasmā atthupaparikkhāya dhammadhāraṇā bahukārā ti. 
914
 Cp. Phelan 1989: 14.  
915
 Moreover, the question would then apply to many other names, too.    
916
 I owe this note and the reference to Prof. Konrad Klaus, Bonn, who regards the existence of a ‘synthetic as-
pect’ of characters in the Pāli suttas impossible.    
917
 SN I 68-103. 
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householder’s. Pasenadi, for his part, appears to be quite satisfied with the outcome of the house-
holder’s and the Buddha’s encounter, as well as with the public opinion about it. Rephrased in 
causal English, the king’s remark appears to be suggesting to say: “Do you see now [from this 
story], Mallikā, what kind of nonsense this ascetic, your Buddha, is talking? Since ‘[…] happi-
ness and joy arise from those who are dear…’918, this must prove to you that the Buddha’s answer 
to the poor householder is nonsensical.” This interpretation is warranted when examining Pa-
senadi’s reaction to Mallikā’s reply to this remark. Pasenadi becomes very angry because he did 
perhaps not expect such an answer from Mallikā. In any case, however, does his angry reaction 
show that he thinks public opinion (= householder’s opinion = gambler’s opinion) is right in this 
matter, and that Mallikā is obviously the only person thinking otherwise, which must mean (in 
Pasenadi’s reasoning) that she automatically parrots anything the Buddha says, even if every-
body else says the opposite.919 
While the householder may be described as what E. M. Forster has called a ‘flat charac-
ter’, being characterised by one prominent trait only, King Pasenadi bears a resemblance to the 
Ghaṭīkāra Sutta’s Jotipāla. Like in his case, the course of events changes his attitude towards the 
Buddha significantly. In the Piyajatika Sutta, however, a mediator (Queen Mallikā) effects the 
change of heart through her cleverness, wisdom, faith, and courage. After the king realised the 
truth by his own experience, namely that change (to the worse, aññathābhāva) of loved ones 
causes pain (because of attachment), he performs a ritual ablution (in order to purify his wrong 
view or his wrong speech?) before he pays homage to the Blessed One three times reciting the 
‘itipiso-formula’.920 
Now, we learn from other sources that Pasenadi was a follower of the Buddha from quite 
early on and that their relationship was rather cordial until the Buddha’s death.921 The Dahara 
                                                 
918
 MN II 106,19-23. 
919
 Cp., again, MN II 107,27-108,2, “It is in exactly this way (Evam evaṃ panāyaṃ) that whatever the drop-out 
Gotama says, Mallikā approves of it, [with the words] ….”  
920
 MN II 112,1-7: Ehi Mallike, ācāmehīti. Atha kho raja Pasenadi Kosalo uṭṭhāy’ asana ekaṃsaṃ ut-
tarāsaṅgaṃ karitvā yena Bhagavā ten’ añjaliṃ paṇāmetvā tikkhattuṃ udānaṃ udānesi: Namo tassa Bhaga-
vato arahato sammāsambuddhassa; … [– pe – 3x]. 
921
 Cp. DPPN, s.v. Pasenadi. 
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Sutta of the Saṃyutta Nikāya922, for instance, records that at their first meeting, the King criti-
cised the Buddha for his claim to be fully enlightened although he was obviously still quite 
“young in years and ha[d] just newly gone forth.”923 As a reply, the Buddha reprimands Pasenadi 
and warns him not to underestimate four things, a young khattiya, a young snake, a young fire, 
and a young bhikkhu, whereupon Pasenadi takes the triple refuge. 
Thus, with a view to relative chronology, it is tempting to place the Piyajātika Sutta first 
among the accounts of his relation with the Buddha. Perhaps, this assumption could be corrobo-
rated by the fact that the texts speak of altogether four wives of Pasenadi924, while in the Piyaj-
ātika Sutta only two are (yet?) mentioned (Mallikā and Vāsabhakhattiyā).  
6.12 Interpretation 
J. Phelan’s theory of characters 
I argue that the story in the Piyajātika Sutta unfolds because it has to: a ‘tension’925 created by the 
(narrated) fact that the householder is confirmed in his view by a group of gamblers, the mem-
bers of which are to be regarded as highly unreliable in their judgments. In narratological terms, 
this poses an inequality in the states of knowledge between the ‘authorial audience’ and the 
sutta-narrator. While the narrator (who, because what he actually does through his act of narra-
tion is a re-capitulation/repetition of past events, knows how his narration will end, but keeps his 
audience uninformed about it!) is aware of the ending which releases the tension, his audience is 
not. Then again, the gamblers’ judgement cannot give closure to the story for the reason that xthe 
norms and values overarching the text (i.e. the suttas’ ‘perspective’ on the whole as their genre-
convention, such as that the Buddha is wise and always victorious in debate etc. due to his trans-
worldly as well as practical wisdom) would not have been met with through such an ending. The 
story, therefore, has to go on in order to resolve this tension, which in turn is caused by an ‘insta-
bility’, which expresses itself in the relation between the householder, who comes to see the 
                                                 
922
 SN I 68f. 
923
 Bodhi 2000: 164. 
924
 Cp. DPPN, s.v. Pasenadi: “Mallikā predeceased Pasenadi [AN III 57]; he had also other wives, one of them 
being the sister of Bimbisāra, and another Ubbirī. The Kannakatthala Sutta [MN II 125] mentions two others 
who were sisters: Somā and Sakulā.” 
925
 Cp. Phelan 1989: 15, we need to remember that a tension was defined by Phelan as an instability on the 
level of narrative communication author > authorial audience. 
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Buddha for advice, and the Buddha. The tension consists primarily in the fact that this outcome 
of the encounter of the householder with the Buddha is felt to be unsatisfactory by the (reader en-
tering the) ‘authorial audience’. This is the function of the character of the householder in the 
sutta, and seen from this angle, it is not necessarily surprising or inconsistent that he doesn’t play 
any further role in the narrative beyond this point.  
When we consider the character of the householder, and we can do so by applying Phe-
lan’s “3x2 terminology”, we find that his very character (i.e. his ‘thematic component’) also re-
flects back on the other characters – his character/understanding/general outlook on life, on the 
one hand, concurs with that of the gamblers (and vice versa) and, on the other hand, it stands in 
stark contrast to the Buddha and Queen Mallikā’s. The King, Pasenadi, inhabits a middle posi-
tion, as it were, between these two poles established by the character, and the overarching theme 
(“Sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair are born from those who are dear, arise from 
those who are dear”) that holds the whole narrative together (also linguistically, as we have seen) 
is, at the same time, the splitting wedge that divides the two “poles” just mentioned, namely the 
right understanding of what the Buddha teaches.  
From an authorial reader’s perspective, there is also a reason for that middling position of 
the king. It communicates to the ‘ideal narrative audience’ that there are two wrong ways to 
“grasp” what the Buddha teaches: blind faith (Mallikā) and outright rejection that is habitual, out 
of an existing preconception about how things are, without any openness to the possibility to 
have one’s own limited view challenged or changed, even if it was for the better. But there is 
more to the character of Mallikā than just this, since she is the one who, through skillfulness and 
wisdom, changes the king’s opinion in the end. The “message” of this seems to be: the Buddha is 
fully enlightened and thus possesses a kind of trans-worldly insight (and is ultimately always 
“right”). It is, however, permitted to first reject or challenge his view and be critical, but one 
should stay open to the possibility of having one’s opinion changed (of course, always for the 
better). This is what kings are supposed to do, namely to act and decide wisely, to make in-
formed and intelligent choices. In this regard, the Piyajātika Sutta does indeed belong in the 
Rājavagga, because it is about kings and the way good kings are expected to act. Furthermore, 
the episode with the gamblers indirectly judges the character of the householder (i.e. his ‘the-
matic component/dimension’) in that it puts him intellectually and thematically (also socially?) 
on the same level with them.  
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Another instability is created by the conflict between King Pasenadi and his Queen Mal-
likā, which further complicates the plot.  
Finally, if we don’t interpret the plot-progression in this way, we might find the episode 
with the gamblers to be “a loose end” in the story, and regard it, from a historical-critical point of 
view, as an inconsistency (Ger. “Bruch”). Consequentially, one may want to explain it as a later 
addition. For the former kind of interpretation, we need to consider the narrative, and this means 
the sutta, as a coherent whole rather than consider the text as historically evolved and grown. This 
is, of course, no proof that it has not evolved. It does of course not exclude the possibility that one 
cannot find later additions to the text in the suttas. Nevertheless, if my interpretation would be 
found reasonable and intersubjectively comprehensible or reproducible, there is a good chance that 
the text as we now have it also made sense – at least – to the ones who authored/compiled/edited 
it in this form in the early days of the formation of the Canon. This is, in a nutshell, what a ‘syn-
chronic’ analysis can achieve through analysing and investigating a text’s form and content at a 
given point in time. Furthermore, it seems unwise to preclude the very possibility that the people 
(if not all, some) who were responsible for the composition, compilation editing, and transmission 
of the suttas have had an equally or (probably) better understanding of their texts and its language 
and narrative tradition than Western scholars, who are timely, culturally, and often geographically 
far removed from the origins of those texts.926  
6.13 Conclusion 
As a conclusion to the analysis of the Piyajātika Sutta, we can perhaps state that the strategy of 
the texts that points to the intention of the implied author(s), implies that the Buddha always be 
depicted as superior in the debate of religious or spiritual truths. To be more precise, the implicit 
genre-convention commands that the Buddha always speaks the Truth. The truth might not al-
ways be understood by everyone (because it is too subtle, too deep, for some minds to compre-
hend). But at some point in the story it will/has to be recognized as true and thereby confirm that 
the Buddha was right in the first place. Thus, with these words, we may be able to “translate” or 
                                                 
926
 My point here is not to take sides in whatever form of an “Orientalism-debate”. But it is an indisputable fact 
that the knowledge and understanding of even the most knowledgeable modern scholar of any ancient textual 
tradition lacks far behind the knowledge of a contemporary recipient, i.e. historical listener/reader.   
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paraphrase the narratological term of the ‘implied author’, and show that it is applicable to pre-
modern, non-European narratives.  
It is furthermore interesting, I think, that the sutta itself seems to thematise an aspect so 
central to the transmission of the Buddhist Canon, namely, the importance of first preserving and 
confirming, and then understanding the words of the Buddha correctly. To close with a quote 
from A. K. Warder:  
“That life [of the Buddha] was evidently inessential for the doctrine of early Buddhism and did not 
interest the compilers of the Tripiṭaka, who were content to record as carefully as they could the 
words of their teacher, the words which were their ‘master’ once the Buddha was no more.”927 
[my emphasis] 
                                                 
927




From the analyses in Part III we can extract and summarise the following results:   
First, some of the characters in the analysed Pāli suttas may be “paper beings” (M. Bal): 
Ghaṭīkāra, one of the main characters of the sutta (if not the main character) turned out to be a 
rather flat, even opaque character. We cannot penetrate into his mind, that is, we do not learn 
about his thoughts and or motivations – at least not in the Pāli version – except for once, when 
we learn about his feelings, namely, that “bliss and joy did not leave him for one month […]”, 
which is, although extraordinary, not a very surprising event given his overall character portrait. 
His opaqueness leaves the listener/reader quite unsatisfied in one particular instance, in which we 
only learn what his friend Jotipāla surmises must be the reason for his insistence on visiting the 
Buddha Kassapa (“Surely, that can be no trivial matter”). But we never learn why Ghaṭīkāra acts 
as he does or whether or not he knew that the meeting of Jotipāla and the Buddha will be im-
portant and why. The ‘flat’ character Ghaṭīkāra can be characterised in one sentence: He is the 
embodiment of the good and virtuous disciple. Moreover, his not very original name may even 
point to his ‘synthetic aspect’, as does the just mentioned fact that he acts without hesitation but, 
apparently, not even knowing why. I have suggested that it is thinkable also that a historical lis-
tener/reader might have been aware of his ‘synthetic aspect’ because the narrative strategy of the 
sutta makes it somewhat clear that the metadiegetic (‘embedded’) Jātaka-tale mirrors the situa-
tion on the communication level ‘narrator (Buddha Gotama)  addressee (Ānanda)’, i.e. that the 
embedded episode has an instructional or illustrative function. A second illocutionary purpose is 
mirrored in the implicit critique addressed to the mythical king Kikī of the practice of arranging 
sumptuous meals for public display, which may reflect back on the situation stated in the begin-
ning of the sutta which mentions a large crowd of monks travelling together with the Buddha and 
Ānanda – perhaps the Buddha is longing for more quiet with just Ānanda as his attendant and a 
few others. Other passages can be found in the Canon in which the Buddha expresses his dislike 
for crowds and noise. 
Secondly, the characters in the Pāli Canon may be “formerly historical” persons or “paper 
beings with a biography”, as we have seen in the works of Richard Gombrich and Monika Zin, 
who try to come to terms with the notoriously elusive character Aṅgulimāla. While Gombrich 
sees in him the Proto-Śaiva par excellence, Zin spots in him the mythical cannibal (or shall we 
say, ‘undead’?) Kalmāṣapāda somewhere in the distance. Although both interpretations are not 
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implausible and have their merits, their reasoning and interpretation seem to betray the respective 
scholar’s ‘system of presuppositions’, rather than presenting simple text-based information about 
the character in a descriptive manner. Although my own character analysis and description based 
on a synchronic investigation claims to be methodically stricter, I have no real solution to the 
“Aṅgulimāla-problem” to offer. However, I think that the ‘thematic aspect’ is predominant. The 
case of Aṅgulimāla, however, leads to an interesting observation. He was initially characterised 
as, “Aṅgulimāla, the robber, gruesome, with blood on his hands, a notorious killer, merciless to-
wards living beings”. Later, however, the only individualising element in his characterisation is 
the name ‘Aṅgulimāla’, which is, nevertheless, rather a description than a proper name, for the 
same characterising statement is also found, we have seen, in a general description of the results 
of one’s actions in the Cūl̥akammavibhaṅga Sutta (MN 135).928 Next – leaving out his encounter 
with the Buddha – we learn that Aṅgulimāla renounces his evil ways, becomes a monk and even-
tually “one of the arahants”. The description, “having shaved off his hair and beard, etc.”, 
kesamassuṃ ohāretvā, is a stock phrase in the Pāli Canon and not a genuine, individualised 
physical description. The expression “one of the” (aññataro), together with the usual arahant-
formula, likewise cannot serve as individualising feature. Thus, we are left with his names 
(Ahiṃsaka, Gaggo Matāṇīputto) and with his story of converting from being a murderer to a 
Buddhist saint as the only individualising features. Now, applying Margolin’s question, “when is 
there an individual in a given narrative?” to Aṅgulimāla’s case, he obviously fails even Margo-
lin’s minimal conditions (3), (4), and (5) that would make for a recognisable, sustainable, and 
clearly distinguishable individual in a story929, with the effect that we cannot speak of a realistic 
presentation of his character in the Aṅgulimala Sutta. This may be the reason, on the one hand, 
why we find a ‘thematising interpretation’ unproblematic, as we can see in Monika Zin’s sugges-
tion. On the other hand, it does not explain why the presentation of characters in the Pāli suttas 
leaves listeners/readers with a more or less vivid impression of a representation of possible per-
sons, as, for example, in the case of Gombrich’s suggestion. A possible answer to the problem 
may be found in the so-called ‘cognitive narratology’. This very recent branch of narratology has 
made the findings of cognitive science usable for a narratological model of readers’ reception of 
                                                 
928
 MN III 203,16-18. 
929
 Cp. Margolin 1989: 12: while the conditions (1), existence, and (2), identity are fulfilled, the remaining ones 
are not ((3) uniqueness, (4) paradigmatic unity, (5) continuity).  
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characters in literary texts which is called a ‘mental model’ – that is, a mental image of a charac-
ter based on the data provided by the text plus world knowledge (Ger. “Weltwissen”) that readers 
create during the reception-process.930 Here, the insight is pivotal – similar to what Margolin had 
proposed earlier in his model of character analysis employing Possible Worlds Theory – that the 
result of a reading/reception process that involves literary characters is an entity that is neither 
independent from the text nor identical with it.931 In the field of literary studies, it was Herbert 
Grabes (1978), who made a first attempt to make a case for a non-reductionist understanding of 
characters in literature by utilising the insights and concepts of social psychology.932  
In conclusion, I propose two interrelated hypotheses (for the time being, with regard to 
the three texts analysed in this thesis): the impression of a person/individual Aṅgulimāla, for in-
stance, is not necessarily based on false perception, as, for instance, the popular Reductionist or 
Structuralist argument claims: while looking from a considerable distance one perceives a some-
what homogeneous row of ants, but if one takes a closer look, one sees only individual ants fol-
lowing each other. Rather, (1) it is precisely due the scarcity of (individualising) information on 
characters provided by the suttas, the gaps (Ger. “Leerstellen”, i.e. the information or details that 
the texts do not provide), which are consequently filled/complemented by the listener/reader, 
who naturally draws up, as it were, a ‘mental model’ of a character following a describable pro-
cess. This activity is not reducible to a Reductionist description of the world, as was argued in 
Part II. (2) The process of complementation of character into a ‘mental model’ is not random but 
facilitated by the skillfully arranged narrative progression, relation (of similarity and/or contrast) 
of the protagonists, and guided by the employment of internal focalization, and thus inviting the 
listener/reader to identify with or – to use a weaker and more cautious expression – “approximate 
the field of perception of the characters”933. While (1) can only be described very roughly and ap-
                                                 
930
 Cp. Jannidis 2004: 177-185. 
931
 Cp. ibid.: 179: “Dieses Konzept des ‚mentalen Modells‘ weist ganz offensichtlich Ähnlichkeiten mit der 
Theorie fiktionaler Welten auf. Auch sie ging davon aus, daß aus den Textanagaben ein Gebilde erzeugt wird, 
das nicht mit dem Text identisch und doch weitgehend von ihm abhängig ist.” 
932
 Cp. ibid.: 179, n. 64 & Grabes 1978: 412, where he mentions, e.g. the significance of “implicit personality 
theories” (“implizierte Persönlichkeitstheorie”) for the reception process, or the primacy- and recency-reffects, 
also known in common parlance, which signify that the first and the last impression we get of people are deci-
sive for our judgement about them; cp. ibid.: 413-416. 
933
 Cp. Weber 1998: 61: “Annäherung an den Figurenhorizont”, “erlebnisperspektivisches Erzählen”. 
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proximately in a strongly text-based approach to narrative by clarifying the listener/reader/inter-
preter’s ‘system of presuppositions’ (Ger. “Voraussetzungssystem”, consisting in world 
knowledge, personality theories, cultural scripts and ‘frames’, knowledge about different genres, 
emotional disposition, and so forth)934, which is what this study tries to summarise approximately 
in Part I, (2) can be effectually carried out, I believe, with the help of narratological models and 
analytical tools, as demonstrated in Part III of this study.  
7.1 Individuality and focalisation 
The Pāli suttas themselves and their textual history are a complicated matter. We must assume 
that during the long history of their transmission and preservation, the texts have been redacted 
and also linguistically levelled and standardised in different stages. Nevertheless, it is generally 
believed that older material does exist alongside the younger in them. To precisely separate the 
one from the other, however, is difficult, if not in many cases impossible. It is additionally also 
very difficult to pinpoint or assign exact dates for changes that may have occurred. What I want 
to argue for, as part of my findings reached through a ‘synchronic’ textual analysis, is that irre-
spective of who might be responsible for the current form of the suttas, we do find interesting 
passages of ‘internal focalization’ and a peculiar emphasis on the “inner life” of literary charac-
ters that might have appeared to the authors/compilers/editors/reciters as important; so they com-
posed, elaborated on it, or at least keep it in the texts. We have also seen that in our examples 
these passages occur at crucial moments within the dramatic or dynamic of the plot of the suttas, 
which suggests a conscious, and skilful, act of redaction (whether carried out by an individual 
author/compiler or a collective does not matter) and/or a vivid and skilful (folk- or typically Bud-
dhist?) tradition of story-telling.  
With regard to the discussion of the notion of ‘subject’, undertaken in Part I (see specifi-
cally chapter 1.2.) of this study, I furthermore want to argue, though much more cautiously, that 
the employment of the narrative technique of narrating from or through the perspective of one of 
the characters (‘focalization’), may be linked with, and an expression of, a newly emerging un-
derstanding of the individual – either large-scale within Indian society in and around the 5th cen-
tury B.C. and within the context of the wider śramaṇa-movement of which the Buddha was one 
prominent part (G. Bailey & I. Mabbett’s thesis), or peculiar for Buddhism and its founder (R. 
                                                 
934
 Cp. Jannidis 2004: 183.  
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Gombrich’s thesis).935 Much more research would be necessary to substantiate this thesis than an 
analysis of only three suttas can provide. In particular, comparisons – with a special emphasis on 
the narratological categories of ‘perspective’ and ‘focalization’ – with the earlier, contemporary, 
and later literature (for instance, with the Brāmaṇas and the Upaniṣads) is required. But let it 
suffice here to cite an authority on early Buddhism, Richard Gombrich, who emphasizes the pe-
culiar style of narration in the suttas:  
“It is hard to exaggerate how amazinlgy different the suttas are from most early Indian religious texts. 
(And it is hardly less amazing that their distinctive character has survived the audition that followed 
their composition.) The style of the bulk of Vedic literature is declaratory; statements ascribed to gods 
or to primeval sages are made ex cathedra, and there is hardly the trace of an audience or a context. 
This remains the style until the early Upaniṣads. Here styles begin to vary: there are couple of formal 
debates, including a few rebuttals of oponents’ arguments, and a few charming passages give us 
glimpses of some rather eccentric teachers of wisdom. But soon a didactic solemnity returns as the 
norm, and remains dominant for centuries. Indeed, to appreciate the Buddha’s personal style in the 
Pali Canon, one could hardly do better than compare it with the Mahayana sūtras composed by his 
followers a few centuries later.”936 
At the base of such an investigation would surely stand the question whether or not it is 
possible to establish a connection between the narrative technique of ‘internal focalization’, the 
notion of the individual, and the conditions of early Indic society? From the evidence gathered 
from the texts treated here, it becomes clear that one cannot speak of an understanding of persons 
as subjects in a modern, Western sense of the word. Nevertheless, individuals – most often the 
protagonists in the sutta-narratives – are in many cases depicted as possessing a strong sense of 
agency (i.e. the understanding that they are the ones who make decisions and choices as, for in-
stances, Aṅgulimāla or Jotipāla, who act and react in ways that may have been considered unex-
pected from the point of view of historical listeners/readers), although their choices were surely 
limited to certain doctrinal or genre-specific alternatives. Subjectivity plays a role in so far as the 
listener/reader of the suttas is, more frequently than one would expect in such early material, 
granted (limited) access to the thoughts, feelings, and considerations of individual persons. And 
although, by and large, the persons in the sutta-narratives are more often than not presented as 
                                                 
935
 Cp. Bailey & Mabbett 2003 and Gombrich, last 2009.  
936
 Gombrich 2009: 165.  
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representations of types (e.g. ariya-puggalā), they leave a strong, persistent and quite live-like 
“afterimage” in listener/readers’ minds. Something similar has been observed by Scholes and 
Kellogg with regard to Homer:  
 “The power of characterization which Homer manifests in this close-up of Achilles and throughout 
the Iliad and the Odyssey is, then, a very real power despite its difference from the manner of James, 
or Proust, or Dostoievsky. It is a power derived partly from its simplicity. Homer and other composers 
of primitive heroic narrative do not aspire to certain complexities of characterization which we find in 
later narratives and which we sometimes think of as essential elements in the creation of characteriza-
tions of interest. Characters in primitive stories are invariably “flat,” “static,” and quite 
“opaque.” The very recurring epithets of formulaic narrative are signs of flatness in characteri-
zation.”937  
Can something be said about the state of society? Let me quote here at some length from 
Scholes and Kellogg again, for the way they write about the ideals of early Christianity reflected 
in the Scriptures, might bear some resemblance with the situation that we find in the Pāli suttas. 
They write:  
“The concept of developing character who changes inwardly is quite a late arrival in narrative. True, 
we have such primitive motifs as the “unpromising hero,” the awkward or diffident young man who 
turns suddenly into a heroic figure. We can find this, for example, in Moses, in Beowulf, and there are 
traces of it in non-Homeric stories about Achilles. This essentially mythical pattern often becomes at-
tached to historical figures, as in the Chronicle Histories of Henry V, whence Shakespeare’s character-
ization of Prince Hal. But the character whose inward development is of crucial importance is 
primarily a Christian element in our narrative literature. Most pre-Christian heroic narratives of 
the epic kind are based on notions of immortality through heroic actions which will live in the 
memory of the race. Achilles’ intense concern over the slight he receives from Menelaus derives from 
just this concept. He has chosen a short glorious life in preference to a long obscure one. If he is to be 
publicly humiliated, to have his posthumous reputation tarnished by this painful episode, then truly, 
what price glory? As long as a culture emphasizes heroic actions and posthumous reputation (as 
in the old Teutonic European Culture) its literature will remain concerned with such external 
attributes of man. When the private and personal relationship of the individual soul with God 
supplants this public concept of heroic excellence, then this culture will tend to develop a litera-
ture which deals with this private relationship and ultimately with other aspects of the inward 
life. When Jesus revives the Commandements in this way — Ye have heard that it was said of them of 
old time, Thou shalt not commit adultery: But I say unto you, That whosoever looketh on a woman to 
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 Scholes/Kellogg/Phelan 2006: 164 [my emphasis].  
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lust after hath committed adultery with her already in his heart.  When He does this, then He is forc-
ing His culture to take more cognizance of the inward life and less of the external actions of men. 
In older Hebrew literature we had had stories of men who change, seen in terms of sin and repentance. 
The story of David’s sin in having Bathsheba’s husband killed so that she could become his wife is a 
story of sin and repentance. But it is seen resolutely from outside the hero:  
And it came to pass in an eveningtide, that David arose from off his bed, and walked upon the roof of 
the King’s house: and from the roof he saw a woman washing herself; and the woman was very beau-
tiful to look upon.  
As the narrative continues, situation after situation develops in which individuals must be experienc-
ing the intensest emotions, but the narrative proceeds on its serene, untroubled way, without apparent 
awareness of this inward violence. Even in the verse quoted above, Bathsheba’s beauty is pre-
sented impersonally, as a fact, and not from David’s point of view or in terms of his reaction to 
seeing her. The inward life is assumed but not presented in primitive narrative literature, 
whether Hebraic or Hellenic. This inscrutability of characters, their opaqueness, is neither a de-
fect nor a limitation. It is simply a characteristic. Much of the power of the David story is gener-
ated by the matter-of-factness of this narration of such violent and emotional events. Such opaque-
ness in characterization functions for the modern reader as a kind of understatement, producing 
an ironic tension between the cool narrative tone and the violence which the reader imagines 
within the minds of the characters. The conscious employment of such irony we call litotes, and rec-
ognize it as a fundamental characteristic of Germanic narratives such as Beowulf. But the conscious 
employment of understated irony is nothing more than a realization on the part of the narrators of the 
fundamental understatedness of primitive literature. Critics whose judgements are emotionally ori-
ented tend to attach a special value to such understatement and talk about it rather nostalgically 
as “classic restraint” but there is no restraint involved in not doing something which it does not 
occur to one to do. The narrative posture of understatement, associated as it is with the opaque 
and static character, is simply a successful narrative formula, well suited to primitive narration, 
which develops in all cultures as the inevitable style in which heroic narrative is treated.”938  
Should this state of affairs be applicable also to the early Buddhist sutta-literature?  
If it is possible to establish a connection between the presentation of characters and the represen-
tation of persons – and from all that was said about the narrative structure of the three analysed 
suttas and the depiction of characters so far, I believe it is –, then, it may specifically be this: that 
the emphasis on the presentation of the inner events of conscious, conscientious, and reflective 
characters in the Pāli suttas might reflect the existence of an environment in which fixed roles 
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 Scholes/Kellogg/Phelan 2006: 165-167 [my emphases].    
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(had) lost their significance and grip, and conscious, self dependent individuals began to emerge 
from behind the (ancestor) masks.  
The following is a list of examples taken from the investigated material and from other 
suttas of the Majjhima Nikāya of what Scholes and Kellogg have called the “peering into peo-
ples’ minds”:   
 1) Potaliya Sutta [MN I 359,19ff.]: Evaṃ vutte Potaliyo gahapati: gahapativādena maṃ 
samaṇo Gotamo samudācaratîti kupito anattamano tuṇhī ahosi. 
“After this has been said, the householder Potaliya, [thinking] ‘the recluse Gotama ad-
dresses me with the designation “householder”', [felt] angry and offended and remained silent.” 
2) Aṅgulimāla Sutta: [MN II 98,27-100,12]: Addasā kho coro Aṅgulimālo Bhagavantaṃ 
dūrato va āgacchantaṃ, disvān’ assa etad ahosi: Acchariyaṃ vata bho, abbhutaṃ vata bho. 
Imaṃ hi maggaṃ dasa pi purisā vīsatim pi purisā tiṃsatim pi purisā cattārīsam pi purisā 
paññāsam pi purisā saṃharitvā saṃharitvā paṭipajjanti, te pi mama hatthatthaṃ gacchanti; atha 
ca panāyaṃ samaṇo eko adutiyo pasayha maññe āgacchati. Yan nūnāhaṃ imaṃ samaṇaṃ jīvitā 
voropeyyan ti? 
“The robber Aṅgulimāla saw the Blessed One coming in the distance. When he saw him, 
he thought: ‘It is [surprising], it is [astonishing]! Men have come along this road [after having 
gathered] in groups of ten, twenty, thirty, and even forty, but still they have fallen into my hands. 
But now this [ascetic] comes alone, unaccompanied, [forcibly, as it were]. Why shouldn’t I take 
this [ascetic’s] life?’” 
3) Ghaṭīkāra Sutta [MN II 47,27-31]: Atha kho, Ānanda, Jotipālassa māṇavassa etad 
ahosi: Acchariyaṃ vata bho, abbhutaṃ vata bho. Yatra hi nāmāyaṃ Ghaṭīkāro kumbhakāro itta-
rajacco samāno amhākaṃ sīsanahātānaṃ kesesu parāmasitabbaṃ maññissati; na vat’ idaṃ 
orakaṃ maññe bhavissatīti.  
“This is indeed surprising, this is astonishing! I imagine this [the meeting with the Bud-
dha Kassapa] will certainly be no trivial matter, that this potter Ghaṭīkāra, while being himself of 
a lowly birth, should think it necessary to touch Our, the Head-Ablutioned’s hair!’” 
4) Ghaṭīkāra Sutta [MN II 50,31f-51,10]: Atha kho, Ānanda, Kikissa Kāsirañño: Na me 
Kassapo bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho adhivāseti Bārāṇasiyaṃ vasāvāsan ti. Ahu-d-eva 
aññathattaṃ ahu domanassaṃ. Atha kho, Ānanda, Kikī Kāsirāja Kassapaṃ bhagavantaṃ ara-
hantaṃ sammāsambuddhaṃ etad avoca: Atthi nu te, bhante, añño koci mayā upaṭṭhākataro ti? 
 302 
 
Atthi, mahārāja, Vebhaliṅgaṃ nāma gāmanigamo; tattha Ghaṭīkāro nāma kumbhakāro; so me 
upaṭṭhāko aggupaṭṭhāko. Tuyhaṃ kho pana, mahārāja: Na me Kassapo bhagavā arahaṃ 
sammāsambuddho adhivāseti Bārāṇasiyaṃ vassāvāsan ti atthi aññathattaṃ atthi domanassaṃ; 
[…]    
“Then, Ānanda, Kikī, the king of Kāsī, thought: ‘The Blessed One Kassapa […] does not 
consent to my offering a residence for the Rains in Benares’, and he became depressed and de-
jected. And then, Ānanda, king Kikī of Kāsī said the following to the Blessed One Kassapa: “Do 
you, Venerable, have a better attendant then I am?” “Yes, maharaja, in a town called Vebhaliṅga 
lives a potter, Ghaṭīkāra by name, he is my main supporter.” “You, on the other hand, maharaja, 
[just] thought: ‘Kassapa, the Blessed One, accomplished and fully awakened, does not consent to 
my [offer of a] rains residence in Benares’, and you became depressed and dejected. [But] this is 
not so with the potter Ghaṭīkāra and it will/cannot be so (i.e. the potter does not and could never 
think thus!)”. 
These passages have in common the element of mental reflexion: all of the characters are 
as a matter of fact reflecting (on) a present situation. The examples taken from the three texts an-
alysed here, are of two kinds: reflection and ascription, respectively, of (supposed) mental/psy-
chological states. They may not always constitute long soliloquies or inner monologues, but what 
nevertheless is peculiar about the practice of representing thoughts in the Pāli suttas is that it is 
generally held that providing readers with access to characters’ mind, which is the privilege of 
narrative, appears rather late in most literature around the world. To quote from Scholes and Kel-
logg again:  
“The notion of peering directly into the mind and dramatizing or analyzing thoughts instead of words 
and deeds seems to arise quite late in most literatures.”939 
Furthermore, in the Pali suttas, we do find inner conflicts of individuals. Their nature, 
however, is quite different from the inner conflicts (Ger. “Zerissenheit des Individuums”) that are 
                                                 
939
 Scholes/Kellogg/Phelan 2006: 170f. 
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a featue of modern novels, and which is regarded a typical “symptom” of modernity.940 Most of-
ten, the texts depict situations in which alternative modes or courses of action are offered to an 
individual. This may, nevertheless, reflect the (radical?) novelty of certain innovations intro-
duced by the historical Buddha.  
As we have seen in the brief comparison of the Ghaṭīkāra Sutta and the Jyotipāla Sūtra 
(Mvu; ch. 4.4), speculation about the motivations for the actions of its characters did matter to 
the pre-modern, ancient Indian authors/compilers/editors/reciters of Buddhist texts. Furthermore, 
characters are ascribed an inner life through the narrative techniques of interior monologue and 
‘internal focalization’. Thus it is possible to assume that a recognition of persons in this particu-
lar cultural setting followed the same criteria as that proposed by Jannidis with his ‘basis type’ 
(Ger. “Basistypus”) of literary character, namely the ‘attribution/ascription of intentional action’ 
(“Zuschreibung intentionalen Handelns”), the ‘differentiation of an inward life and an outside 
appearance’, and ‘differentiation between stable and transitory character traits’.941 Psychological 
research has shown, as Jannidis summarises, that the human ability or the habit to ascribe inten-
tionality to (real) persons is inborn.942 This ascribed intentionality, however, which in the real 
world is a psychological construct (and not a fact), becomes a fact in the “narrative universe” 
(i.e. literature as an image/representation of the way human beings perceive the world).943 On this 
very basic level, there does not seem to exist a fundamental difference in the basic idea of man 
between the ancient Indian and the modern world.  
In this study, I have treated the persons depicted in the Pāli suttas as characters or “narra-
tive agents” (U. Margolin). This nature of the characters is most prominent, I think, in the case of 
Aṅgulimāla: It is neither the sutta’s intention nor its promise to elucidate the elusive (“real-live”) 
person of Aṅgulimāla for us. That is, of course, not to say that one should not or could not ask 
                                                 
940
 Cp. Seigel 2009: 8, where he describes the dimension of the self. The inner conflicts deemed so characteristic for 
the modern Western individual might be explainable by the existence of multi-dimensional self-concepts like that of 
S. Freud (“Es – Ich – Über-Ich”), which according to Seigel, has the disadvantage that it is “subject to competing 
pressures and tensions”. 
941
 Jannidis 2004: 126-128 & 185-195; it should be understood, however, that Jannidis did neither propose a 
character typology with his ‘basis type’, nor is it considered the same as ‘literary character’; the type is just a 
kind of basic grid or model for the most basic conception of literary character based on universals of human 
ways of perception.   
942
 Cp. ibid.: 127. 
943
 Cp. ibid.: 128. 
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historical questions of this kind. But, as J. S. Walters wrote, there are yet so many other interest-
ing questions to ask that the suttas do give us answers to. 
I feel somewhat reluctant to fully subscribe to a view that purports a strictly linear, pro-
gressive upward development of the basic structure and functioning of the human mind in his-
tory, as M. Mauss has suggested.944 My own standpoint regarding the development of human 
consciousness may be called ahistorical, but with a qualification: rather than subscribing to a tra-
ditional Buddhist view of an ‘eternal truth’, nevertheless, I would argue, that from a certain point 
onward in human history, the fundamental structure of human consciousness did not change dra-
matically (at least not as dramatically as before that point. This view is perhaps also reflected in 
the Buddhist tradition itself: the form in which even the Buddha’s teachings appear (sāsana), is 
itself ‘empty’, one among potentially countless expressions of the timeless truth (dhamma) that 
each Tathāgata is to reveal anew.945 The suttas, likewise, offer to the listener/reader, as part of 
their communicative strategy and through their “timeless” structure (Evam me sutaṃ. Ekaṃ sa-
mayaṃ …), potentially endlessly repeatable teaching situations, and thus accommodate for the 
desire of Buddhists to meet “the teacher” face-to-face. That is one aspect of what Steven Collins 
has called “Buddhist Universalism”946 – The Buddha and his teachings, which is itself considered 
universal, can be (re-)accessed at all times and in all places.947 Consequently – casually speaking 
–, to the Buddhist it does not really matter all that much who Aṅgulimāla was, but it matters what 
Aṅgulimāla means to you (now).948   
                                                 
944
 Cp. ch. 1.2. 
945
 Cp., e.g., Gombrich 1980, 2009: xii. 
946
 Cp. Collins 1994.  
947
 What I have adopted here is, of course, that which in the social sciences is called the ‘emic viewpoint’, i.e., how 
the texts ‘wish’ to be received within the tradition that transmits them. From another point of view, the etic, the situ-
ation looks very different: Not disregarding the different levels of communication contained in a sutta, the respective 
‘senders’ and ‘receivers’ have to be located on the same level – they cannot transgress it (except it is done deliber-
ately, which is most probably not intended in the case of the suttas); cp. Galasek 2009: 83. 
948
 Collins has furthermore argued that the distinction between linear and cyclical time is a practical as a means of 
analysis, but that it does not hold true for “a form of cultural description and differentiation”, because „All human 
experience of time always involves both repetition and non-repetition” (p. 103). If there was a cultural difference in 
the concepts of time between the western Judeo-Christian tradition and some of the Indian religions it was, accord-
ing to Collins, probably this: while there is no „notion of a collective end of the world” (p. 106) in Indian world-re-
nunciatory systems, amongst which the Pāli tradition counts, they do offer an end to non-repetitive time for the indi-
vidual, namely Nirvāṇa or mokṣa (Collins 2010). 
 305 
 
Having said that, we have also to reconsider the possibility for identification that the sut-
tas offer for the pious listener/reader. Although reading for the sake of identification seems, ac-
cording to recent research, to have emerged as a reader attitude only in the 18th century, Jannidis 
states949 that the concept of empathy, especially with regard to empathy-causing signals (like, 
e.g., either facial expressions, gestures, voice, or the situation of another), largely contribute to 
the process of reception of a literary work.950 His conclusions are surprising951: a text clearly of-
fers a possibility for identification signalling that a situation is perceived from the perspective of 
one of the characters (or the protagonist etc.) – in other words, through the narrative technique of 
‘internal focalization’. Searching for possible equivalents in texts for facial expression, fo in-
stance (Ger. “Ausdruck”), Jannidis offers the ‘representative expressivity’ of language itself: di-
rect speech, free indirect speech, and the different ways of representing consciousness.952 A third 
parameter that can guide/influence the reader―character relationship is the judgement/assess-
ment of its characters that a text offers. The instances of these judgements can, again, be text-ex-
ternal or text-internal. A group of gamblers appearing in the Piyajātika Sutta (MN 87), for in-
stance, transports an (ethical) judgement intrinsic to the background of contemporary ancient-
Indian value-system.953 In this respect, perhaps there is not too much of a difference in principle 
between modern and ancient modes of narration. 
7.2 The Nature of the Characters 
Descriptions of the outer appearance of characters are very scarce in the Pāli suttas or almost ab-
sent. This seems to be equally true for the description of landscapes etc. (manions are sometimes 
described in very rough outline, as we have seen in the episode in which Mahā Moggallāna visits 
Sakka in the Introduction.) As an example for the physical appearance of a character and its de-
scription may serve the physicality of the Buddha (not his ideal form, which is characterized by 
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 Jannidis 2004: 229ff. 
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 Cp. ibid: 232. 
951
 However, one has to concede, Jannidis limits this conclusion to a possibility, a can and not a must, of identifica-
tion of the reader with one of the characters; see Jannidis 2004: 235: “Ob die vier genannten Aspekte nun tatsächlich 
zu einer Identifizierung des Lesers mit der Figur führen, kann ein Textwissenschaftler nicht beantworten.” 
952
 Jannidis 2004: 234. 
953
 See Chapter 4.1. 
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the 112 special physical characteristics of a “Great Man”954). In the Majjhima Nikāya, for in-
stance, there are reports that the Buddha suffered from back-pain, and in several instances that he 
is not recognised as the Tathāgata. The first incident is reported in the Sekha Sutta (MN 53), and 
striking examples for the latter can be found in the Cūl̥agosiṅga Sutta (MN 31)955. The latter is a 
direct characterisation of the Buddha’s physical appearance, which implicates that he was not ob-
viously recognisable as someone special by both the common people and his own monks 
alike.956  
Another such instance, which we have already met with, can be found in the Ghaṭikāra 
Sutta (MN 81) which perhaps suggests that the Buddha Kassapa (in his earlier days as a 
teacher?) used to wander about alone and that he was undistinguishable and unrecognisable – 
though certainly known to the locals – from any other mendicant. The following passage sug-
gests the Buddha Kassapa kept a rather unassuming “low profile”:     
“At one time, O great king, I stayed in a market town called Vegaliṅga. Then I, O great king, in the 
morning, having dressed and taken up my bowl and outer robe, went to where the parents of the potter 
Ghaṭikāra [lived]. After having gone there, I said the following to the parents of the potter Ghaṭikāra: 
‘Hey! Where did this Bhaggava go?’ ‘He’s gone out, sir. Help yourself with rice and sauce from the 
saucepan!’ Then, o great king, I took rice from the pot and sauce from the saucepan, and after I had 
enjoyed it, I got up from the seat and left. Then, o great king, the potter Ghaṭikāra came back to his 
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 Cp. Lakkhana Sutta, AN I 102. 
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 MN I 205f.: Evaṃ me sutaṃ: ekaṃ samayaṃ bhagavā nādike viharati giñjakāvasathe. Tena kho pana samayena 
āyasmā ca anuruddho āyasmā ca nandiyo āyasmā ca kimbilo gosiṅgasālavanadāye viharanti. Atha kho bhagavā 
sāyanhasamayaṃ patisallāṇā vuṭṭhito yena gosiṅgasālavanadāyo tenupasaṅkami. Addasā kho dāyapālo bhaga-
vantaṃ dūratova āgacchantaṃ disvāna bhagavantaṃ etadavoca: “mā samaṇa, etaṃ dāyaṃ pāvisi. Santettha tayo 
kulaputtā attakāmarūpā viharanti mā tesaṃ aphāsumakāsīti. Assosi kho āyasmā asnuruddho dāyapālassa bhaga-
vatā saddhiṃ mantayamānassa. Sutvāna dāyapālaṃ etadavoca: ‘mā āvuso dāyapāla, bhagavantaṃ vāresi. Satthā 
no bhagavā anuppatto'ti. Atha kho āyasmā anuruddho yenāyasmā ca nandiyo āyasmā ca kimbilo tenupasaṅkami 
upasaṅkamitvā āyasmantañca nandiyaṃ āyasmantañca kimbilaṃ etadavoca: ‘abhikkamathāyasmanto, abhikka-
mathāyasmanto, satthā [PTS Page 206] no bhagavā anuppatto'ti. Atha kho āyasmā ca anuruddho āyasmā ca 
nandiyo āyasmā ca kimbilo bhagavantaṃ paccuggantvā eko bhagavato pattacīvaraṃ paṭiggahesi. Eko āsanaṃ 
paññāpesi. Eko pādodakaṃ upaṭṭhapesi. Nisīdi bhagavā paññatte āsane. Nisajja4 kho bhagavā pāde pakkhālesi. 
Tepi kho āyasmanto bhagavantaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdiṃsu. Ekamantaṃ nisinnaṃ kho āyasmantaṃ 
anuruddhaṃ bhagavā etadavoca: kacci vo anuruddhā khamanīyaṃ? Kacci yāpanīyaṃ? Kacci piṇḍakena na kila-
mathā’ti. “Khamanīyaṃ bhagavā, yāpanīyaṃ bhagavā, na ca mayaṃ bhante piṇḍakena kilamāmā ti.  
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 Cp. Bhikkhu Anālayo: “The Buddha and Omniscience.” In: The Indian International Journal of Buddhist 
Studies 7, 2006 [= Analayo 2006], pp. 13f.: “The idea of a real protuberance could be the due to a misunder-
standing caused by a feature found on Buddha images. Ancient Indian artists represented gods and divine be-
ings with long hair, which at times was depicted as being worn in a topknot. Artists soon took to portraying the 
Buddha as well with long hair, thereby giving expression to the divine status he had acquired by their time. 
This mode of presentation stands in contrast to the early discourses, which leave little doubt that the Buddha 
was shaven-headed just like other monks.” 
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parents, and having returned, he asked his parents: ‘Who has taken rice from the pot and sauce from 
the saucepan and, after having enjoyed it, has gotten up from the seat and left.’957 ‘The Blessed One 
Kassapa, dear, the arahant, the totally enlightened One, has taken rice from the pot and sauce from the 
saucepan, and having enjoyed it, got up from his seat and left.’ Then, o great king, the potter 
Ghaṭikāra had the following [thought]: ‘It is a gain for me, it is a good gain for me that the Blessed 
One Kassapa, the arahant, the totally enlightened One, so confides in me/is so intimate with me.’ 
Then, o great king, pleasure and happiness did not leave the potter Ghaṭikāra for a fortnight or his par-
ents for one week.”958 
We have seen that in the “text of its day mode” reading, this passage is to be understood 
as implying a criticism of crowds and noise, an indication maybe that the Buddha’s ideal was in-
deed that of the wandering mendicant. 
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 Here the formulaic character of some phrases of the Pāli suttas becomes visible: the phrase paribhuñjitvā 
uṭṭhāyāsanā pakkanto was just repeated from the sentence that was previously uttered by the Buddha, although 
this particular details doesn’t make sense in the context of the potter’s statement: how could he know that after 
eating someone had gotten up from the seat and left. Examples like this seem to support/reinforce the idea that 
everything that is reported to be the Buddha’s direct speech is in fact the Buddha’s own word, and therefore 
unalterable. We can often observe this phenomenon in the suttas that what was uttered in direct direct speech is 
repeated verbally in the narrator’s speech or another character’s speech. But all this tells us, in the end, is that 
the editors/compilers of the Pāli Canon did obviously regard the direct speech of the Buddha as a true repre-
sentation of his own words, and therefore as unalterable (this idea was later picked up – deliberately or not – 
by the early scholars of Pāli/early Buddhism, which led in to the already mentioned view/conception of the sut-
tas as “sermons with frame-stories”). Although the thesis cannot, of course, completely be ruled out, I am 
somewhat reluctant to accredit/ascribe such instances only to the inattention/carelessness or ignorance of com-
pilers and/or scribes, as some scholars do. I think it is an out-dated mode of thinking to hold that modern West-
ern scholarship can per se be regarded as superior to ancient scholarship, which was responsible for the texts to 
survive, and that therefore modern explanations and interpretations of ancient texts has to be granted a superior 
position in a hierarchy of interpretations of textual phenomena. 
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 Be(R): “Ekamidāhaṃ, mahārāja, samayaṃ vegaḷiṅge nāma gāmanigame viharāmi. Atha khvāhaṃ, 
mahārāja, pubbaṇhasamayaṃ nivāsetvā pattacīvaramādāya yena ghaṭikārassa kumbhakārassa mātāpitaro 
tenupasaṅkamiṃ; upasaṅkamitvā ghaṭikārassa kumbhakārassa mātāpitaro etadavocaṃ – “handa, ko nu kho 
ayaṃ bhaggavo gato’ti? “Nikkhanto kho te, bhante, upaṭṭhāko antokumbhiyā odanaṃ gahetvā pariyogā 
sūpaṃ gahetvā paribhuñjā’ti. Atha khvāhaṃ, mahārāja, kumbhiyā odanaṃ gahetvā pariyogā sūpaṃ gahetvā 
paribhuñjitvā uṭṭhāyāsanā pakkamiṃ [pakkāmiṃ (syā. kaṃ. pī.)]. Atha kho, mahārāja, ghaṭikāro kumbhakāro 
yena mātāpitaro tenupasaṅkami; upasaṅkamitvā mātāpitaro etadavoca – “ko kumbhiyā odanaṃ gahetvā pari-
yogā sūpaṃ gahetvā paribhuñjitvā uṭṭhāyāsanā pakkanto’ti? “Kassapo, tāta, bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsam-
buddho kumbhiyā odanaṃ gahetvā pariyogā sūpaṃ gahetvā paribhuñjitvā uṭṭhāyāsanā pakkanto’ti. Atha kho, 
mahārāja, ghaṭikārassa kumbhakārassa etadahosi – “lābhā vata me, suladdhaṃ vata me, yassa me kassapo 
bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho evaṃ abhivissattho’ti. Atha kho, mahārāja, ghaṭikāraṃ kumbhakāraṃ 
aḍḍhamāsaṃ pītisukhaṃ na vijahati [na vijahi (sī. syā. kaṃ. pī.)], sattāhaṃ mātāpitūnaṃ.” 
 308 
 
There is, however, last but not least, one caveat: How can we make sure that our reading 
is not entirely guided (blinded?) by modern expectation towards narrative texts? Scholes and 
Kellogg sound an audible note for caution:  
“What, in modern fiction, would be referred to some internal psychological process, presented perhaps 
as an interior monologue or an analytical narrative, is referred by Homer to divine intervention and to 
the external processes of fate and the will of the gods. [...] 
Primitive narrative often turns to myth rather than mimesis at just such psychological moments. 
[...] This sort of treatment of mental process is essentially mythic rather than mimetic, but some of its 
effects strike the modern eye as peculiarly realistic. A character in saga, who always operates accord-
ing to the attributes he is given on his first appearance in the story, tends to behave mechanically ac-
cording to those attributes. But a character whose mental processes and the actions deriving from them 
are subject to sudden supernatural influences inevitably displays some of those irregularities of behav-
ior which seem to twentieth-century eyes quintessentially human because they are irrational.” 959 
To add another caveat: It may, of course, also be necessary to carefully reconsider 
whether the notion of perspective and thus ‘narrative perspective’ is a universal human category 
(of the mind) or not. Even so, I think that my analyses have shown the potential of the narrato-
logical toolbox in the case of the Pāli suttas, and that through a close reading of the Pāli suttas, I 
hope to have highlighted something of the way by which the texts themselves can guide the 
reader’s attention towards the narrative agents and their inner dimension. However, I feel that 
this study just touches “the tip of the Iceberg”, so to speak, and that many areas worth investigat-
ing have only been touched upon here. Much more remains to be said about each of them. A 
statement once made by Steven Collins in reply to a career-related question I had asked as him 
an Undergraduate now feels truer than ever: To my naïve question, whether the Pāli Canon 
would still be worth studying or whether all had been said about it already, he just remarked: 
“Hardly anything has been said.” 
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The abbreviations used follow Heinz Bechert, Abkürzungsverzeichnis zur buddhistischen Literatur 
in Indien und Südostasien. Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden. 
Beiheft 3. Göttingen, 1990. For some editions I here provide the full bibliographical details to-
gether with the abbreviations since in some cases new editions exist that differ from the details 
given in Bechert. For quotations from primary sources in Pāli, I have used the PTS editions, if not 
indicated otherwise (first, the abbreviation of the work title is given, followed by the volume (Ro-
man numeral), page (Arabic numeral), and line.  
 
Ap = Apadāna, ed. Mary E. Lilley, 2 vols., London 1925-1927 (PTS)  
Be = Burmese editions of the Pāli Canon 
Be(R) = Burmese edition of the Pali Canon in Roman script, i.e. the electronic form of the Bur-
mese Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition, based on the edition of the Pāli Canon as agreed upon at 
the sixth Buddhist Council in Kaba Aye, Yangon, from 1954-1956 (Available online at: 
www.tipitaka.org). 
BHSD = Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, vol. 2: Diction-
ary, New Haven 1953. 
cty = Commentary 
CPD  = A Critical Pāli Dictionary, begun by V. Trenckner, ed. D. Andersen, H. Smith, H. Hen-
driksen, vol. I, Copenhagen 1924-1948, vol. II (fasc. 1ff.), Copenhagen 1960ff.   
Dhp = Dhammapada, ed. O. von Hinüber, and K. R. Norman, Oxford 1995 (PTS) 
DN = Dīghanikāya, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, J. E. Carpenter, 3. vols., 1890-1911 (PTS) 
DPPN = G. P. Malalasekera, Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, 2 vols., London 1937-1938. 
Jā = Jātaka, together with its Commentary, ed. V. Fausbøll, 6 vols., London 1963 (Repr.), 
vol. 7 (Index, D. Andersen)   
LHN = Living Handbook of Narratology, an open access Internet-publication provided by the 
University Hamburg, based on based on the Handbook of Narratology, first published by 
Walter de Gruyter in 2009. 
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Mil = Milindapañha, ed. V. Trenckner, Repr. London 1962.   
MN  = Majjhimanikāya 
MW = M. Monier-Williams 
PTS  = The Pali Text Society  
PED = The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English Dictionary, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, W.  Stede, 
 London 1921-1925.    
Pp = Puggalapaññatti, ed. R. Morris, London 1883 (PTS) 
Ps = Buddhaghosa, Papañcasūdanī, Majjhimanikāya-aṭṭhakathā, ed. J. H. Woods, D. Kos-
ambi, I.B. Horner, 5 vols., London 1922-1938 (PTS) 
Singh. = Singhalese 
Sn = Suttanipāta, ed. D. Andersen, H. Smith, London 1913 (PTS) 
Th = Theragāthā, in: Thera- and Therī-Gāthā, ed. H. Oldenberg and R. Pischel, rev. K. R. 
 Norman, L. Alsdorf, London, 2nd ed., 1966 (PTS) 
Ud = Udāna, ed. P. Steinthal, London 1885 (PTS) 
Vin = Vinayapiṭaka, ed. H. Oldenberg, 5 vols., London 1879-1883 (PTS) 
Vism = Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, ed. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, 2 vols., London 1920-1921 
 (PTS) 
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